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Abstract 
Clive Howard Schofield 
Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Thailand 
The Gulf of Thailand, bordered by Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam, 
encapsulates many of the challenges facing coastal states seeking to resolve questions of 
jurisdiction worldwide. Among the key considerations for maritime boundary 
delimitation in the Gulf of Thailand are the fact that the Gulf is a relatively confined 
semi-enclosed sea. This necessitates maritime boundary delimitation between 
neighbouring states. A major constraint is also posed by the Gulf's complex coastal 
geography, including the presence of numerous islands, large and small. The existence 
of competing sovereignty claims to islands, has also complicated the development of 
claims and retarded attempts to resolve maritime boundary delimitation disputes. 
The problems posed by the existing national jurisdictional claims are also 
significant. There are multiple unresolved maritime boundary delimitations, lengthy 
straight baseline claims, maximalist unilateral maritime claims resulting in extensive 
areas of overlapping claims, and a number of undefined jurisdictional claims as well as 
claims based on alleged historic rights. Additionally, there exist a number of maritime 
boundary agreements, aspects of all of which are subject to interpretation, and several 
joint development or interim joint arrangements, which serve to defer delimitation and 
are themselves potentially open to question. These factors have to be set against the 
complexities of the coastal states' political and economic characteristics together with 
the opportunities and challenges associated with the Gulf of Thailand itself. 
This study examines critically the development of the Gulf of Thailand coastal 
states' maritime claims and existing maritime boundary agreements with a view to 
exploring the challenges associated with resolving the remaining undelimited boundary 
situations. Its key aims can be summarised as follows: 
• to examine the interplay between between the disciplines of law and geography in 
the application of the law of the sea to the geographical realities of the Gulf of 
Thailand; 
• . to analyse the baseline claims of the littoral states; 
II 
• to review and evaluate unilateral national claims to maritime jurisdiction; 
• to provide an overview and analysis of existing maritime boundary agreements 
within the Gulf of Thailand; 
• to analyse unsettled boundary delimitations and disputes; 
• to offer prospects for the future including the options for maritime boundary 
dispute resolution in the Gulf of Thailand. 
Despite the obstacles to maritime boundary delimitation in the Gulf of Thailand outlined 
in this study, there are signs of progress and prospects for the future, particularly in the 
wake of the geopolitical transformation of the region in the 1990s, must be considered 
to be good. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The Gulf of Thailand offers a significant research opportunity to the maritime boundary 
scholar. This confined maritime space, bordered by Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand and 
Vietnam, encapsulates many of the challenges facing coastal states seeking to resolve 
questions of jurisdiction worldwide. 1 
Challenges relating to the physical geography of the Gulf of Thailand include the 
fact that the Gulf is a restricted geographical space necessitating maritime boundary 
delimitation and that it boasts a complex coastal geography including the presence of 
numerous islands, large and small. The existence of competing sovereignty claims to 
islands, particularly in the course of the development of maritime boundary claims, has 
also complicated attempts to resolve maritime boundary delimitation disputes. The 
problems posed by the existing national jurisdictional claims are also significant. There 
are multiple unresolved maritime boundary delimitations (see Table 1.1 ), lengthy 
straight baseline claims, maximalist unilateral maritime claims resulting in extensive 
areas of overlapping claims (see Figure 1.1 ), a number of undefined jurisdictional 
claims (particularly in relation to the exclusive economic zone (EEZ)) as well as claims 
based on alleged historic rights. Additionally, there exist a number of maritime 
boundary agreements, aspects of all of which are subject to interpretation, and several 
joint development or interim joint arrangements, which serve to defer delimitation and 
are themselves potentially open to question. 
These factors have to be set against the context of the coastal states' political and 
economic characteristics together with the opportunities and challenges associated with 
the Gulf of Thailand itself. Politically, the region has been afflicted by the legacies of 
colonial and later American intervention. This resulted in inimical relations between 
several of the Gulf of Thailand states characterised by suspicion and distrust. This 
political environment has been largely transformed by the end of the Cold War and 
For example, Stormont and Townsend-Gault (1995: 53) describe the Gulf of Thailand as an 
"area of complex maritime disputes par excellence." 
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removal of the 'Cambodian Question' from the regional agenda. Economically, the four 
Gulf of Thailand littoral states are all developing countries. Nevertheless, there are 
significant disparities between them. Malaysia and Thailand have been among 
Southeast Asia's 'tiger economies' in recent years and are well on the way towards 
becoming an industrialised nations. Vietnam and particularly Cambodia, emerging from 
decades of conflict and international isolation, lag far behind this sustained economic 
development. The peripheries of the Gulf of Thailand are therefore experiencing rapid 
industrialisation coupled with burgeoning coastal populations. 
Table 1.1 Status of Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Thailand 
Delimitation 
Cambodia-Thailand 
Territorial Sea 
Contiguous Zone (Cambodia)-
Continental Shelf/EEZ (Thailand) 
Continental Shelf/EEZ 
Cambodia-Vietnam 
Historic Waters 
Territorial Sea 
Contiguous Zone 
Continental Shelf/EEZ 
Status 
Unresolved 
Unresolved 
Unresolved 
Joint Zone 
Unresolved 
Unresolved 
Unresolved 
Resolved 
Malaysia-Thailand 
Territorial Sea 
Continental Shelf/EEZ 
Malaysia-Vietnam 
Continental Shelf/EEZ 
Thailand-Vietnam 
Continental She(f and EEZ 
Partially Resolved/Joint Zone2 
Joint Zone3 
Resolved 
Source: Author's research. 
The Gulf of Thailand itself is host to abundant, proven oil and gas resources. 
Additionally, the Gulf has proved to be a significant source of living resources. These 
two factors alone make the Gulf of Thailand a vital resource to the littoral states. The 
Gulf of Thailand has also traditionally been a source of both security and insecurity for 
the littoral states and their strategic interests in the Gulf should not be underestimated. 
Exploitation of hydrocarbons combined with the expansion of seaborne trade, and the 
escalating pollution which economic development implies, do, however, pose an 
increasing threat to the marine environment of the Gulf of Thailand. It is also widely 
2 The Thai-Malaysia agreement refers solely to continental shelf (see Section 6.2.2). 
The Malaysia-Vietnam "Defined Area" is exclusively concerned with seabed resources (see 
Section 6.4). 
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Figure 1.1 Maritime Boundary Claims and Agreements in the Gulf of Thailand 
Source: Author's research. 
3 
acknowledged that the Gulf's living resources are subject to destructive levels of 
overfishing. 
With this political, geographical, strategic economic and environmental context 
in mind, the core objective of this study is to examine critically the development of the 
Gulf of Thailand coastal states' maritime claims and existing maritime boundary 
agreements with a view to exploring the challenges associated with resolving the 
remaining undelimited boundary situations. This thesis also aims: 
• to examine the interplay between between the disciplines of law and geography in the 
application of the law of the sea to the geographical realities of the Gulf of Thailand; 
• to analyse the baseline claims of the littoral states; 
• to review and evaluate unilateral national claims to maritime jurisdiction; 
• to provide an overview and analysis of existing maritime boundary agreements 
within the Gulf of Thailand; 
• to analyse unsettled boundary delimitations and disputes; 
• to offer prospects for the future including the options for maritime boundary dispute 
resolution in the Gulf of Thailand. 
1.2 The Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries 
The legal and theoretical framework for the delimitation of maritime boundaries is 
provided by the international law of the sea, largely enshrined in the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).4 While the law of the sea is 
fundamental to maritime boundary delimitation, this process is also profoundly 
dependent on geographical factors. The critical importance of geography to maritime 
boundary delimitation has been widely acknowledged by maritime boundary scholars, 
including those from the legal field. 5 The inherently geographical nature of the 
delimitation process can also be detected within the relevant international legal 
conventions themselves, in the pronouncements of international legal courts and 
tribunals and in state practice (see Chapters 2 and 3). The disciplines of law and 
4 United Nations, 1983. 
See, for example, Birnie ( 1987); Wei I (1989 and 1993); Prescott ( 1985a); Evans ( 1989); and, 
Charney (1994). See also, Section 3.4. 
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geography are therefore· intimately intertwined in maritime boundary delimitation and 
provide a central theme running through this thesis. 
In general terms, geography is fundamental to maritime boundary delimitation in 
that it determines when delimitation is required. Indeed, maritime boundary 
delimitation occurs only when the geographical context means that states are unable to 
claim the full extent of their maritime rights uninterrupted by the presence of another 
state's claims.6 This frequently leads to unilateral overlapping maritime claims which 
necessitate resolution. 
Political geography invariably has a crucial role as the political relations between 
the partners in a delimitation and their political will, or lack of it, towards achieving a 
maritime boundary agreement will inevitable determine the success or failure of 
attempts to secure resolution of a dispute.7 In the Gulf of Thailand context it is also 
probably true to observe that certain countries, Cambodia in particular, have been 
afflicted by such pressing internal instability that maritime boundary issues have been 
relegated to near the bottom of the list of national priorities. 8 The history of the parties' 
bilateral relations can therefore prove to be either of assistance or an impediment to 
maritime boundary dispute resolution. 9 Political and historical factors also determine 
sovereignty over territory which in turn defines access to the sea. Sovereignty disputes 
between states have frequently proved to be intractable obstacles to successful boundary 
delimitation. 10 
Geographical factors are otherwise often primarily expressed in terms of the 
physical geography of a state's coastline, as maritime rights are generated from the 
interface of land territory with the sea (see Section 3.4). Of particular importance in this 
context is the relative length of the interested parties' coastlines, their orientation 
towards one another and configuration (particularly whether they are concave or 
convex). A geographically complex coastline can give rise to difficulties in delimitation 
negotiations with the presence of islands often proving a contentious subject (see 
Section 3.5). 
6 
9 
10 
Prescott, 1985a: 83. 
For example, Prescott ( 1985a: 90) describes the relation between the governments concerned as 
the "critical circumstance." 
Prescott, 1985b: 74. 
Prescott (1985a: 91-92) notes that where one state holds a particular historic view which limits its 
scope for compromise, delimitation negotiations will be complicated. 
For example, Kiitichaisaree (1987: 70), writing about Southeast Asian maritime boundaries, 
noted that sovereignty disputes rendered hopes of delimitation settlements "futile. " 
5 
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Other geographical factors - economic and environmental in nature - may also 
play a significant role (see Section 3.6). 11 Where there is a significant economic 
disparity between the states conducting a delimitation, this is frequently raised by the 
economically disadvantaged state as a legitimate argument for a greater share of the 
overlapping claims area at stake. The maritime interests of coastal states tend to be 
primarily driven by economic concerns and this may emerge as a factor in maritime 
boundary delimitation. This may, however, prove a double-edged sword. Desire for 
access to offshore resources may act as a positive factor, promoting cooperation and 
encouraging maritime boundary dispute resolution. Conversely, perceptions that ocean 
resources (real or imagined) are too valuable to give up, or their location is unknown, 
such that there is fear that a state may 'miss out' if it fails to secure its maximalist claim, 
may retard efforts towards resolving overlapping claims. States are also likely to 
perceive national security concerns in gaining control over maritime space, particularly 
that close inshore. Additionally, as pressure on ocean resources grows, both in terms of 
exploitation and from pollution, environmental factors are proving of increasing 
significance 111 efforts towards delimitation and, particularly, transboundary 
management of resources. 
It is important to recognise, however, that the law of the sea only provides only a 
framework of guiding principles within which maritime boundary delimitation can take 
place. There are no precise rules governing delimitation 12 and thus the scope for dispute 
remains ample. Furthermore, in contrast to land boundaries, the majority of maritime 
boundaries remain undelimited (see Section 2.1 ). Having briefly examined the question 
of the factors influencing maritime boundary delimitation, the following section will 
provide an overview of the geographical background to the Gulf of Thailand. This will 
provide initial insights into what factors are likely to prove of significance in maritime 
boundary delimitation in the region. 
II 
12 
In the Southeast Asian context see Morgan and Fryer ( 1985a). 
Prescott, 1985a: 88; Valencia and Van Dyke, 1994: 222-223. 
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1.3 The Gulf of Thailand 
1.3.1 Geographical Context 
The Gulf of Thailand is a semi-enclosed tropical sea which has been defined as lying to 
the north and west of a straight line joining Mui Ca Mau at the southern tip of the 
Vietnamese mainland to a point on the Malaysian coast in the vicinity of Tumpat. 13 The 
total surface area of the Gulf has been estimated at 82,715nm2 (283,700km\ 14 The 
Gulf extends approximately 400nm (740km) along its southeast-northwest axis to the 
head of the Bight of Bangkok. As the Gulf of Thailand is uniformly less than 400nm 
across this necessitates maritime boundary delimitation between the coastal states. 
The Gulf of Thailand is bordered, from the southwest, by Malaysia 
(c.10.8nm/20km), Thailand (c.783nm/1 ,450km), Cambodia (c.l51 nm/280km) 15 and 
Vietnam (c.184nm/340km). 16 The maximum depth of water in the central part of the 
Gulf is approximately 83m below the lowest low-water while the average depth is 
around 50m. Geologically, the Gulf of Thailand is entirely composed of continental 
shelf covered with a layer of sediments up to 8km thick, deposited since the Tertiary 
period. The Gulf of Thailand's sedimentary basins have proven to host hydrocarbon 
deposits (see Figure 1.2). The Gulf's climate, along with that of Southeast Asia as a 
whole, is dominated by the Asian-Australian monsoon system including seasonal 
tropical cyclones and typhoons, although the Gulf of Thailand is considered outside the 
usual track of such storms through the South China Sea. Tidal ranges are highest, in 
excess of 2m, at the head of the Gulf and lowest, O.Sm, at its mouth. Tidal currents flow 
towards the head of the Gulf during the flood and flow out during the ebb. Wind and 
wave-driven currents are governed by regional weather patterns. 17 As a result of its 
unique topography, oceanography and climate, the Gulf of Thailand can be considered 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Prescott, 1998: 10; Snidvongs, 1998: 11. Prescott defines the point near Tumpat as being located 
at 6° 12 'N., 102° 20'E. and the length of the line defining the limit of the Gulf as 204nm 
(378km). Snidvongs cites the International Hydrographic Organization (Seas and Oceans of the 
W or! d) as the source of his definition of the Gulf. 
Prescott, 1998: 11. However, Snidvongs (1998: 11), puts the area of the Gulf at 93,298nm2 
(320,000km2). 
An indication of the difficulty of supplying absolute figures for coastal lengths of the Gulf of 
Thailand states, such measurements being inherently dependent on scale (see Anderson, 1987), is 
provided by the fact that while Snidvongs gives an estimate of Cambodia's coastal length of 
approximately 280km, the CIA World Factbook (1998) states that the figure is 443km. 
Snidvongs, 1998: 1 I. 
Summarised from Snidvongs ( 1998: 11-22). For more details on the oceanography of the Gulf of 
Thailand, see Snidvongs (I 998). See also, Morgan and Fryer, I 985a: 28-29. 
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to be a large single marine ecosystem, as well being one of the richest biological 
resources in the world. 18 
The coastal geography of the Gulf of Thailand is complex. The Gulf is host to 
numerous islands which have served to complicate maritime boundary delimitations and 
have contributed to maritime boundary disputes (see Figure 1.1 and Chapters 6 and 7). 
Additionally, the 'U' -shaped configuration 19 of the Gulf has resulted in a constriction in 
the maritime claims of certain coastal states, while the Gulf's restricted area means that 
its littoral states, particularly Cambodia and Thailand, are zone and shelf-locked. 20 
1.3.2 Historical and Geopolitical Context 
The pre-colonial history of the Gulf of Thailand sub-region was marked by the steady 
expansion of both the Thai and Vietnamese Kingdoms at the expense of the declining 
Khmer Empire (see Figures 7.3 and 7.13). 21 This has left a legacy of deep-seated 
suspicion and latent hostility, particularly between Cambodia and its neighbours. This 
has coloured dealings between the Gulf of Thailand states, especially when sensitive 
issues such as sovereignty and sovereign rights are at stake in boundary negotiations 
(see Sections 7.2 and 7.3). 
In the colonial period, Britain occupied the area that in due course became 
Malaysia, while France eventually secured dominion over 'Indochina', an area 
comprising modern day Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. Thailand, in contrast, retained 
its independence, thanks in part to its role as a buffer state between competing British 
and French imperial interests. The intervention of the colonial powers led to the 
conclusion of boundary treaties which in large part define the land boundaries and 
distribution of territory between the four Gulf of Thailand littoral states. 22 These treaties 
are therefore fundamental to the Gulf of Thailand states' maritime claims in that they 
determine what portion of the Gulf's coastline belongs to each state. Additionally, they 
provide the starting point for maritime boundaries between adjacent coasts by defining 
where the land boundaries intersect with the coast of the Gulf. 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Mohamed, 1998: 4. 
What Mohamed (1998: 4) has referred to as its "elliptic parabolic" shape. 
The terms 'shelf-locked' and 'zone-locked' are taken to mean that a vessel belonging to one of 
the states mentioned must transit the continental shelf or exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of its 
neighbours in order to gain access to the high seas. On the complexity of the coastal geography 
of the Gulf of Thailand see also, Kittichaisaree ( 1987: 97-99). Thailand was particularly 
unenthusiastic about the concept of the EEZ precisely because of this eventuality (see, for 
example, McDorman, 1986; Ake-uru, 1987; Kittichaisaree, l990a and Sucharitkul, 1991 ). 
See, for example, StJohn, 1998: 4-8. 
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Following World War II the region became embroiled in a succession of 
damaging conflicts which have to a large extent retarded progress in maritime boundary 
delimitation. In the immediate aftermath of the war, French attempts to reimpose the 
colonial order on its possessions in the region were met with indigenous resistance 
resulting in the 'First Indochina War' from 1945-1954. The involvement of the United 
States in what it perceived to be a battle against communist expansion, set against the 
context of superpower rivalries and the Cold War, led to the 'Second Indochina War' of 
1959-1975. The 'Third Indochina War', a conflict involving Cambodia, Vietnam and 
the People's Republic of China, broke out directly after the twin communist victories in 
Cambodia and Vietnam and was brought to an end only with Vietnam's intervention in 
Cambodia from December I 978 and the conclusion of the Sino-Vietnamese border war 
of 1979 (see Section 7.3). The Vietnamese presence in Cambodia, coupled with Cold 
War realities, placed an ideological schism through the middle of the Gulf of Thailand 
with Western-leaning Malaysia and Thailand on one side and Soviet-oriented Cambodia 
and Vietnam on the other. This situation mitigated against meaningful dialogue on 
maritime boundary issues or, indeed, virtually any other issue of mutual concern. 
The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, has led to 
resolution of the 'Cambodian Question' through the UN's intervention in Cambodia in 
1991-1993.23 All four Gulf of Thailand coastal states are now fully accepted members 
of the international community and are also all members of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN).24 The geopolitical situation in the Gulf of Thailand has 
therefore been transformed. It is important to note that these events have thrown up 
fresh challenges as well as benefits. For instance, the almost complete removal of the 
Soviet navy from region and significant scaling down in the US military presence in 
Southeast Asia has, arguably, been a factor in the growth in piracy in the region 25 and 
has given rise to the potential for a regional arms race26 as well as providing the 
22 
24 
25 
26 
For copies of these documents see Prescott, 1975. 
For analysis of the UN mission in Cambodia see Findlay ( 1995) and Brown and Zlasoff ( 1998). 
For a view on the reasons for Vietnam's reversal in its foreign policy and abandonment of its 
'special relationship' with Cambodia, allowing the UN-brokered peace deal to go ahead, see 
Williams (1992: 59-83). 
ASEAN admitted Cambodia, the last Gulf of Thailand state to joint the regional grouping, on 30 
April 1999 (ASEAN Secretariat website, Jakarta, 30/4/99 (BBC SWB FE/3523)). 
According to a special ICC report on piracy ( 1998: 5) the reduction in the presence of Soviet, US 
and UK naval forces in the region has "diminished the deterrent effect" on pirates. 
See, for example, Acharya (1994); Mak (1994) and Schofield and Stormont (1996). 
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opportunity for tension between erstwhile allies afflicted by resurgent nationalism. 27 
Furthermore, the Gulf of Thailand states face serious economic problems which are 
likely to put great strain on their new-found political harmony once national interests are 
at stake in the form of access to potentially vital maritime resources. Nevertheless, 
overall, the political climate in which maritime boundary delimitation negotiations can 
proceed must be considered more favourable than at any previous period in modern 
times. 28 
1.3.3 Economic Context 
As previously mentioned, significant economic disparities between claimant states are 
frequently raised in the course of maritime boundary delimitation negotiations. Several 
economic indicators for the Gulf of Thailand coastal states are summarised on Table 
1.2. Of immediate note is the combined population of the Gulf of Thailand states of 
168.2 million and high population growth rates, particularly for Cambodia, Malaysia 
and to a lesser extent Vietnam. Given that 75% of Southeast Asia's population lives in 
the coastal zone, the potential impact on the Gulf of Thailand's resources and 
environment is significant.29 From the information contained in Table 1.2 it is clear that 
all four Gulf of Thailand states are developing countries. However, it is also abundantly 
clear that Malaysia and Thailand are well on the way to becoming industrialised 
countries. Both these states have been bracketed among the 'tiger economies' of 
Southeast Asia, experiencing annual economic growth rates of 6-8% over the last two 
decades.30 The GDP growth rates shown on Table 1.2 do, however, indicate the impact 
of the Asian economic crisis of 1997-1998? 1 The impact of what has been termed 
'Asian economic flu' on the economies of both Malaysia and Thailand has been 
significant. GDP growth in Malaysia for 1998 was predicted at 4-5% by the government 
but projected at only 2% by private forecasts - down from 7.4% in 1997. Austerity 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
See, for example, Section 7 .3.4. A considerable literature has developed relating to the 
transformed security environment in Southeast Asia and particularly ASEAN's response to that 
transformation. See, for example, Babbage and Bateman ( 1993); Bateman and Bates ( 1996); Gill 
and Mak (1997); Jeshurun (1993); Mcinnes and Rolls (1994); O'Neill (1992); Rau (1994); Singh 
(1997); Snitwongse (1994); Solomon (1994) and Tyler (1992). 
Valencia ( 1997: 265) notes that: "for the first time in a generation, South-East Asia now has an 
opportunity to build a lasting peace." 
Mohamed, 1998: 12-13. 
ASEAN Secretariat website, Jakarta, 30/4/99 (BBC SWB FE/3523). 
An indication of the impact of the Asian economic crisis is that the Thai baht lost 42% of its 
value against the US dollar over the rate a year previously and the Malaysian ringgit 37%. 
Additionally, the market capitalisation of the stock markets in Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur 
suffered falls of63.4% and 74% respectively (Mohamed, 1998: 14). 
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measures to combat the cns1s were predicted to cut government spending by an 
astonishing 20%.32 Meanwhile, the Thai economy dropped deep into recession in 1998 
having contracted by 0.4% in 1997. The Asian economic crisis has, unsurprisingly, 
strained inter-ASEAN relations. It is worth noting that the economic downturn is likely 
to put significant additional pressure on governments to secure the maximum possible 
share of contested offshore space and therefore resources. 
In contrast to the economic success stories of Malaysia and Thailand, at least up 
to the recent economic crisis, Cambodia and Vietnam lag far behind. Cambodia faces 
the enormous task of overcoming decades of internal conflict, low human resource 
levels, an almost total lack of basic infrastructure and recurring political instability 
which serves to discourage foreign investment. 33 Cambodian economic development is 
also hindered by administrative inexperience and pervasive corruption. Indeed, leading 
Cambodian opposition politician Sam Rainsy has memorably described modern 
Cambodia as "a mafia state in a banana kingdom" casting doubt on the government's 
competence, sincerity and legitimacy.34 Despite significant progress over the last 
decade, Vietnam also faces major economic challenges. Vietnam is populous but poor, 
suffers from the aftermath of decades of conflict in the region (almost continuous from 
1 945-1979), and from economic dislocation as a result of the collapse of the Soviet 
bloc, as well as the legacies of Soviet-style economic management which are only 
slowly being addressed. 35 
1.3.4 Maritime Interests of the Coastal States 
The Gulf of Thailand has been of vital importance to its coastal states since ancient 
times as a source of food and as a natural geopolitical link between them. The Gulf has 
therefore provided a conduit for the littoral states' interactions, both in terms of trade 
and military conflict. The modern maritime interests of the coastal states are, 
unsurprisingly, to a large extent driven by economic imperatives. Of particular note are 
fishery and hydrocarbon resources, but navigational, security and environmental 
interests are also salient. Political factors do, however, play an important role - the 
resolution of maritime boundary disputes and cooperative management over the Gulf's 
32 
33 
34 
35 
CIA, 1998. 
CIA, 1998. 
The Economist, 12/12/98. 
CIA, 1998. 
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Table 1.2 Economic Characteristics of the Gulf of Thailand Coastal States 
Country Area 
Cambodia 181,040km2 
Malaysia 329,750km2 
Thailand 514,000km2 
Vietnam 329,560km2 
July 1998 estimates. 
1998 estimates. 
Population36 
11.3m 
20.9m 
60m 
76m 
Population GDP38 GDPGrowth 
Growth Rate 
Rate37 
2.51% US$7.7bn 6.5% (1996) 
1.5% (1997) 
2.11% US$227bn 7.4% (1996) 
4.5% (1997) 
0.97% US$525bn -0.4% (1997) 
1.43% US$128bn 8.5% (1997) 
Source: CIA World Factbook 199844 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
1997 estimates. Estimates derived from purchasing power parity calculations (sec CIA World Factbook, 1998). 
1997 estimates. 
1996 estimate. 
1995 estimate. 
42 1997 estimate. 
GDP per External Debts 
capita39 
US$715 US$2.2bn40 
US$11,100 US$27.5bn41 
US$8,800 US$90bn42 
US$1 ,700 US$21-30bn43 
43 
44 
Composed of US$7.3bn to Western countries, US$4.5bn to CMEA (primarily Russia) and US$9-18bn nonconvcrtiblc debt (former CMEA, Iraq and Iran). 
Sec: http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook 
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resources being potential means by which political relations between the Gulf of 
Thailand littoral states may be enhanced.45 
Fishing 
The Gulf of Thailand has traditionally been an important source of fish for all the littoral 
states.46 However, rising demand for fish from increasing coastal populations for food, 
as well as for export, has resulted in rapid increases in marine fishery production. 47 In 
the 1970s Thailand emerged as a major commercial fishing nation, ranked among the 
top ten in the world with a significant distant-water fishing fleet (the largest in Southeast 
Asia) accustomed to fishing throughout the Andaman Sea, and South China Sea as well 
as the Gulf of Thailand.48 Fish products therefore became an important facet of the Thai 
economy.49 Fisheries development in Malaysia also gathered pace from the 1960s 
onward (albeit largely outside the Gulf of Thailand) while that of Cambodia and 
Vietnam has lagged behind, gaining momentum only from the 1980s.50 As a result of 
these developments, the total fishery catch of the four littoral states was estimated at 
5.95 million tonnes for 1996, having achieved an average annual increase of a startling 
4.9% per annum in the period 1988 to 1994.51 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
For a review of national maritime interests in Southeast Asia as a whole see Valencia (1985a). 
Prescott, 1998: II. Dzurek (1985: 264-265) describes the countries bordering the South China 
Sea as a whole as being "extraordinarily dependent" on the fisheries of the region, obtaining 
13% of their protein from marine products in comparison to 3% for the USA. For a review of 
fisheries throughout Southeast Asia see Samson ( 1985) and United Nations ( 1995). 
Mohamed, 1998: 4. 
McDorman, 1985: 298 and 1990: 41; Torell, 1991. 
By 1984 the export offishery products from Thailand accounted for almost 9% of Thailand's 
total exports (Torell, 1988: 132). 
Menavesta, 1998: 209. Nevertheless, it has been estimated that the fisheries sector accounts for 
up to 5% of Cambodia's GDP (Cambodia, 1994: I 05). See Valencia ( 1991: 5-8) in relation to 
Malaysian fishing activities. 
Mohamed, 1998: 6. 
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Table 1.3 Fish Catch and Per Capita Consumption of the Gulf of Thailand 
Coastal States 
Country Total Catch Catch in Gulf Percentage of Consumption 
(tonnes) of Thailand catch in the Gulf Kg/Capita 
Cambodia 
Malaysia 
Thailand 
Vietnam 
·103,200 
1,181,763 
3,522,233 
1,150,000 
30,96052 
2,297,575 
230,00053 
1.21% 21.6 
36.6 
89.8% 34.6 
8.99% 12.5 
Total/ Average 5,957,196 2,558,535 /6.354 
Source: Mohamed, 1998.55 
Mohamed describes the threat of overfishing in the Gulf of Thailand as "real and 
ominous. "56 This assessment is backed up with analysis showing dramatic declines in 
catch per unit effort (CPUE) in the Gulf indicating that overfishing is evident. 57 If the 
trends outlined continue unchecked, the possibility of the eventual collapse of fisheries 
in the Gulf of Thailand has been raised .. The need for strict ecosystem-wide, and 
therefore transboundary management of these threatened resources is incontrovertible. 58 
Oil and gas 
In the context of the relatively limited oil and gas resources located in Southeast Asia, 
the Gulf of Thailand has proven to be a major source of oil and particularly gas 
resources. 59 The distribution and exploitation of these resources is, however, uneven 
(see Table 1.4). 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
Based on 30% of Cambodia's catch being composed of marine fish according to Sour and Vuthy 
(1997), as referred to in Mohamed (1998: 24). 
Based on a 20% contribution to Vietnam's total catch from its southwestern region, according to 
Pham Thouc and Huy Son (1997), as referred to in Mohamed (1998: 24). 
This compares with average global consumption per capita of l4.5kg (Menavesta, 1998: 53). 
See also APFIC, 1996: 18-21 and 45-47; and, SEAFDEC (1997a and l997b). 
Mohamed, 1998: 3. It should be stressed that this problem is by no means exclusive to the Gulf 
of Thailand. Indeed, most marine fisheries around the world are in danger of severe depletion 
with the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimating that II of the world's 15 
major fishing areas and 69% of the world's main fish species are in decline (McGinn, 1998: 60). 
See also Weber (1994). See Matics (1997), Samson (1985) and Tangsubkul (1982) for 
assessments of the prospect for Southeast Asia as a whole. 
According to Mohamed (1998: 3), long term systematic surveys by the Thai Department of 
Fisheries indicates that the daytime CPUE has declined ti-om 290 kg/hr in 1963 to approximately 
50 kg/hr in 1993 while the night time CPUE has declined from 57 kg/hr in 1976 to 21 kg/hr in 
1995 -less than half its previous value. The same author states that these findings are also 
supported by surveys conducted in Vietnamese waters. 
For an overview of trans boundary fishery management needs in Southeast Asia see Munro 
(1993) and Soegiarto (1993). 
For a review of regional oil and gas potential see Valencia (l985b) and Tabgsubkul ( 1982). 
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Table 1.4: Oil and Gas Resources of the Gulf of Thailand Coastal States60 
Country Oil 
Reserves 
bn. bbl. 
Production RIP Ratio61 Reserves 
Natural Gas 
Production 
bn. em 
RIP Ratio 
'000 bid years tn. em years 
Cambodia 
Malaysia 3.9 730 15.1 2.26 39.4 57.4 
Thailand 0.20 12.7 15.6 
Vietnam 0.6 195 8.5 0.17 >100 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 1998. 
It has been estimated that one third of Cambodia's potentially oil and gas bearing 
sedimentary basins are located offshore .. 62 However, despite strenuous efforts and initial 
promise, Cambodia has no production of either oil or gas and little prospect of such in 
the immediate future, at least as far as exclusively Cambodian waters are concerned (see 
Section 7.2.8). In regional terms Malaysia is clearly a major oil and gas producer, 
boasting significant reserves. These resources are, however, largely located outside the 
Gulf of Thailand. Malaysia is also a major oil and gas exporter but with domestic 
demand for oil reported to be rising at a rate of 6.7%/year, Malaysia's exports look set to 
be limited in the future. 63 Thailand is also an established gas producer with the majority 
of its offshore activity concentrated in the Gulf of Thailand.64 Major finds have been 
made in the central Gulf of Thailand in exclusively Thai waters (see Figure 1.2). 
Among these are the Erawan field with 50 billion cubic metres of initial proven gas 
reserves, the Satun field with 80 billion and the enormous Bongkot field with 180 
billion.65 It has been reported that the Bongkot field alone fulfils 30% of Thailand's gas 
needs.66 The Thai-Malaysian IDA has also recently emerged as a major source of gas 
with estimated reserves of 10 trillion cubic feet. 67 For its part, Vietnam has taken steps 
towards becoming a commercial oil and gas producer. The finds that have been made 
are, however, located outside the Gulf of Thailand. Licensing and exploration activity 
in Vietnam has also taken a nose-dive in recent years as a consequence of lower than 
hoped for exploration success rates, high exploration costs and administrative problems 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
Includes reserves located outside the Gulf of Thailand. 
The Reserves/Production (RIP) ratio can be defined as follows: If the reserves remaining at the 
end of any year are divided by the production in that year, the result is the length of time that 
those remaining reserves would last if production were to continue at that level (BP, 1998: 4 ). 
Praing, 1997: 2. 
Petroleum Review, November 1998: 16. 
As of 1 January 1997 63% of contracts active in Thailand (excluding the Thai-Malaysian JDA) 
were located in the Gulf of Thailand (Petroleum Review, November 1998: 18). 
Praing, 1997: 3. 
Offshore, December 1996: 8. 
Bangkok Post, 21/4/98; The Nation, 21/4/98. 
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in dealing with the authorities in Hanoi.68 Nevertheless, it is estimated that off Vung 
Tau in the Con Son Basin alone, Vietnam has reserves of 1 billion bbl of oil and 5 
trillion cubic feet of gas.69 Additionally, it has been reported that the Malaysia- Vietnam 
"Defined Area" is host to at least 200 million bbl of oil. 70 
As noted, oil and gas reservoirs have been located m the thick sedimentary 
basins in the Gulf of Thailand. These are predominantly located in the central part of 
the Gulf and are aligned along the Gulf's northwest-southeast axis. 71 Of particular 
significance here is the Pattani Trough.' This structure straddles the boundary between 
exclusively Thai waters and the Thai-Cambodian overlapping claims area. On the Thai 
side of the line several major hydrocarbon finds have been made including the 
Benchamas, Tantawan, Satun, Erawan, Pailin and Bongkot fields (see Figure 1.2). As 
the Trough extends into waters disputed with Cambodia, there appears no reason to 
suspect that this area will not prove similarly productive. 
Security of navigation and piracy 
All four of the Gulf of Thailand littoral states, in common with coastal states worldwide, 
have a clear interest in ensuring their maritime defence and security. 72 The Gulf of 
Thailand provides an essential route by which the littoral states gain access to world 
markets. For example, Hamzah has commented that "All of Malaysia's exports- except 
those that go to Singapore via the causeway or that trickle across the border into 
Thailand or Indonesian Borneo - go by sea. "73 Similarly, Navavichit has noted that 
Thailand is dependent on seaborne trade for the import and export of 95% of its volume 
of manufactured goods, agricultural products and raw materials. 74 The same author 
I 
goes on to state that, "Piracy, robberies at sea, the s1nuggling of illegal goods and 
immigrants, and drug traffzcking and environmental damage remain challenging 
problems. "75 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
Petroleum Review, November 1998: 18. 
Offshore, May 1997: 162. 
Offshore, November 1996: 40. 
The two key basins are the Thai Basin running broadly north-south in the Gulf of Thailand and 
the Malay Basin running northwest-southeast off the northeast coast of peninsula Malaysia 
(Valencia, 1985b: 156). 
Morgan and Fryer, 1985a: 23-24; and 1985b. 
Hamzah, 1998: 51. It should also be pointed out that Malaysia is particularly concerned with 
navigation issues as a consequence of its territory being divided by the South China sea 
(Valencia, 1985a: 46; Hamzah, 1987: 357). 
Navavichit, 1998: 79. 
Navavichit, 1998: 80. 
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Figure 1.2 Oil and Gas Fields in the Gulf of Thailand 
Source: /998 Offshore Oil & Gas Concession Map. 
It is clear that there has been a dramatic increase in acts of piracy, 76 particularly in 
Southeast Asian waters in the 1990s. For example, 229 incidents were reported in 1997 
as compared with 38 in 1986. The incidence of piracy has increased year-on-year with 
the exception of one year when there was a slight fall. 77 Unfortunately, the waters of the 
Gulf of Thailand have not proved immune to this threat. A total of 26 acts of piracy 
76 
77 
In its strict definition under UNCLOS piracy is an illegal acts on the high seas. The majority of 
attacks occur within territorial waters and therefore fall outside this definition. As the ICC has 
dryly observed, however, "it makes little difference to the seafarer to know that the man who 
shot him is a robber rather than a pirate." The International Chamber of Commerce's (ICC) 
International Maritime Bureau definition of piracy is as follows: "Piracy is an act of boarding 
any vessel with the intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the intent or capability to 
use force in the furtherance o{ that act" (ICC, 1998: 2). 
ICC, 1998: I 0-11. It should be noted that the problem is often underestimated as many incidents 
are not reported to the authorities as the relatively small financial loss as a consequence of a 
robbery are often outweighed by the cost of delays incurred during investigations (ICC, 1998: 4 ). 
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were reported in the waters of the Gulf of Thailand states in 1997 with Thai waters 
ranking as second only to Indonesian waters as most prone to such attacks. 78 
Piracy is therefore a significant, and growing, problem for the Gulf of Thailand 
states. As previously mentioned, the problem has arisen in part because of the end of 
the Cold War and the removal of the deterrent provided by the presence of superpower 
naval contingents patrolling the region. Despite the development of what has been 
termed a regional arms race,79 primarily for economic reasons the surveillance and 
enforcement capabilities of the littoral states remain inadequate to fill the vacuum left by 
the withdrawal of the Soviet and US navies. 80 Unfortunately, piracy has also developed 
as a consequence of economic hardships. For example, with their traditional fishing 
grounds out of bounds, the temptation to indulge in robbery at sea has reportedly proved 
too much for some Thai fishermen. 81 Some action to combat the threat to navigation 
posed by piracy has already been taken in the form of the joint patrolling efforts 
mentioned in relation to fisheries management (see Section 7 .8). However, more 
intensive cooperation will clearly be required in the future. 
Environmental issues 
A related issue to the question of navigation is the environmental threat that this intense 
maritime activity poses.82 The development of oil and gas production in the Gulf of 
Thailand, coupled with rapid industrialisation among its coastal states and reliance on 
the sea as the predominant conduit for trade has raised a significant threat of marine 
collisions. As a result the possibility of major oil spills in the confined space of the Gulf 
of Thailand has been raised. Additionally, the Gulf is threatened by pollution from both 
land and marine-based sources and has been termed a "concentration area" for marine 
II . 81 po utwn. - Indeed, the inner part of the Gulf, particularly the waters immediately 
adjacent to southern Thailand have been classed as one of the most heavily polluted 
marine areas in the world. 84 It is estimated that in excess of 200,000 tonnes of waste, 
approximately 70% from land-based sources, is discharged into the Gulf of Thailand 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
ICC, 1998: 12. Clearly not all these incidents took place within the strict confines of the Gulf of 
Thailand. 
See Schofield and Stormont, 1996. 
ICC, 1998: 5. 
McDorman, 1986: 193. See Valencia and VanDyke (1994: 231) for similar allegations 
concerning Vietnamese involvement in piracy. 
For a regional review of marine pollution threats and conservation of the marine environment see 
Jaafar and Valencia (1985) and White (1985). 
Ake-uru, 1987:418. 
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annually. This discharge is dominated by domestic wastes but industrial effluents are 
recognised as containing more toxic chemical substances. 85 Despite this it has been 
concluded that, "the marine environment of the Gu(f of Thailand is not yet seriously 
polluted. ,fiG Nevertheless, Johnston and VanderZwaag refer to pollution from land-
based activities alone as: 
... a huge environmental problem in the area, criticall_y a;f{ecting thefitture health 
of the waters as a source of food production and their amenability to attract 
tourists and local recreational users of the beaches and inshore areas. 87 
If urgent steps are not taken by the littoral states to address this problem, coastal 
population and economic growth indicate that a serious deterioration in the Gulf's 
marine environment will be only a matter of time. 88 As well as having a negative 
impact on the renewable living resources of the Gulf such a development would also 
impact on the increasingly important tourist industry (particularly in Malaysia and 
Thailand). Additionally, there is a growing realisation that the coastal states lack the 
information required to address the environmental and resource problems posed by the 
Gulf of Thailand and that unilateral actions are likely to prove inadequate, leading to a 
recognition that progress needs to be made on cooperative marine scientific research 
efforts. 89 
1.4 Significance and Limitations of the Study 
The significance of the Gulf of Thailand to the littoral states is to a large extent self-
evident from national maritime priorities and interests outlined in the preceding section 
and is therefore difficult to overstate. It is clear that lack of clarity over the limjts of 
maritime claims, leading to confusion and uncertainty over jurisdiction, retards resource 
development and results in conflicting activities and competing uses in the maritime 
sphere and may ultimately pose the risk of armed conflict. 90 These activities, many of 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
Johnston and VanderZwaag, 1998: 74-75. 
Chongprasith and Srinetr, 1998: J 41. See also, Piyakarnchana et al., 1990. 
Chongprasith and Srinetr, 1998: 176. 
Johnston and VanderZwaag, 1998: 75. 
See UNEP, 1983 and 1987. 
Valencia and VanDyke, 1994: 220-221. 
As far as living resources are concerned, confusion over jurisdiction leading to lack of adequate 
management and open access has been referred to as the 'tragedy of the commons'. 
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them essentially transnational in character, may m turn lead to ungoverned resource 
depletion, environmental damage and political tension. As Valencia has observed: 
The overlaying of a mosaic of uncoordinated national jurisdictional regimes on 
inherently transnational resources and activities will inevitably create 
fl . 91 C011 lCtS. 
This thesis is devoted to the study of the delimitation of maritime boundaries in the Gulf 
of Thailand. It can be strongly argued that definition of the extent of coastal states' 
jurisdiction is a necessary precursor to the full realisation of the potential benefits of the 
Gulf of Thailand to them. Similarly, the unambiguous delimitation of maritime 
boundaries will provide a sound basis for the sustainable management and protection of 
the resources of the Gulf. Furthermore, the resolution of maritime boundary disputes 
would remove a significant potential source of tension between states and could 
therefore lead to enhanced political relations. No previous study has specifically 
examined in depth the issues which are addressed in this thesis. 
However, the limitations of the research need to be understood from the outset. 
This study is narrowly focused on delimitation of maritime boundaries in the Gulf of 
Thailand. The plethora of issues relating to the management of the resources of the Gulf 
of Thailand and disputes arising out of competing ocean uses are touched upon but not 
dealt with in detail. It is also important to note that this thesis necessarily draws on the 
combined disciplines of law and geography - the essential components of the maritime 
boundary delimitation process. However, it is left to other scholars, for example those 
grounded in political science, to explore in detail other aspects of maritime boundaries 
in the Gulf of Thailand, for instance, the detailed reasons why particular negotiations 
have proved successful while others did not. 
Nevertheless, it is hoped that this thesis will provide a meaningful contribution 
to the understanding and the ultimate resolution of maritime boundary delimitation 
questions in the Gulf of Thailand. 
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1.5 Previous Studies 
The law of the sea and maritime boundary delimitation are issues which between them 
have generated an enormous volume of literature. In the context of this study it is not 
proposed to attempt a review of the seemingly exponentially expanding body of 
published works on these topics. Many key studies devoted to these issues will, 
however, be referred to and addressed throughout this thesis, particularly in Chapters 2 
and 3. Instead, a review of studies specifically concerned with maritime boundary 
delimitation in the Gulf of Thailand is offered here. 
As previously mentioned, this thesis represents the first comprehensive study 
concerned solely with maritime boundary delimitation in the Gulf of Thailand. Previous 
studies specifically devoted to the topic have been limited in scope. Nevertheless, two 
recent studies deserve special mention. These are Dzurek's paper Maritime Agreements 
and Oil Exploration in the Gulf of Thailand presented at the International Boundaries 
Research Unit's (IBRU) July 1996 conference and published by the same research unit 
in 1998; and Prescott's 1998 monograph, published under the auspices of the Malaysian 
Institute of Maritime Affairs (MIMA), entitled The Gulf of Thailand. These two, 
undeniably useful, papers are the only studies which are directly devoted to the core 
topic of this thesis and will be referred to in the main text of this study. However, as a 
consequence of their limited length they carry the debate only so far. 
Maritime boundary delimitation in the Gulf of Thailand has otherwise been dealt 
with in the context of global surveys of maritime boundaries such as Prescott (1985a) or 
regional ones, notably Buchholz (1987), Dzurek (1985 and 1994), Johnston and 
Valencia (1991 ), Kittichaisaree (1987), Prescott (1981 and 1985), Siddayao ( 1978), 
Tangsubkul (1982) and Valencia (1980 and 1997). 
Studies devoted to the development of and nature of the maritime claims of a 
particular Gulf of Thailand state have also proved valuable, not least because such 
works inevitably seek to address the question of that state's maritime boundaries with its 
neighbours. In Cambodia's case, two relatively early studies written in French are 
worth highlighting. These are Sarin Chhak' s book Les Frontieres du Camhodge ( 1966) 
and Norodom Ranariddh's doctoral thesis Les Limites du Domaine Maritime du 
Cambodge. In analysing these texts it is, however, important to acknowledge 
backgrounds of the authors concerned. Sarin Chhak became Foreign Minister of the 
91 Valencia, 1997: 266. 
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GRUNK92 in 1970. Prince Ranariddh is one of King Sihanouk of Cambodia's sons, 
leader of the pro-Royalist FUNCINPEC party and from 1993-1997 was First Prime 
Minister of Cambodia. It is therefore fair to observe that both of these works have been 
written from the Cambodian perspective. It is also worth noting that Chhak's book is 
primarily dealt with land boundary questions and devoted only one chapter to maritime 
boundary issues. In addition, M.Khim Y.' s 1978 doctoral thesis entitled Le Cambodge 
et le Probleme de l 'Extension des Espaces Maritimes dans le Go(fe de Thailand is 
worthy of attention. Apart from these three substantial documents there is a notable 
paucity of studies on Cambodia's maritime claims. 
With regard to studies of Malaysian maritime claims, those of Hamzah ( 1987, 
1988 and 1998) deserve to be highlighted. Valencia (1991) has also made a useful 
contribution, as has Haller-Trost ( 1998) in her substantial study of Malaysia's contested 
territorial and maritime boundaries. Several authors have addressed the development 
and status of Thailand's offshore claims including Ake-uru ( 1987), Kittichaisaree 
(1990), McDorman (1985) and Navavichit (1998). Similarly, Vietnam's maritime 
jurisdictional claims have attracted commentators including Pham Hao (n.d. and 1998) 
Valencia (n.d., 1990 and 1993) and Valencia and Van Dyke (1994). 
It is also important to note that there is a developing literature devoted to the 
Gulf of Thailand, though by no means specifically concentrated on maritime boundary 
issues. This has to a large extent been inspired by the efforts of the Southeast Asian 
Programme on Ocean Law and Policy (SEAPOL) (see in particular several volumes of 
papers edited by Johnston et al. and Matics et al.). The most recent developments in 
this regard have been the convening of annual meetings from 1997 under SEAPOL' s 
Gulf of Thailand Project. The outcome of these meetings are SEAPOL's Integrated 
Studies of the Gulf of Thailand which proved an important source of background 
information on the claims and attitudes of the Gulf's littoral states. 
92 French acronym for the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia- the government-in-
exile set up by Prince Sihanouk in collaboration with the Khmer Rouge after he was ousted in the 
coup that brought Lon Nol to power in 1970 (see Section 7 .3.2). 
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1.6 Research Methods 
1. 6. 1 Documentary Research 
Both primary and secondary documents were collected and these form the backbone of 
the present research. Primary documents predominantly took the form of national 
legislation relating to the maritime claims of the Gulf of Thailand coastal states and their 
bilateral maritime boundary agreements. Several of the most significant of these 
primary documents are included as appendices to this study. Limitations of length 
prevented the inclusion of other important primary documents collected. These 
documents are listed in the bibliography and are held on file with the author. Secondary 
materials collected included relevant reports by global institutions such as the United 
Nations and national government publications as well as academic books, theses or 
dissertations and articles plus cartographic sources referred to. These documents are 
listed in the bibliography. 
These documents were collected from a number of libraries and archives 
primarily in Durham, London and Taunton in the UK and in Bangkok, Hanoi, Kuala 
Lumpur, New York, Melbourne, Phnom Penh and Singapore abroad. Of particular note 
were the archives of the Malaysian Institute of Maritime Affairs (MIMA) in Kuala 
Lumpur, the headquarters of the Southeast Asian Programme on Ocean Law and Policy 
(SEAPOL) in Bangkok and the library of the National University of Singapore. 
Documents were also obtained through contacts with the relevant governments, 
particularly the foreign affairs and hydrographic authorities concerned, and through 
correspondence with interested scholars. Furthermore, access to certain secondary 
sources which were difficult to obtain was facilitated through the inter-library loan 
system and in particular from the British Library at Boston Spa. 
1.6.2 Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews represented another important research tool?' Interviews 
were conducted with government officials in all four Gulf of Thailand coastal states. 
For the most part these interviews were conducted in confidence at the request of the 
93 The term 'semi-structured' means that rather than using a 'structured' technique such as a formal 
questionnaire or a wholly 'unstructured' method of interviewing analogous to a general 
discussion, a relatively straightforward interview 'menu' of key questions and topics of concern 
was prepared before each interview. This was designed to enable the interviewer to guide the 
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interviewees. Additionally, a number of other interviews were undertaken with relevant 
experts from the United Kingdom Hydrographic Office (UKHO), the United States 
Department of State, the international oil industry and in academic circles. Reference to 
these interviews is made in the thesis text where appropriate. 
1.6.3 Fieldwork 
In order to gain access to particular archives in the region and to key individuals and 
government departments so that interviews could be conducted, a number of visits to the 
Gulf of Thailand states were undertaken. Visits to Cambodia took place in March, May 
and July 1995 and in April 1996. Visits to Malaysia in May 1995 and December 1998. 
Visits to Thailand in July 1995 and November-December 1998. The author was invited 
to participate as a speaker in SEAPOL's second Gulf of Thailand experts meeting in 
Hanoi in July 1998 and elected to remain in Vietnam into August.94 Additionally, 
research-related visits abroad were undertaken to New York (February 1997), Singapore 
(June 1995 and November 1998), Vancouver (May 1994), and Washington D.C. 
(November 1996). 
1.6.4 Cartographic Techniques 
In order to assess accurately the maritime claims of the Gulf of Thailand states, 
considerable cartographic work, using primarily British Admiralty charts, was 
conducted. This involved the plotting of coordinates and measurement and construction 
of theoretical equidistance lines on charts depicting the Gulf of Thailand in whole or in 
part. The charts used are listed in the bibliography. British Admiralty charts were 
selected for this task not only because they provide excellent coverage of the area in 
question at a variety of scales, but also because the Gulf of Thailand littoral states 
themselves have shown a tendency to refer to precisely these charts in advancing their 
unilateral claims and in their bilateral maritime boundary agreements. 
Additionally, geodetic tasks, for example the accurate calculation of areas of 
overlap between competing jurisdictional claims, were performed with the aid of the 
library of computer programs collectively known as DELMAR. 95 Areas were also 
94 
95 
conduct of the interview, maximise the relevance and quality of the information gleaned yet 
retain considerable flexibility in order to adapt to the interviewee's responses. 
See Grundy-Warr and Schofield, 1999 (forthcoming). 
DELMAR derives its name from the DELimitation of MARitime boundaries. For a fuller 
description of the attributes and capabilities of DELMAR, sec Carrera ( 1994: 49-58). 
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measured with the aid of a planimetre and appropriate charts. A planimetre is an 
instrument which allows the accurate measurement of the areas of spaces not defined by 
straight lines. Use of the planimetre therefore allowed areas bound by coastlines and 
arcs to be accurately assessed. Three readings of every area measured with the 
planimetre were made and the average taken. When a known area was measured, the 
averaged planimetre reading was within 0.05% of the true area. 
1.6.5 Research Problems 
The chief difficulty encountered in the research undertaken relates to the sensitive nature 
of the subject under discussion. The delimitation of maritime boundaries is inevitably 
linked intimately to a state's sovereign rights. This meant that certain key documents 
remained classified and thus unavailable to the researcher. As well as resistance to 
allowing documents to enter the public domain, this sensitivity over the focus of the 
research also translated into reticence on the part of government officials in particular 
when questioned on issues pertaining to maritime boundary delimitation. This was 
certainly the case in relation to undelimited boundary situations where negotiations were 
ongoing. Similarly, with regard to existing maritime boundary agreements, the rationale 
behind the selection of a particular boundary line has frequently been left opaque by the 
parties to the agreement. The governments concerned are often reluctant to clarify why 
one boundary alignment was chosen in preference to another. The content of maritime 
boundary negotiations, both past and present, is therefore widely treated as being 
confidential. In these circumstances analysis of maritime boundary delimitations 
necessarily requires a certain degree of intuition and educated guess work. 
A further problem encountered during the collection of information was that 
some of the earlier documents have, over the years and largely as a consequence of 
political turmoil, become unavailable. The text of South Vietnam's 1971 continental 
shelf claim is a good example of this. This problem is particularly evident in Cambodia 
where it is believed that many original documents have been destroyed. 96 
96 Interview with Cambodian Foreign Ministry official, March 1995. 
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1. 7 Structure of Study 
The present chapter, Chapter I, provides introductory comments on maritime boundary 
delimitation and on the Gulf of Thailand and states the aims and significance of the 
research. A brief review of relevant literature is included, together with details of 
research methods employed and an outline of the structure of the thesis. Chapters 2 and 
3 concentrate on the theoretical framework for the study of maritime boundaries in the 
Gulf of Thailand. This reviews and analysis of the relevant provisions of the 
international law of the sea in respect of maritime jurisdiction and maritime boundary 
delimitation. The close interrelationship of the geography and law is explored and the 
preponderance of geographical factors, coupled with the political will of the parties 
involved, as the key variables in determining maritime boundary delimitation is 
demonstrated. These chapters provide the framework for analysis of claims on the Gulf 
of Thailand. 
Chapter 4 critically evaluates the baseline claims of the littoral states. Chapter 5 
offers a review of national claims to maritime jurisdiction as a prelude to examining 
agreed and unsettled delimitations in the Gulf of Thailand. Existing maritime boundary 
agreements, both delimitation lines and joint arrangements, are detailed in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 7 focuses attention on the remaining undelimited maritime boundary scenarios 
in the Gulf of Thailand. 
The concluding part of this thesis, Chapter 8, reviews the findings of this study, 
highlights the options open to the Gulf of Thailand states to resolve their outstanding 
maritime boundary delimitation problems and evaluates the prospects for future 
delimitation agreements in the Gulf. 
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The Law of the Sea, Maritime Jurisdiction and the Gulf of 
Thailand 
2.1 Introduction 
Prior to World War ll state jurisdiction rarely extended more than three nautical miles 
(nm) offshore. The delimitation of maritime boundaries between states, confined in 
scope to such a relatively narrow band of inshore waters, was therefore infrequently a 
controversial process. 
The tremendous increase in the maritime space coming under the jurisdiction of 
coastal states in the post-war period, coupled with similarly significant changes in the 
diversity and intensity of offshore activities, has, however, radically transformed the 
nature of maritime boundary negotiations, enhancing both their complexity and 
importance. Clearly, the extension of coastal states' sovereignty seawards has generated 
the potential for a great number of 'new' maritime boundaries and, inevitably, a host of 
overlapping jurisdictional claims and offshore boundary disputes. This latter point is 
amply illustrated by the incomplete nature of the maritime political map of the world. 
Of an estimated 427-434 potential maritime boundaries, 1 only about 160 have been 
formally agreed? 
The delimitation of maritime areas between two or more states is governed by 
the principles and rules of public international law. In this context it is clear that 
geographical factors, and in particular coastal geography, are fundamental to 
international law as it pertains to maritime boundary delimitation (see Section 3.4). 
This is true, whether a boundary dispute is resolved by negotiation between the parties 
or whether it is submitted to third party settlement. Nevertheless, there is a significant 
distinction in character between these types of dispute settlement (see Chapter 8). 
2 
Based on US Department of State (1988) figures updated by the author. On the basis of this 
analysis there are 427 potential maritime boundaries around the word or 434 if the 7 potential 
boundaries of the Caspian Sea are considered to be maritime boundaries. 
Blake, 1999. Volumes I and II of Charney and Alexander (1993), examines 134 maritime 
boundary agreements while Volume III (1998) includes details of 18 more such agreements. As 
a 'rule-of-thumb' it may be estimated that, on average 3-4 new agreements are concluded every 
year (Blake, 1999). 
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In a resolution by negotiation, states are free to agree to any boundary they want 
provided that the rights and interests of third states, or of the international community, 
are not prejudiced. Nevertheless, international law generally provides the context within 
which negotiations take place. 
Where agreement cannot be reached, customary international law - now largely 
reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 3 (see 
Section 2.2)- will apply. While this does not mean that states are obliged to settle their 
maritime differences or to submit such differences to adjudication or other means of 
third party settlement, international law does provide the relevant framework for 
analysing the respective merits of each side's position. 
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to provide an overview of the 
international law of the sea as it relates to maritime jurisdiction and sovereign rights at 
sea. Particular attention will be devoted firstly to the UNCLOS, as to a large extent this 
treaty embodies the law of the sea, and secondly to the law of the sea as it applies to 
maritime boundary delimitation in the Gulf of Thailand. The following chapter will 
explore key principles of geography and international law as they relate to the 
delimitation of international maritime boundaries. 
2.2 The Development of the Law of the Sea 
Up to the close of the medieval period, the international law of the sea was notable by 
its absence.4 Piracy represented a significant threat to seaborne trade and states lacked 
the naval wherewithal to police offshore areas effectively and thus exert their authority 
over ocean spaces in order to enable them to claim national jurisdiction over them. 
Nevertheless, as early as 1493 ownership of the oceans was partitioned between 
Portugal and Spain by a Papal Bull of 4 May of that year. This division of the world's 
seas between the two Iberian powers was later modified by the Treaty of Tordesillas of 
7 June 1494 but the Portuguese and Spanish claims to a global maritime monopoly 
4 
United Nations, 1983. 
Brown, 1994, Volume II: 6. 
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remained. 5 These claims to national sovereignty over the oceans were hotly contested 
by other emerging European maritime powers, notably the English and the Dutch. 
From the seventeenth century onwards, a debate emerged between the leading 
writers (representing the leading powers) of the day, between those advocating state 
sovereignty and control over offshore areas and those proposing unfettered freedom of 
navigation. 6 These competing trends are exemplified by renowned works such as Hugo 
de Groot's (Grotius) chapter Mare Liberum ('free sea') in his book De Domino Maris of 
1604, and John Seldon's Mare Clausum ('closed sea') published in 1635.7 
The debate between state sovereignty and freedom of navigation eventually led 
to compromise and the emergence of two key principles in the law of the sea. Firstly, 
the concept of state sovereignty over a territorial or "small sea "8 of limited extent 
emerged. This came to be defined by reference to the so-called 'cannon-shot rule' -the 
distance a cannon could throw a ball, as proposed by the Dutch in negotiations with the 
English as early as 1610.9 
Secondly, and significantly as the European trading powers entered their 
imperial era in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the principle of freedom of 
navigation on the 'high seas' beyond the narrow limits of national jurisdiction was 
established. This principle was consolidated and safeguarded by the Great Powers, and 
particularly Great Britain as the pre-eminent maritime power at that time, whose 
imperial ambitions and prosperity were dependent upon seaborne trade. 10 
The 'cannon shot rule' hardly provided a precise definition of territorial sea 
width. 11 Nevertheless, by the early twentieth century, several states including, notably, 
5 
6 
9 
10 
II 
According to the Papal ruling, Portugal's zone lay between approximately 3rW and 143°15'E. 
The Treaty of Tordesillas altered these limits to 46° lO'W and 134 °E respectively (McConnell, 
1991: 10). 
Sanger, 1986: 11-13. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, both of these works were driven by state policy interests. Grotius 
advocated the freedom of navigation sought by his client, the Dutch East India Company, while 
Seldon was charged with defending 'British Seas' from Dutch maritime interests on behalf of 
England's Stuart Kings (Brown, 1994, Volume I: 7). Grotius wrote: "The sea, since it is as 
incapable of being seized as the air, cannot have been attached to the possession of any 
particular nation" (Siddayao, 1978: 42). 
Grotius as noted in Sanger, 1986: 12. 
Sanger, 1986: 12. 
In large part, Britain's role as guardian of the right to freedom of navigation has, in the latter part 
of the twentieth century, been assumed by the United States as the modern world's leading sea 
power (Brown, 1994, Volume I: 6-8). 
Clearly, with the development of technology, artillery was able to throw shells further and further 
over time. The US states of Louisiana and Texas took this to its logical conclusion in 1938 and 
1941 respectively by passing laws claiming a 27-mile territorial sea on the grounds that guns then 
had that range. Sanger (1986: 22) who describes these claims, termed them "ridiculous." 
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major maritime powers such as Britain and the United States, had unilaterally adopted a 
3 nautical mile (nm) territorial sea limit. These states, and in particular the maritime 
powers, keen to limit coastal state jurisdiction and thus maximise the area of the high 
seas where freedom of unrestricted freedom of passage was allowed, led a push for the 
3nm territorial sea limit to be adopted as a universal rule. 12 
However, when the representatives of 42 states met under the auspices of the 
League of Nations at the Hague Codification Conference of 1930, no consensus was 
reached on a standard limit for the breadth of the territorial sea. This failure was 
followed by a period of what has been termed "creeping coastal state jurisdiction", 13 
which reflected the tension between the interests of coastal states as opposed to the 
established maritime powers. 
In the immediate aftermath of the Hague Conference, in the 1930s and early 
1940s, a number of states made territorial sea claims beyond 3nm-breadth and up to 
12nm. 14 This process of expanding coastal state claims to maritime space and the 
erosion of the 3nm 'rule' accelerated in the post-World War II period as decolonisation 
led to a radical increase in the number of coastal states, many of which were keen to 
challenge the established maritime order. Furthermore, rapidly increasing populations 
and hence resource demands prompted significantly greater interest in the oceans as 
sources of food and mineral wealth and this was coupled with advances in technology 
allowing for more efficient exploitation of resources in and under the sea. 
Leading the way was the United States. In 1945, US President Truman issued a 
pair of Presidential Proclamations. That relating to the continental shelf stated that: 
... the Government of the United States regards the natural resources of the 
subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous 
to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United States, subject to 
its jurisdiction and control. 15 
The US similarly claimed the right to designate fishery conservation zones in the high 
seas beyond American-claimed territorial sea. 
12 
13 
14 
15 
McConnell, 1991: 11. 
McConnell, 1991:11. 
For example Colombia, Cuba, Greece, Italy, Iran and Uruguay all claimed 6nm territorial seas; 
Mexico claimed a 9nm limit; and, both Guatemala and Venezuela claimed 12nm (McConnell, 
1991: 11). 
Presidential Proclamation No.2667 concerning the policy of the United States with respect to 
the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf, 28 September 1945. 
Copy included in Volume II of Brown, 1994: 113. See also, Siddayao, 1978: 43. 
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The continental shelf declaration, often referred to as the Truman Proclamation, 
did not define precise limits to the US claim to continental shelf. However, it later 
emerged that a 200 metre depth criterion was contemplated. 16 Oil company lobbying 
was probably significant in prompting the Truman Proclamation related to the 
continental shelf - emphasising increasing concerns on the part of coastal states to 
secure access to offshore resources beyond the narrow band of jurisdiction represented 
by the territorial sea. Indeed, the opening paragraph of the Truman Proclamation notes 
that the action was taken in recognition of "the long range world-wide need for new 
sources of petroleum and other minerals." 
The intensification of the process of creeping coastal state jurisdiction eventually 
led to the convening of the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS 1), held in Geneva in 1958. The work of this conference, attended by the 
representatives of 86 states, was in large part founded on seven years of preparatory 
work undertaken by the International Law Commission (ILC) which presented the 
conference delegates with 76 draft articles. 
Ultimately, four key Conventions emerged from UNCLOS I, each approved by a 
clear majority of the states represented: 
• The Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone; 
• The Convention on the Continental Shelf; 
• The Convention on the High Seas; and, 
• The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the 
High Seas. 17 
These four Conventions represented a useful degree of codification and clarification of 
the existing international law of the sea, coupled with a certain amount of innovative 
development in response to the fresh challenges posed primarily by technological 
change and its impact on the intensity and range of activities undertaken at sea. 18 The 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions were largely incorporated into the UNCLOS (see 
below). 
One notable failing of the 1958 Conference was that no agreement on the 
maximum breadth of the territorial sea could be reached. 19 As a result, in 1960, at the 
instigation of Australia, 88 states met for UNCLOS II which was specifically devoted to 
16 
17 
18 
Sanger, 1986: 14-15. 
Copies of the four Geneva Conventions of 1958 are included in Volume II of Brown, 1994. 
Brown, 1994, Volume II: 9. 
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establishing proper limits for the territorial sea. The Conference came extremely close 
to achieving its aim. However, a joint US-Canadian proposal for a 6nm territorial sea 
with a 6nm fishing zone beyond that, ultimately failed by just one vote to achieve the 
two-thirds majority necessary for these limits to be adopted by the Conference. 20 
Technological advances did not cease in 1958.21 The development of efficient 
distant-water fishing capabilities by several states raised new concerns and in some 
cases serious tensions (e.g. the Anglo-Icelandic 'Cod War'). 22 The possibility of deep-
sea mining far offshore, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction also caught many 
observers' imaginations and generated considerable debate. 
These fresh concerns were coupled with the abiding problem of defining the 
limits of claims to territorial seas and the changing international political context.23 All 
these factors contributed to the convening of a further UN-sponsored conference on the 
law of the sea- UNCLOS Ill. 
The 'blue touch-paper' was lit by the Maltese Ambassador to the UN, Arvid 
Pardo. His famous speech to the UN General Assembly in 1967, called for, among 
other things, the area beyond "present" national jurisdiction to be preserved as the 
"common heritage of mankind" which should be "used and exploited for peaceful 
purposes and for the exclusive benefit of mankind as a whole. "24 He also warned of the 
potentially dire consequences of unchecked exploitative and military activities as sea. 
This impassioned call for action led directly to UNCLOS Ill. 25 
Thus, the key international treaties governing the law of the sea relating to 
maritime delimitation are the four Geneva Conventions of 1958 and their successor, the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
The latter was signed at Montego Bay, Jamaica, by 119 states on 10 December 
1982.26 As at 16 November 1993 60 states had deposited their instruments of 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Siddayao, 1978: 43-44. 
Sanger, 1986: 17-18. 
Brown (1994: 9) describes post-war developments in the law of the sea as being "shaped" by 
developments in marine technology. 
Sanger, 1986: 17. 
As well as the increasing influence of post-colonial developing nations in international forums, 
an important element in the success of UNCLOS III was the Soviet Union's moves towards the 
deployment of an ocean-going 'blue water' navy. This latter development led Moscow to share 
many of the freedom of navigation concerns held by the United States as a global naval power 
(Sanger, 1986: 20-21). 
Quoted in Siddayao, 1978: 44. 
Sanger, 1986: 19. 
Koh, 1983: xxxiii. Koh described the number of signatures on the first day on which it was 
opened for signature as "remarkable", all the more so because of the diversity of the states 
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ratification or accession for the 1982 UN Convention. The Convention therefore 
entered into force on 16 November 1994. As of mid-1999 the number of ratifications or 
accessions to the Convention stood at comfortably over 100.27 
Technically, only states which have ratified the Convention are obliged to accept 
the rights and obligations defined therein. However, although the Convention is not 
formally binding on non-signatories, much of it can now be considered as customary 
international law and it would be difficult for any state to defend contradictory practice 
in the context of bi- or multi-lateral negotiations. 
Those articles which deal with baselines are largely unaltered from the 1958 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and may be considered as 
having been accepted as customary international law. The articles on delimitation of the 
continental shelf differ from those of the relevant 1958 Convention but may, so far as 
actual delimitation is concerned, also be considered as expressing customary 
internationallaw.28 The concept of the 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) has 
been generally accepted although not all states have actually claimed one, whilst some 
states have claimed only extended zones of fisheries jurisdiction as far as 200 miles out 
at sea (see Section 2.4). 
The UN Convention therefore codifies many of the rules and principles relating 
to the law of the sea and maritime delimitation which have formed the basis for the 
judgements handed down by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and international 
arbitration tribunals, as well as the context within which states have negotiated bilateral 
maritime boundary agreements. 
In addition to the various United Nations Conventions and judicial decisions 
concerning maritime delimitation, there are over 150 bilateral agreements between states 
which have negotiated maritime boundaries of various types since 1942. These 
illustrate possible solutions to particular technical - and political - problems peculiar to 
the parties which may be applicable in similar circumstances elsewhere. 29 
27 
28 
29 
signing it- from every region of the world, North and South, East and West, coastal and land-
locked or geographically disadvantaged. 
130 as of 1 June 1999 according to the United Nations Department for Ocean Affairs and the 
Law of the Sea (DOALOS) web-site at: http:\\www.un.org/depts/los/ 
McConnell, 1991: 15. 
It is beyond the scope of this research to undertake a detailed study of each of these although 
they will be frequently referred to in the course of this study where relevant to the argument. 
However, Charney and Alexander (1993 and 1998) do provide a brief commentary on 152 of 
these agreements. 
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There remain, however, uncertainties over the interpretation of certain articles 
and definitions in the Convention which frequently makes maritime boundary 
delimitation a complex and controversial process. It is clear that the principles and rules 
of delimitation that have evolved over the past thirty years are often fluid in their 
application. Nonetheless, an analysis of the relevant provisions of UNCLOS coupled 
with reference to the other prime sources of the international law of the sea - case 
precedents decided by the International Court of Justice and international tribunals, as 
well as state practice (i.e. maritime boundaries agreed by states) - permits the 
identification of the kind of factors that are likely to influence the course of maritime 
boundaries in the Gulf of Thailand and the weight that these factors should be accorded. 
Ultimately, each particular case or dispute depends on its own peculiar facts or 
situation, particularly geographic and historic factors. The following sections will 
therefore seek to provide an overview and appreciation of the key elements of the law of 
the sea affecting maritime boundary delimitation in the Gulf of Thailand including 
baselines, relevant maritime jurisdictional zones (Chapter 2) and delimitation 
methodologies and potential relevant circumstances (Chapter 3). 
2.3 Baselines 
The significance of baselines lies in the fact that a state's rights to maritime jurisdiction, 
be it to territorial sea, contiguous zone, continental shelf, exclusive fishing zone or 
exclusive economic zone, are measured from such baselines, the outer limits of each of 
these zones being at a specified distance from the baseline. Correspondingly, baselines 
also represent the limit of a state's internal waters which lie landward of the baseline. 
The establishment of baselines is a necessary precursor to the claiming of zones 
of maritime jurisdiction, as it is essential to determine the points from which the breadth 
of such zones are measured. An understanding of a particular state's baselines is 
therefore fundamental to the assessment of its maritime claims. 
The concept of baselines, as it is currently understood, emerged in the early 
nineteenth century with an 1839 Anglo-French Fisheries Convention being the first 
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treaty to refer to the low-water line as the normal baseline and to apply closing lines for 
bays.30 
Although attempts were made to codify international practice m relation to 
baselines, notably in the 1920s and at the Hague Conference of 1930, they did not lead 
to the conclusion of an agreement on the baselines issue. Nevertheless, these efforts 
resulted in the formulation of draft articles dealing with baselines largely reflecting 
internationally accepted custom at the time and which provided the foundation for the 
International Law Commission's work on baselines leading up to the First United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea held in Geneva in 1958.31 
Article 4 of the resulting Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone relating to straight baselines did, however, also owe much to the 
International Court of Justice's judgement in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case of 
1951 which supported Norway's use of a system of straight baselines along part of its 
coastline. 32 
The baseline articles included in the 1958 Convention were subsequently 
reviewed during the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and largely 
repeated in the UN Convention of 1982. The latter Convention did, however, see the 
introduction of several noteworthy additional provisions relating to atolls, fringing reefs 
and baselines in the vicinity of unstable coastlines. International law therefore provides 
for several types of baseline to be defined as outlined below. 33 
2.3.1 'Normal' Baselines 
Under usual circumstances, according to Article 5 of the UN Convention, a state's 
baselines consist of: "the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale 
charts officially recognized by the coastal State. " Article 5 of the UN Convention, 
therefore, repeats the provisions of Article 3 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone almost verbatim. This type of baseline, commonly 
30 
31 
32 
33 
Nandan, 1989: viii. The concept of closing lines for bays was, however, proposed as early as 
1610 when the Dutch proposed the 'cannon-shot' rule in relation to the breadth of the territorial 
sea to the British: according to this argument, no prince "could challenge further into the sea 
than he command with a cannon, except gulfs within their land from one point to another" 
(quoted in Sanger, 1986: 12). 
Nandan, 1989: viii. 
Kapoor and Kerr, 1986: 33. 
As none of the Gulf of Thailand coastal states are archipelagic states, archipelagic baselines are 
omitted from this review. 
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referred to as the 'normal' baseline, is the predominant type of baseline claimed by 
states and is, in effect, a state's default baseline. 
A key element in the interpretation of this article is determining what constitutes 
the "low-water line." The level of the low-water line is dependent on the vertical tidal 
datum used.34 Clearly, the lower the low-water line selected, the further seaward the 
normal baseline will lie. The area claimed from such a baseline will correspondingly 
increase, as will the area designated as internal waters landward of the baseline. 
However, unless there is a significant tidal range or the coastline in question shelves 
particularly gently, the impact of applying a lower tidal datum on the extent of the 
maritime zones claimed from that baseline will be minimal. 35 
The choice of vertical tidal datum will also determine which features near to the 
low-tide level will emerge above low-tide and therefore qualify as low-tide elevations. 
Equally, the same choice will determine which formations close to the high-tide level 
qualify as islands rather than as low-tide elevations. This is significant because if a 
feature does indeed qualify as a low-tide elevation or island, that feature may, under 
certain circumstances, be used as the basis for generating maritime zones (see Section 
3.5.4). 
Unfortunately, neither the 1958 or 1982 Conventions specify that a particular 
vertical datum be used for the depiction of the low-water line on charts used for 
determining the normal baseline. As a result, a variety of datums have been used by 
states, providing a range of low-water lines and thus the scope for dispute. 
The potential for dispute related to choice of vertical datum is to some extent 
minimised by the fact that charts are primarily designed to aid the navigator and it is 
recognised that they generally tend to err on the side of caution. 36 Modern charts 
therefore frequently take the Lowest Astronomical Tide (LAT), defined as the lowest 
tide level which can be predicted to occur under average meteorological conditions and 
under any combination of astronomical conditions, as the low-water datum and this has 
been accepted as the preferred datum for navigational charts by the International 
Hydrographic Organization (IH0).37 
34 
35 
36 
37 
International Hydrographic Organization, 1993: 67-70. 
Carleton, 1997a. 
Carleton, 1997a. 
Carleton, 1997 a. 
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Nevertheless, if any of the numerous alternative vertical datums are used on 
charts which a particular state recognises, under the terms of the UN Convention these 
must be considered legitimate for determining that state's normal baseline. 
An example of the difficulties that can arise in terms of maritime boundary 
delimitation related to the choice of tidal datum concerns a long-running dispute 
between Belgium and France. On the one hand France used the lowest astronomical 
tide as its chart datum for determining the low-water line. In contrast, Belgium used the 
mean low-water spring tides as the datum for the construction of its charts. In effect the 
French datum represented a low tidal level which is rarely reached while the Belgian 
datum was an average low-tide level measured over the internationally accepted tidal 
period of 18 and two-thirds years. The less conservative Belgian tidal datum was 
approximately 30 centimetres higher than that used by France. 
The dispute between the two states rested on the suitability of a feature called the 
Bane Breedt, located 2.5nm off the French coast as a territorial sea basepoint. Under the 
French datum, Bane Breedt qualified as a low-tide elevation. Under the Belgian datum, 
however, the feature was permanently below the low-water level and was therefore 
unsuitable for use as a basepoint in constructing the territorial sea boundary between the 
two sides. The dispute was eventually resolved in 1990 by splitting the difference 
between two delimitation lines constructed, one using the Bane Breedt as a basepoint 
d . . . 38 an one tgnonng tt. · 
In certain cases coastlines may be subject to rapid erosion or accretion, thus 
shifting the position of the low-water line/normal baseline. This has been referred to as 
the "natural ambulatory nature" of the normal baseline.39 It is, however, worth 
recognising that Article 5 refers to the low-water line along the coast "as marked on 
large-scale charts officially recognised by the coastal state." It is therefore the chart 
that is the legal document determining the position of the normal baseline and this 
remains the case even where the coastline has, in reality, changed. Where this is the 
case, the normal baseline will only come to reflect the physical change in the coastline if 
a fresh survey is undertaken and the chart correspondingly updated. In areas where the 
coastline is highly unstable, specifically where deltas exist, Article 7 permits the use of 
straight baselines (see Section 2.3.3). 
38 Charney and Alexander, 1993: 1,891-1,900. 
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2.3.2 Reefs 
According to Article 6 of the UN Convention: 
In the case of islands situated on atolls or of islands having fringing reefs, the 
baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the seaward low-
water line of the reef, as shown by the appropriate symbol on charts officially 
recognized by the coastal state. 
The key terms here are "atoll" and "fringing reef", both of which have strict 
geomorphological definitions.40 However, as Prescott points out, Article 6 makes no 
distinction between the various types of atoll (oceanic, shelf or compound) or fringing 
reef recognised by geomorphologists and "there is no evidence that those who drafted 
the Convention took such a restricted view. "41 Furthermore, the UN study on baselines 
states categorically that Article 6 "is not confined to atolls in the strict scientific 
sense. "
42 
It IS therefore reasonable to conclude that Article 6 also applies to 'almost 
atolls', that is, features which have a similar configuration and appearance to atolls but 
fall outside the precise scientific definition.43 Similarly, Article 6' s mention of fringing 
reefs might be stretched to apply to barrier reefs at some distance from the coastal low-
water line.44 
One further noteworthy point relating to reefs and the UN Law of the Sea 
Convention is that there appears to be no specific provision allowing straight baselines 
to be drawn across the channels which penetrate a reef system and connect lagoon 
waters to the open sea. This appears to be something of an oversight, as it should not be 
a difficult task to make the case that lagoon waters are sufficiently closely linked to the 
land domain to be considered subject to the regime of internal waters as provided for by 
Article 7(3) dealing with straight baselines (see Section 2.3.3). Similarly, it could be 
argued that lagoons, whose waters are land-locked save for narrow channels to the open 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
Carleton, 1997a. 
The UN study on baselines notes that geomorphologists reserve the term "atoll" for reefs which 
surround a lagoon and are surmounted by one or more islands; such reefs being generally 
pierced by channels and the lagoon waters having an average depth of 45 metres. The UN report 
goes on to acknowledge that such atolls are also categorised according to their location, with 
oceanic and shelf atolls being distinguished (United Nations, 1989a: 5). Similarly, the term 
"fringing reef" has a strict scientific meaning, the most significant element of which is the fact 
that fringing reefs are the result of biological processes and are therefore distinct in character 
from rock platforms (United Nations, 1989a: 8). 
Prescott, 1985a: 48. 
United Nations, 1989a: 6. See also, Beazley (1994b). 
United Nations, 1989a: 6. 
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sea, could be viewed as being comparable to a bay with multiple mouths and it is highly 
likely that the lagoon waters would fulfil the semi-circle test set out for bays by Article 
10 (see Section 2.3.5).45 
Furthermore, the right to close such channels with straight baselines and claim 
lagoon waters as internal waters is implied by Article 47 dealing with archipelagos, 
paragraph 7 of which provides that lagoon waters may be counted as land when 
land:water ratios are calculated. 
2.3.3 Straight Baselines 
Where particular, restricted, geographical circumstances exist, international law allows 
states to depart from the application of normal baselines and measure maritime 
jurisdictional zones from straight baselines drawn along selected parts of their 
coastlines. 
As noted, Article 4 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone was largely inspired by the ruling of the International Court of Justice 
in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case. This 1951 judgment by the Court therefore 
represents one of the most significant judicial decisions of relevance to the delimitation 
of international maritime boundaries generally and the construction of baselines in 
. I 46 part1cu ar. 
As early as 1935 Norway established a series of straight baselines along joining 
the outer points of islands and rocks fringing part of its northern coastline for the 
purpose of establishing the limits of its 4nm exclusive fisheries zone.47 Enforcement of 
this fisheries zone resulted in several British fishing vessels being detained, a situation 
which led the UK to institute proceedings before the ICJ in 1949 in order to establish the 
outer limits of the Norwegian zone through the application of relevant principles of 
internationallaw.48 
The key question before the Court, therefore, was the validity of Norway's 
straight baseline system which served to extend the limits of the Norwegian exclusive 
fishing zone from those limits that would have existed if the normal baseline had been 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
United Nations, 1989a: 8. 
Prescott, 1985a: 49; United Nations, 1989: 11-12. 
Kapoor and Kerr, 1986: 33. 
For a history of the case see Reisman and Westerman (1992: 19-37). 
Kapoor and Kerr, 1986: 33-34. 
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used. In finding in favour of Norway, and confirming the validity of the Norwegian 
straight baseline system, the Court simultaneously stipulated that: 
a) where a coast is deeply indented and cut into ... the baseline becomes independent 
of the low-water mark and can be determined by means of geometric 
construction; and, 
b) the drawing of baselines must not depart in any appreciable extent from the 
general direction of the coast. 49 
Article 4 of the Geneva Convention was therefore drafted with the ICJ' s 1951 decision 
in mind. 5° The provisions of Article 4 were later largely repeated in Artide 7 of the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. Article 7 does, however, also provide guidance in 
relation to baselines on highly unstable coastlines and allows for the possibility of using 
low-tide elevations without lighthouses as basepoints in a straight baseline system so 
long as such lines have acquired general international recognition - provisions absent 
from Article 4. The latter provision was, in fact, included in order to confirm the 
validity of several basepoints used by Norway in its baseline system and expressly 
approved in the ICJ's 1951 judgement. 
49 
50 
Article 7 of the UN Convention provides that: 
1. In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a 
fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight 
baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline 
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 
2. Where because of the presence of a delta and other natural conditions the 
coastline is highly unstable, the appropriate points may be selected along the 
furthest seaward extent of the low water line and notwithstanding subsequent 
regression of the low-water line, the straight baselines shall remain effective 
until changed by the coastal State in accordance with this Convention. 
3. The drawing of straight baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent 
from the general direction of the coast, and the sea areas lying within the lines 
must be sufficiently closely linked to the land to be subject to the regime of 
internal waters. 
4. Straight baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations, unless 
lighthouses or similar installations which are permanently above sea level have 
been built on them or except in instances where the drawing of baselines to and 
from such elevations has received general international recognition. 
Kapoor and Kerr, 1986: 34. 
Prescott, 1987b: 289. 
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5. Where the method of straight baselines is applicable under paragraph 1, 
account may be taken, in determining particular baselines, of economic interests 
peculiar to the region concerned, the reality and importance of which are 
clearly evidenced by long usage. 
6. The system of straight baselines may not be applied by a State in such a manner 
as to cut off the territorial sea of another State from the high seas or an 
exclusive economic zone. 
The intention of Article 7 and its predecessor, Article 4, of the Geneva Convention is to 
cater for unusual coastal geography whereby the configuration of the coastline is such 
that simply using normal baselines and bay closing lines would result in enclaves or 
pockets of non-territorial sea surrounded by the territorial sea of a particular state. Such 
a scenario, involving a complex patchwork of territorial and non-territorial sea areas 
would inevitably raise problems in terms of marine management. A UN study on 
straight baselines included a hypothetical example of such a situation where the 
application of straight baselines would significantly simplify the pattern of maritime 
jurisdiction, therefore resolving associated management problems (Figure 2.1 ). 
The provisions set out in Article 7 of the 1982 UN Convention give rise to 
several significant queries, as precise definitions for the terms allowing the 
establishment of straight baselines are not provided. For example: 
• What constitutes a "deeply indented and cut into" coastline? 
• How is a "fringe" of islands defined and at what distance offshore is such a 
fringe of islands in the coastline's "immediate vicinity"? 
• What is meant by the term "highly unstable"? 
• By what means is the "general direction" of the coastline and what angle 
represents divergence to an "appreciable extent" from that direction? 
Article 7 similarly fails to provide any rule for ascertaining whether the sea area 
enclosed by a particular straight baseline system is "sufficiently closely linked to the 
land to be considered subject to the regime of internal waters. " In addition, there is no 
definition as how the "economic interests peculiar to the region" are to be quantified 
and no test is provided whereby states may prove their "long-usage" of areas so 
enclosed. 
As a consequence of this lack of precision in definition, and thus the absence of 
any means to test the validity of a particular straight baseline system, the adoption and 
application of straight baseline systems has been open to wide interpretation in state 
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Figure 2.1 The Role of Straight Baselines in Simplifying Territorial Sea Boundaries 
Source: United Nations, l989a. 
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practice. 51 Unsurprisingly, states have sought to interpret Article 7 to their maximum 
advantage, resulting in the establishment of what might be termed liberal or even 
aggressive straight baseline systems often reaching significantly offshore in order to 
secure the maximum advantage in any maritime delimitation with neighbouring states. 52 
The littoral states of the Gulf of Thailand have proved no exceptions (see Chapter 4). 
As Prescott notes: "the imprecise language [of Article 7] would allow any coastal 
country, anywhere in the world, to draw straight baselines along its coast. "53 
Several authorities have attempted detailed analysis of international law as it 
relates to straight baselines with the aim of shedding some light on the question of how 
international law should be interpreted and applied. 
An early analysis of note was that of Hodgson and Alexander who examined the 
Norwegian straight baseline system which had earlier been subject to dispute before the 
ICJ and whose validity had been upheld by that body.54 This 1951 ICJ decision may be 
considered fundamental to the introduction of the straight baselines concept into 
international law, leading directly to the drafting of Article 4 of the Geneva Convention 
and Article 7 of the UN Conventions of 1958 and 1982 respectively. Hodgson and 
Alexander found that in the case of the Norwegian straight baselines: 
• only two or three lines varied more than 15° from a general direction as 
judged from small scale charts; 
• the distinguishing features - fringing islands or deep indentations - extend 
along between 60% and 70% of the coastal stretch concerned; 
• the ratio of water to land enclosed between the baselines and the mainland 
coast is 3Y2: 1; 
• the longest single stretch of baseline is 45 sea miles. 55 
Beazley, commenting on Hodgson and Alexander's analysis also noted that, with regard 
to the concept of the "general direction of the coast", the ICJ had found in 1951 that the 
term lacked any mathematical precision and the Court stated that: 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
Francalanci (1998: 112) noted that "A mathematical formula which can be appled to all 
geographical cases does not exist; it would need to contain so many variable parametres that it 
becomes an impracticable enigma. 
Roach and Smith, 1994; Scovazzi et al., 1989. Reisman and Westerman (1992: xv) refer to an 
"explosion" of unilateral straight baseline claims post-1951, many of which they view as 
"manifestly inconsistent with formal legal requirements" resulting in "chaos" in this area of the 
law of the sea. 
Prescott, 1985a: 64 and 1987b. 
Hodgson and Alexander, 1972: 23-44. 
Summarised in Kapoor and Kerr, 1986: 36. 
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In order to properly apply the rule, regard must be had for the relation between 
the deviation complained of and what, according to the terms of the rule, must 
be regarded as the general direction of the coast. Therefore one cannot confine 
oneself to examining one sector of the coastline alone, except in a case of 
manifest abuse; nor can one rely on the impression that may be gathered from a 
large scale chart of this sector alone. 56 
Turning to analyses of the articles related to straight baselines in the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, perhaps the most influential is a 1987 US Department of State study 
which goes so far as to offer guidelines which seek to address some of these questions. 57 
The report concentrates on the key baseline concepts of defining deep coastal 
indentations and the use of fringing islands. The aim of the US study was to suggest 
standard guidelines in order to allow a "reasoned evaluation" of straight baseline 
systems claimed around the world making it possible to identify "with a certain degree 
of confidence" those straight baseline systems conforming to international law and those 
which do not.58 
It must be emphasised, however, that these US suggestions are by no means 
universally accepted. Indeed, as the preamble to the study itself states, the guidelines 
suggested "do not have international standing as benchmarks against which all such 
systems should be measured", and are not offered as "unequivocal yardsticks of the 
legality of straight baseline systems. "59 Nevertheless, many commentators regard the 
US rules as a "useful benchmark" even if state practice has shown them to be too 
. . 60 
constnctmg. 
The study also identifies the "inevitable tension between, on the one hand, a 
desire for establishing objective and uniform standards and, on the other hand, a 
realistic appreciationfor the lack of uniformity ofthe world's coastal geography", but 
maintains that to abandon efforts to establish objective guidelines "invites the grossest 
distortions of the rules for establishing straight baselines." The US analysis therefore 
advances the argument for the development of "reasonable and defensible standards" 
which may be applied "with a realistic recognition of the fact that, in some cases, 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
Quoted in Kapoor and Kerr, 1986: 36. 
US Department of State, 1987a. 
US Department of State, 1987a: 2. 
US Department of State, 1987a: 2. 
Carleton, 1997. 
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straight baseline systems having minor deviations from such standards can still be in 
general conformance with international law. "61 
In addition, the United Nations has itself issued a 1989 report in its Law of the 
Sea series entitled Baselines: An Examination of the Relevant Provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea which also attempts to tackle the thorny 
problem of interpreting the provisions contained in Article 7 of the UN Convention. 62 
These two key studies deserve particular attention and are therefore referred to 
extensively in the course of the following analysis. 63 
Deeply Indented Coasts 
With respect to coastlines that qualify as "deeply indented" the Department of State 
identified the following criteria to test a given coastline's suitability:64 
• Within the particular locality being considered, baseline segments accounting for 
at least 70% of the total length of the relevant baselines should each have at least 
6: 10 ratio of coastal penetration to segment length; 
• A coastline must have at least three significant indentations in any given locality; 
• No individual straight baseline segment should exceed 48 nautical miles in 
length. 
The United Nations' study emphasises the need to "focus on the spirit as well as the 
letter" of the first paragraph of Article 7, the aim of which is to avoid the undesirable 
mosaic of territorial and non-territorial sea areas which would result from the 
application of the normal baseline in certain geographically complex coastal situations 
(Figure 2.1).65 
Although the report observes that no objective test by which to identify deeply 
indented coasts has been developed which has gained general acceptance, it concludes 
that it has been generally accepted that there must be several indentations involved, 
which individually would satisfy Article lO's requirements, to be considered a juridical 
bay. 
In the United Nations' view, the spirit of Article 7 is preserved if straight 
baselines are drawn so that a complex pattern of territorial seas produced by the use of 
61 
62 
63 
G4 
US Department of State, 1987a. 
United Nations, 1989a. 
For a strict interpretation of the straight baseline regime see Reisman and Westerman ( 1992: 71-
104). 
US Department of State, 1987a: 5. 
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the normal baseline can be eliminated by the use of straight baselines "without 
significantly pushing the seaward limits of the territorial seas away from the coast" as 
"it is not the purpose of straight baselines to increase the territorial sea unduly. "66 
Fringe of Islands 
Concerning baseline systems in cases where there is a "fringe of islands along the coast 
in its immediate vicinity" the US guidelines advanced the following criteria to identify 
l .f . 67 qua 1 ymg coasts: 
• In light of the provision that "the drawing of straight baselines must not depart 
to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast" (Article 7 
(3)), the directional trend of the outer islands (i.e., the islands on which the 
straight baseline turning points will be situated) should not deviate more than 20° 
from the opposite mainland coastline; 
• There must be a consideration of distance between the outermost islands and the 
mainland coastline; 
• Islands considered part of the fringe should not be further apart from each other 
than 24 nautical miles (see Figure 2.2); 
• Such islands should mask 50% of the opposite mainland coastline; 
• No individual straight baseline segment should exceed 48 nautical miles m 
length; 
• Such islands should be no more than 48 nautical miles offshore (see Figure 
2.3).68 
Once again the United Nations' study makes it plain that there exists "no uniformly 
identifiable objective test which will identify for everyone islands which constitute a 
fringe in the immediate vicinity of the coast. "69 Instead states are recommended to 
follow the "spirit" of Article 7. 
The only firm guidelines the UN study offers are the observations that the term 
"fringe of islands" suggests that there must be more than one island involved (while 
noting that it is "difficult to specify a minimum number") and that the requirement that 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
United Nations, 1989a: 17; Prescott, 1985a: 50. 
United Nations, 1989a: 17 and 20. 
US Department of State, 1987a: 17-18. 
US Department of State, 1987a: 22. 
United Nations, 1989a: 20. 
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11 b) Non-fringing Islands: islands more 
. than 24 n. miles apart from another island. 
MAINLAND 
Figure 2.2 Fringing Islands 
Source: US Department of State, 1987a. 
the fringe be "along the coast" would mean that a chain of islands aligned 
perpendicularly to the coast would not qualify (see Figure 2.4).70 
Instead of objective rules and tests, the United Nations' report offers two 
scenarios, backed by examples, where a fringe of islands is likely to exist. 71 Firstly, 
where islands "appear to form a unity with the mainland" as in the case of Norway's 
skjaergaard; and secondly where islands at some distance from the coast "form a screen 
which masks a large proportion of the coast from the sea." In the latter case the islands 
along Yugoslavia's (now Croatia's) coastline from Pula to Sibenik are cited as typifying 
this sort of fringe. 
70 United Nations, l989a: 20. 
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Figure 2.3 Distance of Fringing Islands from the Mainland Coast 
Source: US Department of State, 1987a. 
Immediate Vicinity 
While the intent of the phrase in the coast's "immediate vicinity" is clear enough, 
Article 7 once again fails to deliver a clear-cut, objective test by which to judge whether 
certain islands are close enough to a mainland in order to be considered in its immediate 
vicinity. The US study cites Prescott72 as noting that while there was probably a general 
consensus that a fringe of islands 3nm from the coast was within the coast's immediate 
vicinity whereas one 1 OOnm from the coast would not be, "Unfortunately, it would not 
be possible to predict with confidence what the majority thought of a fringe of islands 
25, 40 or 65 nautical miles from the coast. "73 
For its part the US study suggested that there was likely to be general agreement 
that if the area between the islands and mainland would fall within a state's territorial 
sea measured from normal baselines, then it would be difficult to argue that those 
islands were excessively far offshore not to be termed in the mainland coast's immediate 
71 
72 
73 
United Nations, 1989a: 20. 
Prescott, 1985a: 4. 
US Department of State, l987a: 22. 
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---- Straight baseline 
Figure 2.4 Island Chain Lying Perpendicular to the Coast 
Source: United Nations, 1989a. 
vicinity. With 12nm-breadth territorial seas this gives a limit of 24nm between the 
mainland and the island fringe. 
This 24nm distance was proposed as a minimum limit. A maximum limit of a 
48nm separation between islands and mainland was also suggested, the logic being that 
no more than twice the area of hypothetical territorial seas drawn from the normal 
baselines of the islands and mainland would be enclosed by the straight baselines 
system and thus converted into internal waters. Despite providing this maximum limit, 
the US study did envisage circumstances where the 48nm rule might prove too 
restrictive, for example where: "an island grouping consisting of a number of islands 
that are not far separated from each other but that, nevertheless, work their way 
considerably seaward of the mainland coast." In such a case, the report went on, "if 
other criteria were met, straight baselines in these areas would not be precluded by this 
rule. "74 
That the US guidelines themselves contain such loopholes illustrates the 
problems of attempting to establish hard and fast rules which remain universally 
. applicable in the face of the complexity and diversity of coastal geography. 
74 US Department of State, l987a: 22. 
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The UN study concurred with the argument that a 24nm separation between 
island fringe and mainland is probably generally agreed upon but observed that the 
48nm limit "is not necessarily widely agreed upon. "75 Indeed, it is understood that the 
US itself has retreated from its own 48nm rule proposal to the more conservative and 
restrictive 24nm rule.76 
Deltas 
In addition to outlining the key conditions which justify the application of straight 
baselines (deep indentations and/or fringe of islands), Article 7 also provides rules 
relevant to a specific coastal circumstance- deltas. 
Although the US study of 1987 is silent bn the question of straight baselines and 
deltas as dealt with by Article 7(2), the UN report does highlight three key points. 
The second paragraph of the article is subordinate to the first rather than being 
an alternative to it. Thus the requirements of paragraph 1 of Article 7 - that the 
coastline in question be deeply indented and cut into, or there be a fringe of islands 
along that coast in its immediate vicinity- must first be met before Article 7(2) may be 
applied. 
Article 7(2) refers to "a delta and other natural conditions" [emphasis added] 
so that for this paragraph of the Article to apply, a delta must exist. Additionally, the 
coastline concerned must be "highly unstable." No precise definition is provided 
within the UN Convention for the latter term. 
Article 7(2) was introduced into the UN Convention with a specific case in mind 
- the delta of the Ganges/Brahmaputra Rivers - where environmental conditions can 
lead to rapid erosion and sedimentation resulting in significant advance. and retreat of 
the low:water line. The provisions outlined here allow states faced with such a situation 
to establish straight baselines without the obligation of continuously altering them with 
each change in the normal baseline. 
Location of base points and use of low-tide elevations 
Article 7 further provides that straight baselines should join "appropriate points. " The 
UN study makes it explicit that there are requirements that such appropriate points 
should be on or above the charted low-water line, on the territory of the state 
75 United Nations, 1989a: 21. 
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establishing the straight baselines and that the straight baseline system as a whole be 
closed (that is, it should start and finish on or above the low-water line). 
Paragraph 4 of Article 7 specifies that low-tide elevations are not to be used in 
the drawing of straight baselines unless one of two conditions is met. Firstly, if the low-
tide elevation concerned is surmounted by a lighthouse or similar structure, or, 
alternatively, if the use of the low-tide elevation as a basepoint for constructing straight 
baselines has received general international recognition. 
The first condition is fairly clear-cut, as low-tide elevations are specifically 
defined in Article 13 of the UN Convention (see Section 3.5), and it is generally clear 
whether a lighthouse or similar installation does indeed exist on it or not. The second 
condition is somewhat more problematic because, at least to some extent, it may be a 
matter of interpretation as to the degree of international recognition that exists in 
relation to the use of a particular low-tide elevation as a basepoint in a straight baseline 
system. 
The latter provision, absent from Article 4 of the Geneva Convention, was 
included in the 1982 Convention in order to take into account Norway's straight 
baseline system. Norway's straight baselines employ low-tide elevations lacking any 
structures, lighthouse or not, as basepoints and this system of straight baselines was 
expressly approved by the International Court of Justice in 1951. Technically, therefore, 
despite the ICJ's ruling, the Norwegian straight baselines contravened the terms of 
Article 4 of the Geneva Convention. Article 7 of the UN Convention was therefore 
designed to accommodate the Norwegian system and resolve this apparent conflict 
between the Geneva Convention and the judgement of the ICJ.77 
General Direction 
Article 7, paragraph 3 specifies that the alignment of straight baselines "must not depart 
to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast", a concept which 
stemmed from the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case judgement. As noted earlier, 
it was found that in the case of the Norwegian straight baselines that almost all the 
straight baseline segments diverged from what the Court determined as the general 
direction of the coast by no more than about 15°. 
76 
77 
Interview with Bob Smith, Office of Ocean Affairs, US Department of State, 9 July 1997. 
United Nations, 1989a: 24. 
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Permissible departures from the rule that 
baselines not deviate more than 20· from 
general direction of mainland 
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Island group directional trend ---7 
Figure 2.5 Fringing Islands and the General Direction of the Coast 
Source: US Department of State, 1987a. 
Subsequently, the US guidelines on this issue proposed an upper limit of 
divergence from the general direction of the coast of no more than 20°. This suggested 
limit was qualified by the proviso that in cases where the fringe of islands concerned is 
generally parallel to the coast, the lines joining that fringe to the mainland coast may 
exceed the 20° rule (see Figure 2.5).78 
Nevertheless, it is worth recalling that in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case 
the International Court of Justice found the entire concept of general direction to be 
"devoid of mathematical precision. "79 As the UN report observes, it has, therefore, not 
only been impossible to determine a generally accepted precise angle of deviation from 
the general direction of the coast against which to test this rule, but the fundamental 
problem of determining what constitutes general direction in the first place has defied 
resolution. 
Internal Waters 
A further concept introduced into the UN Convention with the Anglo-Norwegian 
Fisheries Case in mind is the requirement that the sea areas enclosed by straight 
baselines "must he sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to he subject to the 
US Department of State, 19X7a: 21. 
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regime of internal waters" (Article 7(3)). Although the spirit of this provision is clear, 
and in the 1951 case this idea was linked to rules relating to the determination of bays, 
no mathematical test by which to accurately assess this provision has emerged. For its 
part the UN report opts to quote from the Swedish government's submission to the 
International Law Commission on this issue that: 
... the expanse of water in question is so surrounded by land, including islands 
along the coast, that it seems natural to treat it as part of the land domain. 80 
Economic Interests, Long Usage and Cut Off 
Paragraph 5 of Article 7 provides the possibility of "economic interests peculiar to the 
region concerned, the reality and importance of which are clearly evidenced by long 
usage" having an influence on the determination of particular baselines. It has been 
observed that such economic interests do not themselves justify the establishment of 
straight baselines in the absence of deep indentations and/or a fringe of islands. Rather, 
these factors may provide justification for an altered alignment of a segment or 
segments of a straight baseline system, not reason for the establishment of that system 
itself.81 
The UN Convention gives no guidance as to what constitute valid economic 
interests, how to assess their "reality and importance" and what timespan amounts to 
"long usage. " Neither the US study or the UN report offer real guidelines on this topic. 
The use of such subjective terms as "importance" and the open-ended nature of what 
might be termed "economic interests" and "long usage" effectively negates the 
possibility of applying mathematical formulae by which to test these rules and provides 
significant scope for flexibility in its application and thus dispute. 
The final paragraph of Article 7 requires that a state's straight baselines should 
not be aligned in such a manner as to "cut off the territorial sea of another State from 
the high seas or an exclusive economic zone. " This provision is unambiguous and 
therefore should not pose particular difficulties in its application.82 
79 
80 
81 
82 
Kapoor and Kerr, 1986: 36. 
United Nations, 1989a: 25. 
United Nations, 1989a: 25. 
United Nations, 1989a: 25. 
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Summary 
It is often difficult to establish whether particular baselines or basepoints have played a 
substantive role in determining the final location of a maritime boundary. States are free 
to depart from strict equidistance and seldom include details of the methodology used in 
arriving at their maritime boundary agreements (see Section 3.2.6). It is unlikely, 
therefore, that the text of an agreement will provide a detailed rationale for that 
boundary and particularly which basepoints or baselines . were significant. Thus, 
frequently, a degree of uncertainty remains in the analysis of the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries and baselines. 
Nevertheless, straight baseline systems themselves may be assessed against the 
international standard provided by Article 7 of UNCLOS and by suggested rules for the 
analysis of straight baselines, such as the US guidelines. For example, if the US 
provisions were to be applied, it can be seen that the former Yugoslavia's baselines (see 
Figure 3.7) would pass the test. The baseline segments are relatively short (with an 
average length of 9.4nm and a maximum of 22.5nm), are compatible with the general 
direction of the coastline, enclose a fringe of islands close to both the mainland coastline 
itself (maximum distance offshore 6.6nm) and to one another and are drawn around a 
fringe of islands that clearly mask much of the mainland coast. 
In contrast, Burma's (Myanmar's) claimed baselines would fail the US test, not 
least for including a baseline segment (A - B on Figure 2.6) of some 222nm in length 
with a maximum distance offshore of 75nm.83 This segment alone clearly does not 
conform to the general direction of the coast in the Gulf of Martoban as well as being far 
too far off shore and concerns connecting islands far apart from one another and 
certainly not significantly masking the coastline. 
It should be stressed that the US guidelines, or indeed the United Nations 
baselines report, are no more than that, with no legal standing either as accepted 
international rules or in terms of state practice. However, they do provide a useful 
yardstick by which to assess straight baseline systems. 
Overall, it is abundantly clear that the imprecision inherent in the terminology of 
the 1982 Convention has provided ample scope for liberal interpretation and extravagant 
baseline claims thus giving rise to numerous potential disputes between states. The 
baseline claims made by the Gulf of Thailand littoral states are no exception (see 
83 Roach and Smith, 1996: 123. 
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Chapter 4). Having made that ominous comment, the way in which the UN Convention 
came to be concluded should be recalled. In a 'package deal' negotiation between 
numerous factions of competing state interests, compromise in its terms and thus scope 
for differing interpretations of them was perhaps inevitable. In these circumstances it is 
all the more remarkable that UNCLOS was drafted at all - had the issues outlined above 
been subject to even more intense analysis it sees doubtful that a Convention would 
have been concluded at all. Coupled with this background to the negotiation process is 
the fact that the Convention's provisions had to be cast in such a way as to apply 
globally, despite the geographical complexity of the world. It is hardly surprising, 
therefore, that a degree of flexibility was retained within the Convention's terms. 
2.3.4 River Mouths 
Where a river "flows directly into the sea", Article 9 of the UN Convention provides 
that "the baseline shall be a straight line across the mouth of the river between points 
on the low-water line of its banks." 
Significantly, the authentic French text of the first part of this Article of the 
Convention reads slightly differently from the authentic English text, instead saying, in 
translation, "If a river flows into the sea without forming an estuary ... "84 According to 
the UN Committee of Experts, the authentic English text should be interpreted in light 
of the meaning of the French text in this case.85 That is, Article 9 only applies where no 
estuary is present. Estuaries themselves are to be dealt with in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 10 relating to Bays. 
Further, it should be noted that Article 9 offers no restrictions on the length of 
the baseline closing a river mouth (both banks of which need not necessarily fall within 
the territory of one country). Article 9 has been left similarly flexible in relation to the 
choice of basepoints anchoring the baseline closing the river mouth. It is likely that this 
is the case because of the difficulties frequently associated with defining the precise 
mouth of a river86 (see also Section 2.3.5 for analogous problems relating to the mouths 
of bays). 
84 
85 
86 
"si un fleuve se jette dans lamer sans former estuaire ... " 
United Nations, 1989a: 26. 
Prescott, 1985a: 51. 
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2.3.5 Bays 
Article 10 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which is itself an almost 
verbatim repetition of Article 7 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone of 1958, provides that: 
I. This article relates only to bays the coasts of which belong to a single State. 
2. For the purposes of this Convention, a bay is a well-marked indentation whose 
penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as to contain land-
locked waters and constitute more than a mere curvature of the coast. An 
indentation shall not, however, be regarded as a bay unless its area is as large 
as, or larger than, that of the semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across 
the mouth of that indentation. 
3. For the purpose of measurement, the area of an indentation is that lying between 
the low-water mark around the shore of the indentation and a line joining the 
low-water mark of its natural entrance points. Where, because of the presence 
of islands, an indentation has more than one mouth, the semi-circle shall be 
drawn on a line as long as the sum total of the lengths of the lines across the 
different mouths. Islands within an indentation shall be included as if they were 
part of the water area of the indentation. 
4. If the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance points of a 
bay does not exceed 24 nautical miles, a closing line may be drawn between 
these two low-water marks, and the waters enclosed thereby shall be considered 
as internal waters. 
5. Where the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance points 
of a bay exceeds 24 nautical miles, a straight baseline of 24 nautical miles shall 
be drawn within the bay in such a manner as to enclose the maxinwm area of 
water that is possible with a line of that length. 
6. The foregoing provisions do not apply to so-called "historic" bays, or in any 
case where the system of straight baselines provided for in article 7 is applied. 
Article 10 therefore offers both objective and subjective tests of bay status.87 Paragraph 
2's references to "a well-marked indentation", and a bay being "more than a mere 
curvature of the coast" both indicate, as Prescott88 notes that "It is expected that the bay 
will be marked by a large change in the azimuth of the coast. " The concept of the bay's 
depth of penetration versus width of mouth being such that its area may constitute 
"land-locked waters" expresses the idea of a body of water surrounded on all but one 
side. These terms are, nonetheless, open to varied interpretation. 
87. 
88 
For a comprehensive legal analysis of bays see Westerman, 1987. 
Prescott, 1985a: 51. 
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Figure 2.7 Bays: The Semi-Circle Test 
Source: Franc..:alanc..:i and Sc..:ovazzi, 1994. 
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In order to overcome this problem a specific and unambiguous mathematical test 
was included in the Article, the semi-circle test. This formula is detailed in paragraph 3 
of Article 10 where it is made explicit that the diameter of the semi-circle to be used to 
test the validity of a particular bay should be equivalent to the width of the mouth (or 
mouths) of the bay. Its conditions are illustrated in Figure 2.7. Prescott89 also makes 
the observation that, strictly speaking, the semi-circle test should only be applied when 
it has been ascertained that a "well-marked indentation" exists. In reality, however, he 
suggests that it would be "inconceivable" for a state to object to the closing of a bay 
which satisfied the semi-circle test on the grounds of it not being a well-marked 
indentation. 
Uncertainty remains, however, concerning how, in certain circumstances, the 
"natural entrance points" of a bay may be identified. As the UN Committee of Experts 
report indicates, certain bays may boast a number of points which could be considered 
its natural entrance(s) while others may possess smoothly curved entrances where it is 
difficult if not impossible to identify a single point as marking the entrance on one or 
both sides.90 In this scenario there is no necessarily 'right' answer. It must therefore be 
concluded that a state may select any appropriate closing line for the bay as long as the 
terms of the semi-circle test are fulfilled. 
Where one natural entrance point can be readily identified but not the other 
because of the smooth coast, Prescott has suggested a method designed to identify the 
second entrance point. He promotes the idea of measuring the distance between the 
natural entrance point and the point where that headland merges with the smooth coast 
in the depth of the bay. The same distance can then be projected along the smooth coast 
to fix an arbitrary entrance point. This was illustrated by reference to Port Waitangi, 
Chatham Island (Figure 2.8). 91 
Where the natural entrance points of a bay are themselves smooth and rounded, 
it is similarly difficult to identify a single point representing the precise natural entrance. 
Shalowitz92 has proposed constructing lines representing the general direction of both 
the coast outside and inside the bay. As the bay is itself a well-marked indentation 
where the azimuth of the coast alters significantly at the entrance point, the two general 
direction of the coast lines can be projected to intersect off the natural entrance point 
89 
90 
91 
Prescott, 1985a: 53. 
United Nations, 1989a: 28. 
Prescott, 1985a: 56. 
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Figure 2.8 Port Waitangi, Chatham Island 
Source: Prescott, 1985a. 
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headland. The angle between these two lines can then be bisected and traced back to the 
headland so that a specific entrance point can be fixed where the bisector reaches the 
coast. This method was illustrated by Prescott by reference to Baie Anarua, French 
Polynesia (Figure 2.9).93 
Another, rather less significant problem, relates to the area of the bay where 
subsidiary bays exist or rivers flow into the bay. Should the area of such subsidiary bays 
be included for the purposes of calculating the area versus diameter equation set out in 
the semi-circle test? Similarly, should straight lines be drawn across the mouths of 
rivers flowing into bays, thus restricting the area of the bay for that test? Clearly, these 
questions only become an issue if the area of the bay is close indeed to that of the semi-
circle. It has further been suggested that if islands forming the mouths of a bay lie 
seaward of the direct line between the two mainland natural entrance points, they should 
not be joined by closing lines and the direct line should be used. A similar argument has 
been advanced in cases where the entrance points between such islands are not 
. bl 94 navtga e. 
As far as subsidiary bays are concerned, if the shoreline of such bays forms part 
of the low-water line and amounts to part of the penetration of the sea into the land, they 
would seem to qualify under the terms of Article I 0. The situation with regard to rivers 
<)2 Shalowitz, 1962: 64-65; Prescott, 1985a: 56; Hodgson and Alexander, 1972: 12. 
Prescott, 1985a: 55. 
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Figure 2.9 Baie Anarua, French Polynesia 
Source, Prescott, 1985a. 
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interrupting the low-water line of a bay is less clear, particularly where such river 
mouths are wide and penetrated by tides. Presumably, that area affected by the tide, 
representing the penetration of the sea, could be claimed as being part of the surface area 
of the bay.95 
Concerning islands in the mouth of bays, Article I 0 does not specify that they 
have to lie directly in the mouth of a particular bay. This in itself gives rise to some 
ambiguity over quite how far removed from the mouth of a bay such islands might 
realistically be (within the confines of the semi-circle test). Article I 0 gives no 
guidance on this issue, nor does it specify that the channels between islands must be 
navigable. Nevertheless, Article I 0, paragraph 5 does restrict bay closing lines to a 
maximum length of 24nm, a provision which must necessarily prevent any island in the 
mouth of a bay being more than 12nm offshore. In addition, where the distance between 
the natural entrance points of a bay exceeds this distance, the bay closing line must be 
pulled back deeper into the bay in order to fulfil the requirements of Article I 0.96 
94 United Nations, 1989a: 30. 
United Nations, 1989a: 28. 
Prcs<.:ott, 1985a: 59-60. 
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The first and last paragraphs of the Article outline three types of bay which are 
not covered by Article lO's restrictions. Firstly, Article 10 only applies to bays 
belonging to a single state. Secondly, Article 10 does not apply to historic bays and 
lastly it doesn't apply where Article 7 relating to straight baselines is being applied. The 
first and last of these three qualifications are precise and easily understood. That 
relating to historic bays is significantly more problematic. 
It is worth quoting Prescott97 at length on this point: 
In a Convention where many of the articles mean all things to all men the rules 
about bays are fairly clear. Unfortunately the force of this clear language is 
undermined by the disclaimer that the rules do not apply to historic bays. It 
would not be so damaging if there was a general understanding of the definition 
of historic bays, but that is the only place such features are mentioned in the 
Convention. 
Recourse to proclamations of authority over historic bays allows states to 
escape from the provisions concerning the drawing of closing lines and defining 
legal bays. This escape is simplified by the lack of codification of international 
law regarding historic bays. 
The concept of historic bays is clearly closely allied to the term 'historic waters'. 
Historic waters may on the one hand be viewed as constituting the maritime space 
enclosed within a historic bay. However, the regime of historic waters have also been 
applied to maritime areas outside bays. A prime example of such a 'non-bay' claim to 
historic waters is that made by Cambodia and Vietnam (see Section 6.3). 
The question of historic bays and historic waters represents something of a 
longstanding, and thorny, issue. Indeed, proposals concerning this topic were discussed 
at UNCLOS I and UNCLOS III (see Section 2.2). Perhaps the closest that the 
international community has come to codification of rules governing historic bays and 
waters was UNCLOS I's request to the UN to conduct a study of the subject which the 
UN Secretariat duly published in 1962. This report concluded that a state may indeed 
claim title to a bay on historic grounds if it can demonstrate that for a considerable 
period of time it has claimed the bay in question is internal waters, exercised its 
sovereignty there and that its claim has received the acquiescence of other states.98 
97 
98 
Prescott, 1985a: 60-61. 
Churchill and Lowe, 1988: 36-37. 
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This interpretation has been adopted by the United States Supreme Court in 
relation to federal-state cases and seems to reflect the current United States vtew, as 
expressed by Roach and Smith:99 
To meet the international standard for establishing a claim to historic waters, a 
State must demonstrate its open, effective, long-term, and continuous exercise of 
authority over the body of water, coupled with acquiescence by foreign States to 
the exercise of that authority. The United States takes the position that an actual 
showing of acquiescence by foreign States in such a claim is required, as 
d b to 0 0 100 oppose to a mere a sence C! opposztwn. 
The United States is of the opinion that few of the 18 claims to historic bays world-wide 
meet the international standard and has issued diplomatic protests concerning 15 of 
them. 101 
In the absence of formal codification, the application of historic bays and historic 
waters is governed by customary international law and this is supported by the 
International Court of Justice which found in the Tunisia-Libya Continental She(f case 
that: 
... general international law ... does not provide for a single 'regime' for 'historic 
waters' or 'historic bays', but for a particular regime for each of the concrete, 
recognised cases C!f 'historic waters' or 'historic bays '. 102 
2.3.6 Ports and Roadsteads 
Articles 11 and 12 of the UN Convention deal with ports and roadsteads respectively. 
The former stipulates that for delimiting the territorial sea "the outermost permanent 
harbour works which form an integral part of the harbour system are regarded as 
forming part C!f the coast. " An example of such a feature would be a detached 
breakwater protecting the mouth of a port. The Article goes on to specifically exclude 
offshore installations and artificial islands from consideration as permanent harbour 
works. Article 11 is therefore clear and reasonably unambiguous. Although it is not 
specifically stated it may be assumed that the mouth of harbours may be closed by 
99 
100 
101 
102 
Roach and Smith, 1996: 31. 
Roach and Smith, 1996: 16. 
For a comparative analysis of historic bay claims see Nixon (1981). See also O'Connell (1982: 
417-438). 
Cited in Churchill and Lowe, 1988: 36. 
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straight baselines - this is, however, unlikely to have a significant impact on the extent 
of the territorial sea claimed. 103 
Article 12 of the UN Convention largely repeats Article 9 of the Geneva 
Convention of 1958 and allows roadsteads used for loading, unloading and anchoring of 
ships which would otherwise fall wholly or partially outside the outer limit of the 
territorial sea to be included in the territorial sea. It would seem that this Article has 
become increasingly redundant. It was originally drafted when many states still claimed 
a 3om-breadth territorial sea. As the majority of states have moved towards 12nm 
territorial sea, the incidence of roadsteads beyond the territorial sea has significantly 
diminished. 104 
2.4 Zones of Jurisdiction 
The 1958 and 1982 Conventions provide for a number of maritime zones - horizontal, 
vertical and functional - over which states may exercise varying degrees of jurisdiction 
or sovereignty. There are many complexities to these zones, the key attributes of which 
are outlined below. 105 
2.4.1 Inter-tidalforeshore 
This lies between high and low tidemarks. The coastal state maintains absolute 
sovereignty over this area as for other parts of its land territory. 
2.4.2 Internal Waters 
Article 8 of the Convention defines internal waters in the following manner: "waters on 
the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea form part of the internal waters 
of the State. " The sovereignty of the state over these waters is fully fledged, the Law of 
the Sea does not apply to them, and there is thus no right of "innocent passage" (see 
103 
104 
105 
Prescott, 1985: 62. 
Kapoor and Kerr, 1986: 52. 
Zones not applicable to the Gulf of Thailand, notably continental shelf beyond 200nm from the 
coast, the high seas and deep seabed are omitted from this review. See Carleton ( 1997) for a 
zone-by-zone review of the responsibilities of coastal states on ratification/accession to 
UNCLOS. 
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below). Internal waters usually include such areas as ports, estuaries inlets, and inter-
island waters. 
2.4.3 Territorial Waters 
Article 2 of UN Law of the Sea Convention states that: 
The sovereignty of a coastal State extends beyond its land territory and internal 
waters ... to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea. This 
sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as its bed 
and subsoil. 
The contentious issue of the breadth of the territorial sea was resolved in Article 3: 
Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a 
limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines detennined in 
accordance with this Convention. 
By no means all states currently claim a 12nm zone. World-wide, some I 0 states claim 
territorial seas of less than 12nm, whilst 16 states claim territorial sea in excess of 12nm 
(11 of which still claim 200nm territorial seas). 106 Thus, the claims of I 0 states to 
territorial seas of less than 12nm breadth are in accordance with the provisions of 
UNCLOS (a 12nm zone being a limit to jurisdiction not a compulsory breadth of zone) 
while, in contrast, those claims to territorial seas beyond 12nm, are not. All of the Gulf 
of Thailand littoral states claim 12nm territorial waters. 
A state's sovereignty over its territorial sea whilst, apparently having all the 
attributes of its sovereignty over its land territory is, however, limited in one significant 
way. According to Article 17 of the Convention, sovereignty over the zone in question 
is limited by the traditional "right of innocent passage through the territorial sea" not 
"prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state. " 
2.4.4 The Contiguous Zone 
The 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone provided for states to 
claim a zone contiguous to the territorial sea of up to 12nm breadth within which a state 
could exercise jurisdiction over matters such as customs and immigration. The 1982 
Con'(ention retained these provisions but expanded the allowable breadth of the 
106 Of these 16 states, 6 have signed and ratified the UN Law of the Sea Convention thus accepting 
the 12nm principle 
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contiguous zone to 24nm. In light of the 200nm exclusive economic zone (EEZ) (see 
below) provided for by the 1982 Convention the contiguous zone has little relatively 
contemporary relevance. 
2.4.5 Exclusive Fishing Zone 
Prior to development of the EEZ concept states sometimes declared an exclusive fishing 
zone (EFZ) beyond territorial waters and contiguous zone limits in order to protect fish 
stocks. This type of jurisdictional claim has been largely superseded by the EEZ. 
Nevertheless, several states, retain EFZ claims. 107 
2.4.6 Continental Shelf 
The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf gave state parties sovereign 
rights for the purpose of exploring the continental shelf, that is "the seabed and subsoil 
of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea", 
and exploiting its natural resources: 
... to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the 
superadjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of 
the said areas and to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas 
adjacent to the coasts of islands (Articles I and 2). 
The UNCLOS granted the same sovereign rights but defined the maximum allowable 
claim differently. Paragraph I of Article 76 of the UNCLOS states that: 
The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the sea-bed and subsoil 
of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout 
the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the 
continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is m.easured where 
the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that 
distance. 
It is worth noting that, in contrast to other zones of maritime jurisdiction, the continental 
shelf does not have to be specifically claimed under UNCLOS - every coastal state has 
one, whether specifically claimed or not: 
107 
The rights of the coastal State over the continental she({ do not depend on 
occupation, effective or notional, or on any express proclamation (Article 77, 3). 
See Smith, 1986: 4. 
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It is also important to acknowledge that rights to the seabed and subsoil acquired 
through EEZ claims are, nonetheless, still governed in accordance with the UN 
Conventions provisions relating to the continental shelf. 
2.4.7 The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
The 1982 Convention allowed for a substantial extension of the jurisdiction of coastal 
states seawards. The principle of a zone extending 200nm from a state's baseline within 
which the state could have exclusive jurisdiction over resources was incorporated into 
Part V of the Convention. Article 55 provides the specific legal regime of the exclusive 
economic zone as being: 
The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial 
sea, subject to the spec{ftc legal regime established in this Part, under which the 
rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other 
States are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention. 
Article 56, concerning the rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State m the 
exclusive economic zone specifies that: 
1. In the exclusive economic zone the coastal State has: 
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving 
and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the 
waters superadjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil, 
and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and 
exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, 
currents and winds; 
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention 
with regard to: 
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and 
structures; 
(ii) marine scient(ftc research; 
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment; 
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention. 
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the 
exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights 
and duties of other coastal States and shall act in a manner compatible with the 
provisions of this Convention. 
3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the sea-bed and subsoil shall 
be exercised in accordance with Part VI [concerning the continental shelf]. 
While Article 57 defines the breadth of the EEZ as being: 
The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from 
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 
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It should be noted that within the EEZ states do not have sovereignty, rather they have 
certain "sovereign rights", ':jurisdiction" and "duties". 
2.5 The Gulf of Thailand Littoral States and the Law of the Sea 
Of the four Gulf of Thailand coastal states, only Vietnam and Malaysia are full parties to 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), both countries 
signing the Convention when it was concluded in December 1982 and subsequently 
ratifying it. While both Thailand and Cambodia have signed the Convention, neither 
country has yet deposited its instruments of ratification with the United Nations (see 
Table 2.1). 
It is also worth noting that before the drafting of the 1982 UN Law of the Sea 
Convention, three of the four Gulf of Thailand littoral states - Cambodia, Malaysia and 
Thailand - also became parties to both the 1958 Conventions dealing with the 
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, and the Continental Shelf, respectively. 108 
Table 2.1 The Gulf of Thailand States and Law of the Sea Conventions 
State UNCLOS 109 Geneva Conventions 110 
Signed Ratified Territorial Sea Continental Shelf 
and Contiguous 
Zone 
Cambodia I July 1983 9 October 1964 6 October 1964 
Malaysia 10 December 1982 14 October 1996 9 October 1964 6 October 1964 
Thailand 1 0 December 1982 7 November 7 November 
1968 1968 
Vietnam 10 December 1 982 25 July 1994 
Technically, only states which have ratified the Convention, such as Vietnam, are 
obliged to accept the rights and obligations defined therein. However, although the 
Convention is not formally binding on non-signatories, as mentioned, much of the 
Convention, particularly those parts relating to maritime zones and maritime boundary 
delimitation, may be considered as having been accepted as customary international law. 
108 
109 
The Gulf of Thailand littoral states are also bound by their past commitments to the 1958 Geneva 
Conventions and it is notable that the terms and provisions contained in those Conventions 
relating to the territorial sea, the contiguous zone and the continental shelf were incorporated 
almost verbatim into the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
National Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction/United Nations Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law 
of the Sea (DOALOS) website: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/losconv l.htm#StatusConvention 
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The Gulf of Thailand states, whether parties to UNCLOS or not, have not been 
slow to advance claims to straight baseline systems and extended maritime jurisdiction. 
This is demonstrated by Table 2.2 which summarises the maritime claims made by the 
Gulf of Thailand states: 
Table 2.2 Maritime Claims in the Gulf of Thailand 
Country Straight Historic Territorial Contiguous Continental EEZ 
Baselines Waters Sea Zone Shelf 
Cambodia v v v v v v 
Malaysia v 
" 
v 
" 
v v 
Thailand v v v 
" 
v v 
Vietnam v v v v v v 
Source: Author's research. 
The baseline claims of the Gulf of Thailand coastal states will be considered in Chapter 
4 while their claims to territorial sea, contiguous zone, continental shelf and EEZ claims 
will be dealt with in Chapter 5. 
110 Brown, 1994, Voi.II.: 387-389. 
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The Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries and the Gulf of 
Thailand 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 Delimitation of the Territorial Sea 
The delimitation of the territorial sea between states with opposite or adjacent coasts is 
governed by Article 15 of the UN Convention which repeats, almost verbatim, the text 
of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. Article 15 
provides that, unless the states agree otherwise or there exists an "historic title or other 
special circumstances" in the area to be delimited, neither state is entitled to extend its 
territorial sea beyond the median line, "every point of which is equidistant from the 
nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of 
the two States is measured. " 
It is apparent from this provision that there is a clear presumption in favour of 
equidistance for the delimitation of the territorial sea, although this presumption does 
not apply where historic title or "special circumstances" exist. While the latter terms 
are not defined in the Law of the Sea Convention, the burden is clearly on the state 
asserting such circumstances to demonstrate that an exception exists - in other words, 
that it has historically exercised a sufficient administration and control over the area in 
question, to the exclusion of others, to warrant a departure from equidistance. 
3.1.2 Delimitation of the Continental Shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone 
The 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf provides, in Article 6 that: 
1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more 
States whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental 
shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement between 
them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is 
justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every 
point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea of each state is measured. 
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2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two 
adjacent States, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by 
agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another 
boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary shall be 
determined by application of the principle of equidistance from the nearest 
points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each 
State is measured (emphasis added). 
Under the Law of the Sea Convention, however, the provisions dealing with the 
delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones are identical. 
Thus, both Article 74(1) dealing with the EEZ, and Article 83(1) dealing with the 
continental shelf, state: 
The delimitation of the continental shelf [or exclusive economic zone} between 
States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the 
basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution. 1 
Significantly, unlike Article 15 dealing with the delimitation of the territorial sea, these 
provisions do not refer to any particular method of delimitation such as equidistance. 
The emphasis is clearly on achieving an equitable result. 
This stance is echoed in recent cases decided by the International Court of 
Justice and by arbitral tribunals. In the Libya-Malta case, for example, the Court held: 
Delimitation is to be effected in accordance with equitable principles and taking 
account of all the relevant circumstances so as to arrive at an equitable result. 2 
The predominant types of relevant circumstances brought into play in maritime 
boundary delimitation are outlined in Sections 3.3-3.6. 
2 
Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ is included as Appendix I. 
Libya/Malta Case, para.29. Republished in Research Centre for International Law, Voi.II, 1992: 
1,547. 
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3.2 Methods of Maritime Boundary Delimitation 
3.2.1 Equidistance Lines 
Strict Equidistance 
A strict equidistance line, defined by the 1958 and 1982 Conventions as a line "every 
point of which is equidistant from the nearest base points on the [territorial sea] 
baselines" of the states concerned is a geometrically exact expression of the midline 
concept and is best illustrated graphically.3 
Figure 3.1 depicts a straightforward equidistance line between opposite 
coastlines. Sector a-b represents the perpendicular bisector of the line joining 
basepoints A and B respectively. Any point on that perpendicular bisector is equidistant 
from points A and B.4 Due to coastal irregularities, however, such straight lines rarely 
remain equidistant from the relevant coasts for long. To maintain equidistance, new 
perpendicular bisectors between other points on the coastline are required such that an 
equidistance line is built up consisting of a succession of sections of perpendicular 
bisectors of straight lines joining the closest points on the coasts of the states 
concerned. 5 
Thus, Point b represents a tripoint equidistant from basepoints A, B and C. 
Basepoints A and C now become the control points for the equidistance line. Point b is 
therefore a turning point on the strict equidistance line with sector b-e being the 
perpendicular bisector of the line joining A and C, and so on. This idea is illustrated by 
the circles on Figure 3.1, centred on the equidistance line with radii such that their 
circumference passes through the nearest basepoints. If the line under examination is 
indeed equidistant from the two coastlines, then it can be seen from this exercise that no 
basepoints lie within the circumference of any of the circles. The same principles can 
also be applied to adjacent coasts as illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
4 
5 
See also, for example, Boggs, 1937 and Hodgson and Cooper, 1976. 
Figure adapted from Beazley, 1994a: 24. 
Beazley, 1994a: 7-9. 
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STATE A 
STATE B 
Figure 3.1 Equidistance Between Opposite Coasts 
Source: Beazley, 1994a. 
Simplified Equidistance 
Where the parties' coastlines are complex and there are consequently numerous 
basepoints on either side, the application of strict equidistance can frequently result in a 
rather convoluted line involving a large number of turning points and a corresponding 
plethora of short straight-line equidistance line segments. This scenario raises practical 
problems for maritime management, particularly in relation to navigation and the 
development of living and non-living offshore resources. In addition, strict equidistance 
often makes the illustration of the line on a chart problematic and results in an overly 
long list of coordinates to describe the line. 6 
This 'problem' or inconvenience IS often resolved by adapting a strict 
equidistance line in order to 'straighten' sections of it - resulting in a simplified 
equidistance line. This method involves reducing the number of turning points to a 
manageable level, thus reducing the number and increasing the length of the intervening 
straight-line segments. The remaining basepoints are often selected such that an equal 
6 Beazley, 1994a: 9 
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STATE B 
Figure 3.2 Equidistance Between Adjacent Coasts 
Source: Beazley, 1994a. 
exchange of area between the two sides results - a method resulting m what IS 
frequently termed an area compensated line.7 
A good example of the application of this method of maritime boundary 
delimitation is that provided by the Mexico-United States boundary, where the number 
of turning points in the Gulf of Mexico delimitation and Pacific coast delimitation were 
reduced from eight to five and sixteen to four respectively. In both cases this 
simplification resulted in only a very slight exchange in maritime space between the 
. 8 parties. 
Other, less accurate, methods of simplification include the selection of only 
certain key basepoints therefore eliminating the complexities to the resulting dividing 
line caused by the intervening basepoints. 
7 Beazley, 1994a: 9; Legault and Hankey, 1993: 207. 
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Modified Equidistance 
In the absence of outstanding geographical features, strict equidistance will result in an 
equal division of maritime space and thus an equitable delimitation. In the case of 
delimitations between opposite coasts such outstanding geographical features capable of 
considerably influencing an equidistance line, and thus the equitability of the resulting 
division, are commonly offshore islands. In the case of delimitation between adjacent 
coasts such features common include promontories in the vicinity of the coastal 
terminus of the land boundary of the two states on the coast. 
Where such features do occur, a frequently applied solution has been to apply 
equidistance principles but to modify the resulting equidistance line by either 
discounting certain basepoints or by according to them a reduced effect. This method 
commonly results in a significantly greater alteration to strict equidistance than that in 
the case of a simplified equidistance line. Furthermore, unlike simplified equidistance 
lines, modifications of an equidistance line in this manner usually result in an unequal 
distribution of maritime space between the parties as compared with a division on the 
basis of strict equidistance. 9 
One popular way to modify a strict equidistance line is to adopt some flexibility 
in terms of the selection of appropriate basepoints. Under this method the parties to a 
dispute may agree to discount particular basepoints when constructing a boundary line 
which is otherwise based on equidistance. This method has been widely used, a good 
example being the Iran-Qatar continental shelf agreement of 1969. In this case, the 
parties agreed to delimit their common boundary on the basis of equidistance but to 
ignore all islands, rocks, reefs and low-tide elevations as basepoints. The resulting 
boundary is therefore equidistant from the nearest points on Iran's and Qatar's mainland 
coastlines. 10 
An alternative solution to the problem of the disproportionate effect of particular 
geographical features when the equidistance method of maritime boundary delimitation 
is applied is to accord the island or other feature concerned only partial effect (See 
Section 3.5). This was the case in the delimitation between Malta and Libya whereby 
the equidistance line was shifted 18 minutes of latitude northwards (i.e. to Libya's 
9 
10 
Charney and Alexander, 1993: 427-446. 
Legault and Hankey, 1993: 208. 
· Charney and Alexander, 1993: 1,511-1,518. 
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TUNISIA 
LIBYA 
Figure 3.5 The Delimitation between Libya and Tunisia 
Source: IBRU, 1999. 
advantage) giving the Maltese islands less than full effect on the final delimitation line 
(Figure 3.3). 11 
In many cases half-effect has been applied, for example in relation to the Scilly 
Isles in the UK-France Arbitration 12 (Figure 3.4) and the Kerkennah Islands in the 
Tunisia-Libya delimitation 13 (Figure 3.5), but there is certainly no obligation or hard and 
fast rule on this issue as illustrated by the Sweden-USSR delimitation where a 75:25 
ratio was applied 14 (Figure 3.6) and ·in the Libya-Malta case mentioned above. 
Half-effect can be applied by means of a 'bisector' method whereby the feature 
or features to be accorded a reduced effect are reduced to a single representative point. 15 
An equidistance line can then by drawn using this point and an agreed point on the coast 
of the state with whom the boundary is being delimited. Another equidistance line can 
be constructed using the latter point, but ignoring the point representing the features 
being given reduced affect, and a half effect line drawn by bisecting the angle between 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Charney and Alexander, 1993: 1,649-1,662. 
Charney and Alexander, 1993: 1,735-1,754. 
Charney and Alexander, 1993: 1,663-1,680. 
Charney and Alexander, 1993: 2,057-2,076. 
For a detailed analysis of half-effect applied to equidistance lines see Beazley, 1979 
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the two equidistance lines. This method was followed in relation to the Scilly Isles in 
the Anglo-French arbitration case (Figure 3.4). 16 
Alternatively, two equidistance lines can be constructed, one giving the features 
concerned full effect and the other ignoring them. A third line, equidistant from the 
other two, can then be drawn in order to accord the features a half effect. This method 
was applied in relation to the influence of the Iranian island of Kharg on the Iran-Saudi 
Arabia continental shelf agreement of 1968. 17 Similarly, this method was used in the 
Sweden-USSR case, although a 75:25 ratio between the two lines using and ignoring the 
Swedish islands of Gotland and Gotska Sandon was agreed upon (to Sweden's 
advantage) rather than a 50:50 half effect one (Figure 3.6). 18 
The half-effect approach can also be applied to non-equidistance line-based 
boundary delimitations as happened in the Tunisia-Libya case before the ICJ. Here, two 
lines were constructed, one following the general direction of Tunisia's mainland coast 
and the other the general direction of the Kerkennah Islands group. A bisector between 
these two lines was then drawn and the angle of that line applied to the seaward part of 
the boundary between the parties thus giving the Kerkennah Islands a half-effect on the 
delimitation (Figure 3.5). 19 
3.2.2 Enclaving 
Where islands belonging to one state are nearer to the mainland coast of the opposing 
state than to their own state's mainland coast, that is, they fall on the 'wrong' side of an 
equidistance line between mainland coasts, the states concerned may opt to ignore the 
islands altogether for the purposes of constructing an overall division between their 
mainland coastlines. 
In such circumstances, the islands concerned may be wholly or partially 
enclaved, usually being accorded no more than a restricted belt of jurisdiction, often no 
more than that over territorial sea. 20 The fundamental intent and effect of such a 
method, which is often applied in conjunction with some form of equidistance, is to 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Charney and Alexander, 1993: 1,735-1,754. 
Charney and Alexander, 1993: 1,5191,532; Bundy, 1994a: 180, 1994b: 30. 
Charney and Alexander, 1993: 2,057-2,076. 
Charney and Alexander, 1993: 1,663-1,680. 
Common practice is for such islands to be awarded a 12nm territorial sea. Occasionally, 
however, as in the case of Italy-Tunisia, enclaved islands may be granted a 13nm belt- 12nm of 
territorial sea plus a symbolic 1nm of continental shelf or exclusive economic zone jurisdiction in 
order to demonstrate that the feature concerned is fully-fledged island and not a mere rock 
(Section 3.2.1 ). 
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eliminate inequalities and reduce the maritime area falling to the state whose islands are 
enclaved relative to the application of strict equidistance?1 
A fine example of the application of the full enclaving method was that which 
was applied in the France-United Kingdom delimitation in the English Channel. The 
Court of Arbitration, which had been asked to render a decision on the delimitation 
question, found that between the opposite mainland coasts of the two states, 
irregularities in the coastlines of the parties generally cancelled one another out such 
that a median line would result in a generally equitable delimitation. Indeed, if the 
Channel Islands did not exist, the Court found that a median line "is precisely how the 
delimitation of the boundary of the continental shelf in the English Channel would 
t 't lf. ,22 presen l se . Having admitted that the Channel Islands do in fact exist, albeit 
located not only on the French side of a median line drawn between mainland coasts but 
"practically within the arms of a gulf on the French coast", 23 the Court concluded that: 
... the Channel Islands are not only 'on the wrong side' of the mid-Channel 
median line but wholly detached geographically from the United Kingdom. 24 
The Court therefore specified that the Channel Islands be enclosed in an enclave formed 
by 12nm arcs from their baselines to the north and west and by a boundary between 
them and the nearby French coasts to their east, south and southwest to be negotiated by 
the two states?5 
Where small islands exist in close proximity to a potential median line a further 
method of accommodating them is to partially enclave them. This method was applied 
in the continental shelf boundary agreement between Italy and the then Yugoslavia 
concluded in 1968. The Yugoslav (now Croatian) islands of Pelagruza and Galijula 
were accorded rights to territorial sea jurisdiction but no influence on the overall 
equidistance line. As a result 12nm arcs were drawn from the islands and as a result, in 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Legault and Hankey, 1993: 212. 
Anglo-French Arbitration, para 182. Republished in Research Centre for International Law, 
Vol.I, 1992: 442. 
Anglo-French Arbitration, para 183. Republished in Research Centre for International Law, 
Vol.I, 1992: 442. 
Anglo-French Arbitration, para 199. Republished in Research Centre for International Law, 
Vol.I, 1992: 448. 
The exact course of the boundary between the Channel Islands and the French mainland coast 
was beyond the scope of the Court's jurisdiction and was not therefore specified (Charney and 
Alexander, 1993: 1 ,741). This was partially resolved through an agreement between France and 
the UK on behalf of Guernsey which defined two equidistance-based fishery boundaries 
(Charney and Alexander, 1998: 2,471). 
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Figure 3.7 The Delimitation between Italy and Yugoslavia 
Source: IBRU, 1997. 
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this section of the boundary, Italy gained 1,400km2 as compared with a delimitation 
based on strict equidistance (Figure 3.7).26 
A yet more striking illustration of this method was included in the continental 
shelf agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia of 1968 (Figure 3.8). Here, although the 
boundary generally follows the equidistance principle, in the central section of the 
boundary line both Iran's Farsi Island and Saudi Arabia's AI- 'Arabiyah Island were 
accorded territorial seas and thereby partially enclaved by 12nm arcs with a local 
equidistance line between them. 27 
3.2.3 Lines of Bearing 
The other main geometric method of constructing an equidistance line evident from 
state practice and case law is that of a line of bearing, that is, a line of constant compass 
b . 28 eanng. 
26 
27 
B!akeetal., 1996:15-16. 
Charney and Alexander, 1993: 1,519-1,532. 
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Perpendiculars 
Where this method of delimitation is employed, frequently the line of bearing taken in 
such circumstances is one perpendicular to the general direction of the coast in order to 
take into account the macro-geography of the region. In effect, this represents a much 
simplified form of equidistance. 
Thus, where states are adjacent to one another and boast relatively uncomplex 
coastlines, a line of bearing perpendicular to the general direction of the coast may 
represent an easy and equitable option. In addition, Beazlel9 has observed that where a 
number of adjacent states have a short coastal length as compared with the possible 
seaward extent of their maritime boundaries: 
Such a situation might well produce a series of equidistance lines which would 
cut off one state from its full reach whilst affording another a disproportionate 
offshore area of jurisdiction. By employing a general direction, or general 
directions, of the coast and a series of perpendiculars to form the maritime 
boundaries, many of the anomalies which might result from using strict or 
modified equidistance will be avoided. 
It is rare, however, that a particular coastline is so regular as to be unambiguously 
summarised by a single straight line - a step fundamental to the construction of a 
perpendicular line. The disadvantage of the method therefore lines in the fact that there 
is almost inevitably disagreement the precise angle of the general direction of the coast-
a problem induced by the apparent simplicity and therefore the arbitrary nature of such a 
simplified form of equidistance. 30 
Nevertheless, a good example of this method's application is the maritime 
boundary which was eventually concluded between the West African states of Guinea 
and Guinea-Bissau. The parties, having failed to reach agreement in relation to their 
maritime boundaries as a consequence of their maintaining incompatible claims to 
equidistance on one hand as opposed to a system of parallel of latitude on the other, 
submitted their dispute to an international Arbitral Tribunal. The Tribunal found that in 
order to fulfil its aim of delivering an equitable delimitation guaranteeing each state 
jurisdiction over those maritime areas in. front of their coasts, and avoiding any 
28 
29 
30 
Beazley, 1994a: 11. 
Beazley, 1994a: 12. 
When the Committee of Experts appointed by the United Nations International Law Commission 
considered this method of delimitation in the drafting of the articles which became the 1958 
Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, it found the method "too vague." This was because 
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enclavement or 'cut-off' effects, the configuration of the parties' relevant coastlines had 
to be taken into account. 
The facts that the coastlines of the two states were partially adjacent and partially 
opposite, and that combined they displayed a concave shape in the context of the convex 
coastline of West Africa as a whole, were therefore taken into consideration. In 
addition, the Tribunal members were keen to provide a delimitation which would be in 
character with the region as a whole and would not disrupt the conclusion of other 
maritime boundary agreements in West Africa . 
. 
As a result the Tribunal found that, seaward of the parties' offshore islands, the 
boundary should constitute a straight line along a bearing of 236° to the outer limit of 
the maritime zones claimed by the two states and recognised under international law 
(Figure 3.8). The bearing of 236° was arrived at by taking into consideration the general 
direction of coastline of West Africa and represents a straight line perpendicular to the 
general direction of the coast as shown by a line connecting Almadies Point and Cape 
Shilling. 
A slightly different approach, which has been used on occasiOns, is that of 
constructing lines representing the general direction of the relevant coastlines of each of 
the parties and then taking the bisector of these two lines as the boundary. This method 
was applied to the inner part of the Gulf of Maine by the International Court of Justice 
in 1984 because of the profusion of rocks and islands in the innermost part of the bay 
and as a result of the Canada and the United States' conflicting claims to certain islands. 
One further variation on this theme, which also holds the advantage of 
preventing 'cut-off' caused by converging equidistance lines, is the construction of a 
pair of parallel straight lines. This technique has been used on two occasions for the 
delimitations between France and Dominica, France and Monaco and was employed by 
the ICJ in the St.Pierre et Miquelon case between Canada and France (see Figure 3.9). 
establishing the general direction of the coast was "often impracticable" because it depended on 
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SENEGAL 
GUINEA 
Figure 3.8 The Delimitation between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau 
Source: IBRU, 1999. 
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Figure 3.9 The Delimitation between Canada and France (St. Pierre et Miquelon) 
Source: IBRU, 1999. 
Parallels and Meridians 
In a similar vein, some states have concluded agreements simply based on parallels of 
latitude or meridians of longitude. Such arrangements between adjacent states often 
involve the use a parallel or meridian constructed from the terminus of the states' land 
boundary on the coast. The agreement between Chile and Peru is excellent examples of 
this relatively rarely adopted method of maritime boundary delimitation (Figure 3.10). 
A variation of this is the application of equidistance for the initial part of the boundary, 
close to the coast, and then a parallel or meridian further offshore, as was the case with 
Kenya's 1976 agreement with Tanzania (Figure 3.11). 
In appropriate circumstances, the advantages of parallels and meridians are 
similar to those associated with perpendiculars. That is, where there are adjacent states 
with concave or convex coastlines, or there are numerous islands and rocks, the use of a 
parallel or meridian can circumvent the possibility of 'cut-off' which might occur if 
equidistance were applied. 
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Figure 3.10 The Delimitation between Chile and Peru 
Source: Charney and Alexander, 1993. 
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3.2.4 Other Geometric Methods of Delimitation 
Two alternative methods of maritime boundary delimitation were identified by a 
Committee of Experts appointed by the United Nations International Law Commission 
when it was asked to draft the articles which in due course became the basis for the 
1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea. 
As well as considering the merits and drawbacks of equidistance lines and lines 
perpendicular to the general direction of the coast, the Committee also evaluated the 
possibility of delimiting maritime boundaries based on a continuation of the direction of 
land frontier offshore or by drawing a line perpendicular to the coast at the point of its 
intersection with the land frontier. Both of these alternative delimitation techniques 
were found to have serious drawbacks by the Commission which recommended 
equidistance as the preferred method of delimitation. 31 
Nevertheless, there are instances of states seeking to employ such alternative 
methodologies where geographical circumstances mean that they provide that state with 
a particular advantage. For instance, in continental shelf delimitation case between 
Libya and Tunisia before the International Court of Justice (1988), the Court found that 
the convention establishing the land frontier constituted a relevant circumstance since it 
determined the starting point of the maritime boundary on the coast and was accepted by 
both parties. The Court could not, however, accept the Libyan contention that the 
maritime boundary should reflect the north-south alignment of the land boundary - a 
division of maritime space which would have been highly advantageous to Libya at 
Tunisia's expense. 
Clearly, land boundaries have not generally been delimited with maritime 
jurisdiction in mind and attention has therefore, unsurprisingly, not been paid to the 
angle at which a particular land boundary intersects with the coast. As a consequence, 
in many circumstances, a seaward continuation of the land frontier would result in an 
inequitable distribution of maritime space. 
The drawing of a line perpendicular to the coast at the point of its intersection 
with the land frontier really represents a simplified and therefore more arbitrary version 
of a perpendicular to the general direction of the coast. The fact that the general 
31 With regard to extending the land boundary offshore it was observed that where the angle of the 
land boundary meeting the coast was acute "the result is impracticable." Use of a line at right 
angles to the coast where the land boundary intersects with the coast was also criticised on the 
grounds that where the coastline in question is curved such a line "may meet the coast again at 
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direction of the coast is not taken into consideration necessarily provides greater scope 
for an inequitable division of maritime space based on this method. 
3.2.5 'Natural' Boundaries 
Over time, certain states have advanced the argument that their maritime boundaries can 
be determined according to 'natural' physical boundaries akin to what are perceived as 
natural divisions on land such as mountain ranges and rivers. 
In relation to territorial sea or continental shelf boundaries, the concept of the 
thalweg, or line of deepest soundings, commonly used in relation to river boundaries, 
has been transplanted to the offshore arena and applied to submarine trenches and 
channels. Similarly, the geomorphology, that is the shape and form, of the seabed and 
its geological make up have been raised as factors favouring certain maritime divisions 
(see Section 3.4.3). In relation to the water column above the seabed, ecological factors 
have also been presented as a justification for a particular delimitation (see Section 
3.6.3). 
Nevertheless, the tendency to claim the physical nature of the seabed as a factor 
m the determination of maritime boundaries has diminished over time. This is 
principally due to the fact that such natural features generally produce zones of 
transition rather than precise boundary lines.32 
3.2.6 Evaluation 
The law of the sea does not specify that maritime boundaries should be delimited 
according to a particular method. Even in the case of the territorial sea, under Article 15 
of the UN Convention, states are merely abjured from extending their claims beyond a 
median line ''failing agreement between them to the contrary." In effect, though, so 
long as third party rights are not infringed upon, states are free to agree upon any 
maritime boundary delimitation they choose. 
It follows therefore, that there is similarly no limit to the methods of delimitation 
that may be employed, so long as the parties agree or the court or other legal tribunal 
charged with resolving a dispute deems it to be equitable. A court or arbitration tribunal 
will, however, be guided by the rules and principles of international law. This is not 
32 
another point. " The International Law Commission concurred with the Committee of Experts 
preference for equidistance, albeit "very flexibly applied" (United Nations, 1956: 272). 
Evans, 1989: 118. 
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always the case for delimitations achieved through negotiations (see Section 3.3). It is 
therefore impossible to consider all the options and methodologies of maritime 
boundary delimitation available to states as these are, at least theoretically, unlimited. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that in practice one method in particular has proved 
significantly more popular as the basis for international maritime boundary agreements 
over time - the equidistance method. 
The advantages of equidistance lines 
The principle advantage of equidistance line based delimitations is the fact that, in the 
absence of outstanding geographical irregularities in the parties' coastlines, the principle 
of equidistance produces an equal division of maritime space. While an equal division is 
not necessarily an equitable division, this is in fact often the case. Another key 
attraction of equidistance lines as maritime boundaries is that they are based on 
proximity. That is, the foundation of equidistance provides for the allocation to a 
particular state of those maritime areas closest to its coastline - a factor of particular 
concern to states, primarily for security reasons (i.e. the territorial sea). 
Equidistance lines also provide an objective method of dividing maritime space. 
As Beazley33 has noted: 
Provided that both parties are agreed on the legitimacy of the respective 
territorial sea baselines and basepoints, there is only one equidistant line which 
will satisfy those conditions, and its course can be determined on strict 
geometric principles without ambiguity. 
Equidistance lines can therefore be constructed in an unambiguous manner according to 
mathematical principles, result in the capture of those areas in closest proximity to a 
particular states coast, and, in the absence of outstanding geographical features, have a 
general tendency towards providing an equitable division of maritime space. 
As a result of these characteristics, the equidistance line concept, accorded a 
degree of flexibility by the proviso that "special circumstances" might justify an 
alternative delimitation, was adopted in the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Territorial 
Sea and Contiguous Zone and on the Continental Shelf at Articles 12 and 6 respectively 
(see Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2). In effect, though, the inclusion of reference to median 
33 Beazley, 1994a: 7. 
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lines in the 1958 Conventions represented the high-tide for the general acceptance of 
equidistance as the preferred or privileged method of delimitation. 
The retreat from equidistance 
Despite the fact that in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases the ICJ noted that a 
median line between opposite states usually resulted in an equal division of the maritime 
space involved (see Section 3.4.4), the Court concluded that the provisions relating to 
equidistance in the 1958 Conventions had not become customary international law and 
that boundaries could diverge from that rule?4 Similarly, the Anglo-French Court of 
Arbitration's judgement, while adhering to equidistance for much of the boundary, gave 
no particular preference to equidistance as a principle overall. 35 The progressive retreat 
from equidistance as a preferred method of delimitation in case law continued through 
the 1980s with the Libya-Tunisia case of 1982, the Canada-United States Gulf of Maine 
case of 1984 and the Guinea-Guinea-Bissau and Libya-Malta cases, both of 1985.36 
This shift away from equidistance over time is particularly well demonstrated by 
a comparison of the texts of Article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf 
and Article 74 of the UN Convention of 1982 (Section 3.12). In the former, in the 
absence of agreement, "the boundary is the median line." In contrast, the UN 
Convention merely provides that the boundary should be effected by agreement "in 
order to achieve an equitable solution" and no mention of equidistance or median lines 
is made. This change in emphasis strongly indicates that the equidistance principle is by 
no means obligatory in international law and was the result of strong pressure from 
states at the Third Law of the Sea Conference against the concept of the mandatory 
application of equidistance for ocean boundaries. 
Equidistance has therefore, at least in theory, been gradually relegated to a status 
and importance equivalent to any other method of maritime boundary delimitation. As a 
result of equidistance being knocked from its pedestal as the preferred method of 
delimitation, the law of the sea as codified by the UN Convention and supported by 
judicial decisions has been stripped down to the process of taking into account all 
34 
35 
36 
Charney, 1987: 509. Legault and Hankey (1993: 204) term this the "first blow" struck against 
the privileged status of the equidistance-special circumstances rule. 
Instead the Court adopted a unified equidistance/special circumstances rule (Charney, 1987: 509; 
Legault and Hankey, 1993: 204). 
Legault and Hankey, 1993: 204. See also, Birnie, 1987: 15-37. 
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relevant circumstances in accordance with equitable principles in order to achieve an 
equitable result. 37 
Nevertheless, there are two geographical situations where the equidistance 
principle appears to have maintained a stronger position in international maritime 
boundary law - with regard to the territorial sea and in delimitations between opposite 
states. 
Where equidistance retains a particular role 
The provisions relating to delimitation of the territorial sea in the 1982 UN Convention, 
contained in Article 15 (see Section 3.1.1), are virtually identical to those laid down by 
the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. Both of these 
documents call on states, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, not to extend their 
territorial sea "beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the 
nearest points on the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured. " 
This preference for equidistance in the case of the territorial sea reflects concerns 
by states to control those maritime areas closest to their land territory, for economic and 
particularly security reasons. The application of equidistance answers these concerns 
admirably, as the foundation of the concept is the provision of a division on the basis of 
proximity. In addition, the fact that the territorial sea is a relatively narrow maritime 
zone, generally up to 12nm in breadth as compared to 200nm in the case of the EEZ, 
means that there is a correspondingly limited risk of major distortions caused by coastal 
irregularities, resulting in large areas inequitably falling under the jurisdiction of a 
neighbouring state. This distinction in the provisions regarding the territorial sea, as 
opposed to the continental shelf or EEZ, therefore reflects the greater importance 
attached to the maritime space in close proximity to the mainland coast (see Section 
3.6.2). 
In addition, even if a strict equidistance line does not become the final line of 
division, such a line frequently provides the starting point for negotiations, if only as a 
way of detecting where inequities might occur. This is particularly the case where a 
delimitation between opposite coasts is at issue. The question of equidistance as it 
relates to opposite as opposed to adjacent delimitation situation will be addressed in 
Section 3.4.4. 
37 Legault and Hankey, 1993: 204-205. 
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It is also worth noting that the introduction of the EEZ and the 'distance 
principle' it entails in UNCLOS with regard to areas within 200nm of a state's baselines 
has effectively eliminated geophysical factors from the delimitation equation in these 
areas (see Section 3.4.3). It has been observed that this development, ironically, 
amounts to little more than a "disguised throwback to equidistance. ,JR 
Despite the recession in the importance of equidistance as a favoured, even 
binding, method from the legal perspective, in practice the equidistance method has 
proved more popular than any alternative method by far and most agreed maritime 
boundaries are based on some form of equidistance. 39 
Equidistance and maritime boundary agreements 
The ICJ itself noted in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases that maritime 
boundary agreements at the time were predominantly based on the equidistance 
principle. Furthermore, Legault and Hankey's analysis of the 134 maritime boundary 
agreements contained in Charney and Alexander's 1993 studl0 found that fully 103 
boundaries (77% of the total) were based on some form of equidistance, whether strict, 
simplified or modified. Of these, 63 boundaries (47%) utilised strict or simplified 
equidistance for all or most of their length while for a further 40 boundaries (30%) 
modified equidistance was employed. 41 Of the 18 agreements included in the third 
volume of the Charney and Alexander series, published in 1998, 16 (89%) are based on 
equidistance, strict, simplified or modified, for at least part of their length.42 
This trend is understandable in relation to pre-1969 delimitations as, prior to the 
North Sea cases of that year, many boundary makers assumed, largely based on the 
provisions of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, that a clear 
presumption existed favouring the equidistance method. What is clear, however, is that 
the equidistance method of maritime boundary delimitation has retained its popularity 
among states in the post-1969 period. 
This, on the face of it, rather surprising turn of events, has chiefly occurred 
because the advantages related to the equidistance method, briefly outlined above, have 
not themselves diminished. Application of the equidistance principle therefore often 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
Highet, 1993: 183. 
Legault and Hankey, 1993: 205. 
Legault and Hankey, 1993: 203-242. 
Legault and Hankey, 1993: 214. 
Author's analysis based on Charney and Alexander, 1998. 
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results in an equitable and politically mutually acceptable delimitation and is therefore 
frequently resorted to in state practice. 
In addition, it has also been observed that the adoption of the equidistance 
method is highly unlikely in the case of judicial awards for the simple reason that were a 
boundary delimitation question easily resolved through the construction of an 
equidistance line or a variant of one, the parties would have resolved the dispute 
between them without reference to any third party conflict resolution procedure. The 
cases that are brought before bodies such as the ICJ are necessarily those which the 
parties have failed to resolve through negotiations and can therefore be considered to be 
the most complex, controversial and, critically, least likely to be suited to the application 
of a boundary delimitation method based on equidistance.43 
Despite the enduring popularity of the method illustrated by the weight of state 
practice in its favour it is clear that no norm in international maritime boundary law has 
emerged requiring the use of equidistance as the basis for a delimitation - in fact, if 
anything, there has been a retreat from that position. Instead of there being any 
preferred method under the law of the sea, the principle of achieving an equitable result 
through an examination of all circumstances relevant to a particular delimitation 
problem is fundamental to the delimitation of maritime boundaries. 
3.3 Relevant Circumstances 
According to the UN Convention, therefore, the key to reaching an equitable result is to 
identify the relevant circumstances and accord them their appropriate weight in the 
delimitation process. Unfortunately, there has been no systematic definition of the 
criteria which should be used to determine an equitable delimitation. As a result, 
equitability remains a rather vague and imprecise concept. 
43 
As the ICJ noted in the 1984 Gulf of Maine case between the USA and Canada: 
There has been no systematic definition of the equitable criteria that may be 
taken into consideration for an international maritime delimitation, and this 
would in any event be difficult a priori, because of their highly variable 
Legault and Hankey, 1993: 205. 
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adaptability to different concrete situations. Codification efforts have left this 
field untouched. 44 
Similarly: 
International law does not require that maritime boundaries be delimited in 
accordance with any particular method; rather it requires that they be delimited 
in accordance with equitable principles, taking into account all of the relevant 
circumstances of the case so as to produce an equitable result. The equitable 
principles are indeterminate and the relative circumstances are theoretically 
unlimited. 45 
Thus there is ample scope for differing interpretations as to which factors are applicable 
to a particular case and therefore potential for dispute and deadlock in delimitation 
negotiations. In a similar fashion, there is much potential conflict in the stances of 
states as to the emphases to be afforded to the principles or rules that might be 
applicable to a particular delimitation. 
The clear distinction between the factors considered before international courts 
and tribunals and those raised in the course of negotiations should, however, be 
understood. Although in many cases the factors considered under both types of 
maritime boundary dispute resolution will predominantly overlap, it is well to recall that 
while courts and tribunals are bound to render a decision on the basis of international 
law, in the context of negotiations the states concerned are merely required under 
international law to negotiate in good faith. 
As has been noted elsewhere (see Section 3.2.6), that given agreement between 
the protagonists and no infringement on the rights of any third parties, states are free to 
divide their offshore areas as they wish. Similarly, in negotiations states are at liberty to 
consider practically any factor they both consider to be relevant. In certain instances 
states may therefore give greater weight to factors than an international court or tribunal 
might, for example the relative levels of economic development of each party, and may 
even tie the question of maritime boundary delimitation to considerations unrelated to 
that boundary or, indeed, maritime jurisdiction in general.46 
Furthermore, states are by no means bound to divulge either precisely how a 
particular delimitation was achieved (that is, what methodology was applied in order to 
44 
45 
46 
Gulf of Maine case, para.l57. Republished in Research Centre for International Law, Voi.I, 
1992: 800. 
Charney, 1994: 230/1987: 507. 
Oxman, 1993: 11. 
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construct the line) or what factors ultimately came into play in the course of bilateral 
negotiations. Indeed, most states tend towards reticence on this issue therefore 
frequently making maritime boundary delimitation a recondite process. The challenge 
for the boundary scholar lies in interpreting such agreements based on incomplete 
information and this often involves a certain amount of 'educated guesswork' based on 
the geographical and legal principles outlined here. 
3.4 Factors Related to Physical Geography 
3.4.1 The Role of Coastal Geography 
Geography has a fundamental role to play in the delimitation of international maritime 
boundaries. By the term 'geography', what is really meant in this instance is physical 
geography and coastal geography in particular. Having said that, it is well worth noting 
the Charney's observation that: "coastal geography is preponderant in maritime 
boundary delimitation law. "47 This situation is based on two key principles: 
... the land dominates the sea and it dominates it by the intermediary of the 
coastal front. 48 
Geography can, in fact be reasonably regarded as the dominant factor m maritime 
boundary delimitation: 
... the primacy of geographical considerations is found in each and every 
maritime delimitation, regardless of whether it concerns territorial sea, 
continental shelf, fishery zone, or exclusive economic zone; or whether it is 
negotiated and agreed by the interested parties, or decided by a third party in 
judicial or arbitral proceedings.49 
The key geographical factors of significance are related to coastal geography, 
particularly the configuration of the coasts under consideration, relative coastal length 
and the impact of outstanding geographical features, notably islands. Considerations 
drawn from economic, social and human geography have received little weight before 
47 
48 
49 
Charney, 1994: 253. See also Birnie (1987: 33-34) who quotes Legault and Hankey as stating 
that "Geography is not so much the most neutral factor as the most positive factor in relation to 
both the seabed and the water column. " 
Wei!, 1989: 50. 
Wei!, 1993: 116. 
97 
The Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries 
the courts but have nevertheless, frequently, played a significant role in negotiated 
delimitations. 
3.4.2 The General Geographical Framework, Relevant Area and Macrogeography 
The first step in maritime boundary delimitation involving geography IS the 
identification of the 'relevant area'. Once this area is determined, "it ts the 
geographical circumstances which primarily determine the appropriateness of 
equidistance or any other method of delimitation in any given case." Thus, the relevant 
area identified will provide the general geographical framework within which the 
delimitation takes place. This, in turn, will influence, for example, the crucial 
considerations of what parts of the coastline can be considered to be opposite or 
adjacent, concave or convex. This is not to say, however, that the general geographical 
context of the relevant area unequivocally dictates the appropriate delimitation method 
in a deterministic manner. Nevertheless, identifying the relevant area is a vital step, as 
the significance of particular geographical factors can only be assessed in the context of 
this area. 50 
The relevant area is generally determined by reference to the area of potential 
overlap between the parties and their relevant coastlines. Clearly there is a large degree 
of interaction between these two elements and there exist no hard and fast rules by 
which to identify the relevant area. 
In addition, the scope of the relevant area may be modified in the light of 
'macrogeographic' factors. A view of the wider, macrogeographic, context of the region 
may very well seriously affect, for instance, assessments of the concavity or convexity 
of coastlines, their oppositeness or adjacency or general direction which are highly 
dependent on scale. A macrogeographic view may therefore serve to undermine the 
importance of a factor apparently of significance in the immediate vicinity of the area to 
be delimited, or vice versa, and this may well have a major impact on the relevant area 
selected and thus the delimitation. 
3.4.3 Geophysical Factors- Natural Prolongation, Geology and Geomorphology 
The concept of natural prolongation is fundamental to claims to jurisdiction over 
continental shelf areas. Indeed, the precursor to modern continental shelf claims, the 
50 Evans, 1989: 124-125. 
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Truman Proclamation, while not mentioning natural prolongation explicitly, was 
undoubtedly founded on the concept of offshore areas being regarded as a territorial 
continuation of the land (see Section 3.2). 
From this point of departure, it was no great step to suggest that the physical 
geography of the seabed, as opposed to that of the coastline, should have a role in 
determining continental shelf boundaries. Two aspects of the physical geography of the 
seabed were swiftly identified as being of potential relevance - geomorphology, that is 
the shape, form and configuration of the seabed, and geology, its composition and 
structure. These two facets of the physical geography of the seafloor may be referred to 
jointly as geophysical factors. 
Natural prolongation does not, however, truly represent a relevant circumstance 
for delimitation. Its primary role is, in fact, that of providing the source of title to the 
continental shelf rather than the means to delimit that shelf. Confusion has, however, 
reigned over the years as to whether natural prolongation may be regarded as: "a means 
of delimitation, an equitable principal of delimitation, a criterion for delimitation and 
as a relevant circumstance. "51 
This has in large part stemmed from the North Sea Continental Shelf cases of 
1969. This represented the first time that the ICJ had dealt with a continental shelf case. 
In addition, the Court was restricted by the parties, Denmark, the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the Netherlands, simply to identifying the principles and rules of 
international law which should be taken into account in achieving a delimitation 
agreement. The Court's judgement was accordingly general and descriptive, providing 
that: 
... delimitation is to be effected ... in such a way as to leave as much as possible to 
each party all those parts of the continental shelf that constitute a natural 
prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea, without encroachment 
on the natural prolongation of the land territory of the other state. 52 
Furthermore, the Court referred to the Norwegian Trough, close to the Norwegian coast 
but ignored it for the purpose of delimiting the UK-Norway continental shelf boundary, 
to illustrate that although those areas seaward of the trough could not be considered part 
of the natural prolongation of Norway's landmass, states were not bound to delimit their 
51 
52 
Evans, 1989: I 00. 
North Sea Continental Shelf cases, para.! 0 I. Republished in Research Centre for International 
Law, Voi.I, 1992: 135. 
99 
The Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries 
boundaries according to this factor. This apparently gave natural prolongation a role in 
the delimitation process as well as its role in terms of giving title to jurisdiction over the 
continental shelf. 53 
Highet54 refers to the term natural prolongation as "vague and marvellous" and 
the Court's use of it as: 
... a descriptive attribute, designed to elaborate and describe the basic nature of 
the continental shelf and its attributes ... not a functional attribute in the sense 
that it was not intended to provide a reason for finding the boundary. 55 
Nevertheless, the North Sea judgement opened the floodgates to claims based 
geophysical factors and a "passionate search for troughs and faults and rift zones" 
which were proposed as 'natural' geophysical continental shelf boundaries in later 
cases. 56 
In the UK-France arbitration, the British side advanced the argument that the 
"Hurd Deep Fault Zone", a geomorphological feature, perhaps unsurprisingly, lying 
closer to France than the UK, should be taken into account by the Tribunal in delimiting 
the boundary between the parties.57 Similarly, in the Tunisia-Libya case before the ICJ, 
Tunisia claimed that bathymetry demonstrated the prolongation of the Tunisian 
landmass eastwards offshore, as opposed to that of Libya northwards. 58 Furthermore, in 
the US-Canada Gulf of Maine case, also before the ICJ, while the US argument was 
primarily founded on coastal geography, its submissions were also laced with elements 
of geomorphology, geology and ecology. 59 This was evident in the proposition that a 
natural boundary existed between two offshore banks.60 
In each case the judges concerned, whether appointed to a special arbitration 
Tribunal or of the ICJ, considered the often considerable and conflicting mass of 
detailed scientific evidence, and found it wanting - rejecting the geophysically-inspired 
arguments presented. In each instance, however, the evidence was discarded as being 
insufficient rather than inappropriate- thus not excluding the possibility of geophysical 
factors playing an important role under other circumstances. 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
Highet, 1989: 89. 
Highet, 1989: 87. 
Highet, 1989: 90. 
Highet, 1989: 89. 
Anglo-French Arbitration, para 12. Republished Research Centre for International Law, Vol.I, 
1992: 375; Highet, 1989: 90. 
Highet, 1989: 90-91. 
Highet, 1989: 91. 
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This situation remained the case up to the Libya-Malta case of 1985. In that case 
before the ICJ, Libya contended that a "Rift Zone" lay between the parties of such a 
profound character, described as a "fundamental discontinuity", that it should form the 
basis of the continental shelf boundary between the two states. 61 
Ultimately, however, the Court decided to do away with geophysical arguments 
in their entirety, at least in relation to those areas within 200nm of the coast. The Court 
therefore found that, on the basis of "new developments in international law" (i.e. the 
signature of the UNCLOS in 1982 and the introduction of the EEZ concept), as there 
was less than 400nm between the parties' coastlines, "the geological and 
geomorphological characteristics of those areas ... are completely immaterial", and that: 
... since the development of the law enables a State to claim that the continental 
shelf appertaining to it extends up to as far as 200 miles from its coast, whatever 
the geological characteristics of the corresponding seabed and subsoil, there is 
no reason to ascribe any role to geological or geophysical factors within that 
distance either in verifying the legal title of the States concerned or in 
proceeding to a delimitation as between their claims.62 
The Court's decision was based on the development of the concept of the exclusive 
economic zone introduced as part of UNCLOS and with it the so-called 'distance 
principle'. This development in international law effectively eliminates the possibility 
of relying on physical natural prolongation as the basis for delimitation as the EEZ is not 
dependant on geophysical factors and has "essentially assumed control over the legal 
regime of the shelf in the method of its delimitation. "63 
Thus although the UN Convention provides that natural prolongation remains 
the basis for title over the continental shelf, geophysical factors are removed from the 
delimitation equation by the establishment of the 'distance principle' of 200nm from 
shore. As Article 76 (1) of UNCLOS states: 
60 
61 
62 
63 
The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of the 
submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural 
prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or 
to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of 
the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin 
does not extend up to that distance (emphasis added). 
Evans, 1989; Highet, 1989 and 1993. 
Libya/Malta case, para.36. Republished in Research Centre for International Law, Vol.II, 1992: 
1,550. 
Quoted in Highet, 1993: 177. 
Highet, 1993: 177. 
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The role of natural prolongation in the delimitation of international maritime boundaries 
is therefore restricted to overlapping continental shelf areas beyond 200nm from either 
party's coastline, that is beyond the scope of the EEZ, and in relation to defining the 
margin of the continental shelf as provided for in Article 76 of the Convention. Within 
200nm of the coast then, as is the case in the Gulf of Thailand, natural prolongation has 
no direct role to play in .the delimitation of maritime boundaries. 
Thus, despite all the arguments marshalled and the wealth of complex scientific 
evidence presented to international courts and tribunals in favour of using geophysical 
features to determine continental shelf boundaries, no geophysically-based delimitation 
emerged. An examination of state practice also reveals a strong element of caution in 
the application of geophysical factors to maritime boundary delimitation. 
Highet's64 analysis in this regard is revealing. Of the 132 maritime boundary 
agreements he reviewed, geophysical factors were potentially relevant to delimitation in 
47-58 of them.65 Of these 47-58 agreements identified, geophysical factors were 
actually taken into account in 15-21 cases (32-36%). He therefore found that: 
... in approximately one-third of the cases where geological or geomorphological 
features were noted, the parties took account of them in their delimitations, and 
that in roughly two-thirds of those cases such features were ignored. 66 
This led Highet67 to the conclusion that, "geophysical factors have been ignored far 
more frequently than they have been used." Indeed, of those agreements where 
geophysical factors were or might have been influential, in only two cases were 
delimitations based directly on them and, moreover, these two delimitations were 
themselves between the same parties.68 Thus, ultimately only two out of the 132 
agreements analysed were intimately linked to geophysical considerations. 
This general reticence in relation to employing geophysical features as 'natural' 
maritime boundaries in an analogous manner to the long-standing use of physical 
features, such as rivers and watersheds, to mark international land boundaries is, 
perhaps, not particularly surprising. Clearly, one of the prime benefits of using physical 
64 
65 
66 
67 
Highet, 1993: 163-202. 
The variation in the figures is caused by uncertainty in certain cases as to whether geophysical 
factors were relevant. As delimitation agreements rarely provide a detailed analysis of what 
factors prompted the particular boundary alignment adopted, this uncertainty is inevitable. 
Highet, 1993: 194. 
Highet, 1993: 195. 
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features to delimit a boundary on land is that it makes the location of that boundary 
more readily identifiable. The same advantage is hardly afforded to a marine navigator 
if a maritime boundary is fixed according to sub-surface features. 
This disadvantage of applying the concept of 'natural' boundaries to the 
maritime sphere is compounded by the fact that geophysical features such as the "Rift 
Zone" of the Libya-Malta case represent just that - zones rather than the precise 
boundary line which is the object of the delimitation exercise. 
It is therefore clear that the international law of the sea in relation to geophysical 
factors has developed dramatically in the period between the North Sea cases in 1969 
and the Libya-Malta case in 1985. This, coupled with the evident disadvantages of 
utilising sub-surface geophysical features as maritime boundaries, makes it highly 
unlikely that arguments similar to those presented in the cases outlined above will be 
placed before third-party adjudicators in the future and, furthermore, are unlikely to be 
much employed in state practice either. 
3.4.4 Coastal Relationship 
Coastal geography 
There can be little doubt that coastal geography, and in particular the configuration of 
the coasts of the parties, is the most important factor in maritime delimitation. This has 
been underscored in all of the relevant decisions thus far and certainly plays a role in the 
disputes in the Gulf of Thailand (see Chapter 7). 
As was observed in the Libya-Malta case: 
The capacity to engender continental shelf rights derives not from the landmass, 
but from sovereignty over the landmass; and it is by means of the maritime front 
of this landmass, in other words by its coastal opening, that this territorial 
sovereignty brings its continental shelf rights into effect. 69 
Thus it is not the landmass itself that is significant to offshore delimitation but the 
geography of the coastline which fronts that landmass. This principle in international 
law applies to judicial or arbitral decisions. However, in negotiated settlements the 
parties may bring to bear any consideration they chose and it would not be unreasonable 
68 
69 
Between Australia and Indonesia in relation to the Timor and Arafura Seas and the Timor Gap 
respectively (Highet, 1993: 194 ). 
Libya-Malta case, para.49. Republished in Research Centre for International Law, Voi.II, 1992: 
1,556-7. 
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to suggest that the larger state would seek a greater share of the maritime space under 
discussion. 
One aspect of coastal geography which is of great significance concerns the 
relationship of the coasts of the parties to each other, that is, whether they are adjacent 
or opposite. This is important because, even though the UN Convention does not make 
any distinction between opposite or adjacent delimitations, the law of maritime 
delimitation as developed by the International Court of Justice suggests that the two 
situations are treated differently. 
In general, for opposite coasts, lines of equidistance are broadly thought to 
produce an equitable division. In the case of adjacent coasts, however, the presence of 
even a small coastal irregularity such as a headland or an offshore island can cause an 
equidistance line to shift significantly towards one state, thereby undermining the 
principle of equitability.70 In both the Germany-Netherlands and Germany-Denmark 
delimitations, therefore, the ICJ found that equidistance represented an unsuitable 
method of delimitation and that equidistance was not a mle of customary international 
law. Therefore the case law suggests that equidistance does not have a privileged status 
for adjacent state delimitations, while it is often used, at least as a first step, in 
delimitations between opposite states. Nevertheless, regardless of the coastal 
relationship, in negotiations states will invariably start with an equidistance line, if only 
to assist in the development of their case. 
Adjacent coasts 
For example, in the case between Libya and Tunisia decided in 1982, both parties stated 
that the application of equidistance would result in an inequitable delimitation. Instead 
of an equidistance line Libya relied on an argument based on the northward thrust or 
prolongation of the African continental landmass, while Tunisia advanced historic 
arguments coupled with geological, geomorphological and bathymetric data to bolster 
its own natural prolongation contentions and geometric methods linked to 
proportionality concepts and relevant coastal fronts. 71 
For its part the ICJ found that although in the immediate vicinity of the terminus 
of the land boundary on the coast, the coastlines of the parties ran in approximately the 
70 
71 
Legault and Hankey, 1993: 216. 
Charney and Alexander, 1993: 1663-1680. 
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same direction, creating a situation of lateral adjacency, the Tunisian coast subsequently 
turns sharply northwards and this could be considered as a relevant circumstance: 
The change in direction nwy be said to modify the situation of lateral adjacency 
of the two States, even though it clearly does not go so far as to place them in a 
position of legally opposite States.72 
As a result the Court resorted to two different delimitation methodologies to be applied 
to those areas effected by the two distinct coastal configurations. In terms of the 
seaward section to be delimited, the Court decided that the change in the direction of the 
coastline, while not going all the way to transforming the relationship between the 
disputants from that of adjacent states to opposite states, did "produce a situation in 
which the position of an equidistance line becomes a factor to be given more weight in 
the balancing of equitable considerations than would otherwise be the case. " 73 
As far as the section where the Libyan and Tunisian coastlines were clearly 
laterally adjacent to one another, the ICJ rejected use of the equidistance method, 
instead opting for an equitable line, 26° east of north corresponding closely to what the 
Court viewed as a de facto, working boundary between the oil exploration concessions 
issued by both states (Figure 3.6). 
None of these elements had anything to do with equidistance, and the Court went 
out of its way to emphasise that it was not constrained to consider equidistance as 
having any kind of privileged status as a possible method of delimitation. 
Furthermore, in 1972 Canada and France established a territorial sea boundary 
between the Canadian island of Newfoundland and the French islands of St. Pierre and 
Miquelon, located just off the Newfoundland coast. Negotiations over the delimitation 
of the maritime area to the south and west of the French islands reached deadlock 
leading the two states to establish an ad hoc Court of Arbitration, consisting of five 
judges, to render a binding decision on the dispute. 
France claimed that the boundary should be delimited on the basis of 
equidistance. This would have accorded St. Pierre and Miquelon a 14,500nm2 maritime 
zone. In contrast, Canada argued that the French islands should be enclaved and 
awarded no more than a l2nm breadth zone around their coasts amounting to I ,070nm2. 
72 
73 
Tunisia/Libya case, para.78. Republished in Research Centre for International Law, Yol.II, 1992: 
972. 
Tunisia/Libya case, para.l26. Republished in Research Centre for International Law, Yoi.II, 
1992: 997. 
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The Court of Arbitration duly delivered its decision on I 0 June 1992, 
establishing a single maritime boundary between the parties applicable to both 
continental shelf and EEZ jurisdiction. The Court established an equidistance line 
boundary between the islands and the Canadian coastline where they faced one another, 
a 24nm-breadth zone around the west of the islands and toward the south, where the 
islands and Newfoundland's coastal front relationship was effectively laterally adjacent, 
a I 0.5nm-wide 'corridor' running due south to the 200nm limit of EEZ jurisdiction. 
This delimitation accorded the French islands a 3,617nm2 maritime zone and rejected 
the use of equidistance as a delimitation method where the parties' coastlines were 
adjacent to one another (see Figure 3.9). 
Opposite coasts 
In opposite state situations the courts and tribunals have taken a different view, and have 
often applied equidistance as a first step in the delimitation process, and then adjusted 
the resulting line to take into account any other relevant factors, such as the presence of 
islands or the lengths of the coasts of the parties, in order to reach an equitable result. 
This was the approach adopted by the ICJ in the Libya-Malta case (Figure 3.3). In 
similar situations it is clear that it will be necessary to assess the relative strengths and 
weakness of the basepoints chosen and the weight that should be given to islands (see 
Sections 3.2.1 and 3.5.6). 
In the case between Malta and Libya in 1985, the ICJ referred back to its 1969 
North Sea decision elaborating that as the Court was faced with a delimitation 
exclusively between opposite states: 
It is clear that, in these circumstances, the tracing of a median line between 
those coasts, by way of a provisional step in a process to be continued by other 
operations, is the most judicious manner of proceeding with a view to the 
eventual achievement of an equitable result. But that this, .. . should not be 
understood as implying that an equidistance line will be an appropriate 
beginning in all cases, or even in all cases of delimitation between opposite 
States. 74 
Similarly, in the US-Canada case concerning the Gulf of Maine, a median line was 
selected as a starting point for delimitation in the central portion of the Gulf between 
74 Libya/Malta case, para.62. Republished in Research Centre for International Law, Yoi.II, 1992: 
1,563. ' 
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opposite coasts and later altered in light of other factors. 75 Furthermore, in the 1993 
case concerning Greenland and Jan Mayen island, the Court concluded, at least as far as 
the continental shelf was concerned, that it was appropriate to start with a median line as 
. . II. 76 a provJSJOna me. 
State practice 
This trend in case law is strongly reinforced by reference to state practice. Indeed, as of 
1993, if both third-party awards and negotiated maritime boundaries between opposite 
states are considered, fully 89% were based on some form of equidistance which by 
their very nature are dependent on coastal geography. 77 However, the picture is very 
different when adjacent state delimitations are considered. 
Of the 32 maritime boundary agreements (including territorial waters 
delimitations) concluded up to 1993 between states with adjacent coastal configurations, 
only 12 (38%) employed equidistance. Alternative methods of delimitation such as 
lines of bearing, frequently lines perpendicular to the general direction of the coastlines 
of the parties or parallels of latitude or meridians of longitude, have proved far more 
popular.78 Charney and Alexander's 1998 volume provides an opportunity to update 
this analysis. Of the 18 new agreements included in the study, only one relates to an 
adjacent coastal situations where perpendicular lines were employed while two involved 
mixed opposite/adjacent situations where equidistance was used for at least part of the 
boundary lines but was substantially modified. 79 
Another important and allied consideration related to coastal geography is 
whether a state's coastline is either concave or convex. Clearly, if a state's coastline is 
75 
76 
77 
7R 
79 
On examining the geography of the Gulf of Maine area, the Chamber decided that it should be 
delimited by a line composed of three segments- from the agreed starting point in the Gulf, 
through the middle of the Gulf to the Gulf's closing line and from that closing line seaward. 
The first segment of that line was between the laterally adjacent sections of the two states' 
coastlines on the Gulf of Maine. In this area the Chamber rejected the use of an equidistance-
based boundary line and instead opted for a 'straight' line bisecting the angle between two lines 
representing the general direction of each states coastline. In the central section of the boundary 
where the coastal relationship was opposite an equidistance line was applied, modified to reflect 
the disparity in the two states' relevant coastal lengths. In the final section, once again between 
adjacent coasts, a line perpendicular to the bay closing line was chosen rather than a strict 
equidistance line. 
Charney and Alexander, 1998: 2,508. 
Legault and Hankey, 1993: 214. 
Legault and Hankey, 1993: 216. 
Author's analysis based on Charney and Alexander, 1998. 
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Figure 3.12 The Distorting Effects of Equidistance 
Source: Francalanci and Scovazzi, 1994. 
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109 
The Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries 
concave, its maritime space, if delimited on the basis of equidistance will be restricted-
in effect 'squeezed' by the presence of its neighbours. The opposite situation may be 
observed if a state possesses a convex coastal configuration (see Figure 3.12). 
It was precisely this problem which faced the ICJ in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf cases where the Federal Republic of Germany's coastal front, and thus maritime 
jurisdiction on the North Sea on the basis of equidistance, was effectively constricted by 
the presence of Denmark to the north and the Netherlands to the west. Ultimately, the 
Court found that further negotiations among the parties should take into account "the 
general configuration of the coasts" in relation to the Germany-Netherlands 
delimitation80 and "the general direction of the coasts" in the Germany-Denmark 
delimitation. 81 Strict equidistance was therefore found to be inappropriate given this 
situation and agreements were eventually concluded providing for German jurisdiction 
considerably beyond the area that would have been accorded to it under a strict 
equidistance formula (see Figure 3.13). 
Similarly, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, having failed to reach agreement in 
relation to their maritime boundaries as a consequence of their maintaining incompatible 
claims to equidistance on one hand as opposed to a system of parallel of latitude on the 
other, submitted their dispute to an international Arbitral Tribunal. The Tribunal found, 
in its judgement of 14 February 1985, that in order to fulfil its aim of delivering an· 
equitable delimitation guaranteeing each state jurisdiction over those maritime areas in 
front of their coasts, and avoiding any enclavement or 'cut-off' effects, the configuration 
of the parties' relevant coastlines had to be taken into account. 
The fact that the coastlines of the two states were partially adjacent and partially 
opposite, and that combined they displayed a concave shape in the context of the convex 
coastline of West Africa as a whole, were therefore taken into consideration. In 
addition, the Tribunal members were keen to provide a delimitation which would be in 
character with the region as a whole and would not disrupt the conclusion of other 
maritime boundary agreements in West Africa. 
As a result the Tribunal found that, seaward of the parties' offshore islands, 
delimitation on the basis of equidistance should be rejected and the boundary should 
constitute a straight line along a bearing of 236° to the outer limit of the maritime zones 
claimed by the two states and recognised under international law (Figure 3.8). The 
80 Quoted in Charney and Alexander, 1993: 1,837. 
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bearing of 236° was arrived at by taking into consideration the general direction of 
coastline of West Africa and represents a straight line perpendicular to the general 
direction of the coast as shown by a line connecting Almadies Point and Cape Shilling. 
The application of an equidistance line in the first instance, to be subsequently 
modified in order to accord with equitable principles reflects what has been termed the 
"dual function" of geography. 82 Coastal geography assumes a positive role in being the 
principle factor dictating the delimitation line. A negative role is also accorded to 
coastal geography in that is then often necessary to ignore or limit the impact of certain 
outstanding geographical features, such as islands far offshore from the mainlands of the 
parties and/or in the midst of the area to be delimited, thus modifying the proposed 
delimitation line. 
This process is in keeping with the Court's 1969 findings that "there can never 
be any question of completely refashioning nature" or "totally refashioning 
geography. "83 The key words here are "completely" and "totally';, providing as they 
do latitude for modification of a delimitation line based exclusively on coastal 
geography. 
3.4.5 Relative Coastal Length and Proportionality 
Closely connected with the question of the configuration of the coasts of the parties is 
the question of coastal lengths and the element of proportionality. The concept of 
proportionality emerged from the North Sea Continental She(f cases of 1969 where 
Federal Republic of Germany claimed that each of the states concerned should have a 
"just and equitable share" of the available continental shelf , "in proportion to the 
l h if . 1. .(, ,84 engt o lts coast me or sea .frontage. The ICJ rejected the contention that 
proportionality should be a direct element in achieving a just and equitable share but did 
accept it as a factor in the application of equitable principles: 
81 
82 
83 
84 
Quoted in Charney and Alexander, 1993: I ,803. 
Wei!, 1993: 119. 
North Sea Continental Shelf cases, Para.91, quoted in Wei!, 1993: 119. See also, Research 
Centre for International Law, Vol.I, 1992: 77-352. 
Evans, 1989: 224. 
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The element of a reasonable degree of proportionality which a delimitation 
carried out in accordance with equitable principles ought to bring about 
between the extent of the continental she({ areas appertaining to the coastal state 
and the length of its coast measured in the direction of its coastline. 85 
In addition, the Court has also held that significant disparities in the lengths of the coasts 
of the parties should be taken into account in the delimitation equation. 
With respect to the first point- proportionality - the situation that the Court was 
concerned about in the North Sea case was the delimitation between Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Germany (Figure 3.13). 
Whilst Germany had a coastline that was roughly equal in length to that of 
Denmark and the Netherlands, application of the equidistance method would have 
'squeezed' its maritime entitlement as can be seen from the figure. The Court, therefore, 
ruled that Germany should receive a more 'proportionate' allocation of shelf, although it 
also indicated that delimitation should not necessarily be carried out in accordance with 
a precise mathematical formula based on proportionality calculations. 
With respect to coastal lengths, the Court has certainly adjusted median line 
boundaries between opposite states to take into account differences in coastal lengths. A 
clear example of how this has been accomplished is provided by the United States-
Canada case. 
In the seaward part of the boundary where the coasts of the United States and 
Canada are opposite to each other, the Court started with a median line between the two 
countries. The Court then adjusted that line to fall closer to the Canadian coast by the 
same ratio (1.38 to 1.00) that the lengths of the two parties' relevant coasts bore to each 
other. In other words, since the United States had the longer coastline abutting the Gulf 
of Maine, it received a correspondingly greater share of shelf. 
As a result in almost every maritime boundary delimitation case brought before 
the ICJ or other international arbitral body, the state with the longer coast has argued 
that this gives it the right to a correspondingly greater area of maritime jurisdiction. The 
same can most probably also be said for maritime boundary negotiations. 
Proportionality has not, however, been treated as a relevant circumstance in the 
delimitation process but merely as a test, or 'broad assessment' of the equitability of a 
particular delimitation line arrived at through reference to other equitable 
85 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, para.! 0 I, republished in Research Centre for International 
Law, Vol.I, 1992: 137. See also, Evans, 1989:224-231. 
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considerations. There are several reasons, both in principle and practice, why the idea 
that there should be a direct link between the length of a state's coastline and the area of 
offshore jurisdiction that accrues to it, has been treated with such caution in ICJ cases. 
In principle, as far as title is concerned there is no direct, constant relationship 
between the length of a particular coastline and the maritime area generated from it. It 
has been argued that if this is true of title then it follows that this also applies to 
delimitation. 
Thus, in the Anglo-French Arbitration Court's award of 1977, the Court held 
that proportionality could not be "an independent source of rights to the continental 
shelf" and was not "itse(f a source of title" such that "an equitable delilnitation ... is 
not ... assigning to them ... areas ... in proportion with the length o.ftheir coastlines. "86 
Similarly, in the Gu(f o.f Maine and Libya/Malta Cases, the judges found that 
proportionality could not be regarded as "an autonomous criterion or 1nethod o.f 
delimitation"; and that coastal length itself was not a "principle of 
entitlement ... and. .. method of putting that principle into operation", respectively. 87 In 
the former case it was also categorically stated that: 
... a maritime delimitation can certainly not be established by a direct division of 
the area in dispute proportional to the respective lengths of the coasts belonging 
h 0 0 h l 88 to t e part1es m t e re evant area. 
On a practical level the concept of proportionality swiftly runs into significant 
difficulties. Not least among these is the fact that 'coastal length' is itself a deceptively 
simple term. The question 'what is the length of a state's coastline?', immediately 
raises the conundrum of how that length is to be measured. Should every sinuosity and 
indentation be included or should the 'general direction' of the coastline be used? If the 
latter, what constitutes that direction and how is that to be determined objectively? 
Much also rests on the scale of map or chart used for measurements as more 
indentations will often become apparent with reference to a more detailed chart. 89 The 
scope for dispute is clearly abundant and this problem has been described as: 
86 
87 
88 
89 
Anglo-French Arbitration, para. I 0 I, republished in Research Centre for International Law, 
Voi.I, 1992: 412. 
Quoted in Weil, 1989: 79. 
Gulf of Maine case, para.l85. Republished in Research Centre for International Law, Voi.I, 
1992:811. See also, Wei!, 1989:78-79. 
See Anderson ( 1987) for an analysis of the importance of geographical scale to maritime 
boundary problems. 
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... a situation where maps can be made to say more or less what one wants, and it 
is not unusual to find parties, on the basis of identical cartographic data, 
producing quite d{fferentfigitresfor the length of their coasts.90 
Similar problems of interpretation emerge in relation to deciding what constitutes the 
coastal front relevant to a particular disputed area. The parties to a dispute will naturally 
try to limit the opposition's relevant coastal front while maximising their own and no 
sure way of determining the relevant coastline fronting onto a given maritime area has 
been generally accepted. The 'relevant' coastal front is therefore often selected by states 
rather than objectively determined, almost inevitably leading to dispute between the 
. 91 parttes. 
A further question arises as to what offshore areas should be in ratio to the 
relevant coastal fronts? Should this simply be the areas of overlap? Or perhaps a ratio 
between the maritime zones of each side throughout the area of dispute - but if so how 
is that area of dispute to be defined? As the ICJ observed in its judgement in the Libya-
Malta case: 
... the geographical context is such that the identification of the relevant coasts 
and the relevant areas is so much at large that virtually any variant could be 
chosen, leading to widely d{fferent results. 92 
Finally, an additional problem relates to the presence of third states. If boundaries with 
third states are unresolved, what limit should be assumed for the sake of proportionality 
calculations? If, subsequently, a boundary differing from that assumed is concluded 
with that third state, any proportionality calculations based on the assumed limit would 
necessarily be undermined. 
It is therefore hardly surprising that over the years international tribunals have 
increasingly resisted the temptation to opt for such an apparently simple delimitation 
formula based on proportionality. As Prosper Weil93 , has observed: 
90 
91 
92 
93 
In short there is nothing riskier than models of proportionality, which 
experience shows to be of such flexibility that they make it possible to prove in 
an allegedly scientific way, almost anything one wants to. Theoretically 
unjustif1able, impossible to put into practice, the test of proportionality ts, 
moreover, useless. 
Wei!, 1989: 77. 
Wei!, 1989: 77. 
Libya/Malta case, para.74, Research Centre for International Law, Vol.Il, 1992: I ,569. 
Wei!, 1989: 244. 
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Whether it is in the context of a direct consideration of coastal lengths or, more 
modestly, of a last-m,inute proportionality test, the legal relevance of 
considerations of coastal length, surface areas and proportionality ought not to 
survive re-examination by the courts. 
Although it may be concluded that no 'proportionality principle' requiring a division of 
maritime space on the basis of the ratio between coastal front exists, proportionality 
nevertheless retains a role, however controversial, in terms of checking that a particular 
delimitation does not result in an unreasonable disproportion between the lengths of the 
parties' relevant coasts and the maritime areas accruing to each party. The relative 
coastal lengths of the parties also certainly remains a factor relevant to delimitation. 
After all, the length of a state's coastline is an important characteristic of a state's 
coastal front from which it may make claims to maritime jurisdiction. The problem 
remains, however, that the proportionality 'concept' is open to such wildly differing 
interpretations that the scope for dispute arising from its use seems well nigh limitless. 
3.5 The Regime of Islands 
The question of the treatment of islands in maritime boundary delimitation is a complex 
and crucially important one. It therefore seems appropriate to devote a separate section 
to this vexed issue. 
It is important to distinguish between the two main types of island disputes -
those relating to sovereignty over islands themselves and those concerned with the role 
of particular insular features in the delimitation of maritime boundaries. It is also worth 
observing in this context, of course, that the potential role of islands in delimitation may 
itself be a factor influencing any dispute over ownership. Escalating concerns over, 
frequently small, islands and their capacity to generate claims to maritime jurisdiction 
reflects increasing interest in offshore resources, the exhaustion of nearshore and 
onshore resources, growing populations and therefore resource demands, allied to 
technological developments allowing for the exploitation of marine resources in deeper 
waters further and further offshore. As a single point of land, if considered an island, 
could theoretically generate a claim to 125,664nm2 ( 431 ,0 14km2) if no maritime 
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neighbours were within 400nm of the feature, the potential importance of such features 
is difficult to underestimate.94 
This section will deal with the frequently contentious questions of what 
constitutes an island or related feature (e.g. rock or low-tide elevation) and what role 
islands play in generating maritime zones and their use as basepoints in the delimitation 
of maritime boundaries. 
Article 121 of UNCLOS, dealing with the Regime of islands provides the basis 
for this analysis. In full Article 121 states that: 
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is 
above water at high tide. 
2. Except as providedfor in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, 
the exclusive economic zone and the continental she~{ of an island are 
determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to 
other land territory. 
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own 
shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. 
3.5.1 What Constitutes an Island? 
Paragraph 1 of Article 121 of UNCLOS represents a direct repetition of Article I 0, 
paragraph 1 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. Four 
requirements are identified by these Articles which a feature must fulfil if it is to legally 
qualify as an island. These insular criteria are that an island must be "naturally 
formed", be an "area of land", be "surrounded by water" and, critically, must be 
"above water at high tide." 
Naturally formed 
The first requirement, that an island be "naturally fanned" clearly serves to disqualify 
artificial 'islands' such as platforms constructed for example on submerged shoals, low-
tide elevations or reefs. Such artificial islands are not considered to be legal islands in 
the international law of the sea as is made explicit by Article 60, paragraph 8 of 
UNCLOS: 
94 Such an eventuality is, however, extremely unlikely. Indeed, Prescott ( 1988: 33) has pointed out 
that were Hawaii to gain independence from the USA it would be the only coastal country in the 
world without overlapping maritime claims with a neighbouring state. 
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Artifzcial islands, installations and structures do not posses the status of islands. 
They have no territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not aflect the 
delimitation of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone or the continental 
shelf 95 
Island-building activities on the part of states, keen to thereby enhance their claims to 
maritime space by creating new islands, is therefore at variance with the UN Convention 
and the customary international law of the sea. Nevertheless, several states have sought 
to protect certain insular features which, although naturally formed, are unstable and 
susceptible to erosion such that they are in danger of losing their status as islands 
through falling below the "above water at high tide" criterion. 
Perhaps the most striking example of such efforts to preserve the insular 
character of vulnerable formations is Japan's efforts to maintain its southernmost islet of 
Okintorishima above the high tide level. This feature generates approximately 160,000 
square miles of claimed exclusive economic zone for Japan despite consisting merely of 
two small peaks sitting atop an otherwise submerged reef. One of these peaks is no 
more than three feet above the high-tide level. The Japanese authorities have therefore 
taken the rather unorthodox and somewhat dramatic step of building artificial sea 
defences entirely surrounding the islet. Although these artificial structures are in fact 
higher than the naturally formed above high tide formations themselves, it is the latter 
which are vital in terms of generating extended maritime zone.96 
Area of land 
The provision that an island be composed of "an area of land" would seem, at first 
glance, to be a fairly self-evident requirement. However, in certain circumstances this 
aspect of insular definition can be problematic and open to dispute. A fine example of 
this is that of Dinkum Sands, a formation lying off the Alaskan arctic coast. Composed 
of alternating layers of sea ice and gravel, the dispute over the feature between the 
Alaskan state authorities and the US Federal government turned on whether that part of 
the formation's vertical height made up of ice could be counted when testing the feature 
against the "above water at high-tide" provision.97 
95 
96 
97 
States may, however, declare "reasonable" safety zones around artificial structures (UNCLOS, 
Article 60, 4 ). 
Silverstein, 1990: 409-431; Symmons, 1995:3. 
Briscoe, 1988: 17-18; Symmons, 1995: 3-4. It is conceivable that similar difficulties may arise 
in relation to coral cays. Islands in coral-inhabited areas are frequently described as 'cays' 
although this is not a term of art in Law of the Sea terminology. The International Hydrographic 
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Surrounded by water 
The "surrounded by water" requirement may be regarded as a largely uncontroversial 
rule. This is so because if a feature is indeed linked to the mainland coast by, for 
example, a sandbar, to such an extent that it may be considered an integral part of the 
mainland coast, then it follows that that feature takes on the characteristics of the 
mainland coast. As such the feature would have a baseline and thus be capable of 
generating claims to the full suite of maritime zones, just as it would do as a full-fledged 
island. 
Above water at high-tide 
The question of an island being "above water at high-tide" is fundamental - as the 
preceding sections relating to the other requirements of Article 121 (1) demonstrate. A 
particular feature's relationship to the tidal level is vital in distinguishing between 
islands (above high-tide), low-tide elevations (above low-tide but submerged at high-
tide) and non-insular features (submerged at Jow-tide).98 This concern is, however, 
intimately linked to the choice of vertical tidal datum used to determine what represents 
the high and low tidal levels. No universally accepted vertical tidal datum in use (see 
Section 3.3.1). 
Alternative Definitions 
The question of the definition of islands has provoked fierce debate over the years. 
Perhaps the most significant issues of contention is related to island size and 
habitability. Many commentators, and indeed states, have proposed that there should be 
some size limit coupled with the definition of what constitutes an island, such as to 
98 
Organisation (1990: 37) describes a cay (or kay or key) as "A low flat island of sand. coral etc. 
awash or drying at low water, a term originally applied to the coral islets around the coast and 
islands of Caribbean Sea." This definition indicates that cays might submerge at some stages of 
the tidal cycle. For a detailed analysis of the Dinkum Sands case see Symmons, 1999. 
Other commentators, for example Nunn ( 1994), have characterised cays as being 
impermanent accumulations of sand and shingle which, with the accumulation of beach rock, 
may develop into more stable features termed motu. This gives the impression that cays may be 
subject to evolution and decay over time. It is, however, reasonable to assume that on those cays 
which are occupied measures have been taken by the occupants to prevent the feature's erosion 
and there may even have been attempts to promote island-building. As a result such features may 
well qualify as 'rocks' or even 'islands' (see Hancox and Prescott, 1995) 
Briscoe, 1988: 18-19; Symmons, 1995:4. 
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prevent each "mere pin-prick of rock", even if permanently above water, from 
generating maritime claims.99 
Arguments of this type were certainly evident in the run up to and during the 
drafting of Article 10 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 
concluded in Geneva in 1958. 100 In the end, however, no size criterion was included. 
An important attempt to tackle the problem of defining islands by size was, 
however, subsequently undertaken by Robert Hodgson, The Geographer at the United 
States Department of State. His 1973 Research Study Islands: Normal and Special 
Circumstances included a categorisation of islands as follows: 
I. rocks, less than .OOI square mile in area; 
2. islets, between .OOI and I square 1nile; 
3. isles, greater than 1 square mile but not more than I,OOO square miles; and, 
4. islands, larger than I,OOO square miles. 
Similar proposals were advanced before and during UNCLOS III. Malta presented draft 
articles defining an island as a "naturally formed area of land, more than one square 
kilometre in area" and an "islet" a similar area of land of less than one square 
kilometre in area. African states and Romania also made notable proposals, concerning 
both size and habitability, broadly aimed at denying or restricting small insular features 
which the maritime zones accorded to 'true' islands. 101 
This trend to link island definition with size and habitability were, however, 
counteracted by several delegations at UNCLOS keen to preserve the status quo. As the 
UK delegate pointed out: 
... there was an immense diversity of island situations, ranging ji-om large and 
populous islands of even larger continental states to small islands with self-
sufficient populations, and that, inter alia, the attempt by some delegations to 
categorise islands in terms of size would not result in any generally applicable 
rules which would be equitable in all cases; and there was grave danger of 
discounting many islands of both absolute and relative importance. 102 
Ultimately, the forces for status quo prevailed- Article 121 of UNCLOS lacks any size 
criteria for defining islands and the 1958 definition remained intact. However, concerns 
over size and habitability were included in the 1982 Convention in the form of 
99 
100 
101 
102 
Johnson ( 1951) 'Artificial Islands', International Law Quarterly, 4. Quoted in Symmons, 1979: 
37. 
See Bowett, 1979 and Symmons, 1979 for details of this debate. 
See Bowett, 1979 and Symmons, 1979. 
Symmons, 1979: 40. 
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paragraph 3 of Article 121 which introduces into the international law of the sea a 
disadvantaged sub-category of island, the "rock". 
3.5.2 Rocks 
A further conundrum relates to the distinction made in Article 121 between islands and 
rocks. Article 121(3) states that: 
Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own 
shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. 
Rocks, therefore represent. a disadvantaged sub-category of island whose zone-
generative capacity, and thus value to a potential claimant is significantly reduced. 
This provision presents a twofold interpretational problem. The UN Convention 
provides no definition as when a feature "cannot sustain human habitation" or what 
constitutes the "economic life" of a particular feature. 
All subsequent attempts to define rocks and islands on the basis of criteria such 
as size or the presence of vegetation have come to nothing, primarily because the terms 
used in Article 121 in relation to rocks are not only vague but are also essentially 
concerned with the functions of technology, economics and culture. 103 For example, at 
the extreme end of the debate, if a space-station can be made 'habitable' and economic 
functions be performed there, under the terms of Article 121, there is nothing to stop any 
rock, however small, from being interpreted as a fully-fledged island. 104 
There is therefore no objective way to distinguish between an island and a rock 
under the terms of the UN Convention. Unless one or more of the parties to a dispute 
over the insular status of a particular feature possesses the political will to compromise 
in the course of negotiations, deadlock will inevitably occur. 
It should be remembered, however, that in order to qualify as a rock, the other 
requirements for insular status laid down in Article 121 (1) must first be met. 
3.5.3 Reefs 
Under the Law of the Sea Convention (fringing) reefs do not qualify as insular 
formations except in certain circumstances in confined geographical situations in which 
103 
104 
Attempts at objective analysis with a view to codification have, however, been made. For 
example, writers such as Kwiatkowska and Soons (1990) have argued that Article 121(3) applies 
to barren, uninhabited islands. 
Dzurek, contribution to discussion on int-boundaries e-mail list, 18/3/97. 
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they act as an extension of another feature, for example in the case of "islands situated 
on atolls or islands having fringing reefs" (Article 6) (see Section 3.3.2). Drying reefs 
may, however, qualify as low-tide elevations (see Section 3.5.4). 
3.5.4 Low-Tide Elevations 
A low-tide elevation is defined in Article 13 of the Law of the Sea Convention, which 
repeats the terminology used in Article 11 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial 
Sea and Contiguous Zone, as a "naturallyJormed area of land which is surrounded by 
water at low-tide but submerged at high-tide. " Such a feature may be used as a 
territorial sea basepoint, but only if it falls wholly or partially within the breadth of the 
territorial sea measured from the normal baseline of a state's mainland or island coasts. 
A low-tide elevation's value for maritime jurisdictional claims is therefore 
geographically restricted to coastal locations. Such features have therefore been termed 
"parasitic basepoints" as their zone-generative capacity is reliant on their proximity to 
a mainland or island baseline. 105 
It is worth noting that although low-tide elevations which fall partially within the 
territorial sea measured a mainland or island coast qualify and may generate a territorial 
sea of their own, those falling partially or wholly within a territorial sea measured from 
a straight baseline do not. Additionally, low-tide elevations which fall wholly or 
partially within the territorial sea of another low-tide elevation (itself wholly or partially 
within the territorial sea of a mainland or island coast), do not qualify so that there can 
be no 'stepping stone' effect offshore of low-tide elevations linked by territorial seas. 
It follows that low-tide elevations located beyond the territorial sea may not be 
used as basepoints for generating maritime zones and therefore represents "no more 
h . . h d ,/06 t an a navzgatwn azar . 
The exception to this rule is provided by Article 7(4) of the Convention 
whereby low-tide elevations may be used as appropriate basepoints for straight 
baselines if lighthouses or similar structures have been constructed on them or 
where general international recognition of the drawing of baselines from such 
features exists (see Section 3.3.3). 
105 Symmons, 1995: 7. 
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3.5.5 Submerged Banks and Shoals 
Such entirely submerged features have no zone generative capacity even if a structure 
has been built on them which is itself permanently above sea level. Many such 
structures have been constructed among the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China 
Sea.I07 
3.5.6 The Role of Islands 
The question of how outstanding geographical features, such as islands significantly far 
offshore, are treated is one of the most contentious issues in maritime boundary 
delimitation. If a formation fulfils the requirements of this definition, it may generate 
the full suite of maritime zones known to the international law of the sea - territorial 
sea, contiguous zone, 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf. 
As a result, islands may be of vital importance for the fixing of maritime zones and thus 
critical to a state's claims to maritime jurisdiction. 
Even if a feature can be categorised as a fully-fledged island under law of the sea 
rules, it must be borne in mind that islands are not always accorded 'full effect' in 
maritime boundary delimitations - achieved either through negotiations or with third-
party assistance. Indeed, there are numerous examples of state practice and case 
precedents where islands have received a substantially reduced, frequently half, effect, 
been partially or wholly enclaved or completely ignored (see Section 3.2.1). 108 
In the context of the Gulf of Thailand, therefore, it should be remembered that 
even if a formation achieves recognition as an island under the Law of the Sea 
Convention definition it may well not be accorded a full effect in any eventual maritime 
boundary negotiation, arbitration or judicial settlement before, for example, the ICJ. 
3.6 Non-Coastal Geography Related Factors 
3.6.1 Political Factors 
It is often difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish when political factors have had a 
direct impact on the course of a delimitation. Nonetheless, political considerations are 
106 
107 
108 
Symmons, 1995: 7. 
Hancox and Prescott, 1995. 
For example see Bowett, 1979; Jayewaedene, 1990; Symmons, 1979 and 1995. 
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fundamental to the maritime boundary delimitation, dealing as it does with sovereign 
rights. Delimitation is therefore essentially a political exercise. As Prescott has pointed 
out, Ancel's dictum on land boundaries is just as apt in relation to maritime boundary 
delimitation: 
Il n 'y a pas de problemes de frontieres. Il n 'est que des problemes de Nations 
[There are no boundary problems. There are only problems of nations.]109 
It is, of course, necessarily a political decision to enter into negotiations (or, indeed, 
whether to take a dispute to third-part adjudication), to decide what proposals to present 
in such talks, what concessions to make to the other side and, finally, to accept or reject 
the proposed boundary delimitation. 110 
Maritime boundary delimitation is m essence a political exercise because it 
involves sovereignty and jurisdiction over territory and maritime space. In a general 
sense political geography and history play a significant role in determining sovereignty 
over territory and thus the possession of coastlines by certain states. A state's land 
boundaries and the extent of its sovereignty over land territory will therefore define that 
state's coastal front from which maritime claims can be made (see Section 3.3.1). 
It should be noted in this context that it is possession of the coastline that is 
significant, rather than the landmass behind that coastal front. Equally, the position 
where the land boundary reaches the coast is important in that it divides the coastline 
between state jurisdictions. The course of the land boundary behind the coast, however, 
has generally been viewed as being irrelevant to delimitation, at least in jurisprudence. 
For example, the Court rejected Libya's argument in the Tunisia-Libya case that the 
boundary line offshore should maintain the generally northerly alignment of the land 
boundary between the states (Tunisia/Libya, para.85). 
The political will of the parties, particularly in the case of a boundary reached 
through negotiations, is therefore the paramount factor in maritime boundary 
delimitation. If relations are cordial and the political will exists to reach a fair and 
equitable resolution, then a mutually acceptable maritime boundary agreement can be 
achieved no matter what other complications exist in relation to the area to be delimited. 
Political will is therefore required to curb a state's natural desire to maximise the area 
under its control and instead avoid dispute and make the concessions necessary in order 
109 Quoted in Prescott, 1985b: 74. 
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to achieve an agreement. The reverse is, naturally, also true. Poor relations and distrust 
will readily give rise to dispute in the course of important and complex maritime 
b d · · Ill oun ary negot1at10ns. 
It is also worth observing that all other factors considered relevant to a particular 
delimitation are seen through a political lens and are subject to political analysis by the 
governments concerned which will assess matters in light of its policy objectives. 
3.6.2 Security Issues 
Defence and national security interests have frequently been raised as a relevant factor 
in the course of maritime boundary negotiations, particularly in cases where the 
boundary concerned is in close proximity to a state's coastline. As with political 
factors, however, it is less than easy to discern when security concerns have had a direct 
bearing on the precise alignment of a maritime boundary, as issues of national defence 
and security are rarely, if ever, explicitly mentioned in agreements. In addition, security 
interests in the broader sense are often part and parcel of other factors, for example 
. 112 
economic concerns. 
Military security-based arguments have also been proposed before international 
courts and tribunals. While the latter have stressed that such interests may constitute 
legitimate relevant circumstances for delimitation, they have hitherto accorded such 
f 1 1 .. d . h 113 actors on y 1m1te we1g t. -
The most immediate and pressing security concern shown by states, in terms of 
the traditional and narrow definition of security as military security, is the protection of 
state territory and exclusion of other potentially threatening activities on the part of 
hostile states and other actors close to that state territory. This security concern equates 
to a desire on the part of states to exert control over those maritime areas in close 
proximity to its coastlines. State interests of this nature are often addressed in the 
adoption of an equidistance line based solution - that is, a line based on proximity with 
those maritime areas closest to each state's land territory belonging to that state (see 
Section 3.2). 
Another major security concern for states is that of access to and from its ports. 
This demands a wider definition of security than the traditional militaristic one. 
110 
Ill 
112 
Oxman, 1993: 10-11. 
Prescott, l985b: 74. 
Oxman, 1993: 22. 
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Concerns over access and navigation include not simply the requirement of freedom of 
access on the part of a state's naval forces (and those of its allies), but also access for 
commercial shipping which may very well be crucial to that state's economic security. 
It is, therefore, frequently difficult to distinguish between strictly military security issues 
and economic interests in state concerns over access and navigation. Indeed, numerous 
factors considered as distinct relevant circumstances for delimitation, such as resource 
and environmental issues, could easily be included under the umbrella of security 
concerns - as they are often fundamental to a state's prosperity and long-term survival 
and thus its security in the broader sense. 
It is worth observing that it would be extraordinary for defence officials to be 
excluded from the teams negotiating the boundary or for them not to be an integral part 
of the decision-making body entrusted with accepting or rejecting a proposed boundary. 
Whatever the factors apparently influencing the final boundary line, it would be 
surprising if that potential delimitation were not analysed from a defence and security 
. f h . . 114 perspective as part o t e negottatmg process. 
3. 6.3 Economic and Environmental Interests 
If there is a clear economic disparity between the parties to a dispute, the less well-off 
state frequently advances the argument that it should be compensated for this 
circumstance by means of shifting the delimitation line in its favour. This sort of 
argument has met with little sympathy before the International Court of Justice, which 
has on more than one occasion held that such factors are not of relevance as they are 
liable to significant change over time. This situation arose in the Tunisia/Libya case in 
1982 when Tunisia argued its poverty relative to Libya. The Court's response was 
unequivocal: 
113 
114 
115 
... these economic considerations cannot be taken into account for the 
delimitation of the continental she(f appertaining to each Party. They are 
virtually extraneous factors since they are variables which unpredictable 
national fortune or calamity, as the case may be, might at any time cause to tilt 
the scale one way or the other. A country might be poor today and become rich 
tonwrrow as a result of an event such as the discovery of a valuable economic 
resource.
115 
See, for example, Evans, 1989: 172-178. 
Oxman, 1993: 22-23. 
Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf case, 1982: para. I 07. 
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The Court has, however, left the door slightly ajar to consideration of such economic 
disparity arguments as a test of the equitability of the result, ruling that they are 
generally to be disregarded unless to do so would entail "catastrophic repercussions" 
for the states concerned. 116 
The relative level of economic development of the parties is, however, an issue 
quite distinct from the economic and environmental attributes of the maritime space to 
be delimited. It has been argued before the ICJ that, much as geophysical features could 
provide the basis for a 'natural' maritime boundary, so too could environmental 
considerations. The US claim, in the Gulf of Maine case, that a natural boundary 
existed between the Brown's and George's banks on a geophysical basis (the Northeast 
Channel) was supported by extensive evidence on marine environmental factors such as 
the pattern of water flow and fisheries resources (the latter could, of course, also be 
considered to be an economic factor). This argument suffered from the same drawbacks 
that plagued geophysical boundary proposals - environmental factors tend to provide 
zones of differentiation rather than distinct lines and are as invisible to the mariner as 
sub-surface geophysical features thus offering little advantage to adopting the potential 
natural boundary. 
There is, however, a significant difference between the approach adopted by the 
courts and that of states entering into bilateral (or multilateral) negotiations. This is 
unsurprising in that, firstly, states are quite free to raise any factors they chose for 
consideration between them, and, secondly, economic and environmental issues are 
frequently the prime concern of the parties and thus the driving force behind the 
negotiations in the first place. In certain circumstances, therefore, these issues can hold 
a dominant role in determining the course of the delimitation line. 117 It is also worth 
noting that the perceived economic potential of the area in dispute may prove a critical 
factor in both encouraging the parties to negotiate and, conversely, discouraging them 
from compromise. 118 In this context Prescott cites Britain and Germany's experience in 
the 1880s in relation to long drawn out negotiations over a comparatively small coastal 
116 
117 
118 
Gulf of Maine case, 1984: para.237. 
For example, Papua New Guinea was able to play the economic disadvantagement card 
effectively in negotiations with Australia when it sought a larger share of the marine resources of 
the Torres Strait area than a delimitation according to equidistance would have provided 
(Prescott, 1985b: 78). Similarly, Iceland seemingly gained a favourable boundary with Norway 
in relation to Jan Mayen island on the basis of arguments related to economic dependence on fish 
storcks (Prescott, 1988: 36). 
In the Gulf of Thailand, this factor was clearly at work in Thai-Malaysian negotiation leading up 
to the establishment of their joint development area (see Section 6.2.4). 
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area on what is now the Cameroon-Nigeria boundary. Neither side would contemplate 
compromise over the disputed territory as it "might prove to be an Eldorado or a 
hl ,}}9 wort ess swamp. 
It is also well to observe that real politik dictates that, perhaps inevitably, the 
more economically prosperous and powerful state is likely to hold an advantage in the 
course of negotiations. This is certainly the case for negotiated agreements, even though 
the existence of such an economic disparity would cut little ice before an international 
court or tribunal. 
Indeed, Kwiatkowska 120 found in the course of her review of over 130 maritime 
boundary agreements that in as many as 36 cases economic and/or environmental issues 
had played a critical role in the decision on the methodology for and ultimate course of 
the boundary. Of these 36 cases identified, 21 were guided by mineral resources issues, 
nine by navigational factors, seven in relation to the existence of fisheries and one on 
environmental grounds. In addition, these factors were acknowledged as subsidiary 
issues of concern in many other cases. 
Even if economic and environmental factors may not frequently directly guide 
the parties directly to the method of delimitation, it is quite conceivable that they may 
play a secondary, though potentially significant, role to geography, in influencing the 
final course of the maritime boundary. 
3.6.4 Conduct of the Parties and Historical Factors 
In general, historical factors frequently coincide with other relevant circumstances for 
delimitation and are therefore often difficult to separate from those considerations. For 
example, traditional fishing activities may well be bound up with arguments of an 
economic nature rather than being a distinct historic factor. 121 
Nevertheless, it has been shown that the prior conduct of the parties can play a 
critical role in maritime delimitation. This is particularly true when the states concerned 
have either expressly or implicitly recognised a particular line as limiting their 
respective jurisdictions and have acted accordingly. Also relevant would be evidence 
119 
120 
121 
Prescott, 1985b: 78. 
Kwiatkowska, 1993,75-113. 
Oxman, 1993: 32. An example where traditional fishing activities were accorded particular 
prominence in the course of delimitation was in relation to the Torres Strait between Australia 
and Papua New Guinea where a protected zone was established as a result. 
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that a state has historically exercised administration or control over a particular area and 
that the competing state has acquiesced to that administration. 
Where past treaties have included lines at sea, for example to define ownership 
over islands, the question arises as to whether the parties to the treaty intended such 
lines to denote a division of maritime space as well the land territory within the area 
concerned. The determining factor in such cases is often the extent to which such lines 
have over the years in fact been used as the limits of each side's activities and 
jurisdiction. This may well have a bearing on the delimitation of the Cambodia-
Vietnam maritime boundary in relation to the Brevie Line. 
For example, in the Tunisia-Libya case, the ICJ eventually selected a line based 
on historic factors, at least for the first part of the boundary in close proximity to the 
terminus of the land boundary on the Mediterranean coast. This part of the boundary 
delimitation was based on a line drawn by the Italian colonial administration in Libya in 
1919 and subsequently respected by both parties in the issuing of their oil exploration 
concessions. The Court therefore found that a de facto, working boundary was already 
in existence and observed over a considerable time by both sides, thus making it a 
suitable basis for its decision on delimitation of that sector of the disputed area. 
3.7 Summary 
It seems clear, therefore, that there exist a multitude of methods of maritime boundary 
delimitation. However, the equidistance method, even if not obligatory, has proved far 
and away the most popular delimitation method. The reasons for this relate to its 
mathematical precision, lack of ambiguity and its accordance with equity where the 
parties' coastlines are broadly comparable. Where the coastlines in question are not 
comparable and a strict equidistance line would result in an inequitable delimitation, the 
equidistance method has frequently been used as a starting point and then modified. 
Equidistance has therefore proved an adaptable and flexible method of delimitation, 
particularly in opposite coast situations. Nevertheless, as Legault and Hankey have 
observed: 
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The choice of means or methods for translating the relevant geographical and 
other circumstances into a precise line is, as ever, the most difficult issue in the 
l f . . b d . J?? aw ~ mantzme oun anes. --
With regard to the relevant circumstances that can be raised in the course of maritime 
boundary delimitation negotiations or other form of dispute settlement, there is no 
restriction on the arguments that may be raised by states within the framework of the 
international law of the sea. This has naturally provided ample scope for overlapping 
maritime claims, dispute and deadlock between states over maritime jurisdictional 
issues. Nevertheless, geographical factors, particularly coastal geography, have proved 
to be of primary importance, eclipsing all other factors. 
Chapter 2 and 3 have provided a review of the key facets of the law of the sea 
relevant to maritime jurisdictional claims and maritime boundary delimitation. The 
objective of this overview and evaluation was to provide the tools for analysis of 
maritime boundary claims, agreements and disputes in the Gulf of Thailand which are 
be addressed in subsequent chapters. 
122 Legault and Hankey, 1993: 206. 
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Baseline Claims in the Gulf of Thailand 
4.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapters concentrated on a review of the key elements of the international 
law of the sea relevant to maritime jurisdiction and maritime boundary delimitation as 
well as establishing the positions of the Gulf of Thailand littoral states in relation to the 
main multilateral agreements on these issues. In addition, an indication of the means by 
which these states may resolve maritime boundary disputes has been made. It is 
therefore appropriate to begin to apply the results of these theoretical background 
studies and turn critical attention towards the Gulf of Thailand. This chapter will 
initiate the detailed examination of the maritime claims of the Gulf of Thailand coastal 
states. 
The focus of this chapter is the baseline claims propounded by the Gulf of 
Thailand littoral states. As indicated in Section 2.3, baseline claims are fundamental to 
a state's overall claims to maritime jurisdiction because the baseline represents the 
starting point for the measurement of the extent of any state's maritime rights. This 
therefore constitutes the logical to start an analysis of Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand 
and Vietnam's offshore claims. 
The baseline claims that have been made within the Gulf of Thailand are 
complex and extensive, in view of the number of straight baseline claims that have _been 
made within the Gulf. As Table 4.1 indicates, all four Gulf of Thailand states have 
made claims to straight baselines and these claims have developed over time such that, 
for instance, Cambodia has comprehensively revised its straight baseline claims no less 
than three times since 1957. Complicating this scenario is the fact that Cambodia and 
Vietnam Uointly) and Thailand have all made claims to parts of the Gulf of Thailand on 
the basis of historic rights. These claims are dealt with in more detail in Sections 6.1 
and 7.2. 
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Table 4.1 Claims to Straight Baselines in the Gulf of Thailand 
State 
Cambodia 
Malaysia 
Thailand 
Vietnam 
Date of Claim 
1957 
1972 
1982 
1979 
1959 
1970 
1992 
19771 
Type of Claim 
Predominantly fringing islands but with mainland 
coastal points. 
Predominantly fringing islands but with mainland 
coastal points. 
Fringing islands. 
Predominantly fringing islands but with mainland 
points within Gulf of Thailand. 
Historic bay closing line. 
Fringing islands in two groups within Gulf of Thailand. 
Extension of claim to include additional islands. 
Fringing islands. 
Source: Author's research. 
Overall, as a consequence of their straight baseline claims, the Gulf of Thailand littoral 
states have laid claim to approximately 26,066nm2 of the Gulf as internal waters. In 
addition, Thailand's claim to the Bight of Thailand as an historic bay amounts to 
2,834nm2 and Cambodia and Vietnam's joint Historic Waters Area covers around 
2,711nm2. The total area of the Gulf claimed landward of straight baselines or closing 
lines therefore amounts to 31,6llnm2 - equivalent to just over 11% of its total area.2 
The following discussion will deal with the development each Gulf of Thailand coastal 
state's baseline claims in turn before concluding with a comparative analysis. The 
intrinsic importance of baseline claims to certain claims to extended maritime 
jurisdiction will be analysed further in relation to particular cases in the Gulf of 
Thailand in subsequent chapters. 
4.2 Cambodia's Straight Baseline Claims in the Gulf of Thailand 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Cambodia's claims to straight baselines have been steadily developed over time (see 
Figure 4.1). As a result Cambodia's straight baselines system has been progressively 
extended incorporating as basepoints insular features further and further offshore. 
2 
Although Vietnam promulgated legislation concerning straight baselines in 1977, the locations of 
these lines was only revealed in 1982. 
Prescott gives the total area of the Gulf of Thailand as 283,700km2 which is equivalent to 
82,715nm2 (Prescott, 1998: II). 
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Baseline Claims 
4.2.2 Cambodia's 1957 Straight Baselines Claim 
Cambodia adopted its first, relatively modest, system of straight baselines in 1957 (see 
Figure 4.2).3 This system fronted the entirety of Cambodia's mainland coast from the 
terminus of the Cambodia-Thailand land boundary on the coast in the north to the 
intersection of the Cambodia-Vietnam land boundary with the coast in the south. 
Cambodia's 1957 straight baselines consist of 12 segments linking a mixture of 13 
defined island and mainland coastal points. The baselines system can be considered as 
falling into three distinct sections. 
In the northern part of Cambodia's coastline, the 1957 claim constructed straight 
baselines from the terminus of the Cambodia-Thailand land boundary on the coast 
(Point A) to the islands of Koh (Kaoh) Kong (Cl), one of the Koh Samit group (C2)4 
and Koh Smach (C3) which all lie close inshore (see Table 4.2).5 These three islands 
are also relatively closely grouped together, Koh Kong lying 16.47nm (30.5km) from 
the island used as a basepoin.t in .the K9h Samit group which in turn lies 3.1nm (5.75km) 
4 
Coordinates of Cambodi~',s claim to straight baselines of 1957 are included in Prince Norodom 
Ranariddh's thesis (1976: 24-25). 
The precise positions of points C l-C3 were deduced from a combination of clues. This is 
because the coordinates supplied in Prince Ranariddh's thesis, when plotted on British Admiralty 
Chart 3985 at a scale of l :500,000, place point C1 inland on Koh Kong and points C2 and C3 
offshore with point C3 being accorded a latitude north of point C2 therefore seemingly taking the 
straight baseline system back upon itself. The text descriptions of the locations of the basepoints, 
coupled with a sketch map included in the thesis were therefore used to try and clarify the 
location of the basepoints concerned. 
Thus, the definition of point C1 as the "west point of Koh Rang", in addition to an 
examination of the sketch map allowed for the deduction of the actual position of the basepoint 
despite the uncertainties of applying coordinates of unknown datum to a chart of known datum. 
In a similar fashion it was possible to locate point C3 which was defined as the western point of 
Koh Smach. Unfortunately, less certainty surrounds the precise location of point C2, not only 
because the coordinate mentioned lies offshore but the text description of the position of the 
basepoint as the first island in the Koh Samit group does not tally with the sketch map which 
marks point C2 as coinciding with "Roche de Ia Table", an isolated rock to the north of the 
Samit group. In any case, it is unclear where the Samit group of islands begins and ends and 
there exist several features which could qualify as the first island in the group. As a result, a 
'best guess' as to the location of point C2 has been taken and this is illustrated on Figure 4.2. It 
should be stressed, however, that there is potential for error in the position accorded to this 
feature on the map and the coordinates included in Table 4.2. 
The coordinates provided for the other basepoints anchoring the baseline system 
generally agree closely with the sketch map, text descriptions and the coastline itself when 
plotted on Admiralty Chart 3985. The exception is the position of point ClO. The sketch map 
positions this point approximately 5.4nm (lOkm) west of that according to the coordinates 
provided in the thesis. The former position is illustrated on Figure 4.2 with a dashed line. 
Attempts to locate an original copy of the legislation establishing Cambodia's 1957 
straight baseline claim proved unsuccessful. This is likely to be the consequence of Cambodia's 
turbulent internal political circumstances from the 1960s onwards. However, there is no reason to 
doubt the veracity of Prince Ranariddh's statements regarding this claim. 
It is also worth noting that there are a significant number of islands lying inshore of the defined 
straight baselines, particularly in the vicinity of Koh Samit and Koh Smach, which could be 
considered as forming part of a fringe of islands off the Cambodian mainland coast. 
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Baseline Claims 
In the central part of Cambodia's coastal front the 1957 straight baselines linked a 
number of islands located across the mouth of Kompong Som Bay. The island 
concerned were Koh Rong, Koh Rong Samlem and Koh Ta Kiev before the baselines 
proceeded southeastwards to Koh Ses. Two basepoints were defined on each of Koh 
Rong Samlem and Koh Ses. These islands are generally somewhat further offshore than 
those linked by baselines in the northern part of the coast, but are also relatively close to 
one another, Koh Rong Samlem being 2.02nm (3.75km) from Koh Rong and l.35nm 
(lkm) from Koh Ta Kiev which is in turn 10.8nm (20km) from Koh Ses (see Table 
4.2).12 
Table 4.3 Cambodia's 1957 Straight Baselines Claim: Segment Lengths 
Segment 
A-Cl 
C1-C2 
C2-C3 
C3-C4 
C4-C5 
C5-C6 
C6-C7 
C7-C8 
C8-C9 
C9-C10 
ClO-Cll 
Cll-C12 
Total 
Average 
Length 
22.27nm (41.25krn) 
19.03nm (35.25km) 
4.05nm (7.5km) 
11.34nm (21 km) 
11.61nm (21.5km) 
1.62nm (3km) 
16.74nm (31km) 
12.69nm (23.5km) 
I .89nm (3.5km) 
11.6 I nm (21.5km) 
7.83nm (14.5km) 
22.68nm ( 42km) 
143.36nm (265.5km) 
11.95nm (22.13km) 
Source: Author's research. 
From Koh Ses, the straight baselines claimed in 1957 proceed to a point on Cambodia's 
southern mainland coast. The baselines then terminate at the intersection of the 
Cambodia-Vietnam land boundary on the coast via another mainland coastal point (see 
Figure 4.2 and Table 4.2). Cambodia's 1957 claim related specifically to straight 
baselines. It can be deduced from this that 'normal' baselines along the low-water mark 
apply to Cambodian islands seaward of the straight baselines claim. 
Overall, Cambodia's 1957 straight baseline claim can be regarded as 
conservative rather than aggressive or expansionist in nature, hugging Cambodia's 
mainland coast. It can further be observed that the baselines claimed in I 957 broadly 
accord with Article 4 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous 
12 Measured on British Admiralty Chart 3985, 1987 edition, at a scale of 1:500,000. 
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Zone and Article 7 of UNCLOS. This is, perhaps, particularly impressive bearing in 
mind the fact that the straight baseline system was formulated relatively soon after 
independence in 194913 and prior to the Geneva Conventions being opened for signature 
in I 958. 
The distances of the islands used as basepoints for anchoring the straight 
baselines from the nearest mainland coastal point are summarised in Table 4.2 while the 
lengths of the straight baseline segments concerned are listed in Table 4.3. The average 
length of the baseline segments making up the 1957 system is 11.95nm (22.13km) with 
the longest segment being 22.68 ( 42km) in length, while the average distance between 
the islands fringing the coast used as basepoints is 9.8nm (18.1km) with the maximum 
distance between such islands being 16.47nm (30.5km). 14 Although neither Article 4 of 
the relevant Geneva Convention nor Article 7 of UNCLOS specify the maximum length 
for individual straight baseline segments, the US Department of State has advanced the 
view that the upper limit should be 48nm (see Section 3.3.3). 15 The latter source also 
proposed that islands considered part of the fringe should not be further than 24nm 
apart. 16 As the major maritime power, US policy on this issue has revolved around 
attempting to minimise what it perceives to be excessive maritime claims and to 
maximise freedom of navigation. The US guidelines on straight baselines can therefore 
be regarded as a strict rather than liberal interpretation of the rules laid out in the 
Geneva and UN Conventions. 17 Even when set against these restrictive prohibitions, 
however, it is clear that, on these two elements at least, Cambodia's I 957 claim is above 
reproach. 
Perhaps even more tellingly, the average distance offshore of the islands fringing 
the Cambodian coast linked by straight baselines in 1957 is 3.74nm (6.93km) 18 and the 
entirety of the maritime area landward of those baselines thereby claimed as internal 
waters, amounting to 1,286nm2 (4,411km\ would in any case have fallen within 
Cambodia's territorial sea (i.e. within 12nm) as measured from 'normal' low-water line 
baselines. Furthermore, of the territorial sea measured from the 1957 straight baselines, 
the area that could be considered 'additional', that is areas claimed over and above that 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Cambodia achieved independence from France on 8 November 1949. 
Measured on British Admiralty Chart 3985, 1987 edition, at a scale of I :500,000. 
US Department of State, 1987: 14. 
US Department of State, 1987: 17. 
See Roach and Smith (1996: 15-28) on how the United States identifies what it regards as 
excessive claims. 
Measured on British Admiralty Chart 3985, 1987 edition, at a scale of I :500,000. 
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claimed from island or mainland 'normal' baselines, is negligible. 19 The Geneva and 
UN Conventions failed to provide a specific distance offshore (or any other objective 
test) by which to measure whether a particular fringe of islands is close enough to the 
coast to be considered in its "immediate vicinity "20 or in order to assess whether the 
waters enclosed by the straight baselines are "sufficiently closely linked to the land to be 
subject to the regime of internal waters. "21 Nevertheless, the US State Department 
suggested that a 24nm separation (i.e. two territorial sea breadths) between the mainland 
coast and a fringe of islands was probably generally accepted as being appropriately 
close, and further proposed that two territorial sea widths ( 48nm) be regarded as the 
upper limit. 22 A UN Committee of experts report concurred with the former finding as 
constituting general international practice but also raised some question over the level of 
international acceptance of the upper 48nm limit. 23 Once again, Cambodia's 1957 
straight baseline claim comfortably passes these tests. 
Concerning Article 7 of UNCLOS's provision that straight baselines should "not 
depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast", it has already 
been noted that the concept of the general direction of the coast is predominantly 
dependent on the scale of observation and is therefore a vague quality.24 Divergence 
from the general direction of the coast is thus a well nigh impossible concept to apply 
rationally (see Section 3.3.3). Having made this rather negative observation, it can be 
argued that the relatively short baseline segments, positioned close inshore, which 
Cambodia claimed in 1957, conform closely to the configuration of the coast and thus, 
in this author's view, accord with the spirit of Article 7 in this regard. 
Nevertheless, one general criticism that can be levelled at Cambodia's 1957 
straight baselines claim is its tendency to use straight baselines to simplify the coastal 
front as a whole - enclosing the entire mainland coastline with straight baselines. 
Alternatively, straight baselines could have been applied somewhat more selectively, 
linking sections of coast where 'normal' baselines might have been more appropriate. 25 
Thus, in the northern section of the baseline system, it could be argued that rather than 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
The area of 'additional' territorial sea was so small that it defied measurement using a planimetre 
and British Admiralty Chart 3985, 1987 edition, at a scale of I :500,000. 
UNCLOS, Article 7(1). 
UNCLOS, Article 7(3). 
US Department of State, 1987: 14. 
United Nations, 1989a: 21. 
See Anderson (1987) on scale. 
Given the vintage of the claim, predating both the Geneva and UN Conventions, this lapse is 
perhaps excusable (or at least understandable). 
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defining the western tip of Koh Kong as a basepoint, straight baselines could have been 
defined by the island's northern point and from its southern extremity with the low-
water line of Koh Kong's seaward-facing western coast forming the 'normal' baseline 
between these two points. The net effect on claims to maritime jurisdiction of enclosing 
Koh Kong with straight baselines rather than in part using the island's 'normal' baseline 
is, however, minimal. 
In the central part of the Cambodian coast, it is immediately apparent that 
several islands are strung across the mouth of Kompong Som Bay. One somewhat more 
conservative alternative to the straight baselines declared by Cambodia in 1957 for this 
part of the coast would have been the drawing of bay closing lines (see Section 2.3.5). 
The bay clearly qualifies under the semi-circle test of Article 10 of UNCLOS as a 
juridical bay. In addition, the combined length of hypothetical closing lines drawn 
across the multiple mouths of the bay, is approximately 15.7nm (29km)- within Article 
lO's maximum bay closing line length of 24nm. 26 It is also worth noting that at this time 
Cambodia could have also designated Kompong Som Bay a "historic" bay.27 In light of 
the deep penetration of the bay into Cambodia's mainland territory, its geographical 
configuration whereby it's waters are clearly surrounded by Cambodian territory on 
three sides, (indeed, almost four if the large islands in its mouth are considered) and the 
strong arguments that can no doubt be marshalled concerning the long-standing and 
sustained use of the bay by the Cambodian people, such a claim to historic status for 
Kompong Som would not seem unreasonable. This is particularly true when Thailand's 
historic claim to the analogous Bight of Thailand is considered. 28 However, such an 
historic claim was not advanced at that time and would be well-nigh impossible to 
advance today. 
26 
27 
28 
Measured from the headland in the vicinity of the Samit island group in the north to that at 
Kampong Saom in the south by way of Koh Mano, Koh Rong, Koh Rong Samlem and Koh 
Kaong Kang (Measured on British Admiralty Chart 3985, 1987 edition at a scale of I :500,000). 
Article 10(4) ofUNCLOS states that "lfthe distance between the low-water marks ofthe natural 
entrance points of a bay exceeds 24 nautical miles, a straight baseline of24 nautical miles shall 
be drawn within the bay in such a manner as to enclose the maximum area of water that is 
possible with that length of line." 
Article 10(6) provides that "The foregoing provisions do not apply to so-called 'historic' bays, 
or in any case where the system of straight baselines provided in article 7 is applied. " 
Ultimately Cambodia opted to declare baselines which can be justified on the basis of Article 7. 
The two bodies of water can be considered analogous in terms of their strategic and economic 
importance to coastal populations and geographical configurations - penetrating into the 
mainland core of each state. If anything, however, Kompong Som Bay is more surrounded by 
Cambodian territory than the Bight of Thailand is by Thai territory as a result of the presence of 
substantial Cambodian islands in the bay's mouth. 
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Instead, straight baselines were defined enclosing not only the bay itself but the 
islands in the mouth of the bay. As is the case for the northern section of the 
Cambodian coast, it could be argued that Cambodia could have defined straight 
baselines linking rather than enclosing, for example, Koh Rong and Koh Rong Samlem, 
relying on the 'normal' baselines of these features' seaward-facing coasts between the 
straight baseline segments. Instead, Koh Rong Samlem is host to two basepoints. This 
would have constituted a mildly more conservative alignment of straight baselines 
without having a significant impact on claims to maritime jurisdiction. The counter-
argument that the arrangement claimed in 1957 simplified the coastline while not 
constituting an excessive claim does have some merit, but perhaps runs counter to a 
strict interpretation of the spirit of the relevant portions of the Geneva and UN 
Conventions, such that straight baselines should only be applied where the geographical 
circumstances specifically warrant them. 
While the criticisms of Cambodia's 1957 straight baseline system outlined above 
m relation to the northern and central sections of the Cambodian coastline are 
reasonably mild, there exist more substantial grounds for complaint concerning the 
southern part of the coast. This observation is particularly true south and east of Koh 
Ses (C8 and C9). From Koh Ses, the 1957 straight baselines proceed to the Cambodia-
Vietnam land boundary intersection with the coast via two mainland points. Such an 
arrangement could, of course, only be justified on the basis of the deeply indented or 
cut-into nature of the coastline concerned (rather than on the presence of a fringe of 
islands)?9 It is certainly difficult to justify baseline segments C10-C12 on this basis as 
the coastline concerned is relatively smooth. A more acceptable arrangement would 
have been for the straight baseline system to terminate at Point C I 0, or perhaps at a 
point on the coast similar to where the limits of the joint Cambodia-Vietnam historic 
waters area meets the coast of Kampot Province (Figure 4.2), and then the 'normal' 
baseline could have been utilised along the remainder of Cambodia's southern coast. 
Instead, Cambodia appears to have slipped into error by pursuing its policy of enclosing 
the entirety of its coastline with straight baselines regardless of the suitability of that 
coastline for such claims. The impact of the application of straight baselines to the 
southern part of the Cambodian mainland coast is, however, slight because of the 
manner in which the straight baselines conform to the shape of the coastline and, 
29 UNCLOS, Article 7(1). 
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critically, because of the presence of the Vietnamese island of Phu Quoc opposite and 
wholly within two territorial sea breadths of this section of the Cambodian coastline. 
These relatively mild criticisms of Cambodia's 1957 straight baseline claim do 
not, however, detract from the fact that a fringe of islands exists along the northern and 
central sections of the Cambodian mainland coast, that these islands are in close enough 
proximity to one another to be linked by straight baselines and that the waters so 
enclosed are close enough to the mainland to be considered suitable for the application 
of the regime of internal waters to them - even under examination according to the 
stringent US State Department's guidelines. 
4.2.3 Cambodia's 1972 Straight Baselines Claim 
In 1972 Cambodia moved to revise its claimed system of straight baselines by Kret 
No.518/72/PRK dated 12 August. Unlike the 1957 claim, however, this decree 
specifically provided for both straight and normal baselines. The new system of straight 
baselines, composed of 20 segments connecting 21 points, was significantly more 
complex than Cambodia's earlier claim and, with the exception of the initial and 
terminal points on the coast, entirely superseded the straight baselines claimed in 1957. 
The 1972 claim therefore departed from the mainland coast at the intersection of the 
Cambodia-Thailand land boundary with the littoral of the Gulf of Thailand and 
terminated at the Cambodia-Vietnam land boundary on the coast. The remainder of the 
1972 system, however, extended seaward of that claimed in 1957 (see Figure 4.3). 
The revised baseline system therefore retained one of the prime features of the 
1957 claim in that the entirety of the mainland coastline was fronted by straight 
baselines. The key differences between the 1972 and 1957 straight baseline systems lay 
in the fact that the islands used as basepoints were significantly further offshore than 
had previously been utilised, coupled with the inclusion of the major island of Koh Tral 
(Phu Quoc to Vietnam) and its associated islets within Cambodia's straight baseline 
system. The latter point is important in that the island concerned was at the time subject 
to a sovereignty dispute with Vietnam and it is likely that this was one of the main 
factors motivating the declaration of the revised straight baselines system. 
The straight baselines described in the 1972 claim can, similarly to those 
claimed in 1957, be considered in three sections - firstly the northern and central area, 
secondly the area in the vicinity of Phu Quoc island and thirdly the area inshore of Phu 
Quoc. 
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In the first section, the northern and central portion of the Cambodian coastline, 
the straight baselines claimed in 1972 therefore proceeded from the Cambodia-Thailand 
land boundary terminus on the coast (Point A) to Koh Kusrovie (C 1 ), lying just beyond 
Cambodia's theoretical territorial sea as measured from the mainland coastline under the 
1957 legislation. 3° From Koh Kusrovie the straight baselines proceeded to Koh (Recife) 
Condor (C2) then to an islet west of_Koh Prins (C3), an islet to the south of Koh Tang 
(C4), a point among the Southwest Islands (C5) and on to Ko Tray Boy just offshore the 
coast of Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) Island (C6). 
In the second section, the straight baselines describe a loop around Phu Quoc 
island (C7-C15) including five points on Phu Quoc itself- one unnamed (C7), Point 
Han (C8), Point Ong Dal (C13), Point An Yen (C14) and Point Pau (Cl5)- with the 
remainder of the basepoints for the straight baselines around the island (C9-12) being 
located on small islands or rocks around the southern tip of Phu Quoc. Specifically 
these are Koh Kim Qui (C9), Koh Trang (ClO), Koh Hong Tay (C11) and Koh Knong 
(Cl2). 
Thirdly, inshore of Phu Quoc the straight baselines connect to the terminus of 
the Cambodia-Vietnam land boundary on the coast (C20) via three points in the Pirate 
Islands group - Koh Ses (C 16), one of the northern Pirate islands (C 17) and Koh Tbal 
(C18) - and one mainland coastal point (C19) (see Figure 4.3). The distances of the 
islands used as basepoints for anchoring the straight baselines from the nearest mainland 
coastal point are summarised in Table 4.4 while the length of the straight baseline 
segments concerned are detailed in Table 4.5. 31 'Normal' low-water baselines were also 
specified for islands claimed by Cambodia lying further offshore, specifically Koh Veer, 
the Poulo Wei group, Koh Despond, the Poulo Panjang group, "Rocher Table", 
"Rocher Blanc", "Ile de L'Est" and "Koh Table. "32 
30 
31 
32 
Based on the assumption that Cambodia's territorial sea had a breadth of 12nm. At the time, 
1957, Cambodia had not declared a territorial sea but did so in 1969 claiming 12nm. Cambodia 
has maintained a claim to a 12nm territorial sea thereafter. 
Measured on British Admiralty Chart 3985, 1987 edition, at a scale of 1:500,000. It is worth 
noting, however, that several of these islands are considerably closer to the main near-shore 
islands fronting the major coastal indentation of Kompong Som Bay than the mainland coastline 
itself. For example, while the islet west of Koh Prins used as a basepoint is 31.86nm from the 
nearest mainland coastal point it is only 24.57nm (45.5km) from Koh Rong Samlem. Similarly, 
the islet south of Koh Tang is only 18.9nm (35km) from the coast of Koh Rong Samlem as 
opposed to 28.2lnm from the mainland coast and the Southwest island used as basepoint is 
17.95nm (33.25km) from Koh Rong Samlem rather than 25.38nm from the mainland coast. 
Ranariddh, 1976: 43-45. Cambodia subsequently relinquished its claim to the Poulo Panjang 
group to Vietnam (see Sections 6.3 and 7.3). 
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Table 4.4 Cambodia's 1972 Straight Baselines Claim: Locations of Turning 
Points 
Point Location Coordinates Distance of 
Island Offshore 
A Cambodia-Thailand land 
boundary terminus 
C1 Koh Kusrovie 
C2 Koh Condor 
C3 Islet furthest west of Koh 
Prins (Koh Pring) 
C4 Islet southeast of Koh Tang 
C5 South East Island 
C6 Koh Tray Boy 
C7 Point on Koh Tral (Phu 
Quoc) 
CS Point Han (on Koh Tral/Phu 
Quoc) 
C9 Koh Kim Qui 
C10 Koh Trang 
Cll Koh Hong Tay 
C12 Koh Knong 
C 13 Point Ong Dal (on Phu 
Quoc) 
C14 Point An Yen (on Phu Quoc) 
C15 Point Pau (on Phu Quoc) 
Cl6 Koh Ses 
C17 Northern Pirate island or 
Koh Russey 
CIS Koh Tbal 
C19 Mainland point'4 
C20 Cambodia-Vietnam land 
boundary terminus 
Latitude 
11° 39' N. 
11o 06'.75 N. 
10° 15'.3N. 
10° 14' .8 N. 
10°2l'.5N. 
10° 18' .5 N. 
10° 00' .75 N. 
9o 55'.2 N. 
9°54'.1N. 
9o 54' .4 N. 
9o 55'.0 N. 
10° 00'.5 N. 
10° 04' .1 N. 
10° 14' .75 N. 
10° 21' .35 N. 
10° 24'.0 N. 
IOo 25' .4 N. 
IOo 27' .0 N. 
10° 25'.I5 N. 
Longitude 
102° 54' .06 E. 
102° 47' .6 E. 
102° 51' .6 E. 
102° 55' .25 E. 
103° lO'.OE. 
I03o 14' .25 E. 
103° 48' .4 E. 
I03°51'.2E. 
I03° 58'.7 E. 
I03o 59'.7 E. 
104° OI '.2 E. 
104° OI '.5 E. 
I 04 o 03' . 1 E. 
104° 02' .5 E. 
I04o 04'.5 E. 
104° 19'.2E. 
104° 20' .1 E. 
I04° 20' .2 E.33 
I04o 23' .2 E. 
104° 26' .38 E. 
16.3nm 
(30.25km) 
I7.I4nm 
(3 1.75km) 
3 I .86nm (59km) 
28.21nm 
(52.25km) 
25 .38nm ( 4 7km) 
9.18nm (17km) 
6.48nm (12km) 
6.48nm (12km) 
36.99nm 
(68.5km) 
37.8nm (70km) 
36.85nm 
(68.25km) 
35.9nm (66.5km) 
6.48nm ( l2km) 
6.48nm (12km) 
6.48nm (I 2km) 
7.02nm (13km) 
4.72nm (8.75km) 
3. Inm (5.75km) 
Average 17.94nm (33.22km) 
Source: Ranariddh (1976) and author's research. 
The average length of the baseline segments making up Cambodia's 1972 straight 
baselines claim is 10.44nm (19.33km) with the longest segment being 33.2nm (61.5km) 
in length. The average distance between the islands fringing the coast used as 
basepoints and the nearest point on the mainland is 22.85nm ( 42.32km) with the 
33 
34 
The coordinates listed were derived from British Admiralty Chart 3985 (1987 edition at a scale 
of 1 :500,000) in light of the text description of Point CIS's location and sketch map included in 
Prince Ranariddh's thesis as this coordinate was missing from the Prince's thesis. 
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maximum distance between such islands being 37.8nm (70km). 35 Although the average 
length of baseline segment claimed in 1972 is comparable to, and indeed somewhat 
shorter than that claimed in 1957 (10.44nm vs. 11.95nm), the length of the longest 
segment (33.2nm vs. 22.68nm), the average distances of the islands used as basepoints 
offshore (24.19nm vs. 6.93nm), and maximum distance of islands from the mainland 
coast (37.8nm vs. 9.18nm) contrast sharply with that claimed in 1957. This confirms 
that the straight baselines claimed in 1972 represent a significant extension of 
Cambodia's claim over those of 1957. The question can therefore be raised as to 
whether the 1972 extension of Cambodia's straight baseline system sea wards can be 
justified in the context of the international law of the sea. 
Table 4.5 Cambodia's 1972 Straight Baselines Claim: Segment Lengths 
Segment 
A-C1 
C1-C2 
C2-C3 
C3-C4 
C4-C5 
C5-C6 
C6-C7 
C7-C8 
C8-C9 
C9-C10 
C10-C11 
C11-C12 
Cl2-C13 
C13-CI4 
Cl4-Cl5 
C15-C16 
C16-C17 
C17-C18 
Cl8-CI9 
C19-C20 
Total 
Average 
Length 
32.26nm (59.75km) 
22.95nm (42.5km) 
21.73nm (40.25km) 
15.79nm (29.25km) 
4.05nm (7.5km) 
33.2nm (61.5km) 
4.59nm (8.5km) 
19.17nm (35.5km) 
5.8nm (10.75km) 
1.35nm (2.5km) 
1.75nm (3.25km) 
0.4nm (0.75km) 
5.67nm (10.5km) 
3.37nm (6.25km) 
10.53nm (19.5km) 
15.39nm (28.5km) 
2.7nm (5km) 
1.62nm (3km) 
3.1nm (5.75km) 
3.37nm (6.25km) 
208.79nm (386.68km) 
10.44nm (19.33km) 
Source: Author's research. 
As all but the starting, terminal and penultimate points defining the straight baselines 
system are located on islands, it is clear that Cambodia's 1972 claim to straight 
baselines can only be justified on the basis of there being a fringe of islands offshore, 
35 Measured on British Admiralty Chart 3985, 1987 edition, at a scale of 1:500,000. 
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rather than on the deeply indented nature of the mainland coast. As noted, while the 
international law of the sea does not specify a maximum baseline segment length, the 
US Department of State suggests 48nm (88.9km) as the limit. 36 This proposed rule was 
coupled with the proviso, also absent from the law of the sea, that fringing islands be no 
more than 24nm (44.45km) apart. 37 Thus, while no baseline segment claimed by 
Cambodia in 1972 exceeds the US suggested limit of 48nm and the average length of 
such segments was considerably less, two segments do exceed 24nm in length. These 
are the first segment, linking the Cambodia-Thailand land boundary terminus on the 
coast to Koh Kusrovie which is 32.26nm (59.75km) long, and that linking Points C5 
and C6 (the Southwest islands and Koh Tray Boy) which is 33.2nm (61.49km) in length. 
As the first segment does not link fringing islands, being the segment connecting the 
fringe back to the mainland coast, the 24nm limit between fringing islands cannot be 
considered applicable. 
As far as the segment between Points C5 and C6 is concerned, it can be argued 
that there are several islands and rocks inshore of the claimed straight baseline, for 
example Koh Ta Kiev, that could have been incorporated into the system and which 
could be considered part of the fringe of islands fronting the Cambodian coast. In order 
to conform to these US guidelines then, only a relatively minor alteration in Cambodia's 
1972 claim would have been necessary. Again, as mentioned, the US guidelines lack 
general international recognition and can be considered at the restrictive end of the scale 
of analysis. In terms of baseline segment length and the distance between the islands 
used as basepoints for the straight baselines, Cambodia's 1972 claim conforms with the, 
admittedly rather loose, terms of Article 7 of UNCLOS and, more particularly, given the 
date of the claim, the relevant provisions of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial 
Sea and Contiguous Zone of 1958. 
Concerning the distance of the fringing islands offshore and their immediate 
vicinity to the mainland coast, such that the area within the straight baselines is close 
enough to the land for internal waters status to be applied, the Geneva and UN 
Conventions provide no guidance as to the maximum distance offshore that fringing 
islands may legitimately be. It is clear, however, that Cambodia's 1972 claim, with an 
average of 22.85nm (42.32km) and maximum of 37.8nm (70km) conforms to the US 
36 
37 
US Department of State, 1987: 14. 
US Department of State, 1987: 17. 
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guidelines of a maximum separation between the mainland coast and fringe of 48nm. 38 
Furthermore, when areas of "additional" internal and territorial waters beyond 12nm 
from 'normal' baselines are considered it seems clear that a strong case can be made that 
the distance between the fringe and the mainland was taken into account by Cambodia 
and that the waters enclosed by the straight baselines claimed are sufficiently proximate 
to the mainland to be deemed suitable for the application of the regime of internal 
waters. 
Of the total area, 2,375nm2 (8, 145km2), claimed as internal waters, 81 nm2 
(278km2) or 3.4% was beyond 12nm from the nearest coastal point and, even more 
convincingly, the entirety of the area claimed as internal waters under Cambodia's 1972 
claim to straight baselines lies comfortably within two territorial sea breadths (24nm) of 
the nearest 'normal' baselines. Moreover, of the "additional" territorial sea claimed by 
the 1972 straight baselines of 2,044nm2 (7,010km2), 522nm2 (1,790km2) or 25.5% was 
beyond 12nm from the nearest coastal points (Figure 4.3). In sum therefore, the total 
"additional" waters claimed beyond 12nm from the coast was 603nm2 (2,068km2), 
representing 13.6% of the total area, 4,419nm2 (23,300km2), of internal and territorial 
waters claimed as a consequence of the 1972 straight baselines. 39 
It has already been established how fallible the concept of the general direction 
of the coast is when attempts are made to apply it in practice (see Section 3.3.3). Thus, 
it could certainly be argued that the configuration of the 1972 straight baselines both 
does and does not reflect the general direction of the coast. Nevertheless, a subjective 
view is that the baselines do, broadly speaking at least, conform to the general direction 
of the coast.40 
Having made these generally positive observations, it cannot be maintained that 
Cambodia's 1972 straight baselines claim was above reproach. One aspect of the claim 
which is clearly at odds with the international law of the sea is the use of Condor Reef 
38 
39 
40 
US Department of State, 1987: 14. 
All additional waters areas were calculated using a planimetre and British Admiralty Chart 3985, 
1987 edition, at a scale of 1:500,000. For the purposes of this calculation, the limit of 
Cambodia's claim to territorial sea with respect to Thailand was taken to be the line bisecting the 
first segments of the two states' straight baselines offshore the terminus of their land boundary on 
the coast. Similarly, the calculation was limited vis-a-vis Vietnam by an equidistance line 
constructed between Cambodia's 1972 baselines claim and Vietnam's islands south of the Brevie 
Line but outside the 1972 baselines. 
Kittichaisaree ( 1987: 14) for one disagrees. In his analysis of Cambodia's I 972 straight baselines 
claim he notes that "The sections which pass through Kusrovie islet/rock and Pring Island 
depart appreciably from the general direction of the coast, and the islets/islands in question are 
not in the immediate vicinity of the coast." 
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(Recife Condor) as a basepoint. According to the relevant British Admiralty Pilot this 
feature, lying just over 17nm (32km) offshore, "dries to 0.3m (1ft)" and does not host 
any navigational light or similar structure. It is therefore clearly a low-tide elevation 
rather than a rock or island.41 As such, it is an inappropriate point for use in the 
construction of straight baselines.42 
A further area of concern is that, in common with the 1957 claim, Phnom Penh's 
1972 claim enclosed the entirety of the Cambodian coastal front with straight baselines. 
Thus, it can be argued that in certain areas, notably along the relatively smooth western 
and eastern shores of Phu Quoc and on the mainland between the penultimate turning 
point in the system and its terminus at the intersection of the Cambodia-Vietnam land 
boundary on the coast, the 'normal' baseline would have been more appropriately 
applied rather than straight baselines. The latter section of mainland coast between 
Points C 19 and C20 comprises a smooth coastline where it would be extremely difficult 
to justify straight baselines on the basis of a deeply indented or cut into coastline. These 
straight baselines segments were, no doubt, designated in order to complete an unbroken 
system of straight baselines across the mainland coastal front. It should be noted, 
however, that the net effect on claims to maritime jurisdiction of these baseline 
segments is minimal, passing as they do across the front of uncomplicated coasts and in 
close proximity to them. 
4.2.4 Cambodia's 1982 Straight Baselines Claim 
A decade later, by means of a Council of State Decree dated 31 July 1982, Cambodia 
once again comprehensively revised its claimed straight baseline system (Appendix 2). 
In the 1982 legislation Cambodia's baselines were defined as being "straight baselines, 
linking the points of the coast and the furthest points of Kampuchea's [Cambodia's] 
41 
42 
Hydrographer of the Navy, 1978: 108. Incidentally, as it lies beyond 12nm from nearest coastal 
point, it is unable to generate a tenitorial sea or contiguous zone claim in its own right. 
Article 7(4) of UNCLOS provides that "Straight baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-
tide elevations, unless lighthouses or similar installations which are permanently above sea level 
have been built on them or except in instances where the drawing of baselines to and from such 
elevations has received general international recognition. " As no lighthouse exists on the 
feature and there is no evidence of international acceptance of it being used as a basepoint for the 
construction of a straight baseline system it must be concluded that the use of Condor Reef in 
Cambodia's 1972 straight baseline claim is in error. This problem could have been corrected by 
simply excluding Condor Reef from the system. Such a modification, providing for a straight 
baseline directly between Koh Kusrovie and the islet west of Koh Prins, would have represented 
a minimal alteration to the alignment of the baseline system. However, it would have resulted in 
a longer segment of 44.55nm (82.5km) between Koh Kusrovie and Koh Prins as compared to the 
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furthest islands." Just as happened in 1972, Cambodia's legislators opted to push their 
country's claims further offshore by utilising islands further seawards from the 
Cambodian mainland as basepoints. Indeed, Cambodia adopted an arguably extreme 
position by using its islands furthest offshore as the anchoring points for its straight 
baseline system. In addition to pushing the straight baseline system offshore, this also 
had the effect of considerably simplifying Cambodia's claim, such that it comprised just 
five points (one of which to be floating and to be determined through agreement with 
Vietnam) linked by four lines. The motivation behind this change in the Cambodian 
claim may lie in the additional waters claimed, the perception that an enhanced 
negotiating position with regard to Thailand would be secured and in order to facilitate 
the conclusion of the Historic Waters Agreement with Vietnam (see Section 6.3). 
Thus, from the low-water mark where the Thai-Cambodian land boundary 
reaches the sea (Point A), Cambodia's 1982 straight baselines, which remain in force, 
proceed in a generally southeasterly direction in straight lines via "Kack Kusrovie" 
[sic.] (C1), "Kack Voar" [sic., Ilot Veer or Veer island] (C2), to a point on one of the 
Poulo Wei group of islands (C3). The baselines then extend, from a different point on 
the same island in the Poulo Wei group,43 in the direction of Vietnam's Poulo Panjang 
(Tho Chu) group of islands, terminating at "Point 0 out at sea on the southwest limit of 
the historic waters of the PRK." Cambodia's straight baseline system is completed by 
the latter agreement (see Section 7.2 and Figures 4.1 and 4.4). The locations of the 
turning points of Cambodia's 1982 straight baselines claim are summarised in Table 
4.6. 
On 7 July 1982, just over three weeks before Cambodia's revision of its straight 
baselines, Cambodia and Vietnam reached an agreement on an area of historic waters in 
the vicinity of their undefined lateral maritime boundary (see Appendix 3). Although 
the significance of this agreement will be discussed in relation to Cambodian-
Vietnamese agreements and disputes (see Sections 7.2 and 8), in the context of a 
discussion of Cambodian baselines it is important to note that the Cambodia-Vietnam 
joint Historic Waters Agreement has the effect of unifying the two countries straight 
baseline systems. 
43 
22.95nm (42.5km) and 21.73nm (40.25km) segments between Koh Kusrovie and Condor Reef 
and Condor Reef and Koh Prins respectively. 
The 'normal' baseline presumably linking the two straight baseline termini. 
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The meeting point "0" of the two straight baseline systems is defined in Article 
3 of the agreement as being "situated on the high seas on the straight baseline between 
Tho Chu [Poulo Panjang] archipelago and Poulo Wai [sic., Wei] Islands." Thus, 
although the precise intersection of the two baseline systems is left indeterminate, or 
'floating', along a straight baseline linking the two groups of islands, the effect is that, 
in keeping with Cambodia's earlier claims to straight baselines, the entirety of 
Cambodia's mainland coast with respect to its northern lateral and opposite 
delimitations in the central Gulf of Thailand, that is with respect to delimiting a 
boundary with Thailand, is fronted with a system of straight baselines. 
Table 4.6 Cambodia's 1982 Straight Baselines Claim: Locations of Turning 
Points 
Point 
A 
C1 
C2 
C3 
0 
Location 
Cambodia-Thailand land 
boundary terminus 
Koh Kusrovie 
Koh Veer (Voar) 
Koh Wei (Wai) 
Floating point 
Coordinates 
Latitude Longitude 
11 o 38' 8" N. 102° 54' 3" E. 
11 o 06' 8" N. 102° 47' 3" E. 
10° 14' 0" N. 102° 52' 5" E. 
09° 55' 5" N. 102° 53' 2" E. 
U ndetermined44 
Distance of 
Island Offshore 
16.3nm 
(30.25km) 
39.69nm 
(73.5km) 
53.05nm 
(98.25km) 
Average 36.35nm 
(67.3km) 
Source: Council of State Decree (31/7 /82) and author's research. 
Indeed, by virtue of the 1982 historic waters agreement linking Cambodia and 
Vietnam's straight baseline systems, the whole of the mainland coast of Indochina is 
enclosed in straight baselines stretching from the Thai-Cambodian boundary on the Gulf 
of Thailand to the final point in the Vietnamese straight baseline system on the Gulf of 
Tonkin. At the time of writing, the precise location of Point "0" has yet to be 
determined by mutual consent as specified by Article 3 of Cambodia and Vietnam's 
treaty on the historic waters area (however, see Section 7.2 and Section 8). 
Nevertheless, as the length of the southwestern limit of the historic waters area between 
44 The Thailand-Vietnam maritime boundary agreement of9 August 1997 states that Point 0, is 
equidistant between Vietnam's Tho Chu (Paulo Panjang) islands and Cambodia's Paulo Wai 
(Wei) islands at 09° 35' 00".4159 N., 103° 10' 15".9808 E .. The Cambodian government has, 
however, reserved its position in relation to this agreement and it is by no means clear that the 
location of Point 0 has in fact been determined (see Section 7.4 ). 
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the Poulo Wei and Panjang (Tho Chu) island groups is approximately 50nm (92.5km) it 
would not be unreasonable to speculate that, were equidistance to be used as a basis for 
the determination of the location of Point "0" (which is by no means certain, see 
Section 7.3.5 and 7.3.6), each state's baseline segment anchored by Point "0" at one end 
would be approximately 25nm (46km).45 
The average length of the baseline segments making up Cambodia's 1982 
straight baselines claim, excluding the final segment of indeterminate length linking 
Poulo Wei to the yet to be fixed Point "0", is 34.06nm (63.09km) with the longest 
segment between Koh Kusrovie and llot Veer, being 51.84nm (96km) in length (see 
Table 4.7). 46 The average distance between the islands fringing the coast used as 
basepoints and the nearest point on the mainland is 36.35nm (67.3km) with the 
maximum distance between such an island and the coast being 53.05nm (98.25km) (see 
Table 4.6).47 As the islands used as basepoints are themselves relatively small in size, 
the distances between the islands in the fringe are virtually identical to the lengths of the 
straight baseline segments. 
Table 4.7 Cambodia's 1982 Straight Baselines Claim: Segment Lengths 
Segment 
A-Cl 
Cl-C2 
C2-C3 
C3-0 
Total 
Average 
Length 
32.26nm (59.75km) 
51.84nm (96km) 
18.09nm (33.5km) 
U ndetermined48 
102.19nm (189.25km) 
34.06nm (63.09km) 
Source: Author's research. 
The straight baselines established by Cambodia in 1982 therefore represent a major 
departure from the position held ten years previously. In terms of sovereignty claims, 
45 
46 
47 
48 
It is by no means clear, however, that equidistance will be used as the basis for determining the 
final position of Point "0" or, indeed, the Cambodia-Vietnam maritime boundary seaward of the 
historic waters area (see Sections 7.2 and 8). 
Were equidistance to be used to determine the location of Point 0, however, the distance from 
C3-0 would be approximately 25nm ( 46km). If this (hypothetical) straight baseline segment 
were included in the analysis, the total length of Cambodia's 1982 claim would rise to 148.19nm 
(214.25km) but the average segment length would fall to 37.05nm (53.56km) (see Table?). 
Measured on British Admiralty Chart 3985, 1987 edition, at a scale of I :500,000. 
Measured on British Admiralty Chart 3985, 1987 edition, at a scale of 1:500,000. 
Were equidistance to be used to determine the location of Point 0, however, the distance from 
C3-0 would be approximately 25nm (46km). If this (hypothetical) straight baseline segment 
were included in the analysis, the total length of Cambodia's 1982 claim would rise to 148.19nm 
(214.25km) but the average segment length would fall to 37.05nm (53.56km). 
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whereas the 1972 straight baselines claim explicitly sought to bolster Cambodia's claim 
to Phu Quoc island by enclosing it within straight baselines and by using points on the 
island as basepoints in its claim, the 1982 straight baselines legislation, while well 
seaward of the island in question, stops short of enclosing it. This apparent shift in 
Cambodia's position reflects its agreement with Vietnam, incorporated into Article 3 of 
their Agreement on Historic Waters signed earlier in the same month as the 1982 
straight baselines claim, to regard the Brevie Line as the line designating jurisdiction 
over islands -thus confirming Phu Quoc as Vietnamese territory. 
Similarly, while both the 1957 and 1972 Cambodian claims to straight baselines 
mention the use of the Poulo Wei and Panjang (Tho Chu) island groups as basepoints 
for the purposes of maritime claims in their own right, the 1982 claim, while 
incorporating the Poulo Wei islands into the straight baseline system, exclude Poulo 
Panjang. Once again, this change in Phnom Penh's stance relates to the Historic Waters 
Agreement with Vietnam and acceptance of the Brevie Line as the determining line for 
sovereignty over islands. Poulo Panjang falls to the south and east of the Brevie Line 
and thus under Vietnamese sovereignty. 
The other significant change enacted under the 1982 claim as compared with 
those of 1957 and 1972 was, of course, the introduction of a 'floating' basepoint and 
integration of Cambodia's straight baselines claim with that of Vietnam. Previously, 
Cambodia had claimed straight baselines stretching between the termini of its land 
boundaries on the coast. 
Cambodia's straight baseline claim of 1982 gave rise to international protests.49 
While it may be generally accepted that the Cambodian coastline is indeed highly 
indented and, furthermore, is fringed by islands in the immediate vicinity of certain 
sections of that coast, thus offering a justification for the declaration of straight 
baselines, this merely provides a justification for the linking of large islands lying just 
offshore, such as Koh Rong, to the mainland coast with straight baselines or the closing 
of the mouth of Kompong Som Bay with straight baselines linking the string of islands 
and rocks which fringe the bay's entrance. In contrast, Cambodia's 1982 (and current) 
claim to straight baselines does not use those islands close inshore which are most 
49 Cambodia's straight baselines claim of 1982 also gave rise to considerable criticism in academic 
circles. For example, Prescott (1985a: 212-213) describes the system in question as depending 
upon "a remarkably liberal interpretation of the concepts of fringing islands and enclosed 
waters linked closely to the land domain." More recently Valencia and Van Dyke ( 1994: 222) 
have echoed Prescott's sentiments. 
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obviously fringing. Instead, what may be termed 'isolated' features of Koh Kusrovie, 
llot Veer and the Poulo Wei island group are used as basepoints or turning points in the 
1982 straight baselines claim. 
Proceeding broadly northwest to southeast from a first point on the mainland at 
the coastal terminus of the Thai-Cambodian land boundary, these insular formations 
used as basepoints lie progressively further and further offshore with the last point 
(excluding the as yet undefined joint Cambodian-Vietnamese floating "Point 0" on the 
limits of the two countries joint Historic Waters area) on the Poulo Wei group being 
almost 1 00km50 from the nearest point on the Cambodian mainland coastline. Thus it 
could be argued that: 
• the basepoints used for Cambodia's 1982 straight baseline claim do not 
constitute fringing islands; 
• the islands used as basepoints are too far offshore for the sea area so enclosed to 
be considered closely enough linked to the land domain to be considered as 
suitable to fall under the regime of internal waters; 
• the distance between the basepoints used is inadmissibly high; and, 
• as a result of successive basepoints being further and further offshore, as a whole 
the baseline system trends southeastwards in direction - at variance with the 
general direction of Cambodia's mainland coastline. 51 
The United States maintains a policy which seeks to protect international freedom of 
navigation and thus makes a point of objecting to what it views as excessive claims.52 
The diplomatic actions of the United States have thus developed into something of an 
international benchmark in terms of identifying excessive maritime claims. The United 
States therefore officially protested against the Cambodian claim in an Assertion of 
Right in 1986.53 At the time of the Cambodian claim, Thailand, the state most directly 
affected by Cambodia's straight baseline claims, held the position that the government 
50 
51 
52 
98.25km (53.05nm) as measured on British Admiralty Chart 3985, 1987 edition, at a scale of 
1:500,000. 
Indeed, Cambodia's 1982 claim to straight baselines has been described by some commentators 
as "an extreme departure from the general direction of the coast" (Reisman and Westerman, 
1992: 172). Ominously for Cambodia, Reisman and Westerman conclude that as these 
"impermissible seaward" baselines have the potential to significantly inf1uence any boundary 
with Thailand, and in view of the findings of the International Court of Justice in the Libya-Malta 
case in 1985: 
... it is highly unlikely that the putative Cambodian claim will be given full weight either 
in negotiations between Thailand and Cambodia on the delimitation of a common 
shelf/EEZ boundary or in any case brought before an international tribunal. 
Roach and Smith, 1996: 3-13. 
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in power in Phnom Penh was illegitimate. Bangkok, therefore, refused to recognise the 
validity of any agreement or declaration emanating from Cambodia, considering such 
claims as illegal and as effectively null and void, including Cambodia's maritime claims 
of 1982. 
As with its 1957 and 1972 predecessors, Cambodia's baseline claim of 1982 can 
be justified on the basis of the existence of a fringe of islands along the Cambodian 
mainland coast. It has been estimated that in total there are 51 islands, islets and rocks 
within the area claimed as internal waters under the 1982 legislation.54 From this 
statistic alone it does not seem unreasonable to contend that a fringe of islands exists 
along the Cambodian coast. 
As noted, the islands constituting the fringe claimed by Cambodia and thus used 
to anchor the baseline system are, firstly, 32.26nm (59.75km) from the terminus of the 
Cambodia-Thailand land boundary on the coast and then 51.84nm (96km) and 18.09nm 
(33.5km) apart. These figures clearly exceed the maximum distance between fringing 
islands as suggested by the US Department of State of 24nm ( 44.45km), thus providing 
grounds to criticise Cambodia's claims as excessive.55 Furthermore, segment Cl-C2 
(Koh Kusrovie to llot Veer), at just under 52nm in length, exceeds the US guidelines 
maximum suggested length for an individual baseline segment of 48nm. Nevertheless, 
it should be stressed once again that the US guidelines lack general international 
acceptance and, significantly, the distances between the Cambodian islands concerned 
and corresponding lengths of baseline segments are by no means remarkable or 
excessive when placed in the context of international state practice with regard to 
straight baseline claims. This is illustrated by Appendix 4 which provides a summary of 
the length of the longest baseline segment for 37 straight baseline claims around the 
world in addition to the four Gulf of Thailand states. This information is drawn from 
the US Department of State's valuable Limits in the Seas series. As there are currently 
55 states claiming straight baseline systems worldwide, 56 the findings from the analysis 
of this data must be viewed as a reasonably representative of global state practice. The 
average length of the longest segment in the baseline claims surveyed was 64.8nm. The 
53 
54 
55 
56 
Roach and Smith, 1996: 77. 
Prescott, 1998: 27. 
US Department of State, 1987: 17. 
Excluding dependent territories such as the Falkland Islands and excluding claims to bay-closing 
lines. 
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longest segment in Cambodia's 1982 claim, at 51.8nm, IS comfortably below this 
average. 
It is worth recalling here that neither the Geneva or UN Conventions specify any 
maximum baseline segment length. Furthermore, the UN's own committee of experts 
did not define an upper limit for either the distance between islands making up a fringe 
or the length of individual straight baseline segments. Indeed, on the subject of island 
fringes, the UN report only rather laconically observes that a fringe of islands should 
consist of more than one island! 57 As far as the existence of a fringe, distance between 
fringing islands and length of baselines are concerned, Cambodia's 1982 claim to 
straight baselines, therefore, seems to conform not only to the letter of the best available 
(albeit extremely general) UN guidelines on the topic but also to emerging international 
custom as represented by state practice. 
Similarly, the distances of the islands forming the Cambodian fringe from the 
nearest point on the mainland coast - 16.3nm (30.25km) for Koh Kusrovie, 39.69nm 
(73.5km) for Ilot Veer and 53.05nm (98.25km) for Poulo Wei- might also be regarded 
as being excessive, particularly for the most seaward point, Poulo Wei. As outlined in 
Section 3.3.3, the US guidelines provide that islands forming part of a fringe should be 
no more than 48nm (88.9km) offshore.58 If adhered to, this stricture means that the 
entirety of the waters enclosed by straight baselines lies within two territorial sea 
breadths of either the mainland coast or of the fringing islands. Having highlighted this 
it is also worth recalling that the UN study, while not offering a maximum distance that 
a fringe could be offshore, was rather more cautious concerning the allied concept of 
"immediate vicinity", suggesting that while a distance of 24nm was probably generally 
accepted (i.e. within the territorial sea of the mainland or fringe), 48nm might be less 
so.s9 
Thus, as far as Cambodia's 1982 claim is concerned, the validity of Poulo Wei, 
situated 53.05nm (98.25km) offshore, as a basepoint for straight baselines is most open 
to question. This is on the grounds that Poulo Wei is too far offshore and the area 
enclosed within the straight baseline extending to it is not close enough to the land to be 
accorded the status of internal waters. 
57 
58 
59 
United Nations, 1989a: 20. 
US Department of State, 1987: 22. 
United Nations, 1989a: 21. 
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In the author's view, perhaps the best measure of the overall 'reasonableness' of 
a straight baseline system rests in an analysis of the area of maritime space within the 
confines of straight baselines converted to internal waters, that is, beyond 12nm (i.e. a 
24nm separation between mainland and fringe) and 24nm (i.e. a 48nm separation 
between mainland and fringe) from any 'normal' baseline. This can be expressed as a 
percentage of the internal waters claimed as a whole. In light of the US guidelines that a 
distance of up to 48nm between mainland and fringe of islands represents immediate 
vicinity, the percentage beyond 24nm from the coast can be usefully measured as a more 
liberal gauge compared to the more conservative interlocking territorial seas limit of 
24nm. Similarly, the area of "additional" territorial waters, that is territorial waters 
claimed seaward of the straight baselines but beyond 12nm from the nearest 'normal' 
baseline, can be measured and assessed. The lower the percentage of additional areas 
claimed beyond 12nm (and in the case of internal waters 24nm from the coast), the less 
excessive or contrary to the spirit of Article 7 the straight baseline claim can be viewed. 
In the case of Cambodia's 1982 straight baseline claim the total area of internal 
waters claimed was of the order of 3,009nm2 (10,320km2). Of this area only 
approximately 201 nm2 (688km2) or 6.7% of the total was beyond 12nm from the coast 
and the entirety of the area claimed as internal waters was within 24nm of the nearest 
coast. As far as the territorial waters claims from the 1982 baselines were concerned, 
the total area claimed amounts to around 1 ,508nm2 (5, 173km2) of which 630nm2 
(2,162km2) or around 42% of the total could be classified as "additional" territorial 
waters beyond 12nm from a 'normal' baseline (Figure 4.4). 
Overall then, of the combined internal waters and territorial waters claimed as a 
result of the application of Cambodia's 1982 straight baseline claim of 4,517nm2 
(15,493km2), 831 nm2 (2,850km2) or 18.4% of the total could be said to constitute 
"additional" areas beyond 12nm from the nearest coastal point. Using these 
measurements as a benchmark, and in particular the fact that over 93% of the internal 
waters claimed are within a territorial sea breadth of the coast and all within 48nm, it is 
difficult to argue that the area enclosed by the 1982 straight baselines is not close 
enough to the mainland coast to be considered in its "immediate vicinity", neither, in 
this author's view, is the claim generally too unreasonable, particularly when set in the 
context of state practice around the world (see Table 4.5 and Appendix 4). 
As far as the question of Cambodia's 1982 baselines conforming to the general 
direction of the coast is concerned, as previously mentioned, the concept of general 
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direction, such as it is, is so nebulous and uncertain when it comes to be applied as to be 
practically useless (see Section 3.3.3). Nevertheless, the Cambodian claim of 1982 
differs significantly from those of 1972 and 1957 in that it does not describe baselines 
between both of Cambodia's land boundary intersections with the coast. Instead, the 
baselines depart from the mainland at the termini of the Cambodia-Thailand land 
boundary on the Gulf of Thailand, before progressing further and further offshore and 
ultimately joining up with the Vietnamese straight baseline system at Point "0" (see 
Section 7 .2). This has the effect of giving the Cambodian baselines the appearance of 
steadily diverging offshore away from the general direction of the Cambodian mainland 
coastline (see Figure 4.1). The problems inherent in the practical application of the 
concept have, however already been outlined (see Section 3.3.3). Furthermore, the US 
guidelines foresaw the possibility of fringes of islands gradually working their way 
further and further offshore as an exceptional circumstance that "would not be 
precluded" from the US rule.60 
One further major criticism of Cambodia's, and indeed Vietnam's, 1982 claim to 
straight baselines has been raised -the two countries' creation of a 'floating' basepoint 
unifying their straight baseline systems in the shape of Point "0". The US Department 
of State has commented on Point "0" in the following terms: 
... point 0 is neither a high-tide elevation nor a low-tide elevation with a 
permanent structure; therefore, a basepoint at point 0 appears to be in violation 
of both the conventions cited above [the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and UNCLOS]. 61 
Prescott has, however, pointed out that while this sort of arrangement IS certainly 
unusual, it is by no means unique. Furthermore, and perhaps significantly, the US 
authorities have not censured the use of floating basepoints to integrate abutting straight 
baseline systems, for instance, in the cases of Denmark and Germany, Norway and 
Sweden and Finland and Sweden.62 Admittedly Point 0 is much further offshore the 
60 
61 
62 
It should be noted that this was envisaged in relation to a fringe consisting of " ... a number of 
islands that are not far separated. " As the islands Cambodia has claimed as a fringe are 
generally in excess of 24nm from one another, they presumably would not be considered close 
enough together to take advantage of this exception to the rule in the State Department's eyes. 
US Department of State, 1983: 7. 
Indeed, in relation to the Denmark-Germany floating basepoint the US Department of State 
merely observes that this point "is not a standard insular or low-tide basepoint", while for the 
Norway-Sweden and Finland-Sweden points the descriptions of "highly unusual" and "unusual" 
represent the degree of criticism the US Department of State was prepared to offer (US 
Department of State, 1972a, 1972b and 1972c quoted in Prescott, 1998: 26-27). 
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mainland coast that the three other examples of state practice mentioned. 63 However, 
the US protest criticises Point 0 because of its floating nature, divorced from any 
insular feature, rather than the distance that it is removed from the coast. The US 
treatment of Cambodia and Vietnam's floating point therefore appears to be at odds 
with Washington's reaction to the use of the same technique by several northern 
European states. This apparent inconsistency on the part of the United States authorities 
does not make the use of floating basepoints necessarily correct, but it does go a long 
way to undermining the strength of the US protest. 
It is therefore clear that the validity of Cambodia's 1982 straight baseline claim, 
and indeed its earlier such claims, is dependent upon the interpretation of Article 7 of 
UNCLOS. When measured against the text of Article 7 itself, vague as it is, it is 
difficult to fault Cambodia's straight baseline claim substantially. Furthermore, it can 
be maintained that such a claim is unremarkable in the context of general international 
state practice and thus emerging custom. Nevertheless, the use of the most seaward 
offshore features as basepoints, despite their relatively isolated nature and distance from 
one another, coupled with the apparent orientation of the system progressing further and 
further offshore and the oddity of a floating basepoint with Vietnam does, in this 
author's view, breach the spirit and intent of Article 7. It is, however, unsurprising that 
states, given the loose terminology of Article 7, have sought to maximise their claims to 
maritime space. 
Despite this criticism of Cambodia's straight baselines, two points are worthy of 
consideration when considering Cambodia's claims in the Gulf of Thailand: 
• the baselines on which Cambodia's continental shelf claims to extended 
jurisdiction were based; and, 
• the claims of islands used as basepoints in their own right. 
Firstly, it is important to realise that Cambodia made its currently held claim to 
continental shelf by means of a Kret dated 1 July 1972, that is, a decade prior to the 
latest straight baseline claim. The Cambodian claim to continental shelf therefore 
63 Point 0, if determined on the basis of equidistance, lies approximately 59nm ( 11 Okm) offshore as 
measured on British Admiralty Chart 3985, 1987 edition, at a scale of 1:500,000. In contrast, the 
Denmark-Germany, Norway-Sweden and Finland-Sweden floating points all lie less than 12nm 
(c.22km) offshore. 
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appears to have been based on its earlier and far more conservative straight baseline 
claim promulgated in 1957 (Figure 4.1 and 4.2). 64 
Cambodia's claim to continental shelf was not, therefore, extended to accord 
with the straight baseline system when it was revised on 31 July 1982. As a result, 
Cambodia's claim to continental shelf is in fact based on a straight baseline system 
which, it can be more convincingly argued, conforms with the provisions of Article 7 of 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
Secondly, even if Cambodia's straight baseline system claim of 1982 were to be 
abandoned or discounted in the course of negotiations, this would not disqualify the 
islands used as basepoints or turning points in that system from generating maritime 
claims in their own right. Under Article 121(2) (see Section 3.5) of the UN Convention 
which deals with the regime of islands: 
... the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the 
continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions 
of this Convention applicable to other land territory. 
Islands are therefore entitled to the full suite of claims to maritime zones including, in 
particular, the most valuable categories from the perspective of potential area of 
jurisdiction generated- continental shelf and EEZ. The question of the zone generative 
capacity and rights of Cambodia's offshore insular features will be discussed in detail in 
Section 8. 
An argument can therefore be advanced that Cambodia's current straight 
baselines claim conforms with the letter of Article 7 of UNCLOS, if not its spirit. 
However, as the islands used as basepoints in the claim can generate maritime claims on 
Cambodia's behalf in their own right, and as Cambodia's continental shelf claim is 
based on earlier and more conservative baseline claims it can also be argued that the 
allegedly excessive aspects of the 1982 claim have little material impact on the question 
of maritime boundary delimitation with Cambodia's neighbours. With this in mind, it 
would seem to cost Cambodia little to pull back its claim at least to that of 1972.65 The 
64 
65 
However, as the straight baselines Cambodia claimed in 1972 post-dated Phnom Penh's 
continental shelf claim of the same year by only a month it would be surprising if the 1972 
straight baselines were not at least borne in mind in the drafting of the continental shelf claim. 
Even if this was the case, however, it is clear that Cambodia's 1972 straight baselines claim is 
significantly more conservative than that of 1982. 
In relation to the maritime areas offshore the Cambodian mainland coast- excluding Phu Quoc 
island in light of the Cambodia-Vietnam agreement regarding islands. Similarly, the 1972 claim's 
illegal use of Condor Reef as a basepoint would ideally be amended. 
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key disadvantage of such an action from the Cambodian perspective, however, is that 
the exclusion of Poulo Wei from the straight baselines and thus the failure to unify the 
Cambodian and Vietnamese straight baseline systems would serve to undermine the 
validity of the joint Historic Waters area with Vietnam, which lies entirely landward of 
the two states' baselines and thus in their claimed internal waters, to which both 
countries apparently remain committed.66 
One suggested option for Cambodia to consider would be to amend the 1982 
claim to include an additional basepoint. This would serve to safeguard the joint 
Historic Waters area and would have minimal impact on its claims to extended maritime 
jurisdiction. It would also address some of the criticisms that can be levelled at the 
1982 claim. The incorporation of the islet west of Koh Prins between Koh Kusrovie 
and Ilot Veer would serve to break up the longest straight baseline segment of the 1982 
claim between Kusrovie and Ilot Veer of 51.84nm (96km) into two segments from 
Kusrovie to Prins and Prins to Veer of 44.55nm (82.5km) and 7.83nm (14.5km) 
respectively.67 Such an amendment would not, however, have a major impact. The area 
of internal waters and territorial sea claimed from this configuration of baselines as 
opposed to those of 1982 would be reduced by 80om2 (275km2) and 17nm2 (57km2) 
respectively. The area of internal waters beyond 12nm from the coast would also be 
reduced by 30nm2 (103km2) and additional territorial sea beyond 12nm by an area 
almost identical to the reduction of the overall territorial sea claim. The proportions of 
"additional" waters beyond 12nm from the coast of the overall claims to internal and 
territorial waters would therefore fall to 5.8% (from 6.7%) and 41% (from 42%) 
. I 68 respective y. 
66 
67 
It should be noted that the current Cambodian premier, Hun Sen, is the signatory of the Historic 
Waters Agreement with Vietnam. For its part, Hanoi has offered no indication that it considers 
the agreement anything other than valid. 
Prescott (1998: 27) notes the reduction in the claim to additional waters beyond 12nm from the 
coast as a result of including Koh Prins as a basepoint in the straight baseline system, finding that 
"None of the area enclosed by Cambodia's straight baselines would lie outside the territorial 
waters and the contiguous zone drawn from normal baselines ... " and that this "confirms that the 
enclosed waters are sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of 
internal waters. " However, it should be pointed out that the entirety of the area enclosed by 
Cambodia's 1982 straight baselines claim falls within 24nm (i.e. the combined breadth of the 
territorial sea and contiguous zone) of the coast even in the absence of this amendment. 
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4.3 Malaysia's Straight Baseline Claims in the Gulf of Thailand 
Any discussion of Malaysia's straight baseline system requires a certain amount of 
educated guesswork. Indeed, Malaysia has not in fact formally claimed or defined a 
straight baseline system along its coast. However, other Malaysian legislation and 
official documents infer that such a straight baseline system has been constructed.69 
The first indication of a Malaysian claim to straight baselines came by Ordinance 
No.731 of 2August 1969.70 This was issued as a prelude to Malaysia's continental 
shelf boundary agreement with Indonesia of the same year. It was intended to put 
Malaysia on an equal footing with Indonesia, which had already established an 
archipelagic baseline system, by establishing straight baselines for Malaysia for the 
purposes of boundary delimitation.71 No coordinates for or map of the straight baseline 
claim were provided at that time. However, the Office of the Geographer of the US 
Department of State when reproducing the Malaysia-Indonesia continental shelf 
agreement of 7 November 1969 in its Limits in the Seas series, referred to, "Malaysia's 
l db l . ,72 recent y constructe ase mes. 
Subsequently, in its analysis of the Indonesia-Malaysia territorial sea boundary 
of 10 March 1971, the Office of the Geographer noted that, "Malaysia appears to have 
a system of straight baselines. "73 The same report went on to state that although 
Malaysia had never officially announced any straight baselines, from an analysis of both 
the Malaysia-Indonesia continental shelf and territorial sea boundary agreements, "it is 
obvious that Malaysia employed some system of straight baselines from which to 
measure the extent of its claimed territorial sea" and that the same system was used by 
Malaysia "to acquire an 'equitable' share of the continental shelf of the Strait of 
Malacca. "74 Furthermore, in its Fisheries Act of 1985 (see Section 7.9) Malaysia 
defines its internal waters as "any areas ... that are on the landward side of the baselines 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
These figures were calculated using a planimetre and a copy of British Admiralty Chart 3985, 
1987 edition, at a scale of 1 :500,000. 
Inquiries to the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in December 1998 indicated that no 
baselines map or list of coordinates had been issued. Confirmed by Hailer-Trost (personal 
communication, 11/6/99). 
Copy on file with the author. 
US Department of State, 1985: 111. 
US Department of State, 1970: 2. 
US Department of State, 1973: 3 
US Department of State, 1973: 3 
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Figure 4.6 Straight Baselines Off Eastern Peninsula Malaysia 
Source: Author's research. 
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from which the breadth of the territorial sea of Malaysia is measured" thus 
strengthening the implication that straight baselines had been claimed. 75 
The actual position of Malaysia's straight baseline system can be deduced from 
two maps issued by the Malaysian Directorate of National Mapping on 21 December 
1979 in order to illustrate Malaysia's agreed maritime boundaries and the limits of 
Malaysia's unilateral territorial sea and continental shelf claims. Together these were 
called the Peta Menunjukkan Sempadan Perairan dan Pelantar Benua Malaysia or 
"Map Showing the Territorial Waters and Continental Shelf Boundaries of 
Malaysia. "76 One sheet covered Sarawak and Sabah while the other, relevant to claims 
in the Gulf of Thailand, dealt with peninsula Malaysia. An excerpt from the latter chart 
is included here as Figure 4.5. Although no baselines are shown on either map and the 
shading representing Malaysian territorial waters extends right up to the coast with no 
distinction for internal waters, where there are no agreed boundaries, the outer limit of 
the Malaysian territorial sea claim is marked, significantly, with straight lines. 77 Such a 
configuration could only occur by virtue of the outer limit of the Malaysian claim being 
constructed from a system of straight baselines. 
It follows, therefore, that by drawing lines parallel to the outer limit of the 
Malaysian territorial sea claim but 12nm landward of that line, Malaysia's straight 
baseline system can be (re)constructed and the relevant turning points identified and 
mapped (see Figure 4.6). When this exercise is undertaken it can be determined that for 
the portion of the Malaysian coast relevant to the Gulf of Thailand, the east coast of 
peninsula Malaysia, Malaysia's inferred baselines connect points on the mainland coast 
as well as the outermost of the islands fringing portions of that coast. 78 
From the terminus of the Malaysia-Thailand land boundary on the coast,79 it can 
be inferred that Malaysia's straight baselines claim proceeds to a point on the coast near 
Kuala Besar then to a point on the coast in the vicinity of Kampung Sabak (see Figures 
4.5 and 4.6). From this point Malaysia's straight baselines extend in a southeasterly 
direction, beyond the confines of the Gulf of Thailand proper, to the fringing islands of 
Pulau Perehentian Besar, the northern cape of Pulau Redang, Pulau Lima, Pulau Yu 
75 
76 
77 
78 
Haller-Trost, 1996: 328. 
Published by the Malaysian Directorate of National Mapping (Haller-Trost, 1998: I) and referred 
to hereinafter as the 'Malaysian Map' or by its Malaysian shorthand Peta Baru. 
Haller-Trost, 1996: 317. 
Prescott, 1985a: 214. 
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Besar, Pulau Tenggol, Pulau Berhala (Pulau Varella), the northern cape of Pulau 
Tioman and a point on the eastern coast of Pulau Aur before terminating at what appears 
to be another 'floating' point 12nm landward of the territorial waters limit located on 
the Malaysia-Indonesia continental shelf boundary. The locations of the turning points 
in this system are summarised in Table 4.8 and illustrated on Figure 4.6. 
Strictly speaking, the Gulf of Thailand has been defined as being limited by a 
line joining Vietnam's Mui Cau Mao Point and a point on the Malaysian coast near 
Kota Bharu. Therefore, only the first and part of the second straight baseline segments 
extending along the Malaysian coast from the boundary with Thailand lie within the 
Gulf of Thailand proper. These segments are 8.2nm (15.1km) and 6.4nm (11.8km) long 
. 1 80 respective y. Nevertheless, as the delimitation between Malaysia and Vietnam 
extending beyond the strict limits of the Gulf falls within the confines of this study, it is 
appropriate to examine Malaysia's claimed baselines along the whole of the eastern 
coast of the peninsula. The lengths of the remaining nine segments on fronting the east 
coast of peninsula Malaysia are summarised in Table 4.9. The total length of Malaysia's 
straight baselines along this portion of its coastline is approximately 356.8nm (660.7km) 
giving an average baseline segment length of 32.4nm (60.lkm) with the longest segment 
being 92.33nm (171 km) in length. 
79 
80 
This point coincides with turning point 47 of Malaysia's maritime claims as expressed in the 
Malaysian Map of 1979 and with the first point of the Malaysia-Thailand territorial sea boundary 
of the same year- 6°27.5'N, l02°10'E (see Section 6.2.2). 
Measured on British Admiralty Chart 3961, 1993 edition at a scale of 1:240,000. 
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Table 4.8 Malaysia's Straight Baselines Claim Off Eastern Peninsula Malaysia: 
Locations of Turning Points 
Point Location Coordinates Distance of 
Island/Point 
Offshore 
Latitude Longitude 
A Malaysia-Thailand land 6° 14' 30" N. 102° 05' 36" E.81 
boundary terminus 
M1 Point on the coast near so 13' 15" N. 102° 13' 40" E. 
Kuala Besar 
M2 Point on the coast in the so 10' 30"N. I 02° 20' 20" E. 
vicinity of Kampung 
Sabak 
M3 Pulau Perehentian Besar so 55' 30" N. 102° 45' 45" E. 8.64nm (16km) 
M4 Northern cape of Pulau so 49' 00" N. 103° 00' 45" E. 12.55nm 
Redang (23.25km) 
MS Pulau Lima so 47' 30" N. 103° 02' 50" E. 14.85nm 
(27.5km) 
M6 Pulau Yu Besar so 38' 40" N. 103° 09' 05" E. 12.01nm 
(22.25km) 
M7 Pulau Tenggol 4o 48' 30" N. 103° 41' 10" E. 13.63nm 
(25.25km) 
M8 Pulau Berhala (Pulau 3o 14' 45" N. 103° 40' 00" E. 12.42nm (23km) 
Varella) 
M9 Northern cape of Pulau 2° 56' 05" N. 104°11' 55" E. 27.27nm 
Tioman82 (50.5km) 
M10 Point on the eastern coast 2° 27' 00" N. 104° 32' 55" E. 32.4nm (60km) 
ofPulau Aur 
Mll Floating point 12nm 2° 22' 15" N. 104° 22' 05" E. 9.72nm (18km) 
landward of territorial 
waters limit located on 
Malaysia-Indonesia 
continental shelf 
boundar 
Average 15.94nm (29.5km) 
81 
82 
Source: Peta Baru ( 1979), Haller-Trost (1998) and author's research. 
These coordinates is consistent with those provided in the Malaysia-Thailand treaty on their 
territorial waters boundary (see Section 6.2.2). 
The north cape of Pulau Tioman is located at 2° 53' 45" N., 104°10' 30" E, as measured on 
British Admiralty Chart 3543, 1965 edition at a scale of 1:500,000. 
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Table 4.9 Malaysia's Straight Baselines Claim Off Eastern Peninsula Malaysia: 
Segment Lengths 
Segment 
A-MI 
Ml-M2 
M2-M3 
M3-M4 
M4-M5 
M5-M6 
M6-M7 
M7-M8 
M8-M9 
M9-M10 
MIO-Mll 
Total 
Average 
Length 
8.23nm (15.lkm) 
6.4nm (11.8km) 
29 .16nm ( 54km) 
15.66nm (29km) 
2.56nm (4.75km) 
10.53nm (19.5km) 
57.37nm (106.25km) 
90.17nm (167km) 
35.91nm (66.5km) 
34.42nm (63.75km) 
62.64nm ( 116km) 
353.05 (653.85km) 
32.1nm (59.44km) 
Source: Peta Baru (1979) and author's research. 
While not overly long, the baseline segments fronting the Malaysian coast within the 
Gulf of Thailand proper nevertheless seem to breach the provisions of Article 7 of 
UNCLOS. As there are no fringing islands off the Malaysian coast within the strict 
definition of the Gulf of Thailand,83 straight baselines can only be justified on the basis 
of the coastline being deeply indented or cut into (see Section 2.3.3). 84 It is hard, if not 
impossible, to maintain that the coastline fronted by the two baseline segments 
immediately south of the boundary with Thailand is deeply indented (see Figure 4.5). 
An alternative justification for straight baselines might be on the grounds of the 
presence of a delta and a highly unstable coast. A delta certainly exists at the mouth of 
the Sungei Kelantan and the "barrier spit" coastline in this area, dominated by the 
progradation of the spit at Tumpat (see Figure 6.1), is clearly unstable. It is equally 
plain, however, that the straight baselines Malaysia has constructed in this area are not 
confined to the delta of the Sungei Kelantan or, indeed, that of the Sungei Golok at the 
Malaysia-Thailand land boundary on the coast. 85 In other words, therefore, the 
83 
84 
85 
There are, however, a number of islands, close in-shore, which are associated with the fan-shaped 
delta at the Sungei Kelanatan river mouth near Tumpat. 
UNCLOS Article 7(2) provides that "Where because of the presence of a delta and other natural 
conditions the coastline is highly unstable, the appropriate points may be selected along the 
furthest seaward extent of the low water line and notwithstanding subsequent regression of the 
low-water line, the straight baselines shall remain effective until changed by the coastal State in 
accordance with this Convention." 
Bird, 1985: 115; Bird and Schwartz, 1985:792-793. Bird (1985: 115) includes a diagram based 
on earlier work by Koopmans (1972) which well illustrates the active characteristics of the 
Sungei Kelantan delta and the Tumpat spit (Pantai Laut) in particular. Between 1944 and 1982 
the spit grew and migrated westwards until it enclosed the whole of the Bay of Tumpat, cutting it 
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Malaysian straight baselines are not claimed on the basis of the existence of a delta or 
deltas and the instability of the coast. Furthermore, Article 7(2)'s provisions concerning 
deltas and unstable coastline have to be read in conjunction with rather than as an 
alternative to paragraph 1 of Article 7 stipulating that there must exist either a fringe of 
islands or that the coastline in question be deeply indented or cut into (see below). 
As a consequence of the generally smooth nature of the coastline concerned, the 
indentations closed by the baselines are shallow and thus the area of internal waters 
enclosed is limited, amounting to approximately 6.8nm2 (23.2km2), the entirety of 
which is comfortably within 12nm of the mainland coast. 86 Similarly, of the 216.7nm2 
(743.3km2) of territorial waters claimed by Malaysia from the straight baselines within 
the Gulf, only 11.8nm2 (40.5km2) or 5.45% lies beyond 12nm from the mainland 
coast. 87 Despite the minimal impact of the Malaysian straight baselines within the Gulf 
of Thailand on claims to maritime jurisdiction, it would seem correct to conclude that 
the normal baseline would have been appropriate for the coastline in question. 
The influence of the Malaysian straight baselines on claims to maritime 
jurisdiction further south, where fringing islands are involved, is, however, more 
profound. In her comprehensive study of Malaysia's maritime and territorial claims, 
Haller-Trost makes several observations concerning the straight baselines fringing 
peninsula Malaysia's eastern coast.88 As well as stating that the baselines in question 
follow the general direction of the coast, Haller-Trost argues that the maritime space 
landward of the straight baselines is sufficiently close to the land domain, and that these 
waters are "mostly less than 13 fm, and numerous shoals, often with less than 5 fm 
clearance are scattered between the mainland coast and the baselines. "89 Haller-Trost 
goes on to describe the coastline fronted by the straight baselines in question as being 
"considerably unstable, especially near the various river mouths" as a consequence of 
"currents impinging on the shore" such that "the shoreline changes continually" and 
that these factors serve to justify the application of straight baselines. 90 Haller-Trost 
supplements the argument that the Malaysian straight baselines in question are "legally 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
off from the open sea. This barrier spit was subsequently breached and large portions of it 
transported westwards along the coast towards Thailand. However, the process is repeating itself 
and the 1987 edition (with minor corrections to 1998) of Chart 3961 shows a renewed spit 
extending west from the delta (see Figure 6.1 ). 
Measured on British Admiralty chart 3961, 1987 edition at a scale of I :240,000. 
Measured on British Admiralty chart 3961, 1987 edition at a scale of I :240,000. 
Haller-Trost, 1998. 
Haller-Trost, 1998: 96. 
Haller-Trost, 1998: 96. 
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justifiable" on the basis outlined above by stating that this is reinforced by the fact that 
"a baseline, which frequently 'jumps' from the coast to offshore islands and back to the 
coast, would create a territorial sea delimitation which, in practice, will prove difficult 
to be enforced. "91 Such an alignment of straight baselines is presumably what Haller-
Trost anticipates were a less liberal interpretation of Article 7 to be applied to the 
coastline in question than that used by the Malaysian authorities in constructing their 
straight baselines. Furthermore, the author states that all the baseline coordinates lie 
"less than 24nm from the main coast" and that although certain baseline segments are 
up to 94nm in length that this is nevertheless acceptable.92 This view of Malaysia's 
straight baselines along the eastern coast of peninsula Malaysia as being in accordance 
with international law is to some extent supported by Valencia.93 
While Haller-Trost's contention that the baseline system accords with the 
general direction of the coast can be maintained, particularly in light of the problems 
encountered in the practical application of the concept of general direction (see Section 
3.3.3), clearly this represents only one of the requirements laid down in Article 7 and 
thus in isolation is insufficient to justify the drawing of straight baselines. Several of the 
author's other comments are also open to question -particularly when set against the 
comparatively restrictive US guidelines on the drawing of straight baselines. 
With regard to baseline length, of the 11 baseline segments under consideration, 
three are in excess of the US-suggested limit of 48nm with the longest being almost 
double that length.94 Clearly Haller-Trost interprets the provisions of Article 7 liberally, 
suggesting a maximum baseline segment length of 100nm.95 Even so, it could just as 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
Haller-Trost, 1998: 97. 
Haller-Trost, 1998: 97. Prescott (1985b) has merely commented that "some sections" of the 
inferred baselines cannot be justified according to the UN Convention's provisions. 
Valencia (1991: 20) comments explicitly that "the inferred Malaysian baselines along the east 
coast of the Malay Peninsula are in conformance with the Convention." He does, however. note 
that this is based on the assumption that the northern terminus of the straight baselines would be 
the headland east of Kota Baru and that an extension of the straight baselines further northwest 
to the Thai-Malaysian land boundary terminus on the coast (as seems to be the case) would not 
be justified. Valencia also undermines his argument somewhat by justifying Malaysia's baselines 
through comparison with those of Vietnam: "Given that its own baselines are not in 
conformance with the convention, Vietnam should not object to the baselines Malaysia appears 
to have used off the east coast of its Peninsula." While state practice is an important yardstick 
for the validity or otherwise of straight baseline claims, Valencia's argument here does seem to 
be a case of 'two wrongs making a right'. 
US Department of State, 1987: 14. 
Haller-Trost, 1998: 89. The author bases this recommendation on a misreading of Article 47 of 
UNCLOS which states, according to Haller-Trost, that "archipelagic baselines shall not exceed 
JOOnm." In fact Article 47 provides that no archipelagic baseline segment should exceed 125nm 
in length and that no more than 3% of the total number of segments should exceed lOOnm in 
length. Haller-Trost also suggests that, based on Article 76, "where states intend to claim a 
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easily be argued that several of Malaysia's claimed straight baselines along this section 
of its coastline are excessively long. Nevertheless, it is well to recall that Article 7 itself 
does not define a maximum baseline segment length. As was the case for Cambodia's 
1982 claim, the longest segment in the Malaysian system (57.4nm) is less than the 
average of the longest segments of straight baselines claims around the world 
summarised in Appendix 4 (64.8nm). This indicates that the Malaysian claim is 
arguably in keeping with international practice. 
The US guidelines also provide that fringing islands should be no more than 
24nm from one another. 96 Of the eight straight baseline segments off eastern peninsula 
Malaysia joining fringing islands, five exceed this limit while the average distance 
between fringing islands is almost 40nm. Furthermore, one of the Malaysian basepoints 
inferred from the territorial waters limits included in the 1979 'Malaysian Map' does not 
appear to be located on an island at all. At the southern end of the peninsula Malaysia, 
the Malaysian claimed territorial sea limit terminates at a point on the continental shelf 
boundary between Malaysia and lndonesia.97 The point 12nm landward of that location 
on the Malaysia-Indonesia maritime boundary, that is the basepoint from which the 
Malaysian territorial sea boundary must have been constructed, does not, however, 
appear to be located on land and therefore represents a 'floating' point.98 Such a 
basepoints seemingly not anchored to the land and not serving to unite two neighbouring 
baseline systems (as is the case for Point "0" between Cambodia and Vietnam), must be 
viewed as being at odds with the law of the sea. 
Haller-Trost's justification of these straight baselines on the basis of the 
instability of peninsula Malaysia's eastern coast seems superficially attractive. Indeed, 
it has been noted that over 90% of the eastern coast of peninsula Malaysia consists of 
sandy beaches and, quite apart from normal seasonal variations, the coastline is subject 
to longer-term progradation or retrogradation, this being most evident at river deltas -
thus supporting the contention that the coastline is highly unstable. 99 However, the 
United Nations Group of Technical Experts on Baselines pointed that the second 
96 
97 
98 
99 
continental shelf of more than 200nm" individual baseline segments should not exceed 60nm in 
length (Haller-Trost, 1998: 89). 
US Department of State, 1987: 17. 
United States, 1970. 
Measured on British Admiralty Chart 3543, 1965 edition at a scale of 1:500,000. 
Bird, 1985: 115; Bird and Schwartz, 1985: 789-795. Bird goes on to note that the " ... deltaic 
coastlines at the mouths of the Endau, the Terengganu, and the Kelantan rivers have prograded 
by the advance of mainly swampy fringes, with some sandy shores, but there have also been 
episodes of recession. " 
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paragraph of Article 7, dealing with the presence of deltas and highly unstable 
coastlines, "is subordinate to paragraph 1, and is not an alternative to it" and stressed 
the word "and" used in the phrase "delta and other natural conditions. " 100 Thus, for 
paragraph 2 of Article 7 to apply, the conditions laid out in paragraph one must be 
fulfilled. Furthermore, paragraph 2 only applies where there is a delta rather than any 
other situation where the coastline is highly unstable, because Article 7(2) does not 
apply where there is the presence of a delta or other natural conditions causing the 
coastline to be unstable. For the east coast of peninsula Malaysia, therefore, Article 7(2) 
applies only if that coastline is either deeply indented or cut into coastline; or a fringe of 
islands exists along it in its immediate vicinity. In addition, even if Article 7(1) is 
fulfilled, Article 7(2) is applicable only to those restricted parts of the coastline, where 
deltas exist and this paragraph cannot therefore provide the foundation for a claim to 
straight baselines along the entirety of the coastline as has been claimed in this case. 
In any case, it is unclear that the eastern coast of peninsula Malaysia is indeed 
"considerably unstable" as Haller-Trost suggests. 101 While, as noted, the literature 
does provide some support for the argument that the coastline in question is less than 
stable, commentators are not unanimous on this issue. For instance, although Bird and 
Schwartz in their survey of the world's coastlines note that the east coast of Malaysia is 
"subjected to northeast monsoon storms and swells from the South China Sea", 
maintain that the coastline of peninsula Malaysia as a whole "has been stable since 
[the] Late Tertiary" period. 102 
As far as the question of whether the fringing islands utilised in the portion of 
Malaysia's straight baseline system under review are sufficiently close to the coast to be 
considered in its "immediate vicinity "103 and such that the waters enclosed by the 
baselines are "sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime 
of internal waters "104, the following observations may be offered. The US guidelines 
suggest that fringing islands should be, at maximum, no more than 48nm offshore. 105 
Haller-Trost states that straight baseline turning points concerned are, in fact, all within 
24nm of the mainland coast and "thereby comply to the test of coalescing territorial 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
United Nations, 1989a: 21-23. 
Haller-Trost, 1998: 96. 
Bird and Schwartz, 1985: 789. 
UNCLOS, Article 7(1). 
UNCLOS, Article 7(3). 
US Department of State, 1987: 22. 
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seas. "
106 When plotted on appropriate charts, 107 however, it becomes clear that two of 
the points - those on Pulau Tioman Pulau Aur- are over 24nm from the mainland coast 
(see Table 4.8). All the islands used as basepoints for Malaysia's straight baseline 
system off peninsula Malaysia do, however, fall within 48nm of the coast with the 
average distance offshore of basepoints located on fringing islands being just under 
19nm - within the limitations set by the US recommendations. 
If the "additional" waters test previously described is applied to the eastern coast 
of peninsula Malaysia, the total area of internal waters claimed within the straight 
baseline amounts to 5,502.7nm2 (18,87.51km2). Of this area, of the order of 330.26nm2 
(1,132.76km2), or just over 6% of the total, lies beyond 12nm from the nearest normal 
baseline and therefore constitutes "additional" waters which would fall outside 
Malaysia's territorial sea in the absence of the straight baseline claim. None, however, 
lies beyond 24nm from the nearest mainland point. 108 As far as territorial waters are 
concerned, the total claimed seaward of the baselines claimed amounts to 4,291.76nm2 
(14,720.16km2) of which 2,030.7nm2 (6,965.02km2), or 47%, lies beyond 12nm from 
the nearest coastline. Furthermore, of the order of 147.38nm2 (505.51km2), of the 
Malaysian territorial sea claim for this part of its coastline, 3.4% of the total, lies beyond 
24nm from the coast (see Figure 4.6). 109 
Haller-Trost also refers to the shallow nature of the waters enclosed by the 
straight baselines off eastern peninsula Malaysia and the presence of numerous shoals 
between the baselines and the mainland as factors supporting the construction of the 
straight baseline system. Article 7 makes no mention of depth as a criterion justifying 
the application of straight baselines and technically, therefore, this consideration must 
be viewed as being irrelevant. Nevertheless, the author's meaning is clear- the shallow, 
islet-strewn character of the waters enclosed supports the contention that these areas are 
of a profoundly inshore nature and therefore close enough to the land rather than sea 
domain to be considered suitable for conversion to internal waters status. The presence 
of numerous shoals, which may qualify as low-tide elevations or even insular features 
(see Section 3.5), is potentially more relevant. Shoals qualifying as low-tide elevations 
and which are within 12nm of the nearest island or mainland coast, can themselves be 
106 
107 
108 
Haller-Trost, 1998: 96. 
British Admiralty Chart 3543, 1965 edition at a scale of I :500,000. 
Calculated using a planimetre and British Admiralty Chart 3542, 1960 edition at a scale of 
1:500,000 and Chart 3543, 1965 edition at a scale of 1:500,000. 
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used to generate a claim to territorial sea. It may well be, therefore, that a number of 
such features exist but are not clearly marked on the scale of charts used for the 
measurement of "additional" waters claimed, leading to an overestimation of the 
proportion of "additional" waters claimed beyond 12nm from the coast. 110 
Overall, it seems difficult to sustain either that the coast of peninsula Malaysia is 
deeply indented or that the islands used as basepoints for the straight baseline system, or 
enclosed by that system, comprehensively fringe or mask the coast in its immediate 
vicinity. It could also be argued that the sea area enclosed by the straight baseline 
system is not sufficiently linked to the land domain to be considered suitable to be 
categorised as internal waters - at least according to the US rules. Having noted these 
issues of concern, however, it is worth considering that Malaysia's apparent straight 
baseline claims are not out of character in terms of general state practice or as far as the 
Gulf of Thailand specifically is concerned. 111 
International reaction to Malaysia's straight baseline claim off the coast of 
peninsula Malaysia has been mixed. For instance, the baselines received a degree of 
international recognition in that they were used as the basis for Malaysia's continental 
shelf claims vis-a-vis Indonesia resulting in their 1969 boundary agreement. Indeed, 
Malaysia's straight baselines are believed to have been established precisely in order to 
counter Indonesia's archipelagic baselines claim with continental shelf delimitation in 
mind. This fact may go a long way to explaining why Malaysia chose to enclose its 
eastern peninsula Malaysia coast with straight baselines - this may have been seen as an 
effective means to counter balance Indonesia's straight (archipelagic) baselines along 
the whole of its coast. 112 The straight baselines located in the vicinity of the Thai-
Malaysian land boundary terminus on the Gulf of Thailand were, however, discounted 
for the purpose of constructing the Thai-Malaysian territorial sea and (partial) 
continental shelf agreements off this coastline (see Section 7 .1.3). Malaysia's straight 
baselines claim have not therefore posed a major impediment to the conclusion of 
109 
110 
Ill 
112 
Calculated using a planimetre and British Admiralty Chart 3542, 1960 edition at a scale of 
1:500,000 and Chart 3543, 1965 edition at a scale of 1:500,000. 
Having made this observation, it should be noted that charts at a scale of I :500,000 were used for 
determining "additional" waters areas which is considered an appropriately detailed scale for the 
task. Furthermore, the charts are specifically deigned as aides to navigation and could be 
legitimately expected to illustrate the presence of all known low-tide elevations and other similar 
potential hazards to navigation. 
For instance, the longest straight baseline segment along Malaysia's eastern peninsula coast is 
approximately 90nm long (see Appendix 4). 
Haller-Trost, 1996: 322. 
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maritime boundary agreements. Similarly, Malaysia's straight baselines do not appear 
to have been relevant in the construction of Malaysia's continental shelf claim vis-a-vis 
Vietnam in the central Gulf of Thailand, a part of which became the northern boundary 
of the Malay-Vietnamese Defined Area. 113 It is also clear that there has been a distinct 
lack of formal protests against Malaysia's straight baseline system, but this may well be 
more attributable to the fact that Malaysia has not formally admitted to the existence of 
the baselines in question, let alone their precise location! 
Nevertheless, Malaysia's straight baselines along its eastern peninsula coast 
remain significant. This is because even though maritime boundary agreements have 
been concluded with Thailand and Indonesia and joint development agreements with 
both Thailand and Vietnam, the continental shelf agreement with Thailand is only 
partial, while both joint development agreements merely defer maritime boundary 
delimitation to a later date. In due course it is anticipated that both the Thai-Malaysian 
Joint Development Area and the Malay-Vietnamese Defined Area will be divided 
between the parties at which time baseline considerations will once again come to the 
fore.JJ4 
113 
114 
The northern limit of the Defined Area is described by three points, from west to east - A, F and 
E (see Section 7.3 and Figure 1.1). Point A is equidistant from the Malaysian island of Redang 
and the Thai island of Ko Losin, ignoring Vietnamese features. Point F is equidistant between 
Redang and the Vietnamese mainland, thus ignoring Vietnamese islands. PointE is equidistant 
from Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam; the Malaysian island of Tenggol and the Vietnamese 
rocks offshore Hon Khoai being the relevant points (Charney and Alexander, 1998: 2,337). Thus, 
although both Redang and Tenggol islands are included in Malaysia's straight baseline system, 
the system itself had no apparent impact on the extent of Malaysia's continental shelf claim in 
this area. 
This is perhaps particularly true in relation to Thailand. Whereas when the territorial sea and 
partial continental shelf agreements were concluded with Thailand in 1979 Malaysia's straight 
baselines were apparently discounted, the situation has since progressed. In 1979, Thailand's 
claimed straight baselines were remote from the area subject to delimitation with Malaysia. The 
normal baseline was therefore used by both sides. In 1992, however, Thailand claimed an 
extension to its straight baseline system extending down the western coast of the Gulf via Ko 
Losin to terminate at the Thai-Malaysian land boundary terminus on the coast (Area 4) (see 
Section 6.2.3). It remains to be seen whether this development impacts on future Thai-Malaysian 
negotiations concerning the division of the Joint Development Area. At the time of writing this 
certainly seems to be a distant prospect. 
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4.4 Thailand's Straight Baseline Claims in the Gulf of Thailand 
4.4. 1 Introduction 
There are three distinct phases evident in the development of Thailand's straight 
baseline system. Firstly, the declaration of the Bight of Thailand as a historic bay in 
1959. Secondly, the designation of two groups of straight baselines in the Gulf of 
Thailand in 1970 and finally, the promulgation of fresh legislation relating to straight 
baselines in the Gulf in 1992. 
4.4.2 Thailand's Historic Bay Claim 
In 1959 Thailand issued a decree, published in the Royal Gazette of 22 September, 
which extended its provincial boundaries closing the northernmost extension of the Gulf 
of Thailand - the Bight of Thailand - with a bay-closing line: 
The Council of Ministers deems it proper to give notification reaffirming that the 
Bight of Thailand ... is the historical gulf and that the waters to the north of the 
said base line are territorial waters of Thailand. Thailand has so held since 
time immemorial. 
Thailand has therefore closed the Bight of Thailand as a historic bay (see Section 2.3.5) 
(Figure 4. 7). 115 As part of the Thai 1959 legislation the area to the north of the bay 
closing line was defined as Thailand's "territorial waters. " 116 In fact, the area to the 
north of the line should be considered to be Thailand's internal waters. 117 Indeed, 
Thailand's territorial waters should extend seawards from the straight baseline closing 
the bay. 
Even so, this distinction makes little material difference and Thailand's historic 
waters claim to the Bight of Thailand has not elicited any known international 
protests. 118 Indeed, even the United States has proved silent in relation to Thailand's 
115 
116 
117 
118 
Nixon (1981: 16) notes that although no motive was given for the historic bay claim, Thailand's 
interests "probably involve both coastal fishing and security." 
US Department of State, 197la: 3; United Nations, 1989b: 306. 
While the US Department of State study cites the Thai Decree as claiming the waters landward of 
the closing line as being Thailand's "territorial waters", the United Nations study and Scovazzi 
et al. (1989: 60) quote the decree as claiming the waters north of the closing line as "internal 
waters. " It is therefore possible that the Thai authorities have amended the decree in order to 
correct this apparent error in its wording when first issued. 
According to Ake-uru (1987: 420-21) of the Thai Foreign Ministry, Thailand's declaration of the 
Bight of Thailand as a historic bay didn't meet with any protests because prior to declaring it 
Thailand had "sought out ideas in the first Conference on the Law of the Sea at Geneva in 
1958." 
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Figure 4.7 The Bight of Thailand Historic Bay Closing Line 
Source: Author's research. 
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historic claim to the Bight of Thailand. This places Thailand's claim in a rather select 
minority - of 18 claims to historic bays or waters, the United States has seen fit to issue 
protests or assertions concerning 15 of them. 119 In fact, the waters of the Bight of 
Thailand have been described as being "eminently suitable" for inclusion in a historic 
bay claim. 120 This is because the area enclosed is surrounded by Thai territory on three 
sides, has historically been used by Thai fishermen and for approaching the port serving 
the Thai capital, Bangkok. In addition, the bay closing line, situated as it is in the 
extreme north of the Gulf of Thailand, has no influence Thailand's maritime boundary 
claims vis-a-vis its maritime neighbours. 
The Bight of Thailand certainly would not qualify as a juridical bay in the 
absence of the historic claim. The bay closing line itself is 59. I 5nm (I 09 .55km) in 
length - almost two and a half times the maximum length of closing line laid down 
under Article 10 of UNCLOS for non-historic bays (see Section 2.3.5). 121 The Bight of 
Thailand would, however, comfortably meet the semi-circle test outlined in Article 
I 0. 122 The closing line stretches from a point on the Bahn Chong Samsarn peninsula to 
a point at the same latitude 123 on the west coast of the Gulf of Thailand. The total 
maritime area enclosed within the historic bay is 2,833.7nm2 (9,7 I 9km\ Of this area, 
672.5nm2 (2,306.7km2) or 23.7% lies beyond 12nm from the coast and therefore 
represents "additional" waters that Thailand would not otherwise exert jurisdiction over 
in the absence of the historic bay claim. In addition, of the 849.5nm2 (2,913.7km2) of 
territorial waters claimable from the Bight of Thailand closing line, 348.1 nm2 
(1, 193 .8km2) or 41% - lies beyond 12nm from the nearest Thai normal baseline and 
therefore also constitutes a Thai jurisdictional 'gain' as a consequence of the 1959 claim 
(Figure 4.7). 124 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
The 18 claims are those of Argentina, Australia, Cambodia, Canada, the Dominican Republic, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Honduras, India, Italy, Kenya, Libya, Panama, the (former) Soviet Union, Sri 
Lanka, Thailand, Uruguay and Vietnam. It should be noted that Cambodia and Vietnam made a 
joint claim to part of the Gulf of Thailand (see Section 7.2), that India and Sri Lanka also made 
their claims by means of an agreement with one another and the El Salvador and Honduras's 
claims both relate to the same body of water - the Gulf of Fonseca. The latter pair of claims, the 
consequence of a decision of the Central American Court of Justice whereby the Gulf of Fonseca 
was recognised as a historic bay co-owned by El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua, are the only 
other historic claims along with Thailand's which have not been subject to a US protest or 
assertion (Roach and Smith, 1996: 33-34; Scovazzi et al., 1989: 28-29). 
Prescott, 1998: 19. 
US Department of State, 1971 a: 4; Scovazzi et al., 1989: 60-61. 
Calculated on British Admiralty Chart 3984, 1958 edition (updated), at a scale of I :500,000. 
12° 35' 45" N. 
Calculated using a p1animetre and British Admiralty Chart 3984, 1958 edition (updated), at a 
scale of 1 :500,000 
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4.4.3 Thailand's 1970 Straight Baselines Claim: Areas 1 and 2 
On 11 June 1970 Thailand claimed a system of straight baselines for three sectors of its 
coastline, two of which, Areas 1 and 2, lie in the Gulf of Thailand (see Figure 1.1). 125 
The 1970 legislation established the straight baseline, "asserting the water areas within 
the said baselines to be the internal waters of Thailand", and that, "Thailand has 
adhered to these claims since time immemorial." Elsewhere along Thailand's coasts 
'normal' baselines along the low-water line apply. It was on the basis of the 1970 
straight baseline system that Thailand's maritime jurisdictional claims were 
promulgated. Both of these distinct straight baseline systems connect fringing islands to 
points on Thailand's mainland coast. 
Area 1 
Area 1 consists of seven segments joining eight points and encloses the islands located 
offshore the Thai coast immediately to the north of the terminus of the Thai-Cambodian 
land boundary on the coast of the Gulf of Thailand. Starting from a mainland point on 
the Laem Ling peninsula in the north the straight baselines proceed southwards via three 
islets (Ko Chang Noi, Hin Rap and Hin Luk Bat) situated to the west of the major island 
of Ko Chang to Ko Rang. From Ko Rang the baselines extend to the islet of Hin Bang 
Baa just west of Ko Kut, then on to the southern tip of Ko Kut itself before returning to 
the mainland at a point coinciding with the terminus of the Thai-Cambodia land 
boundary on the coast (see Figure 4.8 and Table 4.10). 
125 The other area of straight baselines declared by Thailand in 1970 related to peninsula Thailand's 
western coast on the Andaman Sea and is therefore beyond the scope of this study. The 
announcement of the Prime Minister's Office concerning straight baselines and internal waters of 
Thailand was published in the Official Gazette, Special Volume 87, Chapter 52, 12 June 1970. 
179 
Baseline Claims 
Table 4.10 Thailand's Straight Baselines Area 1: Locations of Turning Points 
Point Location 
1 Laem Ling (on mainland 
coast) 
2 Ko ChangNoi 
3 Hin Rap 
4 Hin Luk Bat 
5 Ko Rang 
6 Hin BangBao 
7 KoKut 
8 Thai-Cambodian land 
boundar~ terminus 
Coordinates 
Latitude Longitude 
12° 12.3' N. 102° 16.7'E. 
12° 09.6' N. 102° 14.9' E. 
12° 03.1' N. 102° 14.5' E. 
11 o 56.7' N. 102° 17.2' E. 
11° 46.6' N. 102° 23.2' E. 
11 o 35.8' N. 102° 32.0' E. 
11 o 33.6' N. 102° 35.7' E. 
Distance of Island 
Offshore 
2.97nm (5.5km) 
8.64nm (16km) 
13.9nm (25.75km) 
17.14nm (31.75km) 
21.87nm (40.5km) 
15.52nm (28.75km) 
Average 13.34nm (24.71km) 
Source: US Department of State ( 1971 a) and author's research. 
The straight baselines of Area 1 enclose a complex and numerous group of islands and 
rocks in the immediate vicinity of and masking approximately three-quarters of the Thai 
mainland coast. 126 The straight baselines claimed as Area 1 total 66nm (l22.23km) 127 
giving an average length of segment of 9.43nm (17 .46km). The longest segment of 
baseline claimed is 19.65nm (36.39km) in length (see Table 4.11). 
Table 4.11 Thailand's Straight Baselines Area 1: Segment Lengths 
Segment Length 
1-2 3.3nm 
2-3 6.25nm 
3-4 6.95nm 
4-5 11.75nm 
5-6 13.85nm 
6-7 4.25nm 
7-8 19.65nm 
Total 66nm 
Average 9.43nm 
Source: US Department of State (1971a) and author's research. 
Thus even the longest baseline segment easily conforms to the US State Department's 
stipulation that no single baseline segment be in excess of 48nm in length. 128 
Furthermore, the distance of the fringing islands offshore (a maximum of 21.87nm 
(40.5km) and 13.34nm (24.7lkm) on average) and their location in the immediate 
126 
127 
128 
US Department of State, 1971 a: 8. 
Figure taken from the US Department of State, 197la: 4. 
US Department of State, 1987a: 14. 
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vicinity of the mainland coast indicates the suitability of the enclosed waters for internal 
waters status. This is coupled with the fact that none of the fringing islands is more than 
24nm from its neighbour or over 48nm from the mainland, as suggested by the US 
guidelines, and goes a long way towards sustaining the legitimacy of this claim. 
Similarly, the entirety of the 845.57nm2 (2,900.19km2) area enclosed by the 
straight baselines of Area 1 lies within 12nm of the nearest 'normal' baseline, and of the 
782nm2 (2,684km2) of territorial sea claimed seawards from the straight baselines, 
almost all of this area would have been territorial sea in any case, even in the absence of 
the straight baselines (Figure 4.8). 129 
It is therefore clear that a strong argument can be marshalled that this set of 
straight baselines is in full accordance with Article 7 of the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention, although the US Department of State Geographer's analysis of this system 
of baselines noted that the "land/water ratio is comparatively high, 1:5. "130 
Furthermore, although Cambodia has not apparently issued a formal protest or rejection 
of Thailand's Area 1 straight baseline claim this is implicit in its actions. In 1972, two 
years after Thailand established its straight baselines in the area in question, Cambodia 
issued a maritime claim which not only ignores Thailand's Area 1 straight baselines but 
cuts through the area claimed by Thailand as internal waters (see Figure 1.1 and Section 
7.2.5). 
Area 2 
Area 2 consists of 15 segments joining 16 points, all but the first and final of which are 
located on islands along the western coast of the Gulf of Thailand fringing the Thai 
mainland coast. From the mainland point of Laem Yai the baselines proceed to the 
islands of KoRan Khai, KoRan Pet, Ko Khai, Ko Chorakhe, Hin Lak Ngam and the 
northern point of Ko Tao to Hin Bai. These islands can be considered the northern 
group within the system. The southern group of islands linked by straight baselines 
consists of, south of Hin Bai, Kong Thansadet, just offshore the major island of Ko 
Phangan, a point on the eastern coast of Ko Phangan itself, then Ko Kong Ok just to the 
north of another large island, Ko Samui, Ko Kong Ok, adjacent to the eastern coast of 
129 
130 
Calculated using a planimetre and British Admiralty Chart 3984, 1958 edition (updated), at a 
scale of I :500,000. 
US Department of State, 197la: 8. It is worth pointing out, however, that Article 7 makes no 
mention of a particular land:water ratio as being a condition for the establishment of straight 
baselines. 
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Ko Samui then to a point on the eastern coast of Ko Samui itself. The southern group is 
completed by the small islets of Hin Ang Wan and Ko Rap before the baselines 
terminate on the Thai mainland at Laem Kho Khao (see Figure 4.9 and Table 4.12). 
Table 4.12 Thailand's Straight Baselines Area 2: Locations of Turning Points 
Point Location Coordinates Distance of Island 
Offshore 
Latitude Longitude 
1 Laem Y ai (on mainland 10° 53.7' N. 99° 31.4' E. 
coast) 
2 KoRan Khai 10° 47.8' N. 99° 32.6' E. 4.59nm (8.5km) 
3 KoRan Pet 10° 46.5' N. 99o 32.2 E. 5 .4nm (1 Okm) 
4 Ko Khai 10° 41.8' N. 99° 24.8' E. 1.48nm (2. 7 5km) 
5 Ko Chorakhe 10° 33.6' N. 99o 23.2' E. 5.4nm (10km) 
6 HinLakNgam 10° 30.0' N. 99° 25.6' E. 8.77nm (16.25km) 
7 KoTao 10° 07.5' N. 99° 50.7' E. 33.88nm (62.75km) 
8 Hin Bai 09° 56.6' N. 99° 59.7' E. 38.2nm (70.75km) 
9 Ko Kong Thansadet 09° 45.8' N. 100° 04.7' E. 29.97nm (55.5km) 
10 Ko Phangan 09° 44.0' N. 100° 05.2' E. 24.97nm ( 46.25km) 
11 Ko KongOk 09° 36.1' N. 100° 05.8' E. 22.68nm ( 42km) 
12 KoMatLang 09° 32.0' N. 100° 05.3' E. 19.3nm (35.75km) 
13 Ko Samui 09° 28.3' N. 100° 04.7' E. 8.37nm (15.5km) 
14 HinAngWang 09° 23.4' N. 100° 01.8' E. 11.61nm (21.5km) 
15 KoRap 09° 17.9' N. 99° 57.8' E. 6.2nm (11.5km) 
16 Laem Na Tham (on 09° 12.4 N. 99° 53.2' E. 
mainland coast) 
Average 15.77nm (29.21km) 
Source: US Department of State (1971a) and author's research. 
Area 2's straight baselines total 126.05nm (233.44km) in length and enclose islands 
fringing the western shore of the Gulf of Thailand. The longest segment is 33.75nm 
(62.5km), the shortest, 1.20nm (2.22km) and the average, 8.4nm (15.56km) (see Table 
4.13). 131 While even the longest of the baseline segments under consideration accords 
with the US-promoted limit for an individual baseline segment of 48nm, one part of the 
system fails the requirement of there being no more than 24nm between fringing 
islands132; the distance between Hin Lak Ngam and Ko Tao, coinciding with the longest 
baseline segment, is 33.75nm. The distance between the fringing islands acting as 
basepoints for the remaining 14 baseline segments is under 24nm. 
131 
132 
Figure taken from the US Department of State, 1971a: 5-6 6 and confirmed on British Admiralty 
Chart 3983, 1958 edition, at a scale of 1:500,000. 
US Department of State, 1987a: 17. 
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Table 4.13 Thailand's Straight Baselines Area 2: Segment Lengths 
Segment Length 
1-2 5.9nm 
2-3 1.2nm 
3-4 8.7nm 
4-5 8.35nm 
5-6 4.25nm 
6-7 33.75nm 
7-8 14nm 
8-9 11.95nm 
9-10 1.85nm 
10-11 8.25nm 
11-12 4.25nm 
12-13 4.2nm 
13-14 5.45nm 
14-15 6.5nm 
15-16 7.45nm 
Total 126.05nm 
Average 8.4nm 
Source: US Department of State ( 1971 a) and author's research. 
Furthermore, the average distance offshore of the fringing islands used to construct 
Thailand's Area 2 straight baseline claim, at 15.77nm (29.21km), falls within the 24nm 
limit which both the United Nations experts study and the US guidelines agreed was 
generally internationally accepted. However, four islands - Ko Tao, Hin Bai, Ko Kong 
Thansadet and Ko Phangan - are located further than 24nm from the nearest point on 
the Thai mainland coast. None are, however, located beyond 48nm from the mainland 
which the US guidelines presented as the maximum acceptable separation between 
mainland and island fringe. 133 
As mentioned, the areas of "additional" internal and territorial waters gained by 
the introduction of the straight baseline system can be used as an index of the system's 
overall 'reasonableness'. In the case of Area 2, of the total area of internal waters 
claimed, 3,079.45nm2 (10,562km2), 952.42nm2 (3,266.67km2) or 31% of the total lie 
beyond 12nm from the neatest coastal low-water line. The entirety of the area 
concerned does, however, fall within 48nm of the nearest coastal point. Further, of the 
1 ,693.11nm2 (5,807.13km2) of territorial sea claimed seawards from the straight 
baselines, 398.46nm2 (1,366.67km2) or 23.5%, located in the vicinity of the longest 
133 It is, however, understood that while the US State Department suggested 48nm as an upper limit 
for the separation between island fringe and mainland in its 1987 report, the US authorities have 
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baseline segment, lies beyond 12nm from the nearest coastal point and therefore 
represents a 'gain' for Thailand. It follows that 76.5% of the territorial sea claimed from 
Area 2's straight baselines would be territorial sea regardless of the existence of those 
baselines (Figure 4.9). 134 
The islands enclosed within Area 2 can also be considered as falling into two 
distinct categories. 135 The southern half (south of Point 9 of Area 2) of the straight 
baseline system encompasses large, closely grouped islands clearly masking the 
mainland coast. In contrast, in the northern half of Area 2, the islands are not only small 
but also distant from one another and do not appreciably mask the mainland coastline. 136 
Thus, although the southern group of islands enclosed by Area 2 "could be considered 
as fringing islands", according to the US State Department Office of the Geographer's 
analysis, in the northern section of Area 2, "the land/water ratio would be judged 
0 l h 0 h ,137 excesstve y tg . 
Despite the reservations of the Geographer, it should be noted that Thailand's 
straight baseline claims of 1970 have not elicited any known international protests, in 
particular from Bangkok's Gulf of Thailand neighbours or from the United States. The 
latter, as a consequence of its policy as a key maritime power to preserve freedom of 
navigation, is in the habit of making such challenges to what it views as excessive 
maritime claims, so that the absence of a protest from Washington could be interpreted 
as significant. 
134 
135 
136 
137 
subsequently tended towards the stricter 24nm rule (Dr Robert W. Smith, personal 
communication). 
Calculated using a planimetre and British Admiralty Chart 3983, 1958 edition, at a scale of 
1:500,000. 
United States, 197la: 8. 
Not that masking of the mainland coast is mentioned as a requirement in Article 7 of UNCLOS. 
However, the United States has promoted the idea that fringing islands "must mask and be 
sufficiently close to the mainland to justify being treated as a seaward extension of the coast" 
and has suggested that such islands should mask 50% of the mainland coast (US Department of 
State, 1987a: 25-30) (see Section 2.3.3). 
US Department of State, 1971 a: 5. Once again this statement is made despite the fact that Article 
7 makes no mention of a particular land: water ratio as being a condition for the establishment of 
straight baselines (see Section 2.3.3). Kittichaisaree ( 1987: 18) concurs with the US State 
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4.4.4 Thailand's 1992 Straight Baselines Claim: Area 4 
In a further Announcement of the Office of the Prime Minister concerning straight 
baselines and internal waters of Thailand, dated 17 August 1992, 138 Thailand 
proclaimed straight baselines in an additional sector in the Gulf of Thailand, Area 4. 
The new sector effectively extends the straight baseline system of Area 2 in the western 
Gulf southwards via the Thai insular features of Koh Kra and Koh Losin to the 
intersection of the Thai-Malaysia land boundary with the coast (see Figures 1.1 and 4.6 
and Table 4.14). Area 4 is fundamentally different in character from the straight 
baselines declared by Thailand in 1970. 
Table 4.14 Thailand's Straight Baselines Area 4: Locations of Turning Points 
Point Location Coordinates Distance of 
Island Offshore 
1 Ko KongOk 
2 Ko Kra 
3 Ko Losin 
4 Thai-Malaysian land 
boundary terminus 
Latitude 
9° 36' 06" N. 
8° 23' 49" N. 
7° 19' 54" 
06° 14' 30" N. 
Longitude 
100° 05' 48" E. 
100° 44' 1 3" E. 
101 o 59' 54" E. 
102° 05' 36" E. 
22.68nm (42km) 
27.5nm (51km) 
37.26nm (69km) 
Average 29.15nm (54km) 
Source: Thai announcement of the Prime Minister (17 /8/92) and author's research. 
The three baseline segments defined by Thailand's 1992 claim are approximately 79nm 
(146km), 95nm (176km) and 63nm (118km) long respectively139 giving an average 
segment length of 79.lnm (146.5km) (see Table 4.15). Thus, all three segments 
contravene the US guidelines for maximum segment length and distance between 
fringing islands of 48nm (88.9km) and 24nm (44.45km) respectively. 14° Furthermore, 
the two intermediary basepoints utilised in Area 4, Ko Kra and Ko Losin, are mere 
isolated rocks 141 (see Section 3.5), distant not only from one another but also from the 
Thai mainland coast, being 27.5nm (51km) and 38.6nm (71.5km) distant from the 
138 
139 
140 
141 
Department's view, noting the high water to land ratio and the "considerable divergence" from 
the general direction of the coast caused by the inclusion of Tao island in the system. 
UN Law of the Sea Bulletin, No.25: 82-84. 
The three segments being Ko Kong Ok - Ko Kra, Ko Kra - Ko Losin, and Ko Losin - Thai-
Malaysian land boundary terminus on the coast. The figures mentioned were calculated using 
British Admiralty Chart 2414, 1967 edition at a scale of 1:1 ,500,000. 
US Department of State, 1987 a: 14 and 17. 
Ko Kra is the more substantial of the two, being 161m (530ft) in elevation but both are small 
features with no human habitation and whose only man-made structures are light beacons. Ko 
Los in has been described as "1 'hm (5ft) high and steep-to all round" (Hydrographer of the 
Navy, 1982: 85-87). 
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nearest coastal point respectively. 142 As such, these insular features offer minimal 
masking to the mainland coast which itself is difficult to characterise as being deeply 
indented. By virtue of their significant distance offshore, it also seems unreasonable to 
argue that the sea area enclosed by Area 4's straight baseline system is sufficiently 
closely linked to the land to be considered subject to the regime of internal waters. 
Table 4.15 Thailand's Straight Baselines Area 4: Segment Lengths 
Segment 
1-2 
2-3 
3-4 
Total 
Average 
Length 
78.97nm (146.25km) 
94.89nm (175.75km) 
63.45nm (117.5km) 
237.31nm (439.5km) 
79.1nm (146.5km) 
Source: Author's research. 
This is illustrated by turning to the test of assessing the proportion of "additional" 
waters claimed by Thailand as a consequence of this straight baseline claim. Of the 
7,824.48nm2 (26,836.9km2) area of waters enclosed within Area 4, 4,336.4nm2 
(14,873.27km2) or 55% of the total is located beyond 12nm from the nearest coastal 
point. 143 Furthermore, significant maritime areas, amounting to I ,549.41 nm2 
(5,314.27km2) or 19.8% of the total, claimed as internal waters within Area 4lie beyond 
24nm from Thailand's mainland or island coasts. 144 Concerning the 2,794.91nm2 
(9 ,586.15km2) area of "additional" territorial sea claimed seaward from Area 4' s straight 
baselines, fully 2,086.4nm2 (7,156.06km2) or 75% lies beyond Thailand's territorial sea 
claim in the absence of the straight baselines claim (Figure 4.6). 145 These figures hardly 
indicate the existence of a fringe of islands in close proximity to the mainland coast or 
that the area enclosed by Area 4' s straight baselines is sufficiently closely linked to the 
land to be converted to internal waters status. This claim contrasts sharply, and 
unfavourably, with other straight baseline claims within the Gulf of Thailand. 
On the face of it, it is something of a mystery why Thailand chose to adopt such 
a seemingly excessive additional claim to straight baselines which are seemingly so 
142 
143 
144 
Measured on British Admiralty Charts 3542, 1960 edition at a scale of 1 :500,000 and 3961, 1987 
edition at a scale of 1:240,000, respectively. 
Calculated using a planimetre and British Admiralty Chart 3983, 1963 edition at a scale of 
I :500,000 and Chart 3542, 1960 edition at a scale of 1 :500,000. 
Calculated using a planimetre and British Admiralty Chart 3983, 1963 edition at a scale of 
I :500,000 and Chart 3542, 1960 edition at a scale of 1 :500,000. 
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difficult to sustain under the provisions of Article 7. Clearly, the declaration of Area 4 
has had no apparent effect on the extent of Thailand's claims to continental shelf or EEZ 
jurisdiction in the Gulf of Thailand. 
It may well be that the claim was made in order to counter Cambodia's (and 
Vietnam's) similarly 'maximalist' straight baseline systems and in order to provide a 
strong bargaining position in anticipation of maritime boundary negotiations with 
countries situated on the opposite side of the Gulf of Thailand. Indeed, their existence 
may well have proved a factor in Thailand's remarkably successful negotiation of its 
continental shelf boundary with Vietnam in 1997 (see Section 7.4). This tendency 
towards extreme claims, designed to protect the claimant state's position prior to 
delimitation, was also abundantly evident in relation to the Gulf of Thailand states' 
other straight baseline claims and, indeed, their continental shelf claims (see Section 
5.3). 
Thailand's 1992 declaration of additional straight baselines is, however, 
analogous to Cambodia and Vietnam's 1982 baseline claim. Despite the fact that all 
three countries made significant amendments to their straight baseline claims, they have 
in fact based their continental shelf claims of the early 1970s on their straight baselines 
at that time and have not sought to advance them since that time. As with the case of 
Cambodia, even though Thailand's straight baseline claims have been amended, there 
has been no alteration to its continental shelf claim dating from 1973. The status of Ko 
Kra and Ko Losin and their capacity to generate maritime jurisdictional claims in their 
own right will be considered in Section 8. 
As yet, Thailand's claimed straight baselines enclosing Area 4 have not 
prompted a protest from the United States. 146 However, Germany, acting on behalf of 
the European Union did protest against them on 23 December 1994, pointing out that 
the 'normal' baseline was the low-water line but that Thailand "has used straight 
145 
146 
Calculated using a planimetre and British Admiralty Chart 3983, 1963 edition at a scale of 
I :500,000 and Chart 3542, 1960 edition at a scale of I :500,000. 
According to the Office of Ocean Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and 
Scientific Affairs at the US Department of State, no protest had been made at the time of the 
author's enquiry but Thailand's claim had been noted and would be the subject of a protest in 
due course (personal communication with Dr Robert W. Smith, 14/1/99). Nevertheless, it may 
be observed that the seven years which have passed without a protest over Thailand's Area 4 
claim is in sharp contrast to the alacrity with which the United States issued protests over the 
baseline claims of the other Gulf of Thailand states- Cambodia (four years) and Vietnam (less 
than one month) - which at that time may be viewed as having been ideologically opposed to the 
United States (unlike Thailand). The apparent reluctance of the US authorities to issue a protest 
over the maritime claims of an important ally, promotes the impression of selectivity in the 
application of protests and, if true, serves to undermines their value. 
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baselines along its entire coastline in area 4, even where the coastline is not deeply 
indented and cut into or if there is not a fringe of islands along the coast in its 
immediate vicinity. " The German note verbale went on to state that even though the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea does not set a maximum length for straight 
baseline segments "the segments determined by Thailand are excessively long. " 147 
4.5 Vietnam's Straight Baseline Claims in the Gulf of Thailand 
Vietnam issued a Statement on the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Exclusive 
Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf on 12 May 1977 in which straight baselines 
were claimed from which the limits of all these maritime zones would be measured (see 
Appendix 5). It was not until over five years later, however, on 12 November 1982, that 
the 1977 legislation on baselines was implemented. 
The Declaration on Baseline of Territorial Waters of November 1982 provided 
details of the Vietnamese claimed straight baseline system together with an annex of 
geographic coordinates of the straight baseline turning points. 148 The western end of the 
straight baseline system in the Gulf of Thailand , Point "0", is defined as being: 
On the southwestern demarcation line of historic waters of the S.R. V. [Vietnam] 
and the P.R. of Kampuchea [Cambodia]. 
No coordinates were specified for Point "0". 
The Vietnamese claim therefore conforms with the 7 July 1982 Agreement on 
Historic Waters of Vietnam and Kampuchea [Cambodia} and with Cambodia's 1982 
straight baseline system, the eastern end of which is also defined as: "Point "0" out at 
sea on the southwest limit of the historic waters of the PRK." As detailed in Section 
4.2.4, the straight baseline systems of Cambodia and Vietnam meet at an as yet 
undefined point out to sea on a straight line joining the Cambodian islands of the Poulo 
Wei group and the Vietnamese Poulo Panjang group of islands which also forms the 
seaward limit of the two countries joint Historic Waters area (however, see Section 7.4). 
The system of straight baselines articulated in 1982 connects a series of isolated 
islands, considerably offshore and in so doing, encloses the entire Vietnamese coast 
147 
148 
United Nations Law ofthe Sea Bulletin, No.28 (1995): 31. 
Copy on file with the author. 
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relevant to the Gulf of Thailand (see Figure 4.1 and Table 4.16). If accepted by the 
international community, this Vietnamese claim would represent a significant 
enhancement of Vietnam's maritime claims in terms of area. 
Table 4.16 Vietnam's Straight Baselines: Locations of Turning Points 
Point Location Coordinates Distance of 
Point Offshore 
Latitude Longitude 
0 Floating point Undetermined 
AI Hon Nhan island, Tho Chu 9° 15.0' N. 103° 27.0' E. 80.7nm 
(Panjang) archipelago 
A2 Hon Da island, southeast of 8° 22.8' N. 104° 52.4' E. llnm 
Hon Khoai island 
A3 Tai Lon islet, Con Dao islet 8° 37.8' N. 106°37.5' E. 50.5nm 
A4 Bong Lai islet, Con Dao 8° 38.9' N. 106° 40.3' E. 51.1nm 
islet 
A5 Bay Canh islet, Con Dao 8° 39.7' N. 106° 42.1' E. 51.5nm 
islet 
A6 Hon Hai islet, Phu Qui 9o 58.0' N. 109° 5.0' E. 74.2nm 
island group 
A7 Hon Doi islet 12° 39.0' N. 109° 28.0' E. 
AS Dai Lanh Point 12° 53.8' N. 109° 27.2' E. 
A9 Ong Can islet 13° 54.0' N. 109° 21.0' E. 7.6nm 
AlO Ly Son islet 15° 23.1' N. 109° 09.0' E. 14.lnm 
All Con Co island 17o 10.0' N. 107° 20.6' E. 13.9nm 
Average 39.4nm 
Source: US Department of State (1983). 
Overall, the Vietnamese claim consists of 10 segments and 11 basepoints with a 
combined length of 846nm. 149 The longest distance between basepoints is 16 I .8nm and 
the shortest 2nm, with an average of 84.6nm. The island basepoints (9 of the 1 I 
defined) average 39.4nm from the nearest points on the mainland coastline with a 
maximum of 80.7nm offshore. The internal waters claimed amount to approximately 
27,000nm2 (93,000km2) (see Table 4.1). 150 
149 
150 
US Department of State, 1983: 5. 
US Department of State, 1983: 5. 
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Table 4.17 Vietnam's Straight Baselines: Segment Lengths 
Segment 
1-2 
2-3 
3-4 
4-5 
5-6 
6-7 
7-8 
8-9 
9-10 
10-11 
Total 
Average 
Source: US Department of State (1983). 
Length 
99.2nm 
105.2nm 
3nm 
2nm 
161.3nm 
161.8nm 
14.8nm 
60.2nm 
89.5nm 
149nm 
846nm 
84.6nm 
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In fact, apart from sections of its northeastern coast, Vietnam's coastline, excluding the 
Mekong River delta, describes a relatively smooth 'S' shape devoid of major 
indentations. Furthermore, even if the Mekong River delta qualifies as a deeply 
indented coastline, the selection of islands scores of nautical miles seaward of the delta 
as basepoints, clearly means that the baselines claimed have not been claimed on that 
basis - a situation analogous to that discussed in reference to Malaysia's claim to 
straight baselines (see Section 4.3). The islands selected as basepoints for Vietnam's 
straight baseline claim are predominantly small and scattered resulting in what might be 
termed excessively long straight baselines segments. Indeed, no less than seven of the 
baseline segments defined exceed the US State Department's recommendation of an 
upper limit for individual baseline segment length of 48nm. Additionally, it can be 
argued that the islands used as basepoints are too far seaward to be realistically termed 
in the "immediate vicinity" of the coast, and the sea area enclosed is too far offshore 
and too expansive to be genuinely considered as capable of qualifying as internal waters. 
Furthermore, while, in general, the Vietnamese straight baseline system seems to reflect 
the general direction of the mainland coast, certain segments, for example A9-AIO, 
appreciably do not. 151 
It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that the US government protested against 
Vietnam's straight baseline claims in an aide-memoire of 6 December 1982 delivered by 
the US Mission to the United Nations at New York: 
151 US Department of State, 1983: 11. 
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As to the claimed system of straight baselines, the Government of the United 
States of America wishes to remind the government of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam that, under customary and conventional international law, a coastal 
state may employ the method of straight baselines only in localities where the 
coast line is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along 
the coast in its immediate vicinity. In so doing the baselines established by the 
coastal state must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general 
direction of the coast. It is the view of the Government of the United States of 
America that the baselines claimed by the Government of the Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam do not meet these criteria and that there is no basis in international 
law for the system of straight baselines provided in the declaration of November 
12, 1982. 152 
Thailand similarly issued a protest note, addressed to the United Nations Secretary 
General, in relation to Vietnam's straight baseline system (and by implication 
Cambodia's, as the two countries' straight baselines link up on the limits of the joint 
Historic Waters area). The Thai note, dated 9 December 1985, stated that between 
points 0 and A7, Vietnam's claimed straight baselines were "at variance with the well-
established rules of international law", referring to both the 1958 and 1982 
Conventions, and concluded that: "the Government of Thailand reserves all its rights 
under international law in relation to the sea areas in question and the airspace above 
them. " 153 The French government similarly protested over some sectors of Vietnam's 
straight baselines claim stating that they were "at variance with well-established rules 
,-r· . ll ,]54 OJ mternatwna aw. 
Furthermore, in its analysis of Vietnam's straight baseline claims in its Limits in 
the Seas series, the US Department of State's Office of the Geographer concluded that: 
Several of the island base points used by Vietnam are at a considerable distance 
from the mainland. This is particularly true of the Tho Chu Archipelago, the 
Con Dao group and the Phu Quy group (Catwick Islands), all of which are at 
least 50nm from the mainland and neighbouring island groups [, and the main 
segments of which are 99-160nm long]. 155 
Despite this, on 15 November 1982, an article entitled The Base Line of Vietnam's 
Territorial Waters was published in Nhan Dan, the official daily publication of the 
Vietnamese Communist Party, which is therefore viewed as being authoritative. The 
Nhan Dan article stated that: 
152 
153 
154 
155 
Roach and Smith, 1996: 102. 
Law of the Sea Bulletin, No.7, April 1986: 111. 
Quoted in Park, 1987: 445. 
Roach and Smith, 1996: 102. 
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[a]lthough some base points are about 50-70 nautical miles from shore and 
more than 100 nautical miles from each other, our stipulations on the baseline 
of [the] territorial waters do not conflict with the stipulations of international 
law and customs thus far. 156 
In support of the Vietnamese position, the article went on to refer to three other 
examples of state practice relating to particularly long straight baseline claims 
significantly far offshore- Burma, Malaysia and Thailand (see Appendix 4). 
With specific reference to the Gulf of Thailand, only two of the straight baseline 
segments defined in 1982 are relevant. These link Point "0" on the limit of the Historic 
Waters area claimed jointly with Cambodia to Point AI located on Hon Nhan island of 
the Tho Chu (Poulo Panjang) island group and from Point AI to A2, the latter being 
defined as Hon Da island southeast of Hon Khoai island. As the latter point lies south 
and east of Point Ca Mau, the baseline segment A1-A2 extends beyond the strict 
definition of the Gulf of Thailand (see Figure 4.1). 157 
As noted in Section 4.2.4, the precise location of Point "0" has yet to be 
determined. However, were this point to be determined on the basis of equidistance, 
each state's baseline segment leading up to Point "0" would be approximately 25nm 
(46km) long. Vietnam's baseline segment A1-A2 is, however, considerably longer at 
99.2nm (167km), 158 and therefore exceeds the US guideline for maximum segment 
length of 48nm (88.9km). 159 Furthermore, several of the turning points designated by 
Vietnam for its straight baseline system are at a considerable distance from the mainland 
coast. Within the Gulf of Thailand, Point A1 is 80.7nm offshore and Point 0, if 
determined on the basis of equidistance, would be approximately 90nm (166.5km) 
offshore. Overall, the turning points which make up the Vietnamese straight baseline 
156 
157 
158 
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Quoted in US Department of State, 1983: 11 
Segment A2-A3 is potentially relevant to Vietnam's delimitation with Malaysia. However, 
Vietnam's claim vis-a-vis Malaysia is based on the Saigon government's 1971 continental shelf 
claim (see Section 5.3.4)- promulgated long before (reunified) Vietnam's straight baseline claim. 
As a result, the southern limit of the Malay-Vietnamese Defined Area is defined by two points 
equidistant between the Vietnamese and Malaysian mainlands (Points C and D of the Defined 
Area) and a point equidistant between Indonesian, Malaysian and Vietnamese islands (Point E) 
(Charney and Alexander, 1998: 2,337). Vietnam's straight baselines (including segment A2-A3) 
may, of course, eventually come into play when the issue of dividing the Defined Area 
resurfaces, the joint development agreement ultimately only delaying the question of eventual 
delimitation. 
Measured on British Admiralty Chart 3985, 1987 edition, at a scale of 1:500,000; US 
Department of State, 1983: 6. 
US Department of State, 1987: 14. 
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system are, on average, 39.4nm (73km) offshore (see Table 4.16). 160 It may be recalled 
that the US Department of State guidelines recommended that at a maximum fringing 
islands be no more than 48nm offshore while the UN study on baselines points the 
reader towards a limit of 24nm as being that which has gained wide international 
acceptance. Clearly, certain sections of the Vietnamese claim are in breach of these 
suggested limits, including within the Gulf of Thailand. 
Concerning the proximity to the coast of the waters of the Gulf of Thailand 
enclosed by Vietnam's straight baseline claim to the coast and their suitability for the 
application of internal waters, an examination of the "additional waters" claimed as a 
result of the baselines is revealing. The area landward of Al-A2 limited by the mouth 
of the Gulf of Thailand and the eastern border of Historic Waters area amounts to 
5,805nm2 (19,910km2) of which 1,843nm2 (6,320km2) or 31.7% of the total lies beyond 
12nm from the nearest coastal point. However, only 4.75% (276nm2/947km2) lies 
beyond 24nm from the coast. 161 Additionally, it is worth noting that there is a relatively 
small, 5.1nm2 (17.5km2), 162 pocket of maritime space to the east of Phu Quoc which is 
beyond 12nm from the coast but is otherwise wholly surrounded by Vietnamese 
territorial seas (see Figure 4.2). This is perhaps analogous to the theoretical situation 
described in the United Nations report on straight baselines of a coastline suitable for 
the application of straight baselines (see Figure 3.1). 163 This could be used as at least 
partial justification for Vietnam's straight baselines claim. 
Of the 948nm2 (3,251km2) of territorial sea claimed from Vietnam's straight 
baselines within the Gulf of Thailand (including off the Historic Waters area assuming 
Point "0" equidistant between Poulo Wei and Panjang island groups), fully 830nm2 
(2,846km2) - 87.6% - lies beyond 12nm from the nearest normal baseline (Figure 
4.1 ). 164 It is therefore fair to conclude that Vietnam's straight baselines within the 
160 
161 
162 
163 
164 
The figures included in Table 4.16 are taken from the US Department of State's 1983 study of 
Vietnam's straight baseline system. This paper provides the distance of each point offshore, 
rather than that of each fringing island. However, as the islands concerned are predominantly 
small in size, the distances listed in the table closely approximate the distances the islands 
themselves are offshore. 
Calculated using a planimetre and British Admiralty Chart 3985, 1987 edition, at a scale of 
1:500,000. 
Measured with a planimetre on British Admiralty Chart 3879, 1957 edition at a scale of 
1:240,000. 
United Nations, 1989: 18-19. 
Calculated using a planimetre and British Admiralty Chart 3985, 1987 edition, at a scale of 
1:500,000. 
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confines of the Gulf of Thailand were in The Geographer's mind when the concluding 
statement of his analysis of Vietnam's straight baselines claim as a whole: 
In several significant respects, geographic components of the straight baselines 
claimed by Vietnam do not appear to follow the convention signed by Vietnam 
or those conventions referenced in the article published in the official daily of 
the Communist Party of Vietnam. 165 
4.6 Conclusions 
It therefore seems quite clear that if a strict interpretation of Article 7 of UNCLOS, 
analogous to that embodied in the US Department of State's guidelines, were to be 
brought to bear on the straight baseline claims of the Gulf of Thailand states, with the 
exception of Thailand's Area 1 claim, all the current straight baseline claims within the 
Gulf would be found wanting in one way or another:·· 
For Cambodia, the 1982 straight baseline claim has question marks hanging over 
it because, when the US rules are applied, certain segments (specifically that between 
Koh Kusrovie and llot Veer) are over-long. Moreover, the 'fringing' islands linked by 
the straight baselines are too far apart from one another and located too far offshore to 
be considered in the "immediate vicinity" of the mainland coast and for the waters 
enclosed within them to be viewed as being suitable for internal waters status. In 
addition, there are queries over the 1982 baseline system's alignment according with the 
general direction of the coast and the issue of the unorthodox termination of the straight 
baselines system at an as yet unspecified 166 'floating' basepoint significantly far offshore 
which serves to link the Cambodian straight baselines system to that of Vietnam. 
Nevertheless, only one segment of Cambodia's baseline claim exceeds the US-
suggested limit on individual segment length of 48nm, 167 and then by only just under 
4nm (see Table 4.7). Furthermore, while the Cambodian islands linked by straight 
baselines are relatively distant from one another, the existence of a fringe of islands off 
the Cambodian mainland coast is difficult to contest. A strong argument can therefore 
be marshalled to support the construction of straight baselines along this coast and in 
165 
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US Department of State, 1983: 11. 
However, see Section 7.2. 
US Department of State, 1987a: 17. 
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favour of the suitability of the waters enclosed by the baselines for internal waters 
status. The latter point is bolstered by the fact that of the area enclosed within 
Cambodia's straight baselines only 6. 7% lies beyond 12nm from the nearest coastal 
point and therefore constitutes waters Cambodia would not otherwise have claimed as 
territorial waters in the absence of straight baselines (see Table 4.20). Moreover, none 
of the area claimed by Cambodia as internal waters in 1982 lies beyond 24nm from the 
nearest island or mainland coastal point. This is perhaps significant in light of the US 
Department of State's recommendation that the maximum separation between fringing 
islands and the mainland coast be set at 48nm (that is, two territorial sea breadths from 
each side). 168 Although one of Cambodia's fringing islands, Poulo Wei does exceed 
this limit, lying just over 53nm offshore, none of the waters landward of that island 
group are actually beyond two territorial sea breadths from the nearest coast by virtue of 
the number and scattered configuration of the islands and islets lying off the Cambodian 
mainland coast (see Table 4.6). 
As far as the floating Point "0" is concerned, although unorthodox, as noted, it 
is not unique. While rare, analogous arrangements do exist around the world and have 
met with the approval of the international community. 
With regard to Malaysia's claims, there are clearly concerns on a number of 
Issues both within the Gulf of Thailand proper and along the eastern seaboard of 
peninsula Malaysia as a whole. Nevertheless, it should be recalled that the locations of 
Malaysia's straight baselines have been extrapolated from the territorial sea limits 
illustrated on the Peta Baru. There is therefore some additional scope for error in the 
calculations made. Within the strict definition of the Gulf of Thailand, the Malaysian 
straight baselines joint points on the mainland coast rather than fringing islands. 
Although these straight baselines could be construed as being conservative in nature in 
that they conform closely to the alignment of that coastline such that minimal 
"additional" waters are accorded to Malaysia as a result of the baselines claim, such 
baselines can only be justified on the basis of the deeply indented nature of the coastline 
in question and this is manifestly not the case. It can therefore be concluded that it is 
inappropriate for Malaysia to construct straight baselines along this portion of its 
coastline. 
!68 US Department of State, 1987a: 22. 
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Along the eastern coast of peninsula Malaysia south of the formal limits of the 
Gulf of Thailand, there are also problems associated with Malaysia's claimed straight 
baselines. In terms of segment length, three of the nine segments concerned exceed the 
United States guideline that no individual segment should be longer than 48nm (see 
Table 4.9). 169 Indeed, the longest segment claimed by Malaysia along this coastline 
comprehensively breaches the United States suggested limit, being approximately 90nm 
in length. It can therefore be argued that several of the Malaysian-claimed straight 
baseline segments are excessively long. 
Similar criticisms can be raised concerning the distance between fringing islands 
linked by Malaysia's straight baselines. The United States guidelines suggest that these 
be no more than 24nm apart. 170 The five Malaysian baseline segments along the 
southern portion of peninsula Malaysia which link fringing islands exceed this proposed 
limit (see Table 4.9). 
In terms of the proximity of Malaysia's claimed fringing islands to the mainland 
coast such that they fall within its "immediate vicinity" and such that the waters 
enclosed are intimately enough associated with the land to be considered to be suitable 
for an internal waters claim, in fact, ali the islands fall within 48nm of the mainland 
coast (see Table 4.8). This is consistent with the United States suggested maximum 
separation between fringing islands and mainland coast. 171 Additionally, the entirety of 
the internal waters claimed by Malaysia falls within 24nm of the nearest coastline. 
Moreover, only approximately 6% of the maritime area within Malaysia's straight 
baselines along this part of its coast lie beyond 12nm from the nearest 'normal' baseline 
and therefore represent areas which would not otherwise constitute Malaysian territorial 
waters in the absence of the straight baseline claim. This figure is comparable to that 
for Cambodia's 1982 straight baseline claim (see Table 4.20). 
A further uncertainty concerning the Malaysian straight baseline system relates 
to two apparently 'floating' points. As already outlined, one lies to the north of Pulau 
Tioman and the other at the terminus of this part of Malaysia's straight baseline system 
at the southern tip of peninsula Malaysia. These points do not link into neighbouring 
169 
170 
171 
US Department of State, 1987 a: 17. 
US Department of State, 1987a: 17. 
US Department of State, 1987a: 22. 
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straight baseline systems and must be considered inconsistent with Article 7 of 
UNCLOS. 172 
Mixed conclusions may be drawn about Thailand's claims to straight baselines 
in the Gulf of Thailand. As already mentioned, Thailand's Area 1 straight baselines are 
above reproach - the longest segment in the group is under 20nm in length, while the 
average baseline segment length is under 1 Onm (see Table 4.11 ), as compared with the 
US suggestion that no individual segment exceed 48nm in length. 173 It follows that 
none of the fringing islands linked by Area 1 's straight baselines are further than 24nm 
from one another as urged by the US proposed rules. 174 Further, the maximum distance 
of one of the fringing islands included in the system offshore is just under 22nm (see 
Table 4.1 0), let alone the 48nm maximum separation between fringing islands and 
mainland laid down in the US guidelines. 175 This puts Area 1 well within the confines 
of the relatively strict interpretation of Article 7 laid down by the US Department of 
State's guidelines. 
Thailand's Area 2 straight baselines claim pose more of a problem. Although 
the average segment length is low, at 8.4nm, the maximum is rather longer at 33.75nm 
(see Table 4.13). While this falls within the US guidelines 48nm individual segment 
length limit, 176 it does mean that the fringing islands concerned are more than the 
recommended 24nm from one another. 177 All the islands linked by Area 2' s straight 
baselines are, however, within 48nm of the mainland coast. 
A further point of concern relates to the appropriateness of the waters enclosed 
by Area 2 for internal waters status. The entirety of the area so enclosed lies within 
24nm of the nearest coastal point. Similarly, none of the fringing islands linked by 
straight baselines are more than 48nm offshore. This is consistent with interlocking 
double territorial sea breadths, suggested by the US guidelines as the maximum 
acceptable distance between fringing islands and the mainland coast. 178 However, 31% 
of the internal waters claimed by Thailand within Area 2 lie beyond 12nm from the 
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It should be stressed, however, that there is some potential inaccuracy inherent in inferring the 
positions of Malaysia's straight baseline system from the Peta Bant.. Even if these points do 
prove to be erroneously positioned offshore, this could be easily corrected and the Malaysian 
territorial waters limit adjusted accordingly. 
US Department of State, 1987a: 17. 
US Department of State, 1987a: 17. 
US Department of State, 1987a: 22. 
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coast and therefore constitute "additionai" waters gained by Thailand which would not 
otherwise form part of the Thai territorial sea in the absence of the straight baseline 
claim. This compares unfavourably with both the Cambodian straight baselines claim 
of 1982 and the Malaysian straight baselines along the eastern coast of peninsula 
Malaysia where only of the order of 6-7% of the claimed internal waters constitute 
additionally claimed waters. Nevertheless, Thailand can certainly credibly claim that a 
fringe of islands exists along the portion of coastline covered by Area 2 and that the area 
of "additional" waters is tucked in to the landward or behind the front of the group of 
fringing islands - arguably precisely the kind of complex geographical configuration of 
maritime space which the United Nation's report on baselines indicates as being suitable 
for the application of straight baselines. 179 Furthermore, Bangkok can point to the fact 
that Thailand's establishment of the Area 1 and 2 groups of straight baselines has 
elicited no known international protests. 
Thailand's 1992 straight baselines extension within the Gulf of Thailand, termed 
Area 4, is still more problematic. All three of the baseline segments designated exceed 
the US-suggested limit of 48nm, 180 the average being over 79nm and the longest 
segment just under 95nm (see Table 4.15). This can certainly be viewed as being 
excessive, particularly when the recommended separation between fringing islands is no 
more than 24nm is borne in mind. 181 The actual distance between Ko Kra and Ko Losin 
coincides with the longest baseline segment in the Area 4 claim- 94.89nm. 
While the fringing islands used to construct the Area 4 straight baselines claim 
fall within 48nm of the coast (see Table 4.14), the percentage of "additional" waters 
claimed as a result is telling. Fully 55% of the waters claimed as internal waters by 
Thailand as a result of the Area 4 claim, lie beyond 12nm from the coast and therefore 
represent a gain to Thailand in that they would not form part of the Thai territorial sea in 
the absence of the straight baseline claim (see Table 4.20). Furthermore, just under 20% "'" 
of the claimed internal waters within the confines of Area 4 lie beyond 24nm from the 
nearest island or mainland coastal point. It is therefore difficult to argue that the waters 
within Area 4's straight baselines are sufficiently closely linked to the land to be 
considered suitable of internal waters status. 
179 
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Vietnam's straight baselines claim within the Gulf of Thailand really consists of 
one segment of indeterminate length from the yet to be defined Point "0" to a point in 
the Tho Chu (Poulo Panjang) group and a segment just under IOOnm in length which 
extends from there to Hon Da island in the vicinity of Cap Cau Mau at the entrance to 
the Gulf of Thailand proper (see Table 4.17). There are therefore good grounds to 
criticise Vietnam's straight baselines claim within the Gulf for the excessively long 
nature of the latter baseline segment and the overly wide separation between the fringing 
islands of the Tho Chu group and Hon Da. The US-recommended maximum distances 
for these two factors being 48nm and 24nm respectively. 182 
In addition, the Tho Chu island group lies approximately 80.7nm offshore at 
their closest point to the coast (see Table 4.16). This is clearly significantly beyond the 
48nm separation between fringing islands and the mainland coast suggested by the US 
Department of State's guidelines. 183 The flaws in Vietnam's claims to straight baselines 
within the Gulf of Thailand are reinforced when the "additional" waters claimed as a 
consequence are taken into account. 
Of the area within the Vietnamese claimed straight baselines within the Gulf, 
almost one third (31. 7%) lies beyond 12nm from the nearest coastal point and therefore 
amount to "additional" waters not forming part of the Vietnamese territorial sea in the 
absence of a straight baseline claim (see Table 4.20). Furthermore, just under 5% of the 
claimed internal waters lie beyond 24nm from the nearest 'normal' baseline point. The 
proportions of claimed internal waters beyond 12nm and 24nm from the coast 
respectively for Vietnam's straight baselines in the Gulf are, in fact, less extravagant 
than for Thailand's Area 4 claim by virtue of the number and positioning of Vietnamese 
islands inshore of the straight baselines. Nevertheless, it suggests that the waters 
claimed by Vietnam within the Gulf of Thailand are not suitable for internal waters 
status. Even so, Vietnam could be expected to argue that the waters between the 
historic waters area and Cap Cau Mau represent something of a 'maritime cul-de-sac', 
vital to Vietnam and therefore appropriate for enclosure with straight baselines by the 
coastal state. However, such an argument is highly unlikely to gain much favour with 
the international community. Regardless, it is difficult to envisage Vietnam, or for that 
matter Cambodia, rolling back their straight baselines systems while their joint Historic 
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Waters Agreement remains in force and the parties remain politically committed to it 
(see Section 7.2). 184 
As previously noted, the straight baseline claims of the Gulf of Thailand littoral 
states mean that approximately 26,066nm2 of the Gulf is claimed as internal waters. 
Coupled with Thailand's claim to the Bight of Thailand as a historic bay (2,834nm2) and 
Cambodia and Vietnam's joint Historic Waters Area (2,711nm\ the total area of the 
Gulf claimed landward of straight baselines or closing lines amounts to 31 ,611 nm2 or 
just over 11% of its total area. 185 This figure in itself seems excessive. It is difficult to 
credit that over one tenth of the Gulf of Thailand is suitable for the regime of internal 
waters. The littoral states claims are, however, dissimilar to one another. A comparison 
between the claims in terms of segment length, the distance offshore of fringing islands 
and the areas and proportions of "additional" waters bears this out. 
As far as straight baseline segment lengths are concerned, as Table 4.18 
demonstrates, Malaysia's claim along eastern peninsula Malaysia, Thailand's Area 4 
and Vietnam's claim within the Gulf, all include segments over 90nm in length. These 
claims can therefore be viewed as being similarly excessive when set against a strict 
interpretation of Article 7 of UNCLOS's provisions such as the US State Department's 
guidelines. Of other current claims, Cambodia's 1982 straight baseline claim and 
Thailand's Area 2 and Area 1 claims include segments of approximately 52nm, 34nm 
and 20nm respectively. Only the latter two claims, Thai Areas 1 and 2 therefore 
conform to the US guidelines proposed maximum straight baseline segment length of 
48nm. 186 Furthermore, only Thai Area 1 accords with the stricture from the same 
guidelines that fringing islands be no more than 24nm distant from one another. 187 
184 
185 
186 
187 
It is worth noting that the Cambodian Premier at the time of writing (mid-1999), Hun Sen, was 
signatory to the Historic Waters Agreement. 
Prescott gives the total area of the Gulf of Thailand as 283,700km2 which is equivalent to 
82,715nm2 (Prescott, 1998: 11). 
US Department of State, 1987a: 17. 
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Table 4.18 Straight Baseline Segment Lengths in the Gulf of Thailand 
State Claim Longest Segment Average 
Cambodia 1957 22.68nm 11.95nm 
1972 33.2nm 10.44nm 
1982 51.84nm 34.06nm 
Malaysia within Gulf 8.2nm 
east coast 90.17nm 32.lnm 
Thailand Area I 19.65nm 9.43nm 
Area2 33.75nm 8.4nm 
Area4 94.89nm 79.lnm 
Vietnam within Gulf 99.2nm 
overall 161.8nm 84.6nm 
Source: Author's research. 
With regard to the distances of so-called fringing islands from the mainland coast, Table 
4.19 illustrates the position in the Gulf of Thailand. Bearing in mind the US 
Department of State guideline that such islands be not more than 48nm offshore, 188 it is 
clear that while on average this is the case for all the straight baseline claims in the Gulf 
of Thailand, both the Cambodian and Vietnamese claims fail this test, including islands 
over 53nm and 80nm offshore respectively. 
However, it is worth recalling that the United Nations study on straight baselines 
noted that while it was "generally agreed" that a 24nm distance between fringing 
islands and the mainland coast was acceptable, the proposed general rule of 48nm was 
"not necessarily widely agreed upon. "189 Were the stricter, 24nm rule to be applied, it 
is clear from Table 4.19 that of current claims in the Gulf only Thailand's Area 1 claim 
would still prove faultless. Cambodia's 1957 claim would also have qualified under this 
test but has, of course, been superseded not once, but twice by later claims. 
Interestingly, when the average distance of fringing islands from the mainland 
coast is examined with the 24nm rule in mind, Cambodia's 1982 claim, Thailand's Area 
4 claim and Vietnam's claims, whether within the Gulf of Thailand or as a whole, are all 
found wanting. The failure of these claims to fulfil the conditions of this stricter test on 
average, let alone with regard to individual fringing islands is significant. 
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Table 4.19 Distances Offshore of Fringing Islands in the Gulf of Thailand 
State 
Cambodia 
Malaysia 
Thailand 
Vietnam 
Claim 
1957 
1972 
1982 
within Gulf 
east coast 
Area I 
Area 2 
Area4 
within Gulf 
overall 
Distance of Island 
Furthest Offshore 
9.18nm 
37.8nm 
53.05nm 
32.4nm 
21.87nm 
38.2nm 
37.26nm 
80.7nm 
80.7nm 
Source: Author's research. 
Average Distance of 
Fringing Islands 
Offshore 
3.74nm 
17.94nm 
36.35nm 
16.21nm 
13.34nm 
15.77nm 
29.15nm 
80.7 
39.4nm 
When "additional" waters claimed as a consequence of the straight baseline claims are 
examined, that is, waters which in the absence of the straight baseline claims would not 
in any case form part of the claimant state's territorial waters, a distinction can be drawn 
between additional internal waters and additional territorial waters. Article 7(3) of 
UNCLOS states that "the sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently closely 
linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters. " Furthermore, 
where fringing islands are being used to justify the adoption of straight baselines it is 
stated, in Article 7(2), that such islands must be in the "immediate vicinity" of the 
coast. These two provisions can be viewed as being interrelated. 
As already mentioned, the upper limit proposed for "immediate vicinity" 
between a fringe of islands and the mainland coast is 48nm - double the breadth of the 
territorial sea- 24nm from both the fringe and the mainland. 190 The more conservative 
interpretation of immediate vicinity is based on interlocking territorial seas, 12nm from 
each coastline and thus a 24nm separation between fringing islands and the mainland. 
Although it has proved impossible to develop a mathematical formula to test the phrase 
"sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal 
waters "191 , it follows from the proposed rules concerning the necessary proximity 
between fringing islands and the mainland coast that claimed internal waters landward 
to fringing islands but beyond 24nm from the nearest coastal point should be considered 
inappropriate for internal waters status. Furthermore, if the more restrictive rule based 
on coalescing territorial seas is taken as a benchmark, it could be argued that claimed 
190 
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internal waters within a straight baseline system constructed on the basis of fringing 
islands yet beyond 12nm from the nearest 'normal' baseline are also not sufficiently 
closely linked to the land domain to be considered as internal waters. Certainly, the area 
and proportion of claimed internal waters beyond 12nm and 24nm from the coast gives 
an excellent indication of the overall reasonableness of the claim in question. 
Within the Gulf of Thailand, two straight baseline claims include claimed 
internal waters beyond 24nm from the nearest coast. The first of these is Thailand's 
Area 4 claim where almost 20% of the internal waters within the straight baselines are 
over 24nm from the coast. The other is Vietnam's claim within the Gulf of Thailand 
where just under 5% of the claimed internal waters fall beyond 24nm from the nearest 
island or mainland the coast (see Table 4.20). Both of these claims must therefore be 
viewed with considerable caution. 
This assessment is confirmed when claimed internal waters areas beyond 12nm 
from the coast are taken into account. Fully 55% of the maritime space within the 
limit's of Thailand's Area4lie beyond 12nm from the nearest coastal points and 31.7% 
of Vietnam's claimed internal waters within the Gulf of Thailand similarly constitute 
"additional" waters. It is notable that with the exception of Thai Area I, all the straight 
baseline claims within the Gulf of Thailand include claims to internal waters beyond 
12nm from the coast- 6% for Cambodia's 1982 claim, 6.7% for Malaysia's claim along 
the eastern coast of peninsula Malaysia and a substantial 31% for Thailand's Area 2 
claim (see Table 4.20). The suitability of the waters enclosed within these straight 
baselines for the regime of internal waters is therefore open to question, but to differing 
degrees. 
Turning to claimed additional territorial waters, that is, territorial waters claimed 
seaward of the straight baselines which do not fall within 12nm of the nearest 'normal' 
baseline and therefore would not form part of the claimant state's territorial waters in 
the absence the straight baselines claim, the excessive nature of Thai Area 4 and 
Vietnam's straight baseline claim within the Gulf of Thailand is re-emphasised. 
Threequarters of the territorial sea claim from the former's and 87.6% of the latter's 
straight baselines are over 12nm from the coast and therefore consist of "additional" 
territorial waters. In contrast, Cambodia's and Malaysia's claims are comparable, 42% 
and 47% of the territorial waters seaward of their baselines being "additional" waters 
respectively. The figure for Thai Area 2, at 23.5%, is significantly lower (see Table 
4.20). This is because of the number and configuration of the fringing islands 
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concerned. While the islands making up the fringe linked by Area 2's straight baselines 
are numerous and, in the southern half of the claim at least, positioned in close 
proximity to one another (see Figure 4.8), this is far less the case for Cambodia's 1982 
claim or Malaysia's claim along the eastern seaboard of peninsula Malaysia (see Figure 
4.6). This is acutely demonstrated by the fact that the average straight baseline segment 
length, which largely equates to the distance between fringing islands, for Cambodia and 
Malaysia's claims is 34nm and 32nm respectively, for Thailand's Area 2 claim it is a 
mere 8.4nm (see Table 4.18). Perhaps significantly, Thai Area 1 's territorial waters 
claim seaward of its straight baselines almost all falls within 12nm of the coast such that 
there are negligible "additional" waters. 
When claims to "additional" waters, both within the straight baselines and 
seaward of them, are totalled, the claims can be evaluated in terms of their apparent 
reasonableness or extravagance as follows. According to these criteria there is no 
question as to which claim is the 'best'. Thailand's Area 1 claim is clearly the most 
conservative with the "additional" waters claimed as a result of it being negligible. The 
next most reasonable claim assessed on this basis is Cambodia's 1982 claim to straight 
baselines. This is rather surprising given the international protests that have been 
levelled against this claim. However, of the total claim to internal waters and territorial 
waters resulting from the Cambodian claim, 18.4% constitute "additional" waters. In 
contrast, 28.3% of the internal and territorial waters associated with Thai Area 2, which 
has not elicited known international protests, are also 12nm from the nearest coastal 
points and therefore count as internal waters. In fact, Malaysia's claimed straight 
baselines along eastern its peninsula coast are marginally more reasonable than Thai 
Area 2's in that only 24.1% of the waters associated with that claim constitute 
"additional" waters. 
Vietnam's claims within the Gulf of Thailand include additional waters 
accounting for 35% of the overall claim to internal and territorial waters. However, the 
most extreme claim, as with the least, has been claimed by Thailand. According to this 
analysis, over 60% of the internal waters and territorial waters claimed within and 
beyond Thailand's Area 4 group of straight baselines lie beyond 12nm from the nearest 
'normal' baseline and therefore consist of "additional" waters. 
Overall, it can be concluded that of all the claims within the Gulf of Thailand, 
only Thailand's Area 1 straight baseline claim conforms to a strict interpretation of 
Article 7 of UNCLOS. The remaining claims are not, however, equally flawed. 
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Thailand's Area 4 claim in particular stands out as being excessive when measured 
against virtually any test based on Article 7, be it with regard to individual segment 
length, distance between fringing islands or proportion of "additional" waters claimed. 
Vietnam's claims within the Gulf of Thailand are, however, similarly, if not quite as 
extremely, excessive as those of Thailand's Area 4. 
The relative merits of Cambodia's 1982 claim, Malaysia's claim along the coast 
of eastern peninsula Malaysia and Thailand's Area 2 group of straight baselines are 
rather more difficult to disentangle. In terms of segment lengths, Thai Area 2 is clearly 
more conservative than either the Cambodian or Malaysian claims, although all three 
breach the recommended limit on separation between fringing islands of 24nm. The 
Cambodian claim also suffers from the drawback of including a fringing island and 
'floating' basepoint positioned significantly further offshore than the other two claims. 
Nevertheless, when the overall reasonableness of the claims is compared on the basis of 
the proportion of "additional" waters included in each claim, it is the Cambodian claim 
that proves the least excessive with Thai Area 2 including, in percentage terms, five 
times as much "additional" waters. 
In conclusion then, the Gulf of Thailand states have without doubt sought to 
bend the terms of Article 7 of UNCLOS to their advantage in order to enclose the 
maximum area of the Gulf possible within straight baselines. This is no doubt with a 
view to enhancing their respective positions in relation to maritime boundary 
delimitation by means of advancing their baselines offshore. Ironically, these mutually 
competitive policies has led each country to adopt what might be termed excessive or 
aggressive claims in turn in what may be viewed as attempts not to get 'left behind'. 
Each Gulf of Thailand coastal state has therefore sought to counter its neighbours 
straight baseline claims with its own leading to a series of excessive claims. As a result, 
with the notable exception of Thailand's Area 1, all the straight baseline systems 
claimed within the Gulf of Thailand are open to, admittedly varying degrees of, 
criticism. 
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Table 4.20 Summary of Additional Waters Claimed as a Result of Straight Baseline Claims in the Gulf of Thailand 
State Claim Internal Waters Territorial Waters Total Claim 
Total Additional % >24nm % Total Additional % Total Additional % 
Cambodia 1957 1,286nm 2 0% - - - - - - - - -
1972 2,375nm 2 81nm2 3.4% 2,044nm 2 522nm2 25.5% 4,419nm2 603nm2 13.6% - -
1982 3,009nm 2 201nm2 6.7% 1,508nm 2 630nm2 42% 4,517nm2 83lnm2 18.4% - -
Malaysia within Gulf 6.8nm2 0% 216.7nm 2 11.8nm2 5.45% 223.5nm2 11.8nm2 5.3% - - -
east coast 5,502.7nm2 330.3nm2 6% - - 4,291.8nm2 2,030.7nm2 47% 9,794.5nm2 2,361nm2 24.1% 
Thailand Area I 845.6nm 2 0% 782nm2 0% 1,627.6nm2 0% - - - - -
Area 2 2 952.4nm2 31% 1,693.lnm 2 398.46nm2 23.5% 4,772.6nm2 1,350.9nm 2 28.3% 3,079.5nm - -
Area4 7,824.5nm 2 4,336.4nm2 55% 1,549nm2 19.8% 2,794.9nm2 2,086.4nm2 75% l0,619.4nm2 6,422.8nm2 60.5% 
Vietnam within Gulf 5,805nm 2 1,843nm2 31.7% 276nm2 4.75% 948nm2 830nm2 87.6% 7,648nm2 2,673n_m2 35% 
- -
Source: Author's research. 
Chapter 5 
Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction in the Gulf of Thailand 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter dealt with the fundamental issue of the baselines claimed by the 
Gulf of Thailand coastal states. This chapter will focus attention on the claims to 
maritime jurisdiction relating to areas seaward .of these baselines. Accordingly, it will 
explore the claims Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam have made with regard 
to territorial sea, contiguous zone, continental shelf, exclusive fishing zones and 
exclusive economic zones. These claims are summarised in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Maritime Claims in the Gulf of Thailand 
Country Historic Territorial Contiguous Continental EEZ 
Waters Sea Zone Shelf 
Cambodia 
""' ""' ""' ""' ""' Malaysia )( 
""' 
)( 
""' ""' Thailand 
""' ""' 
)( 
""' ""' Vietnam 
""' ""' ""' ""' ""' Source: Author's research. 
Particular attention will be devoted to the claims established to continental shelf rights 
as these are the most complex claims to extended maritime jurisdiction that have been 
made by the interested states, encompassing, as they do, extensive areas of the Gulf of 
Thailand. 1 The nature of the littoral states' claims to continental shelf gave rise to 
significant areas of overlap between competing claims which have been subject to 
subsequent delimitation or other agreement as detailed in Chapter 6 or which persist 
undelimited and are subject to dispute between the Gulf of Thailand states. The latter 
issues are considered in Chapter 7. 
It should also be noted that of the Gulf of Thailand coastal states, only Malaysia 
has ·made no claim to a regime of historic waters (albeit with Cambodia and Vietnam 
making a joint claim). These claims will not, however, be considered in this chapter. 
Thailand's claim to a historic bay in the Bight of Thailand is reviewed along with its 
The Gulf of Thailand states' EEZ claims for the most part do not specify precise limits, unlike 
their claims to continental shelf. 
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other straight baseline claims in Section 4.4 while Cambodia and Vietnam's 1982 
Agreement on Historic Waters is dealt with in detail in Section 6.3. 
5.2 Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 
5.2.1 Cambodia 
France, as the colonial power, did not claim a specific territorial sea on behalf of its 
possessions in Indochina prior to Cambodia achieving independence in 1949. The 
French authorities did, however, make some provision for the protection and regulation 
of fisheries off Cambodia's coasts in 1936 to a distance of 20km (1 0.8nm) from the 
coast, within what would subsequently become part of the latter's territorial sea claim 
(see Section 5.4). 
Independent Cambodia's first claim to a territorial sea and contiguous zone was 
embodied in Kret No.622 of 30 December 1957. At that time Cambodia reportedly 
claimed a 5nm-breadth territorial sea and a contiguous zone of 7nm beyond the 
territorial sea.2 Having become a party to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1964, Cambodia, by a Declaration by the 
Royal Government dated 27 September 1969, duly claimed a 12nm territorial sea.3 
Cambodia has been consistent in this claim in its subsequent legislation - a position in 
full accordance with the 1958 Convention and subsequent developments in the law of 
the sea including the 1982 UN Convention (see Section 3.4.3). The 12nm territorial sea 
claim was thus repeated in Kret No.518172-PRK of 12 August 1972, a Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Statement dated 15 January 1978, and most recently in the 31 July 1982 
Council of State Decree on Territorial Waters (Appendix 2). 
In the 1978 and 1982 legislation Cambodia also laid claim to a 12nm-breadth 
contiguous zone beyond and adjacent to its territorial sea. Within the contiguous zone 
the 1982 decree states, in Article 4, that Cambodia, "exercises necessary control in 
order to oversee its security and to prevent and check violations of it customs, fiscal, 
2 Ranariddh, 1976: 329. Efforts to obtain a copy of Cambodia's 1957 Kret proved unsuccessful. 
However, Ranariddh indicated in 1976 that the document in question was not in the public 
domain. 
Siddayao, 1978: 56. Ranariddh (1976: 241) noted that Cambodia's 1969 Declaration made no 
reference to a contiguous zone and that it could be presumed that this had been "reabsorbed" by 
Cambodia as part of its extended territorial sea. 
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health and emigration and immigration laws. " 
international legal norms (see Section 3.4.4). 
These provisions conform to 
In relation to Cambodia's lateral territorial sea boundary with Thailand, the Kret 
of 12 August 1972 specifically states that the limit of Cambodia's territorial sea 
"follows the division of maritime waters determined by the historic frontier stipulated in 
the Treaty of 23 March 1907 and confirmed by the map annexed thereto" (see Figure 
1.1). This statement was subsequently repeated (with the exception of reference to the 
map) in Article 3 of the July 1982 decree and remains Cambodia's formal position on 
the territorial sea boundary vis-a-vis Thailand. Cambodia's territorial sea boundary 
claim based on the 1907 Franco-Siamese treaty will be considered along with the 
similarly based continental shelf claim (Section 5.5.1) in Section 7.2. 
A territorial sea and contiguous zone delimitation between Cambodia and 
Vietnam is also required and has not, as of mid-1999, been concluded.4 This 
delimitation will relate to waters seaward of the two states' integrated system of straight 
baselines taking "Point 0", the location of which has yet to be determined, as its 
starting point (see Sections 4.2 and 4.5). By virtue of Cambodia and Vietnam's joint 
claim to historic waters (see Section 6.3), a delimitation of jointly claimed historic 
waters will also be necessary landward of their straight baselines. These issues will also 
be explored in Section 7.3. 
5.2.2 Malaysia 
On gaining independence in 1957,5 Malaysia inherited a 3nm claim to territorial sea 
which the United Kingdom, as the colonial power, had established by the Territorial 
Waters Act of 19 October 1927. 
Malaysia became party to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and Contiguous Zone on 10 September 1964. Accordingly, the 3nm territorial sea claim 
4 This is the only delimitation within the Gulf of Thailand where the states concerned both claim 
contiguous zones as well as territorial seas. Neither Malaysia nor Thailand claim contiguous 
zones. Thus there is no call for a Malay-Thai contiguous zone boundary. As Cambodia claims a 
contiguous zone but Thailand does not, presumably the Cambodian contiguous zone will extend 
beyond the limit of the yet to be delimited Thai-Cambodian territorial sea boundary and will, in 
all probability, be defined by the limits set down in the yet to be delimited Thai-Cambodian 
continental shelf and/or EEZ boundary. It is worth noting that contiguous zone delimitations, 
though rare, are not unheard of, though they are generally delimited in conjunction with the 
territorial sea. A good example of this is the Convention between France and Spain on 
Delimitation of the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone in the Bay of Biscay (Charney and 
Alexander, 1993: 1,719-1,734). 
Malaysia gained its independence from the United Kingdom on 31 August 1957. 
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was superseded by one to a 12nm territorial sea by means of Emergency (Essential 
Powers) Ordinance No.7 of2 August 1969.6 
The precise limits of Malaysia's claimed territorial sea are illustrated on the two 
maps Peta Menunjukkan Sempadan Perairan dan Pelantar Benua Malaysia1 issued by 
the Malaysian Directorate of National Mapping in December 1979, previously referred 
to in Section 4.3. 8 An excerpt from the chart relevant to Malaysia's claims in the Gulf 
of Thailand is included as Figure 4.5. 
Malaysia has made no claim to a contiguous zone beyond its territorial sea but 
has concluded an agreement with Thailand relating to the two states' territorial seas 
within the Gulf of Thailand. The location of the Thai-Malaysian territorial sea boundary 
coincides with that outlined in Malaysia's Peta Baru, as might be expected given the 
territorial sea delimitation was apparently agreed upon seven years prior to the 
publication of the Peta Baru (see Section 6.2.2). This is the sole territorial sea 
delimitation involving Malaysia within the Gulf of Thailand. Curiously, however, the 
boundary line agreed with Thailand appears to extend beyond 12nm from the coasts of 
either state (see Section 6.2.2). 
5.2.3 Thailand 
Thailand, alone among the Gulf of Thailand states, was not subject to European 
colonisation and its claims to maritime jurisdiction therefore developed, at least to some 
extent, independently. As early as the reign of Rama ill (1824-51) therefore, relevant 
laws began to be issued generally relating to taxation on fishing activities both in rivers 
and at sea.9 Gradually, however, as European influence in Southeast Asia grew and 
Thailand (Siam) came under pressure from colonial powers in the form of Britain (from 
the south and west) and France (from the east), it was recognised that Thailand needed 
to revise its legislation and bring it into line with Western norms. As a result, in 1899 
Thailand sent a delegation to attend the First Hague Conference on international law 
6 
9 
The legislation in question was promulgated under special emergency powers as a consequence 
of the prevailing political unrest in Malaysia at the time (Haller-Trost, 1996: 320). Copy on file 
with the author. 
"Map Showing the Territorial Waters and Continental Shelf Boundaries of Malaysia." This 
document will be referred to simply as the 'Malaysian Map' or by the Malaysian shorthand of 
"Peta Baru" ['new map']. 
The timing of the publication of the Peta Baru had little to do with developments in the Gulf of 
Thailand. Instead, its publication was prompted by the imminent conclusion of a maritime 
boundary treaty with Indonesia in the wake of the end of the conflict between the two sates 
known as the konfrontasi (Haller-Trost, 1996: 320-321). 
Tangsubkul, 1982: 20-21. 
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codification. With regard to law of the sea issues, Thailand moved to adopt British 
practice. Article 5 of the Thai Vessels Act of 1938 gave a definition of "Thai Waters" 
(Nan Nam Thai) as being every water zone found under the sovereignty of Siam. 10 
Although Thailand did not formally specify the width of its territorial sea until 1966, 
since approximately 1910 Tangsubkul notes that in practice Thailand ''followed the 
Anglo-Saxon concept of three nautical miles. "11 
Thailand established the breadth of its territorial sea by means of a Royal 
Proclamation dated 6 October 1966 as "twelve nautical miles from a baseline used for 
measuring the breadth of the territorial sea." Thailand has not subsequently altered or 
amended this claim which in any case conforms with accepted norms of international 
law (see Section 3.4.3). 
As noted, however, Thailand has concluded a territorial sea delimitation treaty 
with Malaysia within the Gulf of Thailand although this delimitation does seem to 
exceed 12nm in length (see Section 6.2.2). No agreement relating to the territorial sea 
(or indeed continental shelf or EEZ) has been concluded between Thailand and 
Cambodia whose claims diverge to a considerable extent (see Section 7.2). Thailand 
has not seen fit to claim a contiguous zone beyond its territorial sea. 
5.2.4 Vietnar,n 
As mentioned in relation to Cambodia, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
France made no formal claim to a territorial sea off what was then French Indochina. 
Instead, legislation was promulgated in 1936 in order to manage and protect fisheries in 
what was to become Cambodia and Vietnam's territorial sea (see Section 5.4). 
South Vietnam claimed a 3nm-breadth territorial sea through a Declaration dated 
27 April 1965. 12 It was subsequently reported in mid-1974 that the Saigon authorities 
had extended South Vietnam's territorial sea claim to 50nm. 13 However, this 
development was short-lived as Saigon fell to the Vietnamese communists in the 
following year. 
Reunified Vietnam's Statement on the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the 
Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of 12 May 1977 (Appendix 5) 
defines Vietnam's territorial sea as having: 
10 
II 
12 
13 
Tangsubkul, 1982: 21. 
Tangsubkul, 1982: 21. 
Siddayao, 1978: 52. 
Siddayao (1978: 52-54) citing Petroleum News, 3115174 as the source of this report. 
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... a breadth of 12 nautical miles measured from a baseline which links the 
furthest seaward points of the coast and the outermost points of Vietnamese 
offshore islands. 14 
The waters within the straight baselines were defined as constituting Vietnamese 
internal waters. Vietnam's contiguous zone was defined in the same statement as: 
... a 12 nautical mile mantlme zone adjacent to and beyond the Vietnamese 
territorial sea, with which it forms a zone of 24 nautical miles from the baseline 
used to measure the breadth of the territorial sea. 
The statement went on to define Vietnamese control over the contiguous zone as being 
exercised for its security, customs, fiscal, sanitary and emigration and immigration 
interests. 
Vietnam has not concluded any delimitation agreements in respect to either 
territorial sea or contiguous zone. Its potential delimitation with Cambodia represents 
the only candidate for a territorial sea and/or contiguous zone boundary for Vietnam 
within the Gulf of Thailand. 15 As noted, a delimitation within the Cambodian-
Vietnamese joint historic waters area has also yet to be effected (see Section 7.3.5). 
5.2.5 Summary 
All four littoral states on the Gulf of Thailand claim 12nm territorial seas in accordance 
with Article 3 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. However, only 
Cambodia and Vietnam have also claimed contiguous zones extending a further 12nm 
offshore. These claims are in accordance with Article 33 of UNCLOS dealing with the 
contiguous zone. Among the Gulf of Thailand littoral states, Malaysia previously held a 
claim to a different breadth of territorial sea, 3nm, which Kuala Lumpur inherited from 
the United Kingdom as the former colonial power while South Vietnam briefly claimed 
a 50nm territorial sea before being reunified with victorious North Vietnam. 16 
14 
15 
16 
This effectively reaffirmed North Vietnam's 1964 claim to a 12nm territorial sea (Siddayao, 
1978: 54). 
Vietnam's other obvious potential territorial sea boundary is that with China. This delimitation is, 
however, complicated by historic claims and at the time of writing was yet to be agreed. Vietnam 
is also party to the Spratly islands dispute in the South China Sea the eventual resolution of 
which could conceivably give rise to the need for further territorial sea boundaries involving 
Vietnam. 
As noted, Cambodia and Vietnam did inherit fisheries legislation from France relating to areas 
within 12nm of the coast (see Section 5.4). 
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However, despite the fact that both Malaysia and Thailand claim 12om-breadth 
territorial seas, it is apparent that their agreed territorial sea delimitation extends beyond 
12nm from their respective baselines (see Section 6.2.2). Aside from this problem, it is 
clear that it is the baselines from which the territorial sea (and other maritime zones) are 
measured, rather than the claimed breadth of territorial sea itself which have been the 
cause of controversy between the states concerned. 
Three potential territorial sea boundaries exist in the Gulf of Thailand. As 
mentioned, one, that between Malaysia and Thailand, has been delimited by agreement 
between the parties (see Section 6.2.2). The others, between Cambodia and Thailand 
and Cambodia and Vietnam remain undelimited and to be resolved (see Sections 7.2 
and 7.3). In addition, one potential contiguous zone boundary exists within the Gulf, 
that between Cambodia and Vietnam. 17 
5.3 Continental Shelf 
5.3.1 Cambodia 
Cambodia's first explicit claim to continental shelf was embodied in Article 4 of its Kret 
No.622 of 30 December 1957 which defined the outer limit of Cambodia's continental 
shelf as coinciding with the 50 metre depth isobath. 18 Such a definition of continental 
shelf rights on the basis of bathymetry was in keeping with general international 
thinking and practice at the time, but swiftly became outmoded and was superseded by 
later legislation. On 27 September 1969 Cambodia declared its full sovereignty over its 
continental shelf and, therefore, control and jurisdiction over the natural resources of its 
shelf, but did not specify any limits to that area. 19 
In 1969, a Committee of Experts was formed to study the delimitation of 
Cambodia's continental shelf.2° The Committee's prime concern was delimitation with 
Thailand. The Committee was apparently working on the basis of previous studies 
carried out by the Merchant Marine Service and by Cambodia's Continental Shelf Sub-
Committee. The Committee of Experts commissioned a further study by a French 
17 
18 
19 
Were Malaysia and Thailand to declare contiguous zones, which they certainly would be entitled 
to claim, there would then be the need for contiguous zone boundaries between Malaysia and 
Thailand and Cambodia and Thailand within the Gulf of Thailand. 
Ranariddh, 1976: 358. 
Siddayao, 1978: 47 and 66. 
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expert, M. Legoux, who submitted his report to the Committee on 5 November 1969. 
On 26 November 1969, the Committee presented its report to the Royal Government in 
which it outlined various alternatives for addressing the delimitation of Cambodia's 
continental shelf. 21 
With respect to the delimitation with Thailand, the Committee was primarily 
concerned with two issues: the weight or effect to be given to the various Cambodian 
islands and rocks in the delimitation process; and the manner in which the Thai island 
of Koh Kut should be treated in the lateral section of the boundary. The Committee 
came up with four different proposals. 
The first proposal called for the lateral delimitation with Thailand to coincide 
with the bi-sector of the angle formed by the respective Thai and Cambodian baselines 
running from the terminal point on the land boundary.22 Thailand adopted straight 
baselines in this area in 1970, the relevant segment of which stretched from the eastern 
tip of Koh Kut to the Thai-Cambodian land boundary's intersection with the coast (see 
Section 4.4 and Figure 4.8). It must be recalled that at the time that these deliberations 
were taking place Cambodia was operating under its 1957 straight baseline system (see 
Section 4.2.2 and Figure 4.1 ). Terming this the least favourable result, the Committee 
then proposed the construction of an equidistance line between Koh Prins and Poulo 
Wai on the Cambodian side and Koh Pennan, Koh Samuie, Ban Lem and Cap Patani on 
the Thai side to complete the delimitation. According to this option the Thai islets of 
Ko Kra and Ko Losin were therefore discounted. 
The second proposal was based on a line extending from the terminal point of 
the land boundary, described as a "perpendicular" line using the first segment of 
Cambodia's claimed straight baselines as its baseline and terminating at a point "PP" 
defined as being equidistant from the Cambodian and Thai baselines. This resulted in a 
slightly more favourable delimitation than the first alternative, which had essentially 
split the difference between the two parties' respective baselines. In both the first and 
second alternatives, the question of Cambodian sovereignty over Poulo Panjang (Tho 
Chu) and Koh Tral (Phu Quoc) islands was reserved. 
The third alternative was identical to the second except that it proceeded on the 
hypothesis that Poulo Panjang was under Cambodian sovereignty. 
20 
21 
22 
Ranariddh, 1976: 367. 
Ranariddh, 1976: 369-72. 
This is, in fact, the rationale on which Thailand itself based its lateral continental shelf claim vis-
a-vis Cambodia (see Section 5.3.3). 
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The fourth alternative was ultimately embodied in Kret No. 77 -70-CE of 6 
February 1970.23 This recommendation was based on a line drawn on the basis of 
Cambodian 1957 straight baselines24 and thence equidistant between the two countries, 
using the islands of Poulo Wai and Panjang as basepoints on the Cambodian side (see 
Figure 5.1 ). In contrast to Cambodia's subsequent 1972 claim, that of 1970 describes an 
arc around the southern tip of Ko Kut island and, by terminating at Point PP, falls both 
south of the lateral claim and east of the interpretation of equidistance used to construct 
the opposite claim vis-a-vis Thailand constructed in 1972. This Kret formed the basis 
for Cambodia's first offshore concessions. On 21 February exploration rights to 
Cambodia's entire continental shelf, were formally awarded to the French Elf-ERAP 
group?5 
Cambodia's 1970 claim was, however, swiftly superseded by Kret No.439172-
PKR of 1 July 1972, which modified and extended the continental shelf I imits claimed 
by Cambodia in 1970. The 1972 Kret divided Cambodian claimed continental shelf into 
two sectors (Appendix 6): 
Article I of the Kret covers the lateral limit between Cambodia and Thailand 
based on an interpretation of the Franco-Siamese Treaty of 23 March 1907 and should 
therefore be considered in conjunction with Kret No.518/72-PRK of 12 August 1972 
relating to the territorial sea as mentioned in Section 5.2.1. The Kret of 1 July 1972 
stipulates that, in application of the 1907 treaty and a subsequent verbal agreement of 8 
February 1908, the delimitation between Cambodian and Thai continental shelves 
fo1lows: 
.. . a straight line joining the frontier point "A" on the coast with the highest 
summit on the Island of Koh Kut and thence [still in a straight line] up to Point 
"P".26 
Article 2 of the Kret relates to the median line boundary in the central part of the Gulf of 
Thailand. From Point "P", the limit of the Cambodian claim turns abruptly southwards 
and is constructed broadly on the basis of equidistance between opposite Cambodian 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Ranariddh, 1976: 369. 
Although curiously also described as being "perpendicular" to the relevant part of Cambodia's 
straight baselines in relation to the lateral delimitation with Thailand. 
A subsidiary of the Elf-ERAP group, Elf du Cambodge, was formed to operate Elf s offshore 
Cambodia concession. In 1972 Elf du Cambodge relinquished 39,100km2 of its original 
concession which was an enormous 80,000km2 in area. Details of hydrocarbon activities in this 
period are drawn from an internal memorandum of an international oil company (whose name 
has been withheld by request) entitled Collected Notes on Cambodia's Offshore Boundaries 
(1995). The author is indebted to said oil company for permission to cite this document. 
Defined in the list of coordinates attached to the Kret as 11 °32'N. I 01 °20'E. 
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and Thai mainland and island coasts. Cambodia's claimed straight baseline system was 
apparently not used in the construction of this line. Point Pck 1 is defined in the Kret as 
being equidistant between the Cambodian island or rock Kusrovie and the islands or 
islets of Koh Cham and Hin Bai on the Thai side of the Gulf. 27 However, while Pck 3 
appears to be almost precisely equidistant between the Poulo Wei islands and Laem 
Talum Phuk on the Thai mainland coast, Pcks 2, 4 and 5 do not appear to be precisely 
equidistant between the Cambodian claimed Poulo Wei and Panjang island groups and 
the Thai mainland. For instance, Pck 2 is located approximately 4nm (7.5km) nearer to 
Poulo Wei than to Ko Phangan; Pck 4 is 2.8nm (5.25km) closer to the nearest islet of 
the Poulo Panjang group than the nearest point on the Thai mainland coastline north of 
Laem Khao Phra; and, Pck 5 is similarly 2.8 and 2.0nm (5.25 and 3.75km) nearer to the 
Poulo Panjang group than Laem Khao Phra and the Malaysian mainland coastline in the 
vicinity of Kota Bharu respectively. 28 It therefore seems clear that while the line P-Pck 
6 is broadly speaking a median line, it is somewhat simplified and generally falls 
marginally short, to Cambodia's disadvantage, of an equidistance line giving full effect 
to Cambodian claimed islands on one side and the Thai mainland and islands in close 
proximity to it on the othe!· 
At Point 6, equidistant between the Poulo Panjang (Tho Chu) islands, the 
Malaysian mainland coast at Kota Bharu and Cape Ca Mau at the southern tip of 
mainland Vietnam, the Cambodian claim turns sharply to the north and becomes a 
dividing line between the then Cambodian-claimed islands of Poulo Panjang (Tho Chu) 
and Koh Tral (Phu Quoc) and the Vietnamese mainland and islands. For example, Pck 
7 appears to be equidistant between the main island of the Poulo Panjang group and the 
Vietnamese mainland. Closer inshore (Pck 7-Pck 12) the basis of the alignment of the 
Cambodian claim line becomes more difficult to distinguish but it is clear that it is 
broadly an equidistance line between Vietnam's Poulo Damia and Pirate islands and the 
Cambodian claimed island of Phu Quoc (Koh Tral). The final segment of the claim, 
Pck 13-B, terminating at the Cambodian-Vietnamese land boundary on the coast 
appears to be broadly equidistant between the two states' mainland coasts, ignoring 
islands close inshore (see Figure 1.1). 
27 However, when this point was plotted on British Admiralty Chart 2414 at 1: I ,500,000 scale, 
while it proved to be equidistant between Koh Kusrovie and Koh Charn (Ko Chan on the chart), 
it was approximately 2nm (3.75km) short of being equidistant with Hin Bai islet. 
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Subsequently, in June 1973 Marine Associates of Hong Kong acquired 
exploration rights to offshore acreage totalling 6,564 square miles (17,000km2). Part of 
the Marine Associates concession had previously been relinquished by Elf du 
Cambodge but also included areas between Cambodia's 1970 and 1972 continental shelf 
claims. As a result the Marine Associates block formed a long, narrow frame around the 
eastern northern and northwestern sides of the remaining Elf concession area (see Figure 
5.2) As a consequence of overlappping maritime claims in the Gulf of Thailand, 
approximately 4,402 square miles (11,400km2) or 67% of the Marine Associates block 
lay in waters claimed by Thailand and Vietnam.29 
The 31 July 1982 Council of State Decree, in Article 6, stated that Cambodia's 
continental shelf extends "beyond the territorial waters throughout the natural 
prolongation of its land territory to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baseline 
used to measure the width of the territorial waters of the PRK." No precise limits were 
included in the 1982 legislation which at the time of writing was the most recent 
concerning Cambodia's maritime claims. As far as continental shelf is concerned, 
therefore, it can be concluded that the Kret of 1 July 1972 constitutes the basis of 
Cambodia's present claim. 
The total area of Cambodia's claims to extended maritime jurisdiction, including 
both territorial sea and continental shelf claims, seaward of its 1957 straight baselines 
was of the order of 25,304nm2 (86,790km2) (Figure 5.3).30 However, even though 
Cambodia's 1972 continental shelf claim has to date not been superseded by more 
recent legislation, it can be inferred that the resolution of the Cambodian-Vietnamese 
islands dispute31 (see Section 6.3), coupled with the extension of Cambodia's straight 
28 
29 
30 
31 
The basepoints used to construct this equidistance line were recovered through plotting and 
analysis using the relevant coordinates on British Admiralty Chart 2414, 1967 edition, at 
1: 1 ,500,000 scale. 
Collected Notes on Cambodia's Offshore Boundaries, 1995. Oil exploration offshore Cambodia 
was brought to an abrupt halt with the Khmer Rouge take over of the country in 1975. 
Calculated using DELMAR and British Admiralty Chart 2414, 1967 edition at a scale of 
1: l ,500,000. The latter was used in to approximate the normal baseline along the mainland coast 
such that coordinates appropriate for input into DELMAR could be ascertained. Excludes Phu 
Quoc island, whose area was calculated using a planimeter and British Admiralty Chart 3985 , 
1987 edition, at I :500,000 scale. The area of relatively small islands, including the Poulo Wei 
and Panjang groups, which fall within the limits of the Cambodian claim are included. However, 
their area is considered sufficiently small not to have much distorting effect on the overall 
calculation of the extent of Cambodia's continental shelf claim. 
Cambodia and Vietnam's accord over island sovereignty, leaving the Poulo Wei group to 
Cambodia but confirming Vietnamese sovereignty over Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) and the Tho Chu 
(Poulo Panjang) island group, undermines the basis of both Cambodia's and South Vietnam's 
claims to continental shelf dating from 1972 and 1971 respectively. This is because both claims 
were made on the understanding that all three island groups belonged to the claimant state. 
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Source: Ranariddh, 1976. 
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Figure 5.3 Cambodia's Continental Shelf Claims in the Gulf of Thailand, 1972 
Source: Author's research. 
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baselines system offshore later in 1972 and then once again in 1982 (see Section 4.2), 
have served to significantly reduce the extent of Cambodia's claims. The merits of 
Cambodia's claims to continental shelf in relation to the other Gulf of Thailand littoral 
states are discussed in Chapter 7. 
5.3.2 Malaysia 
Malaysia laid claim to its continental shelf to a depth of 200 metres or to the depth of 
exploitation, that is, in conformity with the definition laid down in the 1958 
Conventions (see Section 2.4.6), by the Continental Shelf Act No.57 of 28 May 1966.32 
Malaysia's continental shelf claims were not, however, revealed until the Directorate of 
National Mapping published the Peta Baru ['new map'] on 21 December 1979, as 
referred to in Section 4.3 (see Appendix 7 and Figure 4.5). 33 
The Malaysian continental shelf claim off the east coast of peninsula Malaysia in 
both its lateral sector (relating to delimitation with Thailand- turning points 43-47) and 
opposite sector (vis-a-vis Vietnam - turning points 41-43) is broadly based upon 
equidistance with the Thai and Vietnamese mainland coasts. Islands substantially 
offshore, particularly Thailand's islet Ko Losin and Vietnam's34 Tho Chu (Poulo 
Panjang) island group have been discounted for the purposes of the Malaysian claim. 
The Malaysian claimed lateral boundary, vis-a-vis Thailand, therefore, departs 
from the terminus of the Thai-Malaysia land boundary on the Gulf of Thailand coast 
northeastwards, with turning points governed by basepoints on the Thai and Malaysian 
mainland coasts, before turning abruptly southeastwards on reaching a point equidistant 
between the Thai, Malaysian and Vietnamese mainland coasts in the central Gulf. The 
first three turning points of the Thai-Malay land boundary, Nos.47, 46 and 45, 
proceeding progressively offshore are coincident not only with Points 17, 16 and 15 of 
the Thai continental shelf claim of 1973 (see below), but also with Points (i), (ii) and 
(iii) of the Malaysia-Thailand Memorandum of Understanding on the continental shelf 
(see Section 6.2.3). The latter point- Malaysian turning point 45, Thai Point No.15 and 
32 
33 
34 
Copy on file with the author. 
The charts include a table of the turning points of the Malaysian continentals shelf claim and 
their geographic coordinates (Appendix 7). According to this table, the coordinates mentioned 
were "based on [British] Admiralty Chart Nos. 771, 793, 1353, 1358, 2414 and 2660A." No 
mention was made of the type of line to be described between the turning points. However, since 
the charts mentioned are on the Mercator projection and the only straight lines which are 
geodesics on such a chart are the meridians and the equator, it can be deduced that the lines 
joining the turning points described are loxodrome or rhumb lines (see Section 7.9). 
Previously also claimed by Cambodia (see Sections 5.3.1 and 6.3). 
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Point (iii) of the MoU - is also consistent with Point A of the Thai-Malaysian joint 
development are (JDA). Furthermore, Malaysian turning points 44 and 43 are, 
respectively, identical to Thai-Malaysian JDA Points B and C (see Section 6.2.4). 
Malaysian turning point 43, representing the northwesterly extent of Malaysia's 
continental shelf claim in the Gulf of Thailand, is equidistant between the Thai 
mainland at Laem Khao Phra and the Malaysian mainland at Kuala Besar.35 The 
location of point 43 therefore discounts the presence of Thailand's islet Ko Losin (as 
does point 44). In addition, Point 43 ignores the presence of Vietnamese islands on the 
opposite side of the Gulf of Thailand. 
From Malaysian turning point 43, the continental shelf limit then constitutes an 
equidistance line between opposite mainland coasts trending southeastwards via turning 
point 42 until it meets up with the final point (Point 20) of the 7 November 1969 
continental shelf boundary agreement between peninsula Malaysia and Indonesia which 
is coincident with Malaysian turning point 41.36 Point 42 is equidistant between the 
Malaysian island of Redang and the Vietnamese mainland coast, ignoring Vietnamese 
islands?7 Point 41 represents a tri-point equidistant from Malaysian, Indonesian and 
Vietnamese mainland coasts. 38 Both Malaysian turning points 41 and 42 coincide with 
the points defining the Malaysian-Vietnamese joint Defined Area, being identical to 
Points E and F of that agreement (see Figure 1.1 and Section 6.2.4). 
It is therefore clear that although Malaysia's December 1979 definition of its 
continental shelf claim, post-dating Malaysia's territorial sea and partial continental 
shelf treaties with Thailand (see Section 6.2.2 and 6.2.3), is consistent with these 
agreements and also encompasses the entirety of the JDA. Malaysia's policy of ignoring 
Thailand's Ko Losin islet, coupled with Bangkok's insistence on it as a valid basepoint 
led to the overlap in continental shelf claims with Thailand which became the JDA. 
Similarly, Malaysia's (and Thailand's) selective application of equidistance in relation 
to Vietnamese islands and Hanoi's opposing view (i.e. giving its islands on the eastern 
side of the Gulf full weight in its own claims) have resulted in the overlap between 
Vietnam's continental shelf claim and the Thai-Malaysian JDA. Similarly, to the 
southeast, the same factors have resulted in an overlap between the claims of Malaysia 
35 
36 
37 
Measured on British Admiralty Charts 3961, 1987 edition at 1 :240,000 scale, and 2414, 1967 
edition at 1: I ,500,000 scale. 
US Department of State, 1970a: 1; Charney and Alexander, 1998: 2,335-2,344. 
Measured on British Admiralty Chart 2414, 1967 edition at I: 1,500,000 scale. See also, Valencia 
(1991: 20 and 26). 
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and Vietnam - an overlap ultimately designated a joint development zone as the Thai-
Vietnamese Defined Area (see Sections 5.3.4, 6.4 and 7.?).39 
The total area, in terms of both territorial waters and continental shelf, claimed 
by Malaysia within the Gulf of Thailand proper amounts to approximately 3,21 Onm2 
(11,010km2) (Figure 5.4).40 
5.3.3 Thailand 
Prior to a formal declaration concerning its claim to continental shelf in the Gulf of 
Thailand, Thailand implied a claim by issuing an invitation to international oil 
companies to explore for and exploit oil and gas in offshore areas in the Gulf. 
Following the drafting of Thailand's Petroleum Act and Petroleum Income Tax in 1967, 
bids were invited to explore for and produce oil and gas from 21 June the same year. 41 
In conjunction with this, a series of informal maps were issued to accompany 
each offer of acreage in 1967, 1971 and 1972. The limits of Thai waters illustrated on 
each of these maps differ from one another (see Figure 5.5) and, perhaps significantly, 
from Thailand's eventual, formal claim of 1973.42 Interestingly, in relation to the lateral 
delimitation with Cambodia, all three of the pre-1973 limits appear consistent with 
interpretations of equidistance rather than a bisector of baselines (see below) and 
therefore fall well to the west of the eventual Thai claim. In contrast, in the central Gulf 
of Thailand, the limits of the acreage designated as belonging to Thailand lie 
predominantly on the Cambodian side of the official continental shelf claim expressed 
in 1973. Finally, in relation to Malaysia, two of the three pre-1973 limits extend 
generally to the east of Bangkok's eventual claim to Malaysia's disadvantage. 
It therefore seems that Thailand, in the development of its thinking on the limits 
of continental shelf claims, eventually opted to moderate its claims with regard to the 
central and southern parts of the Gulf of Thailand but adopted a rather more forward 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
Measured on British Admiralty Chart 2414, 1967 edition at 1:1 ,500,000 scale. 
Accordingly, Malaysia's interpretation of its continental shelf limits, expressed in the Peta Baru, 
drew protests from some of Malaysia's maritime neighbours, including Vietnam, Indonesia, 
Singapore, the Philippines and Brunei (Hamzah, 1987: 359). 
Calculated using DELMAR and British Admiralty Chart 2414, 1967 edition at a scale of 
1: 1 ,500,000. The latter was used in order to approximate the normal baseline along the mainland 
coast such that coordinates appropriate for input into DELMAR could be ascertained. The limit 
of the Gulf of Thailand was taken to be a line joining Vietnam's Mui Cau Mau and the Malaysian 
coast at Kota Bahru (Prescott, 1998: 10). 
Collected Notes on Cambodia's Offshore Boundaries; Siddayao, 1978: 77. 
The author is indebted to a major international oil company (whose name has been withheld by 
request) for supplying the information on which the map of these limits was based. 
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Figure 5.4 Malaysia's Continental Shelf Claim in the Gulf of Thailand, 1979 
Source: Author's research. 
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stance in relation to its adjacent delimitation with Cambodia. The latter decision may 
well, it can reasonably be suggested, have been a response to Cambodia's own liberal 
lateral claim vis-a-vis Thailand - involving a line extending almost due west from the 
terminus of the Thai-Cambodian land boundary on the coast (see Sections 5.2.1 and 
7.2). 
Thailand made its formal claim to continental shelf by the 18 May 1973 
Proclamation on Demarcation of the Continental Shelf of Thailand in the Gulf of 
Thailand.43 This document included a list of coordinates and sketch map of the claim 
(see Appendix 8).44 Thailand's proclamation stated that the claim to continental shelf 
was made to further "exploring and exploiting natural resources in the Gulf of 
Thailand. " The claim was further justified as being "demarcated on the basis of the 
right accorded to the generally accepted principles of international law and the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf done at Geneva on 29 April 1958 and ratified by 
Thailand on 2nd July 1968." Future agreement with neighbouring states, it was stated, 
would be on the basis of the relevant provisions of the Geneva Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. Since 1973 Thailand has not advanced or 
modified its claim to continental shelf in the Gulf of Thailand. 
Point I of the Thai claim coincides with the terminus of the land boundary 
between Cambodia and Thailand. The entire lateral or adjacent boundary between 
Cambodia and Thailand claimed by the Thais is made up of a straight line from the land 
boundary terminus to Point 2 in the central Gulf. The long straight line adjacent 
boundary claimed by Thailand between Points 1 and 2 in relation to Cambodia in 1973 
is consistent with a bisector of the angle between the straight baseline segments of the 
two states' respective straight baseline systems immediately offshore. As such, this 
therefore represents a much simplified form of equidistance.45 The suggestion that this 
part of the Thai claim to continental shelf was based on an extension of the azimuth of 
43 
44 
45 
According to Ake-uru ( 1987: 416), of the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this claim was made 
"in response" to those previously made be Cambodia and South Vietnam. 
It should be noted that the Thai claim did not include detailed chart, spheroid or datum 
information and, similarly, did not specify the types of line used to link the turning points 
specified. 
Kittichaisaree's (1987: 65) claim that Thailand's claim lines "are pure median or equidistance 
lines" therefore seems something of an overstatement. However, his subsequent comment that 
Thailand 1973 declaration represented a "maximum claim" is apt. 
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the final section of the land boundary before it reached the coast offshore seems 
erroneous.46 
The two straight baseline claims involved are Thailand's Area I declared by 
Bangkok in 1970 and the relatively conservative straight baselines declared by 
Cambodia in 1957 (see Sections 4.2.2 and 4.4.3). As detailed in the previous section, 
Cambodia subsequently developed its straight baseline system. However, Thailand 
since 1973 has not modified its continental shelf claim in recognition of the revised 
Cambodian baseline system (which, in any case, it has protested against, see Section 
4.2.4).47 
The remainder of the 1973 Thai claim in the Central Gulf of Thailand relevant to 
Cambodia and Vietnam consists of a north-south median line through 13. points, 
apparently equidistant, between the opposite mainland coasts of Cambodia and Thailand 
but ignoring both its own Area 2 straight baseline claim,48 Cambodia's straight baseline 
claim and Cambodian islands. 
From Point 14 the Thai claimed continental shelf boundary turns abruptly 
southwest to terminate at Point 18 at the intersection of the Thai-Malaysia land 
boundary on the coast. It is important to note that in 1973 in this lateral boundary 
section of the claim between Thailand and Malaysia, Thailand did not base its claim on 
giving full weight to the offshore insular feature Ko Losin. It can be reasonably 
concluded that in subsequent negotiations with Malaysia, Thailand altered its policy and 
pressed for Ko Losin to be treated as a valid basepoint for the determination of a 
bilateral continental shelf boundary on the basis of equidistance. This can be deduced 
because the effect of using Ko Losin as a basepoint is to push the Thai claim to the 
south and east at Malaysia's expense, and it was precisely Malaysia's rejection of this 
position that led to the overlap in claims which was eventually designated as the Thai-
Malaysian Joint Development Area (JDA) (see Section 6.2.4). 
As has been mentioned, closer inshore the Thai and Malay continental shelf 
claims coincide (see Section 5.2.2). It is understood that this situation is the result of 
agreement, at least in principle, on the alignment of the maritime boundary between the 
46 
47 
Suggested by Prescott (1981: 28 and 1985b: 85) and in an internal memorandum of an 
international oil company (whose name has been withheld by request) entitled Collected Notes on 
Cambodia's Offshore Boundaries. The author is indebted to said oil company for permission to 
cite this document. 
Similarly, just as Thailand has not adjusted its continental shelf claim in response to revisions 
(i.e. advances) in Cambodia's claimed straight baseline system, so too the more recent creation of 
Thai baseline Area 4 has not led to any alteration in the Thai continental shelf claim line. 
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two countries prior to the two states' promulgation of their continental shelf claims (see 
Section 6.2).49 
The total area of continental shelf and territorial sea claimed by Thailand in 
1973, seaward of its 1959 and 1970 straight baseline claims and including that part of 
the Thai-Malaysian JDA claimed at that juncture amounts to approximately 51 ,027nm2 
(175,019km2) (Figure 5.6).50 
Thailand's claims to continental shelf rights have not subsequently been altered. 
However, in January 1997, it was reported that the Thai cabinet had decided to extend 
Thailand's claim, resulting in further overlaps in its claims with both Cambodia and 
Vietnam. 51 The report, citing a "high level source" at Thailand's Government House, 
went on to state that when the Thai Prime Minister returned to Bangkok from a visit 
abroad at the end of the month, he was summoned for an audience with the King who 
was concerned over the potential negative impact such action could have on Thailand's 
. h . . hb 52 relations wit Its neig ours. As a result, the cabinet's decision was apparently 
reversed. 
5.3.4 Vietnam 
On 7 December 1967, the Chairman of the National Leadership Committee of South 
Vietnam issued a proclamation stating as follows: 
... affirming that the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf adjacent to the 
Republic of Viet-Nam territorial waters, together with all natural resources 
contained therein and thereon, are considered as part of the national territory 
and therefore come under the exclusive jurisdiction and direct control of the 
Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam. 53 
This act was, followed by Petroleum Law No.Oll/70 of 1 December 1970 which 
defined Vietnam's continental shelf according to both the 200 metre depth and 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
Confirmed by Kittichaisaree, 1987: 65. 
Kittichaisaree, 1987: 100. 
Calculated using DELMAR and British Admiralty Chart 2414, 1967 edition at a scale of 
1:1 ,500,000. The latter was used to approximate the normal baseline along the mainland coast 
such that coordinates appropriate for input into DELMAR could be ascertained. The area of 
Area 4, only claimed in 1992, is therefore included in this calculation. 
The report was carried by Thai newspaper Naeo Na on 2811/97 (BBC SWB FE/2835) and in the 
Bangkok Post on 29/1/97. 
Naeo Na, 28/1/97 (BBC SWB FE/2835). 
Mentioned in South Vietnam's Proclamation by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam on 
its National Natural Resources in the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Sub-Soil Thereof 
Adjacent to the Territory of the Republic of Viet-Nam (see Appendix ?). 
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Figure 5.6 Thailand's Continental ShelfClaim in the GulfofThailand, 1973 
Source: Author's research. 
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exploitability criteria.54 Subsequently, on 6 June 1971, South Vietnam made a claim to 
continental shelf including parts of the Gulf of Thailand. The total area so claimed was 
bounded by 33 straight-line segments (Appendix 9). Although the basis for this claim 
was not specified, within the Gulf of Thailand it is apparent that it is based on the 
principle of equidistance. 55 
The 1971 Vietnamese continental shelf claim was, it is important to note, also 
made at a time when Vietnam and Cambodia disputed sovereignty over three key island 
groups in the Gulf of Thailand- Poulo Wei, Tho Chu (Poulo Panjang) and Phu Quoc 
(Koh Tral). The Vietnamese claim of the time was therefore based on Vietnamese 
sovereignty over all three groups of islands. 
South Vietnam's 1971 claim enters the Gulf of Thailand between Points 11 and 
12, the latter lying within the area that was in due course to be designated as the Thai-
Malaysian JDA. Points 12-16 of the claim are comparable to Cambodia's continental 
shelf claim in the central Gulf of Thailand. 56 This is unsurprising as the two claims were 
based on sovereignty over the same offshore features. Thus, the Vietnamese claim was 
based on equidistance giving considerable weight to Vietnamese (or Cambodian!) 
offshore features while discounting the Thai islet of Ko Kra and Ko Losin. At Point 16 
the Vietnamese claim turns due east. Cambodia's Veer island is ignored but the line 
between Points 17 and 18 roughly equates to a median line between Poulo Wei on the 
Vietnamese-claimed side and Koh Prins and Koh Tang on the Cambodian side. 57 From 
Point 18, the claim line turns sharply north-northeastwards to describe a line around the 
shores of Koh Themi (Points 19-22). 
Unusually, the continental shelf line is continued (Points 22-30) close inshore 
between Phu Quoc (Koh Tral) island and the Cambodian mainland, its alignment 
approximating equidistance. This claim serves to leave the Pirate island group on the 
Vietnamese side of the line.58 The Vietnamese claim line then proceeds through 
uncontested Vietnamese waters to exit the Gulf of Thailand in the vicinity of Mui Cau 
Mau (see Figure 1.1). 
54 
55 
56 
57 
Kittichaisaree, 1987: 68. 
Analysis based on claimed coordinates plotted on British Admiralty Chart 2414, 1967 edition at 
a scale of 1:1,500,000. 
Or, perhaps more appropriately given that the South Vietnamese claim predates that of 
Cambodia, the latter bears comparison to the former. 
Siddayao (1978: 79) has reported that in its lateral boundary with Cambodia and Thailand, 
Vietnam "advocated the mid-channel between Pulau Wai and Koh Tang." 
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In fact, although the question of sovereignty over the islands disputed with 
Cambodia was subsequently resolved (see Section 6.3) the 1971 claim was never 
apparently amended or rescinded. A likely explanation for this lies in South Vietnam's 
military defeat and the reunification of the country. Nevertheless, the South Vietnamese 
1971 claim to continental shelf was used as the southern limit of the zone of overlapping 
claims between Vietnam and Thailand divided by mutual agreement in mid-1997 (see 
Section 6.5). This provides a strong indication of Hanoi's adoption and acceptance of 
Saigon's claim as that of reunified Vietnam. 59 The resolution of the islands dispute and 
the fact that Vietnam's straight baselines terminate at a 'floating' point on the seaward 
limit of the joint Cambodia-Vietnam Historic Waters Area and therefore are not relevant 
to the entirety of Vietnam's 1971 continental shelf claim is significant. This does 
suggest that the 1971 claim has been superseded or invalidated, at least in part, by 
subsequent legislation. 
Subsequently, in the late 1970s Vietnam explicitly adopted the principle of 
natural prolongation as the basis for determining the limits of its continental shelf claim 
- something emphasised in the 12 May 1977 statement which, in Article 4, offers a 
definition of Vietnam's continental shelf as comprising: 
... the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond the 
Vietnamese territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of the 
Vietnamese land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a 
distance of 200 nautical miles from the baseline used to measure the breadth of 
the Vietnamese territorial sea where the outer edge of the continental margin 
does not extend up to that distance. 
The 1977 statement did not provide any coordinates for a Vietnamese continental shelf 
claim nor was any accompanying map illustrating the extent of the claim issued. No 
sets of coordinates or precise maps have subsequently been issued.60 The total area of 
58 
59 
60 
Point 29, in the vicinity of the terminus of the Cambodia-Vietnam land boundary on the coast, 
appears to be an aberration causing a violent alteration in the course of the line. An error in the 
list of coordinates seems the most likely explanation. 
Hanoi's post-1975 adoption of Saigon's 1971 continental shelf claim is also confirmed by Thao 
(1997: 75-77) review of the negotiations that led to the conclusion of the Thai-Vietnamese 
maritime boundary (see Section 6.5). 
It was further reported that in the context of opposite delimitations, particularly that with 
Indonesia between Vietnam's baselines and Indonesia's archipelagic baselines enclosing the 
Natuna Islands group, that Vietnam favoured determining the boundary by means of the 
'Thalweg Principle' (Buchholz, 1987: 42; Johnston and Valencia, 1991: 128). In essence, 
application of this principle, traditionally only applied in river boundary situations as it refers to a 
division along the deepest part of the deepest navigable channel, would result in a delimitation 
along the deepest part of the trough in the continental shelf between the two countries. As this 
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territorial sea and continental shelf claimed by South Vietnam within the Gulf of 
Thailand under the 1971 claim amounts to approximately 22,988nm2 (78,848km2) 
(Figure 5.7).61 However, the resolution of the Cambodian-Vietnamese islands dispute 
(see Section 6.3), coupled with Hanoi's subsequent claims to a straight baseline system 
extending into the Gulf of Thailand but not in such a manner as to sustain the entirety of 
the 1972 claim represent important developments. It can be inferred from these factors 
that the extent of Vietnam's claim to continental shelf within the Gulf of Thailand has 
been significantly reduced, even though the 1971 claim has to date not been officially 
rescinded. 
5.3.5 Summary 
With one notable exception, the continental shelf claims of the littoral states to parts of 
the Gulf of Thailand are based on equidistance, albeit applying differing interpretations 
of this method of delimitation. 
Each claimant state has, unsurprisingly, sought to interpret equidistance to its 
. d 62 maximum a vantage. The key variables resulting in the overlapping claims to 
jurisdiction have been the use and abuse of islands, both in terms of disputed ownership 
over them and their uncertain status under the UN Convention, and of straight baseline 
61 
62 
trough lies just to the north of the Natuna islands, such a delimitation would be highly favourable 
to Vietnam. 
Subsequently, Vietnam appears to have retreated from this position in favour of a so-
called 'harmonised line' as the southern extent of the Vietnamese-Indonesian overlapping claims 
area. The harmonised line represents a compromise proposal running north of the thalweg-
inspired line but south of both the 1971 claim and an equidistance line between Vietnamese and 
Indonesian baselines. It also lies to the south of the northernmost extent of the continental shelf 
boundaries agreed between Indonesia and Malaysia in 1969. Vietnam has in fact offered to split 
equally the overlapping claims zone or develop it jointly with Indonesia (Johnston and Valencia, 
1991: 128-129). 
Calculated using DELMAR and British Admiralty Chart 2414, 1967 edition at a scale of 
I: 1,500,000. The latter was used to approximate the normal baseline along the mainland coast 
such that coordinates appropriate for input into DELMAR could be ascertained. The limit of the 
Gulf of Thailand was taken to be a line joining Vietnam's Mui Cau Mau and the Malaysian coast 
at Kota Bahru (Prescott, 1998: 10). Vietnam's continental shelf was taken to extend up to the 
mainland coast rather than the inshore limits Vietnam designated. Excludes Phu Quoc island, the 
area of which was calculated using a planimeter and British Admiralty Chart 3985, 1987 edition, 
at 1:500,000 scale. The area of relatively small islands, including the Poulo Wei and Panjang 
groups, which fall within the limits of the Vietnamese claim are included. However, their area is 
considered sufficiently small not to have an overly distorting effect on the overall calculation of 
the extent of Vietnam's continental shelf claim within the Gulf of Thailand. 
As a result, Johnston and Valencia (1991: 143) have described all the jurisdictional claims in the 
Gulf of Thailand as "weak." Kittichaisaree (1987: 65) notes that Cambodia, Thailand and South 
Vietnam all made maximalist claims on the basis of the same rationale - pending determination 
of what rules of international law would justify another boundary line at their expense. 
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Figure 5.7 
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South Vietnam's Continental Shelf Claim in the Gulf of Thailand, 
1971 
Source: Author's research. 
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systems as the basis for claims and their acceptance as valid, or otherwise, on the part of 
one or more of the other Gulf of Thailand littoral states. 
Thus, in Cambodia's case, the islands of Koh Kusrovie, Koh Veer, the Poulo 
Wei group and Poulo Panjang group were used as the basis of the 1972 continental shelf 
claim, even though sovereignty over the latter two groups of islands was at the time 
disputed by Vietnam. Insular features on the opposite side of the Gulf, belonging to 
Thailand, namely, Ko Kra and Ko Losin, were discounted for the purposes of the 1972 
claim. The consequence of this selective use of islands as basepoints was to shift the 
claimed equidistance line significantly westwards in the central Gulf of Thailand, 
chiefly at Thailand's expense, and in relation to the disputed islands with Vietnam, 
substantially to the south and east (Figure 1.1 ). In its lateral claim with regard to 
Thailand, however, Cambodia comprehensively abandoned equidistance as a 
delimitation method, instead preferring a claim apparently based on historical factors 
which is highly favourable to Phnom Penh. It can be concluded from the analysis of the 
littoral states' claims that this represents the sole departure from the use of equidistance 
as a basis for claims to continental shelf throughout the Gulf of Thailand. 63 
As noted, Malaysia has based its claim to continental shelf on equidistance but 
discounting opposing states' island-based claims. Thus, Malaysia does not recognise 
Ko Losin as a basepoint - resulting in the overlap in adjacent claims with Thailand. 
Similarly, in the opposite maritime boundary situation, vis-a-vis Cambodia and 
Vietnam, Malaysia does not recognise the Poulo Panjang island group as basepoints 
and, furthermore, does not recognise the validity of Vietnam's straight baseline system 
or the islands it encloses as valid basepoints, while at the same time giving full weight 
to Malaysian islands such as Poulo Redang. 
The consequence of this selective recognition of baseline systems, and of the 
islands used as basepoints in straight baseline claims, is an overlap of continental shelf 
claims between Malaysia, Cambodia and Vietnam in the central Gulf of Thailand 
(Figure 1.1 ). 
Thailand also interpreted equidistance to its advantage for the purposes of its 
1973 continental shelf claim, and, in fact, in a rather contradictory manner when 
Bangkok's opposite and adjacent claims are compared. With regard to its lateral 
delimitation with Cambodia, Thailand has opted for a much simplified form of 
63 Vietnam's thalweg or "harmonised" line claims vis-a-vis Indonesia being located outside the 
Gulf of Thailand. 
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equidistance - a bisector of the first legs of the Thai and Cambodian straight baselines -
projecting from the coast in a straight line and thus ignoring the potential impact that 
several Cambodian islands and straight baseline segments further offshore would have 
had on a strict equidistance line. In its opposite continental shelf claim vis-a-vis 
Cambodia and Vietnam, Thailand has discounted not only Cambodian islands 
significantly offshore such as Koh Kusrovie, Koh Veer and the Poulo Wei and Panjang 
groups (but not those islands lying very close to the mainland coast), but has also 
discounted its own insular features beyond its 1970 straight baseline system - Ko Kra 
and Ko Losin. As a consequence of the fact that the Cambodian islands discounted are 
substantially further offshore than the Thai features, 64 also ignored for the purposes of 
the opposite continental shelf claim, the equidistance line claimed by Thailand is shifted 
eastwards at Cambodia's expense and to Bangkok's advantage. 
With regard to its adjacent continental shelf claim relating to Malaysia, however, 
Thailand has pursued a policy at variance with its claims concerning its opposite 
delimitation in the Gulf with Cambodia and Vietnam. Whereas in the opposite 
boundary situation Thailand has discounted the islet Ko Losin in order to further 
Thailand's claims in the central Gulf, in the adjacent boundary claim with Malaysia, Ko 
Losin was used as a basepoint,65 pushing Thailand's equidistance based claim 
southwards and resulting in a roughly wedge-shaped overlapping area with Malaysia, 
which based its own claims in this situation on an equidistance line discounting all 
islands significantly offshore. Although the parties were able to narrow the area of 
overlap somewhat, negotiations reached deadlock, and the remaining zone of overlap 
subsequently became the Thai-Malaysian joint development area (JDA) (see Section 
6.2.4 ). 
The inconsistency with which Thailand has used islands as basepoints between 
its opposite and adjacent continental shelf boundary claims vividly illustrates the way in 
which the Gulf of Thailand littoral states have selectively and at times inconsistently 
64 
65 
For instance Cambodia's Poulo Wei islands are 53nm (98.25km) offshore while the Poulo 
Panjang (Tho Chu) group (also claimed by Cambodia at the time the continental shelf claims 
under discussion were made) is 80.7nm (149km) (Measured on British Admiralty Chart2414, 
1967 edition at a scale of 1: 1 ,500,000). In contrast, Thailand's Ko Kra and Ko Los in islets are 
respectively 27.5nm (51km) and 37.3nm (69km) offshore (Measured on British Admiralty Charts 
3542, 1960 edition at a scale of 1 :500,000 and 3961, 1987 edition at a scale of 1 :240,000, 
respectively). 
Albeit at the time of negotiations with Malaysia rather than as part of Thailand's 1973 
continental shelf claim. 
237 
Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction 
manipulated equidistance principles and law of the sea rules to their maximum 
advantage. 
For its part, Vietnam has utilised equidistance to its advantage for portions of its 
claim line - giving weight to its own offshore features while at the same time 
discounting opposing islands, particularly those belonging to Thailand on the western 
side of the Gulf such as Ko Kra and Ko Losin. A critical factor which must be recalled 
in relation to Vietnam's original 1971 continental shelf claim, however, is that it was 
promulgated when Cambodia and Vietnam disputed ownership over several key islands 
including the Poulo Wei and Panjang groups which are potentially highly significant 
from a maritime delimitation perspective. The overall effect, however, is a series of 
overlaps with Cambodia, Thailand and Malaysia. 
These differing interpretations of maritime boundary delimitation 
methodologies, primarily of equidistance and predominantly the consequence of the 
divergent approaches to the use of island basepoints, have resulted in substantial 
overlaps in continental shelf claims to the Gulf of Thailand, such that by the mid-1970s 
of the order of 24, 179nm2 (82,93lkm2) of the Gulf of Thailand was subject to 
competing claims (see Figure 5.8). As the total area of the Gulf of Thailand has been 
estimated at 153,187nm2 (283,700km2),66 it is apparent that overlapping claims account 
for just over 29% of this total.67 Moreover, primarily as a result of sovereignty disputes 
over islands, multiple overlapping claims to the same maritime space were made. Thus, 
approximately 3,649nm2 (12,519km2), or 4.4%, of the Gulf of Thailand was subject to 
the claims of three states (Figure 5.9).68 Furthermore, all four littoral states claimed an 
87nm2 (300km2) area- a quadruple overlap of claims amounting to approximately 0.1% 
of the total area of the Gulf (see Figure 5.10).69 
66 
67 
68 
69 
Prescott, 1998: 10. 
Calculated using DELMAR and British Admiralty Chart 2414, 1967 edition at a scale of 
1:1,500,000. The latter was used in order to approximate, where appropriate, the normal baseline 
along the mainland coast such that coordinates appropriate for input into DELMAR could be 
ascertained. The limit of the Gulf of Thailand was taken to be a line joining Vietnam's Mui Cau 
Mau and the Malaysian coast at Kota Bahru (Prescott, 1998: I 0). As a result, part of the overlap 
between Vietnam's claim and the Thai-Malaysian JDA is excluded from this calculation. 
Vietnam's continental shelf was taken to extend up to the mainland coast rather than the inshore 
limits Vietnam designated. Excludes Phu Quoc island, the area of which was calculated using a 
planimeter and British Admiralty Chart 3985, 1987 edition, at 1:500,000 scale. The area of 
relatively small islands, including the Poulo Wei and Panjang groups, which fall within the limits 
of the Vietnamese claim are included. However, their area is considered sufficiently small not to 
have an overly distorting effect on the overall calculation of the extent of Vietnam's continental 
shelf claim within the Gulf of Thailand. 
Calculated using DELMAR. 
Calculated using DELMAR. 
238 
Figure 5.8 
T h a i 
Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction 
Malaysia · Vietnam 
Agreed Common Area 
Competing Claims to Continental Shelf in the Gulf of Thailand in the 
1970s 
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Source: Author's research. 
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As a result of the resolution of Cambodia and Vietnam's dispute over island 
sovereignty and the conclusion of the Malaysia-Thailand and Thai-Vietnamese maritime 
boundary agreements it can, however, be concluded that the area of the Gulf of Thailand 
subject to overlapping claims has fallen dramatically to approximately 7 ,755nm2 
(26,597km2) or 9.4% of the total (see Figure 5.11).70 The question of a quadruple 
overlap of maritime claims has therefore been eliminated, but there is still some concern 
over the presence of trilateral disputes within the Gulf of Thailand (see Section 7.6). 
The merits of these conflicting claims will be assessed in detail in chapters 6 and 7. 
5.4 Exclusive Fishing Zone 
As previously mentioned, in the colonial era Great Britain made a claim to a 3om-
breadth territorial sea on behalf of Malaysia and from the early years of the 20th century 
Thailand independently adopted this rule (see Section 5.2). In contrast, France made no 
such formal claim to a territorial sea of specified breadth on behalf of Cambodia and 
Vietnam, which formed part of French Indochina,. 
Nevertheless, in the mid-1930s the Governor-General of French Indochina was 
concerned over the unregulated exploitation of the fisheries resources off the coasts of 
the territories for which he was responsible. 71 As a result of his actions a French 
Presidential Decree was issued on 22 September 1936. This decree set the sea territory 
of French Indochina at two "myriametres", equivalent to 20km (10.8nm).72 The 
method by which the limits of this zone were to be delimited was not, however, 
specified. Within the zone claimed foreign fishing vessels were prohibited from fishing. 
The decree applied to the coasts of both Cambodia and Vietnam and remained in force 
. d d 73 post-m epen ence. · 
Subsequently, pnor to the concept of the exclusive economic zone gammg 
international currency, South Vietnam, built on its colonial inheritance in the field of 
70 
71 
72 
73 
Calculated using DELMAR. Assumes the Cambodia-Vietnam boundary comprises an 
equidistance line seaward of the two states' historic waters area. The area of the Cambodia-
Vietnam historic waters area (c.2,711 nm2 or 9,299km2) is also excluded as is that portion of the 
overlap between Vietnam's claim and the Thai-Malaysian JDA beyond the strict limits of the 
Gulf of Thailand. Were the area of the former to be included, the total area of the Gulf subject to 
competing claims would amount to around 10,466nm2 (35,896km2) or 12.7% of the total are of 
the Gulf. 
Ranariddh, 1976: 327. 
Ranariddh, 1976: 328. One "myriametre" equals 10,000 metres. 
Ranariddh, 1976: 328. 
242 
Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction 
--··-·'-
T h a i 
Malaysia - Vietnam 
Agreed Common Area 
) 
Figure 5.11: Area of Overlapping Claims in the Gulf of Thailand in the 1 990s 
Source: Author's research. 
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fisheries legislation and claimed an exclusive fishing zone (EFZ). By Decree-Law 
No.056/TT/SLU, dated 26 December 1972, the Saigon authorities claimed a "50-mile 
fishing zone starting from the territorial waters. "74 Two years later, Cambodia was 
poised to follow suit. A Presidential Decree dated 14 December 1974, was presented to 
the Cambodian Council of Ministers by the Agriculture Minister. This legislation was 
designed to claim an exclusive fishing zone with a breadth of 50nm measured from the 
outer limits of the territorial sea. However, the Decree was not enacted before the fall of 
Phnom Penh to the Khmer Rouge in April 1975.75 
Although these exclusive fishing zones have not been specifically rescinded by 
either country and, in the case of Vietnam, was presumably inherited by the Hanoi 
government on the reunification of the country, these claims are of little contemporary 
relevance as they have been effectively superseded by Cambodia and Vietnam's EEZ 
claims. 
5.5 Exclusive Economic Zone 
5. 5.1 Cambodia 
Cambodia first made a claim to an exclusive economic zone of up to 200nm in a 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statement of 15 January 1978. This claim was repeated and 
updated in Article 5 of the 31 July 1982 Council of State Decree on Territorial Waters 
(Appendix 2) such that: 
The exclusive economic zone of the PRK is a maritime zone located beyond its 
territorial waters and adjacent to the latter. This zone extends to 200 nautical 
miles measured from the baseline used to measure the width of the territorial 
waters of the PRK. 
No precise limits to Cambodia's EEZ were released at the time the claim was made. As 
of mid-1999 this situation remains unchanged. 
74 Referred to in South Vietnam's Proclamation by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam on 
its National Natural Resources in the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Sub-Soil Thereof 
Adjacent to the Territory of the Republic of Viet-Nam (see Appendix ?). Ranariddh (1976: 337) 
has noted that the breadth of the Vietnamese zone was to be measured from the limit of the 
territorial waters claim. 
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5.5.2 Malaysia 
Malaysia made a claim to a 200nm exclusive economic zone by its Exclusive Economic 
Zone Bill (Act No.311) of 1984,76 which states in Part II (Article 3) that: 
( 1 )The exclusive economic zone of Malaysia, as proclaimed by the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong vide P. U. (A) 115180, is an area beyond and adjacent to 
the territorial sea of Malaysia and, subject to subsections (2) and (4), 
extends to a distance of two hundred nautical miles from the baselines 
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 
(2)Where there is an agreement in force on the matter between Malaysia and 
a State with an opposite or adjacent coast, questions relating to the 
delimitation of the exclusive economic zone shall be determined in 
accordance with the provisions of that agreement. 
(3)The Yang di-Pertuan Agong may cause the limits of the exclusive 
economic zone to be published in maps and charts from time to time. 
(4)Where, having regard to international law, State practise or an 
agreement referred to in subsection (2), the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
considers it necessary to do, he may order published in the Gazette alter 
the limits of the exclusive economic zone detennined in accordance with 
subsection ( 1 ). 
Despite the provisions of subsection (3) Malaysia has not, thus far, issued a map, chart 
or list of geographic coordinates to illustrate the precise limits of Kuala Lumpur's EEZ 
claim. Hamzah has, however, noted that Malaysia's continental shelf map (the Peta 
Baru of 1979) is the "nearest we have" to such a map and that when published "the 
map of the EEZ can be expected to overlap, more or less, with this 'Peta Baru '. "77 
5.5.3 Thailand 
Thailand established its claim to EEZ by a Royal Proclamation of 23 February 1981.78 
The decision to proclaim an EEZ was reportedly taken "much earlier. "79 The reasons 
for this delay lie in Thailand's opposition, as a distant-water fishing nation, to the EEZ 
75 
76 
77 
78 
Ranariddh, 1976: 331-332. 
For a copy, see Hamzah (1988: 26-52). 
Hamzah, 1988: 10. It is notable here that Hamzah suggests that the EEZ claim may not 
necessarily coincide with the continental shelf claim. The exceptions mentioned by Hamzah were 
the northern part of the Straits of Malacca, an area off eastern Sabah (presumably coinciding with 
the disputed area with Indonesia related to Poulo Sipadan and Ligitan) and "the disputed area 
near the Gulf of Thailand." This last comment may refer to the Thai-Malaysian JDA or Defined 
Area between Malaysia and Vietnam. It is not clear, however, why Malaysia, when specifying the 
extent of its EEZ claim, would exclude these areas or, indeed, seek to claim EEZ rights beyond 
the limits of Malaysia's earlier claim to continental shelf. According to Kittichaisaree (1990a: 
318), however, even through Malaysia has not yet defined the outer limits of its EEZ claim "in 
practice Malaysia officially assumes that the coordinates of its continental shelf claim also 
coincide with those of its EEZ claim." 
B .E. 2514 according to the Thai calendar which takes its start date from the death of Buddha. 
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concept in principle and because prior to the EEZ declaration Thailand was able to 
reject accusations of illegal fishing by its neighbours on the grounds that Thailand did 
not recognise the legal validity of their EEZs.80 
Although it was stated that Thailand's EEZ was defined as the area beyond and 
adjacent to the territorial sea extending to 200nm "measured from the Baselines used 
for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea" no precise limits were defined. 81 
Indeed, the only comment about the limits. of the EEZ vis-a-vis other states was the 
general statement that in cases where the EEZ, 
... is adjacent or opposite to the exclusive economic zone of another coastal 
State ... Thailand is prepared to enter into negotiations with the coastal State 
concerned with a view to delimiting their respective exclusive economic zones. 
As previously noted, however, Thailand's 1973 claim to continental shelf did include a 
list of geographical coordinates defining the extent of its claim (see Section 5.3.3). 
From these coordinates it is clear that the Thai continental shelf claim at that time fell 
short of the equidistance line using Ko Losin as a basepoint which was used to define 
the eastern limit of the Thai-Malaysian joint development zone (JDA) (see Figure 1.1). 
This can, in all probability, be attributed to a post-1973 hardening in the Thai 
negotiating stance vis-a-vis Malaysia, with Thai insistence on the validity of Ko Losin 
as a basepoint and Malay resistance to this position eventually leading to the overlap in 
claims and ultimately the creation of the JDA in February 1979 (see Section 6.2.4). 
Subsequently, in December 1979, Malaysia issued its Peta Baru illustrating the 
extent of Malaysia's claimed continental shelf. This map showed the whole of the Thai-
Malaysian JDA within Malaysia's claim, as might be expected given the 'sovereignty 
neutral' characteristics of the Thai-Malaysian Memorandum of Understanding 
concerning the JDA whereby neither party relinquished its existing sovereignty claims 
79 
80 
81 
McDorman, 1986: 191. 
McDorman, 1986: 191. At the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, Thailand argued 
strongly that acceptance of the EEZ concept should be conditional on the "equitable sharing" of 
the living resources of areas newly falling within EEZs, particularly for those countries which 
had "traditionally and actually" exercised exploitation rights there in the past (Kittichaisaree, 
1987: 125, 1990: 316-317). 
Kittichaisaree (1987: 125) has suggested that Thailand's claim of a 200nm EEZ was designed to 
put Thailand in a strong bargaining position in that overlapping claims would be inevitable and 
"Thailand envisaged that some concessions or compromise would have to be reached to the 
benefit of Thailand before the boundaries of the area with its neighbours were to be finally 
settled." The wording of the Thai declaration is, however, unremarkable and not readily 
distinguishable in the nature of its provisions than many other EEZ claims. The declaration 
certainly does not explicitly indicate that Thailand intended to claim an EEZ limit described by 
200nm arcs from its baselines as Kittichaisaree seems to imply. 
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(see Section 6.2.4). This action therefore left Malaysia formally claiming the whole of 
the JDA while Thailand's 1973 continental shelf claim only covered part of the same 
area. 
In order to redress this imbalance between the Thai and Malaysian claims in this 
area, on 16 February 198882 it was "deemed appropriate" by the Thai authorities to 
issue a further Proclamation relating to Thailand's EEZ in the Gulf of Thailand adjacent 
to that of Malaysia. 83 This Proclamation ensures that Thailand's claimed EEZ 
encompasses the whole of the Thai-Malaysian JDA and therefore balances Malaysia's 
Peta Baru. The Thai Proclamation includes a list of eight geographical coordinates. 
Point 1 coincides with the terminus of the Thai-Malaysian land boundary on the coast. 
Point 2 matches the seaward point given in the Thai-Malaysian territorial sea treaty (see 
Section 6.2.2) and therefore also Point i) of their Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) on the continental shelf (see Section 6.2.3). Points 3 and 4 and consistent with 
Points ii) and iii) of the same MoU with the latter point also matching the coordinates of 
Point A of the Thai-Malaysian JDA (see Section 6.2.4). Points 5-8 of the 1988 
Proclamation coincide with Points G, F, E and D respectively of the JDA which 
constitute the eastern limit of the joint development area. Thailand only made the extent 
of its EEZ claim explicit with regard to the lateral delimitation with Malaysia and has 
remained silent concerning the limits of its EEZ claims elsewhere in the Gulf of 
Thailand. 84 
5.5.4 Vietnam 
Vietnam's Statement of 12 May 1977 provides, in Article 3, a definition of Vietnam's 
EEZ as being: 
82 
83 
84 
... adjacent to the Vietnamese territorial sea and forms with it a 200 nautical 
mile zone from the baseline used to measure the breadth of Vietnam's territorial 
sea. 
B.E. 2531. 
Thailand's action was also prompted by concerns over conflicts with Malaysia over fisheries 
rights (Kittichaisaree, 1990a: 318) (see Section 7.8). 
However, Kittischaisaree (1990: 318) has stated that prior to the 1988 Proclamation "it had been 
tacitly understood among the public that the coordinates of the Thai continental shelf also 
represented the Thai EEZ boundary." Similarly, referring to all the littoral states' claims, 
McDorman (1990: 44) has observed that it had been "generally assumed" that EEZ claims 
"parallel" earlier claims to continental shelf "where the outer limits for each state's claim has 
been determined by the application of the equidistance principle." According to Haller-Trost 
(1991: 218), Malaysia subsequently protested the Thai EEZ extension. 
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No coordinates or map have subsequently been issued to define the limits of Vietnam's 
exclusive economic zone claim. 
Summary 
All four of the Gulf of Thailand littoral states have claimed exclusive economic zones 
(EEZs) using very similar terminology in line with the terms laid down in Part V of the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (see Section 2.4.7). None of the states 
concerned has, however, specified the precise limits of its claimed EEZs in full. 
The likely explanation for this reticence is the fact that all four states have in any 
case made claims to continental shelf within the Gulf of Thailand and established the 
limits of these claims through geographic coordinates and illustrative maps. These 
claims to extended maritime jurisdiction which predate the EEZ claims, and, indeed, the 
adoption of the concept of the EEZ in 1982, serve the coastal states purposes well 
enough and there was therefore little perceived need at the time the EEZ claims were 
promulgated to establish specific EEZ claim limits. 
This suspicion is to some extent borne out by the exception to the general rule 
for EEZ claims in the Gulf of Thailand- Thailand's EEZ claim relating to Malaysia. As 
previously noted, in 1988 Thailand defined the extent of its EEZ claim in relation to its 
adjacent maritime boundary delimitation with Malaysia. The significance of this 
supplementary decree was that it served to establish a Thai EEZ claim encompassing the 
entirety of the Thai-Malaysian JDA, only part of which fell within the scope of 
Thailand's 1973 continental shelf claim. Thailand did not, however, specify the limits 
of its EEZ claim elsewhere within the Gulf of Thailand, for instance in relation to its 
delimitations with Cambodia and Vietnam. Thus, it was only in relation to a 
delimitation scenario where Thailand wanted to establish an EEZ claim beyond its 
existing continental shelf claim that the precise limits of its EEZ claim were defined. 
This experience supports the view that the Gulf of Thailand states regard their 
continental shelf claims dating from the 1970s as representing the outer limits of their 
extended maritime space, be it to continental shelf or EEZ. Nevertheless, it must be 
acknowledged that states can, as Thailand has demonstrated in relation to its 
delimitation with Malaysia, advance a claim to an EEZ beyond a previously established 
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claim to continental shelf. This must, however, be regarded as something of a rare 
occurrence. 
85 
In the context of the Gulf of Thailand, the possibility of Thailand claiming the 
whole of the area of the Thai-Malaysian JDA aside, the claiming of EEZ rights beyond 
existing continental shelf claims must be considered unlikely. This analysis is further 
supported by the fact that the continental shelf claims made by the littoral states in the 
1970s were themselves constructed in such a manner as to give the claimant states the 
maximum possible advantage. It is therefore difficult to envisage EEZ claims being 
made beyond these already maximalist claim lines. Having made this observation, 
however, it should be noted that the straight baseline claims of Cambodia, Thailand and 
Vietnam have all undergone major revisions since these three states made their 
continental shelf claims. It is therefore conceivable that any contemporary expression of 
an EEZ claim could take these developments into account leading to an EEZ claim 
beyond the existing continental shelf limit. On balance, however, it is this author's 
view that the Gulf of Thailand states' claimed EEZs are generally likely to conform to 
the limits of their previously declared continental shelf claims. 
85 A recent example of a water column boundary differing from a defined continental shelf limit is 
the boundary defined by the Australia-Indonesia treaty of 14 March 1997 (see Commonwealth of 
Australia, 1997). 
249 
Chapter 6 
Maritime Boundary Agreements in the Gulf of Thailand 
6.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter dealt with the Gulf of Thailand littoral states' claims to maritime 
space and in particular their overlapping jurisdictional claims. This chapter will analyse 
existing maritime boundary agreements concluded between the Gulf of Thailand states. 
Such agreements have proved to be either in the form of a definitive maritime boundary 
or that of joint zone arrangements of an interim nature designed to shelve or postpone 
disputes over conflicting claims until a later date whilst allowing mutually beneficial 
resource exploitation activities to proceed. 
6.2 Malaysia - Thailand Agreements 
6.2.1 Overview 
Malaysia and Thailand concluded a treaty on the delimitation of their territorial seas on 
24 October 1979. On the same date, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was 
signed between the two sides. This MoU provided for a partial delimitation of the 
parties' continental shelf boundary extending sea wards from the terminus of the 
territorial sea boundary in the Gulf of Thailand. A partial delimitation only was 
achieved because of disagreements and overlapping continental shelf claims beyond a 
point approximately 29nm offshore. 1 
The Thai-Malaysian overlapping claims area was, however, subject to another 
MoU which predates the territorial sea and continental shelf agreements in the Gulf by 
just over eight months, having been concluded on 21 February 1979. This related to the 
establishment of a Joint Authority to manage the exploitation of seabed resources in a 
defined joint development area (JDA), corresponding to the area of the parties' 
Kittichaisaree, 1987: 100-101. However, the two sides were eventually able to agree to a partial 
continental shelf delimitation. The actual distance measured on British Admiralty Chart 3961, 
1987 edition at 1:240,000 scale was 38.1nm from the terminus of the Thai-Malaysian land 
boundary on the coast (see Section 6.2.2). 
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overlapping continental shelf claims beyond 38nm offshore. A further agreement 
concerning the constitution and other matters relating to the establishment of the Joint 
Authority was finally concluded on 30 May 1990, over 11 years after the first MoU was 
signed. 
Although the agreements relating to Thailand's and Malaysia's territorial sea and 
continental shelf boundaries in the Gulf of Thailand were signed after the MoU 
establishing a joint development area in the Gulf, these accords will be considered as 
they progress offshore rather than chronologically. This approach not only seems 
logical but is supported by the fact that it is understood that Malaysia and Thailand in 
fact reached agreement in principle on their maritime boundaries as far offshore as 
38nm as early as 1972.2 Furthermore, although the impasse in negotiations caused by 
overlapping claims further than 38nm offshore eventually resulted in the adoption of a 
joint zone formula, and this was embodied in an MoU eight months before the 
delimitation agreements relating to areas further inshore, the Joint Authority charged 
with governing the Thai-Malaysian joint development area began to be implemented 
only with the additional agreement of 1990. 
6.2.2 Malaysia- Thailand: Territorial Sea Treaty 
The Treaty between the Kingdom of Thailand and [the Republic of] Malaysia Relating 
to the Delimitation of the Territorial Seas of the Two Countries of 24 October 1979 
defines territorial sea boundaries between the two countries on both sides of Malaysian 
peninsula in both the Straits of Malacca and Gulf of Thailand (see Appendix 10).3 The 
agreement relating to the two countries' territorial sea boundary in the Straits of 
Malacca is beyond the scope of this study. In the Gulf of Thailand, however, the treaty 
provides, in Article ll(l), for a "straight line" boundary from a point with coordinates 
6° 14'.5N, 102° 05'.6 E to a point with coordinates 6° 27'.5 N, 102° 10'.0 E. Although 
no definition is given as to what is meant by a "straight line" between the two points, 
the text of the treaty states that the coordinates and points referred to were derived from 
British Admiralty Chart 3961, a copy of which was annexed to the original treaty 
2 Kittichaisaree (1987: 100) states that: "In 1972, Thai and Malaysian negotiators were able to 
agree on a lateral continental shelf boundary in the south-western part of the Gulf of Thailand 
up to approximately 29nm offshore." No mention of a territorial sea boundary was made. The 
author writes with authority, given his senior position with the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
The treaty entered into force on 15 July 1982 following the exchange of instruments of 
ratification. 
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(Article II(2)).4 As far as straight lines are concerned, therefore, it can be inferred from 
the text of the treaty and from the fact that a copy of Chart 396 I was annexed to the 
agreement, that the lines linking the points referred to in the treaty are loxodrome (or 
rhumb) lines. 
However, a significant caveat concerning the precise location of the boundary is 
provided in Article III(l) whereby it is specified that "the actual location at sea of the 
points mentioned ... shall be determined by a method to be mutually agreed upon by the 
competent authorities of the two Parties. " Such competent authorities are specifically 
defined as being the Director of National Mapping and the Director of the Hydrographic 
Department, or persons authorised by them, for Malaysia and Thailand respectively. 
This provision was apparently included because of the problems experienced by the 
parties in the precise fixing of locations elsewhere, particularly in the Straits of 
Malacca.5 Politically the two sides wanted to conclude an agreement. As a result, 
technical difficulties were left to one side to be resolved at an unspecified later date (see 
Section 7 .9). 
Article V of the treaty also provides that in the event of a dispute ansmg 
concerning the interpretation or implementation of the treaty, any such dispute "shall be 
settled peacefully by consultation or negotiation. " 
According to the treaty text, coupled with the parties' territorial sea legislation 
(see Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3), therefore, the boundary delimited by the Thai-Malaysian 
treaty of 24 October 1979 is designed as a straight line to a point I 2nm offshore from 
the terminus of the two states' land boundary on the coast of the Gulf of Thailand. The 
latter point also coincides with the first point, Point i), of the partial continental shelf 
boundary located further offshore which was delimited by agreement between the 
parties on the same date (see Section 6.2.3). 
No straight baselines were relevant to this delimitation, because at the time the 
treaty was concluded Thailand's straight baseline 'Area 4', which ends at the Thai-
Malaysian land boundary terminus on the coast, had not been declared and both 
Thailand's other straight baselines and Malaysia's straight baselines were ignored (see 
Section 5.2, Figure 5.1).6 Similarly, although both states boast a wealth of islands off 
4 British Admiralty Chart 3961, at a scale of 1 :240,000. The latest ( 1987) edition of this chart 
indicates that it is based on Indian Datum (1975). 
Charney and Alexander, 1993: 1,101. 
Analysis based on plotting coordinates from agreement on British Admiralty Chart 3961, 1987 
edition at a scale of 1 :240,000. 
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their Gulf of Thailand coasts, none is close to the delimitation area and none therefore 
had a influence on the alignment of the boundary. 7 These factors, coupled with the 
relatively smooth nature of the coastline concerned, resulted in what is believed to have 
been a fairly straightforward delimitation process. 8 Thus, although the text of the treaty 
does not explicitly state that a particular method of delimitation was employed, the 
straight line boundary which was adopted, in effect amounts to a simplified equidistance 
line.9 
Two anomalies 
When the coordinates outlined in the treaty are plotted on the latest edition of British 
Admiralty Chart 3961, 10 however, two problems become apparent. 11 These relate to the 
terminus of the land boundary on the coast (and thus the starting point for the territorial 
sea boundary) and the length of the boundary extending offshore. 
The alignment of the modern Malaysia-Thailand land boundary across peninsula 
Malaysia is based on a treaty dated 10 March 1909 between Siam (Thailand) and the 
United Kingdom (the colonial power controlling Malaysia at that time) 12, or, more 
precisely, a Boundary Protocol which was annexed to the treaty (Appendix 11 ). In 
relation to the easternmost part of the boundary, that abutting the Gulf of Thailand and 
thus of direct relevance to the present discussion, the Boundary Protocol states that from 
the source of the main stream of the Sungei Golok in the interior: 
9 
10 
II 
12 
Thence the frontier follows the thalweg of the main stream of the Sungei Golok 
to the sea at a place called Kuala Tabar (see Appendix 11). 
As mentioned in Section 4.3, the islands associated with the mouth of the river at Kuala Besar 
can be considered to be part of the mainland coast. This observation is based on analysis of the 
relevant coordinates plotted on British Admiralty Chart 3961, 1987 edition at 1:240,000 scale. 
The relevant report in Charney and Alexander's Maritime Boundaries (1993: I ,091-1 ,097) 
indicates that negotiations relating to the continental shelf were more complex and time-
consuming (see Section 6.2.3) but that once those deliberations were complete "it was relatively 
easy" for the parties to conclude both the territorial sea and (partial) continental shelf 
delimitations. 
According to the report in Charney and Alexander (1993: 1,093), "Clearly ... the delimitation 
method is equidistance. " 
The edition of Chart 3961 used was published in 1987 with minor corrections as recently as 
1998. This was, of course, not the same edition as that used at the time of delimitation and 
possible changes to the coastline cannot be ruled out (see below). 
These have been identified in most detail by Prescott (1998: 34), but are also alluded to in the 
report on this boundary included in Charney and Alexander ( 1993: I ,091-1 ,098) and discussed 
by Haller-Trost (1998: 72-73). 
For an overview of the development of this boundary see Prescott, 1975: 418-427. 
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However, when the coordinates provided by the October 1972 treaty establishing the 
starting point for the Thai-Malaysian territorial sea boundary are plotted on Chart 3961, 
it appears that this point is not located on the thalweg 13 of the Golok river where the 
river meets the sea as might have been expected from reference to the 1909 Boundary 
Protocol. Instead, the starting point for the territorial sea boundary is located slightly 
inshore of the mouth of the river in the estuary. Consequently, the territorial sea 
boundary described by the 1972 treaty appears to pass over a narrow strip of land 
territory (formed by the spit at the mouth of the river) before reaching the Gulf of 
Thailand. If this is indeed the case, this would cut off part of a spit on the northern bank 
of the mouth of the Golok river and thus, according to the 1909 Protocol, part of Thai 
territory since it is on the northern side of the Golok thalweg line, leaving it on the 
Malaysian side of the territorial sea boundary line (see the extract of British Admiralty 
Chart 3961 included here as Figure 6.1 ). 
The other anomaly concerns the length of the territorial sea boundary line 
itself. 14 Both Malaysia and Thailand have claimed 12nm-breadth territorial seas (see 
Section 6.2). Nevertheless, the distance between the points identified by coordinates in 
the 1972 treaty is 13.48nm - thus clearly exceeding Article 3 of UNCLOS's 12nm 
territorial sea breadth limit and both states' own claims. 15 
Possible explanations 
Possible explanations for these anomalies generally relate to the instability of the 
coastline in question and the meandering nature of the Golok river leading to shifts in 
the location of the river's thalweg and mouth on the coast. 16 The eastern coast of 
peninsula Malaysia, including the Thai-Malaysian border area, is characterised by sandy 
beaches and a "barrier-beach" or "beach ridge" complex known locally as 
13 
14 
15 
16 
The International Hydrographic Organization (1993: 27) has defined the term thalweg as follows: 
"The line of maximum depth along a river channel. It may also refer to the line of maximum 
depth along a river valley or in a lake." 
Prescott, 1998: 34. 
The distance of the terminus of the Thai-Malaysian territorial sea boundary offshore from its 
landward starting point was measured on British Admiralty Chart 3961, 1987 edition, at a scale 
of 1 :240,000. It is also worth noting that as the delimitation is not strictly equidistant, the point in 
question (and the line as a whole) is somewhat closer to the nearest points on the Thai coast than 
Malaysia's. Thus the seaward point of the territorial sea boundary is 13.48nm from the coastal 
starting point of the boundary (which is also the nearest Malaysian point) but is 12.96nm from 
the nearest Thai coastal point at Tak Bai. 
Prescott (1998: 34), Charney and Alexander (1993: 1,091-1,098) and Haller-Trost (1998: 72) all 
agree on this point. 
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permatang. 17 This coastline is subject to northeastern monsoon storms and swells 
emanating from the South China Sea and is therefore susceptible to erosion. 18 Coupled 
with these forces is the deposition of sediment from the Golok river system, with the 
development of a spit at the mouth of the river being a telling sign (see Figure 6.2). 
Thus, in its lower reaches the Golok river meanders across an undulating coastal plain 
of sandy beaches and permatang, its course becoming braided and changing frequently 
under the influence of annual storms and floods. 19 Additionally, the sediments carried 
by the river are redistributed along the coast by the forces of the ocean environment. 
These factors conspire to make the coastline in question unstable. 
This is clearly demonstrated by a dispute which arose between Malaysia and 
Thailand in 1958-60. Lee Yong Leng reports that the Thai-Malaysian international 
boundary ran through an opening between two spits at the Golok river mouth. 20 In 1958 
the extension of the spits closed this opening and thus denied local Malaysian fishermen 
access to the Gulf of Thailand save through the Thai side of the river. As a result, the 
Malaysian fishermen were cut off from their fishing grounds unless they were willing to 
pay the Thai Immigration Department stamp fees and comply with Thai regulations. 
The dispute was only resolved when, fortuitously, flood waters broke through the spit in 
1960 and reopened Malaysia's access to the sea from its side of the river. 21 Changes in 
the vicinity of the Golok river mouth in the 1955-71 period are illustrated in Figure 6.2. 
The first point of the territorial sea boundary 
The instability of the coastline and river outlined above provides a sound explanation 
for the first of the anomalies identified - the location of the first point of the territorial 
sea agreement within the estuary of the river. Kittichaisaree acknowledges this, stating 
that "sand dunes have been continuously forming at the mouth of the Golok River" and, 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Bird and Schwartz, 1985: 771-795; Lee Yong Leng, 1982: 22; Bird, 1985: 114. Bird notes that 
7.7% of the east coast of Malaysia is composed of steep sectors without beaches with the 
remaining 657km consisting of beaches. 
Bird and Schwartz, 1985: 789. 
Lee Yong Leng (1982: 22-23) notes that while it was agreed that the thalweg would form the 
boundary in 1909, it has moved back and forth over time and no detailed surveys of its position 
were made in order to establish it as a precise boundary. As a result of this uncertainty the 
Kelantan State government on the Malaysian side of the boundary adopted the "midstream" as 
the boundary, but this too changes over time. An example of the resulting problems cited was 
when a meander of the Golok encroached on Thai territory leading the Kelantan authorities to 
inadvertently designate Thai territory for the planting of rubber. The Malaysian side later 
accepted the old course of the Golok as the boundary and apologised to the Thais for the 
unintentional encroachment. 
Lee Yong Leng, 1982: 23. 
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Figure 6.2 Changes at the Golok River Mouth 
Source: Lee Yong Leng, 1982. 
as a result, the initial point of the boundary "might not be the thalweg at the river mouth 
as intended. "22 This theory was largely confirmed by Admiral Thanom Charoenlaph, 
formerly Chief Hydrographer of the Royal Thai Navy, who stated that, when the treaty 
was negotiated, the first point of the territorial sea boundary between Malaysia and 
Thailand was indeed "the deepest point of the Golok River at that time. "23 It seems 
clear that this has not remained the case. 
Kittichaisaree goes on to suggest the construction of a dam on the river to 
control currents and thus resolve this problem?4 Prescott derides this plan on the 
grounds of expense, lack of guaranteed success and the possibility of unforeseen 
erosion/deposition elsewhere along the coast as a result of such construction. 25 Instead, 
Prescott proposes a considerably less expensive, not to say risk-free, approach based on 
analogous Mexican-United States experience in the Gulf of Mexico. Here the parties 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Lee Yong Leng, 1982: 23. 
Kittichaisaree, 1987: 49. 
Interview with Admiral Thanom Charoenlaph (Rtd.), Bangkok, 18 December 1998. 
Kittichaisaree, 1987: 49. 
Prescott, 1998: 35. 
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were faced with a similarly errant river, the Rio Grande. The innovative solution 
applied in the Mexico-United States treaty of 1970, establishing their territorial sea 
boundaries, was for the first point of the boundary to remain the midpoint of the mouth 
of the river, moving as and when the river itself moved. From this migratory point the 
boundary proceeds in a straight line to a fixed point approximately 2,000 feet offshore 
which acts as a hinge about which the landwards portion of the territorial sea boundary 
shifts.Z6 This type of approach to the problem of delimiting a boundary seaward of an 
ambulatory river mouth, which avoids the necessity of major engineering works aimed 
at stabilising the coast concerned (itself something far from being a sure-fire success), 
strikes this author as being both a cost-effective and elegant solution. 
Length of the territorial sea boundary line 
The instability of the coastline in the vicinity of the Thai-Malaysian land boundary 
terminus on the coast provides a rather less convincing rationale for the second anomaly 
identified, however. This is the oddity of the Thai-Malaysian territorial sea boundary 
being almost one and half nautical miles longer (13.48nm) than the international 
standard of 12nm which is also the breadth of territorial sea claimed by the two states 
involved (see Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3). The force of monsoon storms and swells from 
the South China Sea tend to move sediments deposited by rivers such as the Golok 
along the coast in what is termed "littoral drift" generating features such as spits, rather 
than allowing for the extensive progradation of the coast seawards which could account 
for the 1.48nm discrepancy detected in the length of the boundary line.27 Bird has noted 
that alongside long-term progradation of beaches and the creation of new beach ridges 
along the coast, the erosional forces described also lead to retrogradation where beach-
ridge plains previously formed are "trimmed back. "28 This process appears to be 
happening in relation to the coastline in the vicinity of the Thai-Malaysian border on the 
Gulf of Thailand with spits being repeatedly developed, then breached and eroded away 
without a significant advance in the coastline offshore. 
Instead, the extended territorial sea boundary appears to have resulted from a 
technical problem relating to the method of delimitation chosen. Admiral Charoenlaph, 
who was involved in the negotiations with Malaysia which resulted in the delimitation 
26 
27 
Charney and Alexander, 1993: 439. 
Bird and Schwartz (1985: 789) state that littoral drift along the eastern coast of peninsula 
Malaysia "can he significant." 
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in question, suggested that the problem was the consequence of applying, or perhaps to 
this author's mind misapplying, the arcs of circle method of generating a delimitation 
line.Z9 As this method is a technically precise one, it remains something of a mystery as 
to why the two states should have adopted a territorial sea boundary so demonstrably at 
odds with their own maritime legislation and the relevant provision of UNCLOS.30 It is 
to be hoped that this clear, albeit relatively minor, breach of the international law of the 
sea is in due course corrected, most obviously by amending the Thai-Malaysian 
continental shelf agreement such that it applies to the offending 1.48nm of territorial sea 
boundary beyond 12nm. Such an action could be combined with an amendment to the 
territorial sea boundary to take into account the unstable nature of the coastline m 
question, perhaps with the 'floating point and hinge' method suggested by Prescott. 
6.2.3 Malaysia- Thailand: Continental Shelf Memorandum of Understanding 
The Memorandum of Understanding between Malaysia and the Kingdom of Thailand 
on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Boundary between the Two Countries in the 
Gulf of Thailand was signed on 24 October 1979 simultaneously with the treaty 
establishing territorial sea boundaries (Section 6.1.2). 31 The MoU defines a partial 
continental shelf boundary in the Gulf of Thailand between the countries concerned 
which is 25.1nm (46.5km) in length (see Appendix 12).32 The coordinates provided for 
the first point of the continental shelf boundary (point i)) coincide with those for the 
terminal point of the Thai-Malaysian territorial sea agreement in the Gulf of Thailand,33 
while the coordinates for the final point of the delimitation (point ii)) correspond to 
those of point A of the Thai-Malaysian JDA (see Section 6.2.4 and Figure 6.1 ). In 
addition to being signed and ratified on the same dates, the treaty on territorial sea and 
the MoU on the continental shelf between the two countries bear several similarities to 
one another in terms of their provisions. 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
Bird, 1985: 115. 
Interview with Admiral Thanom Charoenlaph (Rtd.), Bangkok, 18 December 1998. 
Article 3 of UNCLOS stipulates that every state has the right to establish the breadth of its 
territorial sea "up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles" (see Section 2.4.3). 
The MoU on the continental shelf boundary entered into force on 15 July 1982 following the 
exchange of instruments of ratification - the same date that the territorial sea treaty also entered 
into force. 
Measured on British Admiralty chart 3961, 1987 edition, at a scale of 1:240,000. 
6° 27' .5 N, 102° 1 0' .0 E 
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The partial continental shelf boundary consists of three points, i)-iii), linked by 
what are described in the text of the MoU as "straight lines." As is the case with the 
territorial sea boundary described in Section 6.2.4, no further definition of what is meant 
by the term "straight" in this context is supplied in the text of the accord. Once again, 
however, the MoU includes provisions which parallel those in the territorial sea treaty of 
the same date. Article II(2) of the MoU corresponds verbatim to Article III(l) of the 
territorial sea treaty, providing that the actual location of the points laid out in the MoU 
will be determined by mutual agreement between the competent authorities of the 
parties?4 Article V of the MoU also essentially equates to the same article in the 
territorial sea treaty, providing that in the event of any dispute over the interpretation or 
implementation of the provisions of the MoU they will be settled "peacefully by 
consultation or negotiation" between the parties. 
The continental shelf MoU does include two provisiOns which differ 
significantly from the territorial sea treaty. Article II of the MoU contains an explicit 
statement that the governments concerned "shall continue negotiations to complete the 
delimitation of the continental shelf boundary" between them in the Gulf of Thailand. 
This is a clear recognition of the partial nature of the delimitation covered by the MoU 
and the interim or temporary nature of the joint development area agreed between the 
two countries further offshore (see Section 6.2.4). Article II also serves to emphasise 
that neither state has been willing to compromise in principle over its sovereign rights to 
the continental shelf seawards of the terminus of the continental shelf boundary 
delimited under the MoU, the joint development area agreement notwithstanding. 
Indeed, the very use of the term "Memorandum of Understanding" in this context 
indicates unfinished business and incomplete delimitation of the continental shelf 
between the two states. 
Article IV of the MoU contains provisions designed to address the possibility of 
the discovery of an oil or gas deposit straddling the boundary line. In such an 
eventuality, the two sides undertake to consult one another with the aim of reaching an 
agreement whereby "all expenses incurred and benefits derived [from the deposit] shall 
be equitably shared." This is a fairly standard provision included· in most continental 
34 The same "competent authorities" defined in the Malaysia-Thailand territorial sea treaty were 
included in the MoU on the continental shelf: the Director of National Mapping and the Director 
of the Hydrographic Department, or persons authorised by them, on behalf of Malaysia and 
Thailand respectively. 
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shelf agreements, particularly since the concept of unitisation was developed in the 
North Sea. 35 
The boundary delimited by the Thai-Malaysian MoU of 24 October 1979 IS 
effectively a straight line continuation of the territorial sea boundary of the same date, 
with a slight deviation between Points i) and ii) which are in close proximity to one 
another (Figure 6.1 ). As was the case for the territorial sea boundary detailed in Section 
6.2.2, and for the same reasons, no straight baselines were relevant to the delimitation 
(see Section 4.3 and 4.4). Similarly, no islands influenced the course of the boundary. 
Although the MoU does not mention that a particular delimitation methodology 
was applied, the lack of straight baseline or island considerations and the generally 
uncomplex nature of the coastline relevant to the delimitation, made the adoption of a 
simplified equidistance line a straightforward decision. 36 Indeed, because of their 
reasonably uncomplicated nature, the alignment of Thai-Malaysian maritime boundaries 
in the Gulf of Thailand as far offshore as around 38nm distance from the coast was 
apparently agreed in principle as early as 1972.37 Further offshore a dispute, particularly 
over the role of islands, caused an impasse in continental shelf negotiations and an 
overlap of claims, eventually leading to the creation of a Thai-Malaysian Joint 
Development Area (JDA) (see Section 6.2.4). 
It is worth noting that the coordinates of Points i)-iii) in the MoU conform to 
those of Thailand's I 973 Continental Shelf Declaration of 18 May 1973 (Appendix 8) 
and also match the coordinates of the turning points of Malaysia's continental shelf 
claim as expressed in the Malaysian Peta Baru of 1979 (Appendix 7) (see Section 5.2.2 
and 5.3.2). Thus, the coordinates of Points i), ii) and iii) are identical to those of Thai 
Declaration Points I 7, 16 and 15 and Malaysian Turning Points 47, 46 and 45 
respectively. If Kittichaisaree's contention is correct that the Thai-Malaysian 
boundaries as far offshore as the terminus of the boundary delimited by the MoU under 
discussion were in fact agreed upon in principle as early as 1972, then it may very well 
be that subsequent state claims - the Thai Declaration and the Malaysian Peta Baru -
simply conformed to the understandings reached during those earlier negotiations. 
35 
36 
Robson, 1995:6-7 and 9-11. 
It should be noted here that although the line in question broadly represents an equidistance line 
and has been described as such (e.g. it is described as a "simple equidistant latera/line" in 
Charney and Alexander (1993: 1, I 0 1)), it is in fact slightly closer to the Thai than to the 
Malaysian coast is plotted on British Admiralty Chart 3961, 1987 edition at a scale of 1 :240,000. 
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The diversion in the boundary line between points i) and ii) 
This does not, however, explain why Points i) and ii), only approximately 750 metres 
apart,38 are so close together. No obvious reason for this slight zigzag in the boundary is 
readily apparent. The MoU provides, in Article I(2), that the coordinates of Point ii) 
were determined "by reference to" a point with coordinates 6° 16'.6 N, 102° 03'.8 E 
(see Figure 6.1), this being referred to as the ''former position of Kuala Tabar" under 
the UK-Siam Boundary Protocol of 1909 (see Appendix 11). 
However, although the Boundary Protocol does refer to the Golok river meeting 
the sea "at a place called Kuala Tabar", no coordinates were mentioned (see Appendix 
11). It is also worth recalling that the 1909 Protocol defined the eastern terminus of the 
boundary to be the thalweg of the Golok river rather than at Kuala Tabar itself (see 
Section 6.2.2). At first glance it is, therefore, difficult to see how the former position of 
Kuala Tabar relates to Point ii), 13.5nm offshore.39 Furthermore, although both the Thai 
Continental Shelf Declaration and the Malaysian Peta Baru coordinates match those of 
Points i)-iii), no explanation for the diversion between Points i) and ii) is provided in 
either of these documents. This slight diversion in the boundary alignment is therefore 
something of a mystery and has not been dealt with in detail in the relevant literature.40 
In fact, the phrase the ''former position of Kuala Tabar" under the 1909 
Boundary Protocol, used to establish the position of Point ii) in the continental shelf 
MoU is crucial. As previously demonstrated with regard to the Thai-Malaysian 
territorial waters boundary, the coastline in the vicinity of the two states border is 
unstable and the position of the mouth of the Golok River on the Gulf of Thailand has 
changed frequently over the years (see Section 6.2.2). Furthermore, according to 
Admiral Thanom Charoenlaph, the former position of the mouth of the Golok River was 
"a little to the northwest" of its location when the Thai-Malaysian agreements on 
territorial waters and continental shelf were negotiated.41 It is therefore likely that when 
the ''former position of Kuala Tabar" is mentioned, what was really meant was the 
former position of the mouth of the Golok River in the vicinity of Kuala Tabar. The 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
Kittichaisaree, 1987: I 00. 
Prescott, 1998: 36. 
The assertion in the report on this boundary included in Charney and Alexander (1993: 1,099-
1, 123) that: "For the location of Point ii, the parties agreed on a point formerly used in the 
Boundary Protocol annexed to the Treaty between Siam and Great Britain of 10 March 1909. 
As a result, the boundary line has a tiny zigzag" fails to make a connection between the location 
of Kuala Tabar on land and Point ii) offshore and is therefore rather unhelpful, if not misleading. 
Prescott, 1998: 36. 
Interview with Admiral Thanom Charoenlaph (Rtd.), Bangkok, 18 December 1998. 
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'kink' in the continental shelf delimitation between Points i) and ii) is therefore believed 
to reflect the fact that the old position o~ the mouth of the Golok River on the Gulf of 
Thailand was northwest of its location at the time the boundary was negotiated. The 
alteration in the boundary line compensates Malaysia for accepting the modern location 
of the river mouth on the coast as the starting point of the territorial sea boundary 
somewhat to the southeast of its former location. 
6.2.4 Malaysia- Thailand: Joint Development Area 
Beyond what was to become designated Point iii) of the continental shelf MoU, situated 
at 38.1nm offshore, delimitation negotiations between Malaysia and Thailand in the 
1970s reached a stalemate. The key reason for this deadlock was a dispute, which 
remains unresolved in mid-1999, concerning the status of an offshore insular feature, Ko 
Losin, and its potential impact on claims to maritime jurisdiction. The position of Point 
iii) is, however, not consistent with a tripoint between the mainland coasts of the two 
states and Ko Losin. Instead, it is located approximately 2nm (3.6km) nearer to Ko 
Losin than to the mainland coasts of Malaysia and Thailand.42 This indicates that the 
two sides were able to narrow their area of overlapping claims in the course of their 
continental shelf delimitation negotiations, albeit marginally. It is, however, noteworthy 
that Thailand's 1973 continental shelf claim cuts through the area that eventually 
became the joint zone rather than forming its eastern limit. It seems clear that once 
negotiations were initiated Thailand extended its claim to give full weight to Ko Losin 
which it had not done in 1973, and that in due course Malaysia accepted this extended 
claim as the basis for the eastern limit of the joint area. 
Ko Losin is located 39nm offshore and is described in the British Admiralty's 
Pilot for the area as being "llh m (5 ft) high and steep-to all round" with a light-beacon 
sited on it.43 Thailand claims that Ko Losin is a fully-fledged island capable of being 
used as a basepoint for its claims to continental shelf and EEZ. In contrast, Malaysia 
maintains that this small and isolated feature is no more than a 'rock' as defined under 
Article 121(3) of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (see Section 3.5). As such 
Thailand would be able to claim no more than 12nm-breadth territorial sea and 
contiguous zones from Ko Losin and the islet would be an inappropriate basepoint for 
Thailand's continental shelf and EEZ claims. 
42 
43 
As measured on British Admiralty Chart 3961, 1987 edition at a scale of 1:240,000. 
Hydrographer of the Navy, 1978: 85. 
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There is no doubt that Ko Losin, a tiny, barren, unpopulated feature, is little 
more than a danger to navigation (hence the light-beacon) and can legitimately be 
defined as a rock within the meaning and spirit of Article 121 (3). Nevertheless, the 
uncertainties over how a rock is to be distinguished from an island proper, as 
highlighted in Section 3.5, obfuscated the issue and led to deadlock in continental shelf 
delimitation negotiation between Malaysia and Thailand. 
Beyond 38nm from the coast, neither side proved willing to compromise on this 
issue in principle, resulting in overlapping continental shelf claims (see Figures 5.1 and 
6.1) and stymied negotiations. Eventually, however, the two governments showed 
considerable flexibility in their approach to the dispute, while still reserving their 
original positions by agreeing to establish a jointly administered zone, encompassing the 
overlapping claims area.44 The purpose of the joint development area (JDA) so created 
is the joint exploration for and shared exploitation of seabed resources, particularly 
hydrocarbons, within the designated zone. 
The report on this agreement included in Charney and Alexander's Maritime 
Boundaries also suggests that another factor which made agreement on delimitation in 
the overlapping claims area problematic was the fact that Thailand had already awarded 
hydrocarbon concessions to oil companies in the area that was to become the JDA.45 
This may have been a complicating additional factor in negotiations (see below), but the 
contention over the role of Ko Losin in the delimitation was clearly the driving force 
behind the dispute. Indeed, it could be argued that the prospective nature of the seabed 
involved was a major factor in encouraging the parties to embark down the joint zone 
route in order to gain access to those resources and effectively shelve the sovereignty 
dispute.46 Conversely, the hydrocarbon resource potential of the overlapping claims 
area was a major factor in discouraging either side from wholly relinquishing its claim 
or defining a single compromise line for fear of subsequently discovering that the most 
or even all the oil and gas was located on the 'wrong' side of the line.47 
As a result, on 21 February 1979 the two sides signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Kingdom of Thailand and [the Republic of} Malaysia on the 
44 
45 
46 
It should be noted that the terminology of the agreement is at pains to stress that the issue of 
delimitation is by no means over or even 'shelved' and that both governments remain committed 
to continuing the search for delimitation agreement. 
Charney and Alexander, 1993: 1,100-1,101. 
Stormont and Townsend-Gault (1995: 65) note that decreased production from Thailand's giant 
Erawan gas field in the central Gulf of Thailand may have been the "determining factor" in 
"forcing" Thailand to proceed with joint development with Malaysia. 
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Establishment of a Joint Authority for the Exploitation of the Resources of the Sea-Bed 
in a Defined Area of the Continental Shelf of the Two Countries in the Gulf of Thailand 
(Appendix I3). It should be noted that the conclusion of this accord opened the way for 
the agreements on the territorial sea and continental shelf outlined in Sections 6.1.2 and 
6.1.3 to be implemented. 
In Article I of the MoU establishing the joint development area, the parties 
agreed that an area of overlapping claims existed and defined it by seven points joined 
by "straight lines." Coordinates were provided for each of the points designated A toG 
and the resulting wedge-shaped pentagon was plotted on the relevant part of British 
Admiralty Chart 2414 (1967 edition) annexed to the MoU. As in case for the 
agreements relating to the territorial sea and continental shelf between the two countries, 
no definition was provided for the term "straight lines." Chart 2414 is a nautical chart 
on the Mercator projection at a scale of I: I ,500,000 showing the entirety of the Gulf of 
Thailand. Straight lines drawn on this chart are loxodrome or rhumb lines rather than 
geodesic lines which represent the shortest path between two points on the earth's 
surface (see Section 7.9). Using the coordinates provided by MoU as a basis, the area of 
the Thai-Malaysian joint development area was calculated to be 2, 110nm2 (7 ,238km2) 
(Figure 6.3).48 
Article II of the MoU commits the two states to continue efforts to resolve the 
question of the remaining continental delimitation between them in the Gulf of Thailand 
(i.e. in the overlapping claims area that became the joint zone). This is to be achieved 
through negotiations, or any other mutually agreed methodology, in accordance with 
international law and "the spirit of friendship and in the interest of mutual security." 
This mirrors Article II of the MoU on the continental shelf (see Section 6.2.3, Appendix 
12) and illustrates that neither side has been willing to relinquish fully its jurisdictional 
claims to the overlapping claims area, regardless of the agreement to shelve the dispute 
and establish a joint development area. 
Article III consists of six paragraphs and sets out the fundamental elements it 
was envisaged would govern the joint zone. Article III( I) establishes the Malaysia-
Thailand Joint Authority "for the purpose of the exploration and exploitation of the 
non-living natural resources of the sea-bed and subsoil in the overlapping area for a 
period of fifty years" starting from when the MoU enters into force. According to this 
47 
48 
Ong, 1995: 79 
Calculated using DELMAR. 
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Figure 6.3 The Thai-Malaysian Joint Development Area (IDA) 
Source: Author's research. 
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article the Joint Authority so established will assume "all rights and responsibilities" of 
the two parties to the above end and, significantly, responsibility for "the development, 
control and administration" of the joint development area (Article ill(2)). A proviso 
that the Joint Authority's powers would have no bearing on pre-existing concessions 
granted in the area was also included. This was probably included at the insistence of 
Thailand in light of the licences already issued by Bangkok in the area prior to the 
conclusion of the agreement and subsequently was to prove a major factor in the 
problems encountered in the two sides' attempts to implement the MoU. 
Article ill(3) includes a rather skeletal outline of the composition of the Joint 
Authority - simply providing that there be two joint chairmen, one from each country, 
and an equal number of members from each country. It further provides that all costs 
and benefits resulting from Joint Authority-inspired activities in the joint development 
area would be equally borne and shared by the parties (Article ill(5)). The remainder of 
the article comprises a fairly standard statement that if a hydrocarbon deposit were to be 
discovered straddling the limits of the joint zone, the Joint Authority and the other party 
or parties concerned would consult with one another with a view to reaching an 
agreement whereby the straddling field could be effectively exploited with all expenses 
and benefits being equitably shared. 
Article IV provides that in terms of issues such as fishing, navigation, 
hydrographic and oceanographic surveys, the prevention of marine pollution and "other 
similar matters", both Malaysia and Thailand's rights and regulatory powers "shall 
extend to the joint development area" (Article IV(l)). The goal of a "combined and 
coordinated security arrangement" within the joint zone was also raised here (Article 
IV(2)). No limit to each state's jurisdiction over these issues was mentioned, 
presumably because overlapping jurisdictions were envisaged with each state's authority 
extending throughout the joint development area. 
In contrast, Article V, relating to criminal jurisdiction, serves to divide the joint 
zone into Thai and Malaysian sectors. An additional point was designated, Point X, 
midway along the line joining Points C and D (the seaward limit of the zone), and a line 
connecting Points A and X constructed. This arrangement divides the joint 
development area roughly into two,49 Thailand having criminal jurisdiction to the north 
49 As the zone is not symmetrical but is rather an uneven polygon, the two criminal jurisdiction 
sectors are unequal in area. Malaysia's zone is approximately l,038nm2 (3,560km2) and 
Thailand's 1,069nm2 (3,666km2) in area. Calculated using DELMAR. 
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of the line linking A and X and Malaysia to the south of it. Article V also made it plain, 
however, that such criminal jurisdiction zones: 
... shall not in any way be construed as indicating the boundary line of the 
continental shelf between the two countries in the joint development area ... nor 
shall such definition in any way prejudice the sovereign rights of either Party in 
the joint development area. 
Thus, the limited nature of the joint development arrangement m terms of its 
implications for the sovereign rights of the parties was reemphasised. 
Article VI states that if a continental shelf delimitation is achieved prior to the 
end of the 50-year period provided for in Article III, the Joint Authority will be wound 
up and its liabilities/assets split equally between the two parties. On the other hand, if 
no resolution of the continental shelf question in the overlapping claims area is reached 
by the expiry of the 50-year life of the agreement, "the existing arrangement shall 
continue." Finally, Articles VII and VIII which conclude the MoU, provide that any 
dispute over the MoU's terms or their implementation "shall be settled peacefully by 
consultation or negotiation" between the two sides (Article VII), and that the MoU 
comes into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification. The joint 
development MoU was duly ratified and the Joint Authority established on 24 October 
1979 - the same day that the treaty on the territorial sea and MoU on the continental 
shelf between the two states were also signed (see Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3). 
The Thai-Malaysian MoU of 21 February 1972 is a relatively concise document, 
comprising just eight articles, which essentially serves to lay out the basic principles for 
joint development (see Appendix 13). Even the choice of terminology used to refer to 
the accord- a "Memorandum of Understanding" rather than a formal "treaty" as was 
the case for the territorial sea delimitation signed in the same year - is revealing. 
Reference to an MoU as opposed to a treaty implies that the something less than a fully-
fledged agreement has been concluded. This is despite the fact that the MoU has all the 
characteristics one might expect of a binding bilateral treaty. 50 This has been taken to 
50 Ian Townsend-Gault (l990a: 102), who makes this observation, notes that the MoU was executed 
in duplicate, was signed by both parties and is subject to ratification by them, thus bearing "all 
the hallmarks" of a binding international agreement. He goes on to define an MoU as "usually 
the preferred means of expressing something less than a full agreement, but something rather 
more than a mere agreement to agree. A statement of principles which govern an undertaking, 
in other words." 
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reflect less than whole-hearted commitment to the agreement on the part of the 
governments concerned. 51 
In fact, it took just over II years before Malaysia and Thailand reached a further 
agreement designed to put the institutional mechanisms in place and address the many 
technicalities of putting the MoU into practice. This was achieved on 30 May 1990 with 
the conclusion of the Agreement between the Government of Malaysia and the 
Government of the Kingdom of Thailand on the Constitution and Other Matters 
Relating to the Establishment of the Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority. 
The 1990 Agreement makes no changes to the fundamental elements of joint 
development as laid out in the 1972 MoU. For example, the scope of the area to be 
subject to joint development, the overall purpose of the arrangement, the principle of the 
equitable sharing of costs and proceeds from joint activities and the peaceful resolution 
of any disputes arising all survive intact. What the 1990 Agreement does achieve is to 
add substance to the MoD's framework, laying out detailed rules and regulations 
concerning key practical issues. It is therefore a much weightier document than its MoU 
predecessor, consisting of 22 articles divided into seven distinct chapters (Appendix 14). 
The issues dealt with in the I990 Agreement include: the legal status and organisation of 
the Joint Authority (Chapter I); its powers and functions (Chapter 11);52 financial matters 
(Chapter ill); regulations governing the Joint Authority's relations with other 
organisations (Chapter IV); and, issues such as customs and excise and taxation 
(Chapter VI). 
One intriguing difference in emphasis between the joint development MoU and 
the 1990 Agreement that has been observed53 relates to a comparison of the texts of two 
parallel articles, one from each agreement. Under Article ill(2) of the former, the Joint 
Authority is tasked with assuming: 
... all rights and responsibilities on behalf of both Parties for the exploration and 
exploitation of the non-living natural resources of the sea-bed and subsoil in the 
overlapping claims area ... and also for the development, control and 
administration of the joint development area [emphasis added]. 
In subtle contrast, in the corresponding article in the 1990 Agreement, Article 7(1), it is 
merely stated that the Joint Authority: 
51 
52 
53 
Townsend-Gault, 1990a: 104. 
Including, in Article 8, a commitment to the use of production sharing contracts. 
Ong, 1990: 57-60; 1995: 87-88. 
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... shall control all exploration and exploitation of the non-living natural 
resources in the Joint Development Area and shall be responsible for the 
formulation of policies for the same [emphasis added]. 
Ong has interpreted the substitution of the word "control" for the phrase "development, 
control and administration" as evidence of a desire on the part of the governments 
concerned to limit strictly the autonomy of the Joint Authority, despite specifically 
giving it juridic personality, and thus decision-making and administrative powers, in 
Article 1 of the 1990 Agreement. According to Ong, the change in wording by the 
states concerned is designed to "retain some higher authority which would enable them 
to be the final arbiters of any policy-making dilemma with respect to the whole scenario 
of joint development in the area. "54 
As noted, it took over 11 years to transform the Thai-Malaysian MoU on joint 
development into a fully-fledged agreement enabling exploration and exploitation 
operations in the joint zone to proceed.55 Why was this the case? In fact there were 
multiple, interrelated, reasons for the delay. Arguably, the key reason for the slow 
progress on the implementation of the framework of provisions laid out in the MoU was 
lack of political will. This factor has been described as "the single most important 
ingredient" in realising and sustaining joint development agreements. 56 
The decision to embark on joint development in principle, as provided for in the 
February 1972 MoU, was itself a significant step. 57 This represented the maximum 
limit of the two states' willingness to compromise and cooperate over the sovereignty 
issue at that time. Such a bold initiative was therefore undertaken despite the 
reservations of sections of the governments and societies concerned and a backlash was, 
perhaps, inevitable. 
In the Thai-Malaysian case, the inspiration and enthusiasm for joint development 
which led to the conclusion of the MoU emanated primarily from the Prime Ministers of 
the two countries.58 It is hardly surprising that changes in government and the resulting 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
Ong, 1990: 59. 
Some commentators (e.g. Dzurek, 1998: 126) put the delay between signing the MoU on joint 
development and implementation at in excess of 13 years. This is probably due to the fact that 
agreement on exploration between the IDA's Joint Authority and international oil companies was 
not achieved until 21 April 1994 (Business Times, Bangkok, 24/4/94). 
Stormont and Townsend-Gault, 1995: 61. The same could probably be said of achieving success 
in any negotiation or agreement. 
Townsend-Gault, 1990a: 104. 
The MoU was signed by Thai Prime Minister General Kriangsak Chomanan and his Malaysian 
counterpart, Datuk Hussein Onn (Valencia, 1985a: 40, 1986: 668; Townsend-Gault, 1990a: 104). 
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removal of the individuals responsible for initiating the joint development project, 
significantly undercut the level of support for the scheme on the part of the governments 
concerned. The joint development MoU was therefore regarded as a priority of the 
previous regime and therefore liable to criticism and a waning in official commitment 
by its successor. This was particularly true of Thailand where there were protests that 
Bangkok should have negotiated more successfully and secured a greater share of the 
overlapping claims area - a sentiment emphasised the fact that the "lion's share" of the 
gas reserves discovered in the JDA are on the Thai side of an equidistance line. 59 This 
view was further reinforced by a Thai perception that with its burgeoning population 
and industrial base the country needed the resources of the overlapping claims area more 
than did Malaysia, there being only limited industrial development and a relatively small 
population, and consequentially limited energy requirements, in the northern Malay 
provinces in the vicinity of the border with Thailand.60 According to Valencia: 
... the major factor in the delay seems to be Thai governmental instability and the 
unwillingness of the politicians to risk their political future by being involved in 
a scheme that may fall out of favour with the next change of minister or 
government. 61 
Political backing for the joint development arrangement was also adversely affected by 
the impact of issues unrelated to continental shelf delimitation on bilateral relations. 
The most significant of these was the dispute over fishing rights. Since the introduction 
of the EEZ, Thailand's position on the Gulf of Thailand has been that of a 'zone-locked' 
state. That is, in order to reach maritime areas beyond the Gulf of Thailand, Thailand's 
shipping must traverse the EEZs of a combination of Cambodia, Malaysia and Vietnam. 
The movement of Thai fishing fleets through the Malaysian EEZ gave rise to Malay 
concerns that whilst apparently engaging in their right of transit through their EEZ, Thai 
fishermen were in fact continuing to conduct fishing operations en route, thus poaching 
Malaysia's resources. This led to a series of confrontations and acrimonious incidents 
between Malaysian coastguards and Thai fishermen (see Section 7.8). Malaysian 
accusations of poaching were countered by Thai protestations of innocence and counter-
accusations of the harassment and victimisation of its fishermen, who were perceived as 
simply engaging in their internationally recognised right of passage through another 
59 
60 
61 
Valencia, 1985a: 40; Stormont and Townsend-Gault, 1995: 64-65. 
Valencia, 1985a: 40; Stormont and Townsend-Gault, 1995: 65. 
Valencia, 1985a: 40. 
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state's EEZ. These events inevitably had a negative impact on bilateral relations and 
hardly created the political climate conducive to carrying the joint development scheme 
to fruition. 
A further difficulty arose m relation to dealing with concessiOns previously 
granted by the parties within the zone defined as the joint development area. Texas 
Pacific Oil Company, holding a concession from Thailand had already made a gas 
discovery in the overlapping claims area. When this zone was transformed into the joint 
development area, Thailand allowed Texas Pacific to retain its concession with 
Malaysia's consent. However, Texas Pacific and the Thai authorities soon became 
embroiled in a commercial dispute leading to a Thai desire to terminate the oil 
company's involvement in the joint zone. For its part the oil company refused to 
recognise the legitimacy of the newly created Joint Authority. This state of affairs led to 
complications and delay as far as implementing the joint development MoU was 
concerned. 62 
Concerns also emerged over the involvement of another Thai concessionaire, 
Triton Oil Company, in the joint development area. Again, the problems revolved 
around a dispute between the Thai government and the oil company, undermining 
moves towards implementation of the joint development agreement. As previously 
mentioned, when the dimensions of the joint zone were being negotiated, it became 
apparent that Thailand had extended its claim to the south and east since it had formally 
issued its continental shelf limits in 1973, so as to base its claim on equidistance, 
including Ko Losin as a basepoint (see Sections 5.3.3 and 5.5.3). A Malaysian gas 
discovery, Pilong 1 was therefore also included within the area of overlapping claims 
and thus, with Malaysian consent, within the joint development area. Triton invoked a 
clause in its contract stipulating that the limit of its concession coincided Thailand's 
international boundary. As a result of the Thai claim line moving, Triton argued, so too 
did its concession limit to include Pilong 1.63 Thailand initially agreed to this position 
but this apparently caused dissension within the Thai government and the Thai 
authorities subsequently backtracked.64 As a result Malaysian sources reported in 1985 
62 
63 
64 
Valencia, 1985a: 39, 1986: 668; Townsend-Gault, 1989a: 106-107; and Townsend-Gault, 1989b: 
183. 
Valencia, 1985a: 39-40. 
Valencia, 1986: 677. 
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that the delay in implementation of the joint development MoU was the consequence of 
Thai disputes with oil companies with interests in the joint development area.65 
Yet another major issue that had to be addressed was the need to reconcile the 
two countries' differing approaches to managing the exploration and exploitation of 
resources on the continental shelf. Malaysia has applied the production-sharing contract 
approach while Thailand has adopted the more traditional concession-based system.66 
Thailand was apparently willing to conform to a Malaysian desire to use a production-
sharing system within the joint development area. However, one of Thailand's 
concerned concessionaires, Triton, objected and Thailand was faced with the choice of 
either reneging on its agreement in principle with Malaysia to apply production-sharing 
to the joint zone or with revoking Triton's concession. The latter move was viewed as 
having the potential to seriously undermine the confidence of the international oil 
industry in Thailand. This situation has been described as "a major bone of contention" 
between the two states at least since 1985 and resulted in paralysis as far as progress 
towards implementation of the joint development MoU was concerned until 1989.67 
Eventually a compromise deal was worked out. The joint operating agreement 
setting out the oil and gas resource development regime to be applied within the joint 
zone provides for production-sharing involving Malaysia's national oil company, 
Petronas, and Triton. This resolved the Thai government's dilemma by both addressing 
Malaysia's desire to see a production-sharing arrangement and by preserving Triton's 
interests in the joint zone. 
Ultimately, the desire for access to the resources outweighed all the obstacles 
outlined above.68 Now that production from fields within the JDA is underway the joint 
development agreement can be viewed as being far less vulnerable to challenge as the 
benefits of the cooperation are readily apparent and underpin it. Indeed, since the JDA 
65 
66 
67 
68 
Energy Asia, 10 May 1985 quoted in Valencia, 1986: 678. 
Production-sharing contracts represent an alternative to the concession-based system whereby 
rights over resources remain vested in the state concerned, or at least a state-led entity such as a 
national oil company with the foreign oil company acting as contractor. In contrast, the 
concession-based system involves a contract between the, usually international, oil company and 
the state concerned. The distinction between the two approaches has, over time become 
somewhat "blurred" (Townsend-Gault, 1990a: 105-106). 
Ong, 1990: 60. 
This was particularly true for Thailand with its burgeoning energy requirements. For example, 
Thailand's energy needs leaps by 11% in the 1995-96 period alone (Offshore, December 1996: 
8). Despite boasting one of the fastest growing economies in the world in the 1980s and early 
1990s, by 1997 the Thai economy was experiencing severe recession as a result of the economic 
crisis gripping Asia with an estimated GDP growth rate of -0.4% in 1997 (CIA Factbook, 1999). 
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finally swung into operation in earnest with the signing of production-sharing contracts 
with three contractors on 21 April 1994,69 exploration has proceeded apace yielding 
several discoveries.70 These developments culminated on 22 April 1998 with the 
conclusion of two major gas supply agreements designed to give Malaysia and Thailand 
access to the estimated 10 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves within the JDA. 71 The 
significance of these events, reported to be set to trigger a total initial investment of 
US$2.42 billion in the two countries, was emphasised by the stock placed on them by 
the two countries' leaders. Thai Prime Minister Chuan Leekpan saying that the gas 
deals would restore stability and economic prosperity while his Malaysian counterpart, 
Mahathir Mohamad, stated that they would "revitalise" both countries. 72 
It should be noted, however, that the joint development area is itself not free 
from dispute by a third party. The seaward part of the joint zone is also subject to a 
claim on the part of Vietnam. This claim covers approximately 256nm2 (879km2) (see 
Figure 1.1 and Section 7.6).73 
6.3 Cambodia- Vietnam: Joint Historic Waters 
On 7 July 1982 Cambodia and Vietnam signed an Agreement on Historic Waters of 
Vietnam and Kampuchea which laid claim to a roughly oblong-shaped area of historic 
waters projecting into the Gulf of Thailand offshore the two states' border provinces on 
the coast (Figure 4.1 ). The agreement is short, consisting of only three articles, but 
encompasses a claim to 2,802nm2 (9,609km2) of the Gulf as "historic waters. "74 Article 
1 of the Cambodian-Vietnamese agreement defines the limits of the claimed area of 
historic waters in detail. Accordingly, the joint historic waters claim is bounded by: 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
Valencia ( 1985a: 40) indicates that an expected shortfall in gas supplies from the Era wan field in 
the Gulf of Thailand put pressure on the Thai authorities to press ahead with joint development. 
Business Times, Bangkok, 24/4/94. 
Offshore, December 1995: 12 April 1996: 20, September 1996: 22, January 1997: 18, March 
1997: 14, May 1997: 14, September 1997: 126, October 1997: 18 and January 1998: 16. 
Bangkok Post, 21/4/98; The Nation, 21/4/98. 
Bangkok Post, 23/4/98. 
Calculated using DELMAR and British Admiralty Chart 2414, 1967 edition at a scale of 
1:1,500,000. 
Calculated using a planimetre and British Admiralty Chart 3879, 1957 edition at a scale of 
1 :2400,000. 
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... the coast of Kien Giang Province, Phu Quoc Island, and the Tho Chu [Paulo 
Panjang] archipelago of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on the one side, and 
the coast of Kampot Province and the Paulo Wai [Wei] group of islands of the 
People's Republic of Kampuchea on the other (Appendix 3, Figure 4.1). 75 
The maritime space within the limits specified is, therefore, jointly claimed and 
presumably has the same status as the maritime areas within historic bays (see Section 
2.3.5). The agreement does not, however, define a bilateral maritime boundary. Article 
2 holds open the door to future negotiations on determining such a maritime boundary 
"at a suitable time." At the time of writing no such agreement has apparently been 
concluded (see Sections 6.4 and 7.3). 
Pending settlement of the maritime boundary between them, Article 3 of the 
agreement includes statements concerning the two countries' baselines and the issue of 
sovereignty over islands within the zone established and lists a number agreements 
concerning activities within the joint historic waters area. As discussed in Sections 
4.2.4 and 4.5, Cambodia and Vietnam have integrated their straight baseline systems. 
The two baseline systems meet at "Point 0" on the southwestern limit of the historic 
waters area. Article 3 of the historic waters agreement confirms this by providing that 
"Point 0" "on the straight baseline linking the Tho Chu archipelago and Paulo Wei 
Island", is to be determined by mutual agreement. At the time of writing the precise 
position of "Point 0" has not been agreed (however, see Sections 6.4 and 7.3). 
A further important agreement between the parties included in Article 3 is that 
the two sides would "continue to regard the Brevie Line drawn in 1939 as the dividing 
line for the islands in this zone." The remainder of Article 3 relates to activities within 
the zone. Accordingly, Cambodia and Vietnam commit themselves to conducting joint 
surveillance and patrolling in the historic waters area; agree that local fishermen could 
continue their operations in the zone created "according to the habits that have existed 
so far"; and conclude that the exploitation of natural resources within the joint zone 
would also be decided "by common agreement. "76 
75 
76 
It should be noted that in common with to other maritime boundary agreements in the Gulf of 
Thailand, no mention is made in the text of the Historic Waters Agreement concerning what 
datum the coordinates listed therein relate to (see Section 7.9). 
Amer (1997a: 89) has noted that what the Cambodian News Agency (SPK) transmitted on 8 July 
1982 as the ''full text" of the Historic Waters Agreement omitted the sentence Patrolling and 
surveillance in these historical waters will he jointly conducted by the two sides. " This phrase 
was, however, included in the version published by the Vietnamese News Agency. Whether the 
Cambodian omission was intentional or simply by chance is open to question. 
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As the vast majority of claims to the regime of historic waters concern bays 
surrounded by the declaring state on three sides and thus very closely linked to that 
state, the Cambodia-Vietnam claim, encompassing an area reaching from the mainland 
coast seawards to be bounded by offshore islands, is, to say the least, highly unusual. 
As outlined in Section 2.3.5, key requirements for a valid claim to historic 
waters include: open assertion of the claim, effective and long-standing exercise of 
jurisdiction and the acquiescence to the claim by other states. Instead, the 1982 
Cambodia-Vietnam agreement justifies the historic waters claim because it: 
... encompasses waters which by their special geographical conditions and their 
great importance for the national defence and economy of both countries have 
long belonged to Vietnam and Kampuchea [Cambodia] (Appendix 3). 
Despite this statement, other states have taken exception to the Cambodian-Vietnamese 
agreement and have exhibited stiff resistance to its acceptance. 
Thailand protested against the agreement in a note to the UN Secretary General 
of 9 December 1985, stating that: 
Regarding the claims to the so-called 'historic waters', which purport to 
appropriate and subject certain sea areas in the Gulf of Thailand and in the 
Gulf of Tonkin (Gulf of Bac Bo) to the regime of internal waters, the 
Government of Thailand is of the view that such claims cannot be justified on the 
basis of the applicable principles and rules ofinternationallaw.77 
Singapore protested in comparable terms in a note dated 5 December 1986.78 Similarly, 
in a note to the UN Secretary General, dated 17 June 1987, the United States 
government protested against the Cambodian-Vietnamese agreement, saying that 
notwithstanding the above statement "the claim was first made internationally no 
earlier than July 7, 1982, less than five years ago", and: 
77 
78 
The brief period of time since the claim's promulgation is insufficient to meet the 
second criterion for establishing a claim to historic waters [effective exercise of 
authority}, and there is no evidence of effective exercise of authority over the 
claimed waters by either country before or after the date of the agreement. 
Moreover, without commenting on the substantive merits or lack thereof 
attaching to the "special geographical conditions" of the waters in question and 
their "important significance towards each country's defence and economy", 
such considerations do not fulfil any of the stated customary international legal 
prerequisites of a valid claim to historic waters. 
Law of the Sea Bulletin, No.7, April 1986: 111 
United Nations, 1989c:84. 
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Finally, the United States has not acquiesced in this claim, nor can the 
community of States be said to have done so. Given the nature of the claim first 
promulgated in 1982, such a brief period of time would not permit sufficient 
0 79 
acquzescence to mature. 
It is difficult to find fault with the United States authorities' analysis. The claim is 
unique and must be considered extremely hard to justify in the context of customary 
international law relating to historic waters (see Section 2.3.5). 
The historic waters claim that most closely resembles that made by Cambodia 
and Thailand is India and Sri Lanka's claim to Palk Bay and Palk Strait. On 26-28 June 
1974 the two states concerned agreed on a boundary delimitation through their claimed 
historic waters in the strait and bay.80 This body of water measures approximately 74nm 
north-south and 76nm east-west and, despite the presence of numerous islands, parts of 
it would fall beyond 12nm-breadth territorial seas claimed from the baselines of the two 
states. 81 The Palk Strait and Bay area is comparable to the Cambodia-Vietnam claim in 
that two states are involved and the maritime area claimed as historic waters lies 
between the mainland and island coasts of the two states, with multiple entry points to 
the wider ocean, rather than being a 'classic' bay indented into a coastline and 
surrounded by the territory of one state. 
In contrast to the Cambodia-Vietnam case, the claim to historic waters status for 
Palk Strait and Bay is backed by considerable evidence. The issue was subject to legal 
proceedings before the Appellate Criminal Division of the Indian High Court in Madras 
in 1903-04 when both India and Sri Lanka (Ceylon) formed part of the British Empire. 
The court ruled that Palk Bay was: 
... landlocked by His Majesty's dominions for eight-ninths of its 
circumference .. .[ and] effectively occupied for centuries by the inhabitants of the 
adjacent districts of India and Ceylon respectively ... [w ]e do not think that 
Palk's Bay can be regarded as being in any sense the open sea and therefore 
outside the territorial jurisdiction of his Majesty. 82 
This led the author of the relevant report in Charney and Alexander to conclude that 
there "seem to be strong reasons for considering these areas historic waters." 83 This 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
Law of the Sea Bulletin, No.10, November 1987: 23 
Charney and Alexander, 1993: 1,409-1,417. 
United States, 1975: 3. 
United States, 1975: 3-4. 
Charney and Alexander, 1993: 1,410. 
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evidence did not, however, prevent the United States from protesting this claim in a note 
directed to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs dated 13 May 1983.84 
Cambodia and Vietnam's claim only emerged relatively recently, in 1982, which 
clearly undermines its validity. While it is possible that the parties to the agreement 
could claim that they have consistently and effectively exercised jurisdiction over the 
area claimed, the fact that the outer limits of the historic waters area are of the order of 
60nm (liOkm) offshore throws such arguments open to question. 85 Additionally, the 
Cambodia-Vietnam claim to historic waters can demonstrably be shown to have not 
been acquiesced to by the international community, as the protests outlined above prove. 
Furthermore, a significant proportion, approximately 42%, of the joint historic waters 
area lies beyond 12nm from the nearest coastline of wither state undermining the 
argument that the historic waters can be readily considered as suitable for the regime of 
internal waters. 86 
Quite apart from the extent and peculiar nature of the area of joint historic waters 
claimed, and the straight baseline issue associated with the limits of the zone (see 
Section 4.2.4 and 4.5), the primary significance of the agreement lies in the resolution of 
what had been a contentious dispute over island sovereignty. As outlined in Sections 
5.3.1 and 5.3.3, both Cambodia's and Vietnam's claims to continental shelf as expressed 
in declarations dating from the 1970s were based on exclusive sovereignty over Phu 
Quoc island and the Poulo Wei and Tho Chu (Poulo Panjang) island groups. Ownership 
of Koh Ses island and Koh Thmei island was also subject to dispute between the two 
states. 
The historic waters agreement applies the 1939 Brevie Line as the dividing line 
for jurisdiction over islands within the zone. This was consistent with the occupation of 
the disputed islands by the two sides. 87 Interestingly, the agreement states that the 
Brevie Line would "continue" to serve as the dividing line for sovereignty over islands 
- emphasising the importance of historical considerations in terms of establishing title 
84 
85 
86 
87 
Roach and Smith, 1996: 43. 
Measured on British Admiralty Chart 3985, 1987 edition, at a scale of 1:500,000. 
The area of historic waters beyond 12nm from the coast was calculated to be I, 188nm2 
( 4,075km2) as compared with a total area of the historic waters area of 2,802nm2 (9,609km2). 
These measurements were made using a planimetre and a copy of british Admiralty Chart 3879, 
1957 edition at a scale of 1 :24,000. Depond Reef was used as a basepoint for measuring 
territorial sea claims. 
Charney and Alexander, 1998: 2,358. 
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to territory. 88 It should be noted, however, that the parties did not adopt the Brevie Line 
as a maritime boundary delimitation between them although it is understood that 
Cambodia may, understandably, favour this option (see Section 7.3). 
The final provisions of the agreement, concerning joint surveillance, fishing and 
resource exploitation within the zone, bear some similarities to the other joint zone 
agreements wholly or partially within the Gulf of Thailand. These are the Joint 
Development Area established between Malaysia and Thailand (see Section 6.2.4), and 
the joint "Defined Area" set up by Malaysia and Vietnam (see Section 6.4). The main 
differences between these joint zones and the Cambodian-Vietnamese joint area are 
firstly, that the former do not purport to claim extensive offshore areas as historic 
waters. Unlike the other joint zones, although the Cambodian-Vietnamese zone is 
composed of areas of overlapping claims, it is not defined by such claims. The limits of 
the zone bear no relation to the limits of the earlier continental shelf claims of the 
parties.89 Furthermore, the Cambodian-Vietnamese zone is multi-fuctional rather than 
uni-functional in nature, dealing with both fisheries and seabed resources and 
encompassing non-economic provisions such as joint patrolling and surveillance related 
to military and strategic issues. 
There has been some question as to whether the historic waters agreement 
remains in force. This stems from the view that Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia was 
illegal and thus the PRK government in Phnom Penh was also illegitimate. As such, 
any action undertaken or agreement entered into by these authorities could be viewed as 
being legally null and void.90 Prior to the UN's intervention in Cambodia, opposition 
parties tended to denounce the PRK-Vietnam agreements. 91 For example, it was 
reported in September 1992 that the Khmer Rouge had demanded that Cambodian 
territory "annexed" as a result of the agreements be returned as a precondition for the 
implementation of the 1991 Paris peace accords for Cambodia. 92 However, with the 
emergence of a coalition government between the former ruling communists and the 
main pro-Royalist party, FUNCINPEC, there was every indication that undertakings 
88 
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92 
According to the report in Charney and Alexander (1998: 2,357-2,365), "it would appear that 
the international law doctrine of uti possidetis determined the division of the land territory". 
Charney and Alexander, 1998: 2,359. 
The government installed in Phnom Penh with Vietnamese assistance was only recognised by the 
Soviet bloc states and India rather than the international community in general. Its actions 
therefore had no legal effect on the latter states (Kittichaisaree, 1987: 43). 
Johnston and Valencia, 1991: 141. 
Chanda, N. (1992) 'Land erosion', FEER (3 September). 
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entered into by the Cambodian government in the 1979-1992 period would be upheld. 93 
Discussions with senior Cambodian officials also indicated that this is the case and that 
the agreement remains valid.94 As far as the Historic Waters Agreement is concerned, it 
is perhaps significant the it was signed by Hun Sen - Cambodia's post -1992 Second 
Prime Minister who remains firmly in power. Furthermore, in the course of his visit to 
Hanoi on 1 June 1998, Cambodian First Prime Minister Ung Huot and Vietnamese 
Prime Minister Phan Van Khai "asserted the determination to continue to abide by the 
agreements and treaties on land and sea borders signed by the two countries in 1982, 
1983 and 1985. "95 In any case, under the law of treaties the post -1992 Cambodian 
government is the legal successor state to the government that signed the agreement and 
therefore inherits that agreement. 
6.4 Malaysia - Vietnam: Joint "Defined Area" Agreement 
A Memorandum of Understanding between Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam for the Exploration and Exploitation of Petroleum in a Defined Area of the 
Continental Shelf Involving the Two Countries was signed on 5 June 1992 and entered 
into force on 4 June 1993 (Appendix 15). Article 1(1) specifies that "as a result of 
overlapping claims" between the two states a "Defined Area" exists off the 
northeastern coast of peninsula Malaysia and the southwestern coast of Vietnam (see 
Figure 6.4).96 This zone was defined by a list of six points the locations of which were 
described by geographic coordinates which were said to be linked by "straight lines." 
These coordinates were referenced to the 1967 edition of British Admiralty Chart 2414, 
but no further technical information, for example, concerning datum used or what was 
meant by the term "straight line", was provided. 
93 
94 
95 
96 
StJohn (1998: 29) notes that while the agreements were indeed criticised by opposition 
politicians, "they were tacitly recognised by the Royal Government of Cambodia installed in 
mid-1993." Similarly, Dzurek (1994: 160) found that Cambodia and Vietnam's successor 
regimes "seem to maintain" the positions established by their predecessors. 
Interview with Cambodian government officials, July 1995. Names withheld by request. 
Voice of Vietnam, Hanoi, 1/6/98 (SWB/3243). A spokeswoman for the Vietnamese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs reinforced this by subsequently stating that: "Regarding the sea border, 
agreements on historical water territories signed since 1982 are continuing to be respected by 
both sides" (Voice of Vietnam, Hanoi, 18/6/98 (SWB FE/3258)). 
The "Defined Area" is often also referred to as the Malaysia-Vietnam "Commercial Area" or 
"Commercial Zone." 
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The omission of such technical information from the MoU seems to store up 
issues that will certainly have to be addressed in the future (see Section 7.9). This is 
confirmed by the second paragraph of the article which states that the "actual 
locations" of the points mentioned are to be determined by mutual agreement between 
the "competent authorities" of the two states at an unspecified time in the future. The 
competent authorities designated in the MoU are the Directorate of National Mapping 
for Malaysia and the Department of Geo-Cartography and the Navy Geo-Cartography 
Section for Vietnam. 
In Article 2(1) of the MoU the parties specifically agreed to "explore and exploit 
petroleum" in the Defined Area "pending delimitation of the boundary lines" in that 
zone. Where a hydrocarbon field is found to straddle the limits of the Defined Area it is 
simply provided that both parties shall develop the resources concerned on mutually 
acceptable terms (Article 2(2)). The now familiar provision that all costs incurred and 
benefits derived are to be borne and shared equally by the parties is also included here 
(Article 2(3)). 
Article 3 of the MoU serves to nominate the two states' national oil companies-
Petronas for Malaysia and Petro Vietnam for Vietnam- as the two governments' agents 
to undertake exploration and exploitation of petroleum in the defined Area. The article 
goes on to task them with entering into commercial arrangement to achieve this 
objective at an early stage. The two governments have, however, sought to retain firm 
control over arrangements in the joint zone by insisting that the terms and conditions of 
any such commercial agreements shall be subject to their approval. 
The following article, Article 4, contains without prejudice clauses, designed not 
to jeopardise either state's position concerning their sovereignty claims to the whole of 
the defined Area. A similar provision stresses that the MoU does not apply to any entity 
not a party to it. The duration of the MoU was, according to Article 5, to be determined 
through an exchange of diplomatic notes. This duly took place on 4 June 1993 with the 
duration of the arrangement set at 40 years, subject to review if necessary.97 Article 6 
provides that in the eventuality of a dispute arising concerning the interpretation or 
implementation of the MoU, this would be settled "peacefully by consultation or 
negotiation" between the two sides. The entering into force of the MoU, governed by 
97 Bernama News, 4/6193 (SWB FE/W0286). 
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Article 7, is recorded as taking place when specified by an exchange of diplomatic notes 
between the parties. As mentioned, this took place on 4 June 1993.98 
The Malaysia-Vietnam MoU, therefore, bears many similarities to earlier 
agreements concluded between the Gulf of Thailand littoral states. In particular, the 
points mentioned in the accord are referred to British Admiralty Chart 2414 and their 
precise location left to be determined by the parties' competent authorities at some 
future date. The MoU does not prejudice either state's claim to jurisdiction over the 
whole of the joint area defined, the delimitation of a boundary is still regarded as the 
long-term objective of the two states and the resolution of disputes is to be peaceful and 
by means of consultations or negotiations. 
The Defined Area created by the 1990 MoU consists of a long but narrow strip 
of maritime space extending from the northeastern corner of the Thai-Malaysian joint 
development area in a southeasterly direction beyond the limits of the Gulf of Thailand 
and into the southwestern South China Sea. The Defined Area corresponds to the two 
states' overlapping claims to continental shelf. This overlap is, as noted in Sections 
5.3.2 and 5.3.4, caused by the two sides' differing use of island basepoints rather than 
straight baseline considerations which apparently played no part in determining the 
dimensions of the dispute. 
Malaysia constructed its claim giving full weight to its island basepoints but 
discounting the Vietnamese island of Hon Da as a legitimate basepoint. In contrast, 
Vietnam ignored all island basepoints and constructed a claim line based exclusively on 
mainland coasts. Points C and D, which provide the southern limits of the Defined Area 
are based on (South) Vietnam's 1971 continental shelf claim and represent points 
equidistant from the two states' mainland coasts with all potentially relevant islands 
ignored for delimitation purposes. Points A, F and E form the northern limit of the zone 
and are derived from Malaysia's continental shelf claim of 1979.99 Point F is 
equidistant between Malaysia's Redang island and the Vietnamese mainland coast. 
Point E consists of a tripoint between relevant coastal points, islands included, in 
Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam and also represents the final point of the Indonesia-
Malaysia continental shelf boundary off eastern peninsula Malaysia concluded in 
98 
99 
The final article of the MoD, Article 8, merely provides definitions of certain terms used (see 
Appendix 15). 
As expressed in the Peta Menunjukkan Sempadan Perairan dan Pelantar Benua Malaysia or 
"Map Showing the Territorial Waters and Continental Shelf Boundaries of Malaysia" 
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1969. 100 Points A-C lie are consistent with the eastern limits of the Thai-Malaysian 
JDA. The Defined Area is about 150nm in length and is approximately 12nm-wide at 
its broadest point. It has an area of 585nm2 (2,007km2) (Figure 6.4). 101 
The Malaysian-Vietnamese MoU concerning their overlapping claims area is a 
brief document that provides little in terms of institution-building or an organisational 
framework for joint development. Indeed, the two governments specifically delegate 
their rights as far as petroleum exploration and development are concerned to their 
respective national oil companies, albeit while retaining the final say with regard to any 
agreements those companies might reach. This represents a marked contrast to the 
Thai-Malaysian joint development area where implementation of joint development 
could only proceed in the wake of detailed agreements on all manner of institutional, 
organisational and procedural issues (see Section 6.2.4). The Malaysian-Vietnamese 
agreement represents a far more simplistic approach to joint development which is 
unifunctional and sharply focused on facilitating petroleum exploration and exploitation 
at the earliest opportunity and with the minimum of governmental participation or 
interference. This approach can be viewed as something of a reaction to the long delays 
which prevented the implementation of the Thai-Malaysian JDA (see Section 6.2.4). As 
oil and gas discoveries have subsequently been made within the Defined Area this 
approach may be deemed a success. In November 1996 it was reported that the joint 
zone was destined to become a "sizeable source" of oil with the combined potential of 
known structures put at 200 million bbl of oil with several other prospects yet to be 
explored. 102 Further discoveries were reported in September 1997 and in January and 
September 1998. This led Malaysia's state-owned oil company Petronas and 
Petro Vietnam to sign a 'pre-unitisation agreement' relating to the extension of a 
discovery in the "Defined Area" into exclusively Vietnamese waters. 103 
The concise nature of the Malaysian-Vietnamese MoU should not be regarded as 
unusual. After all, the agreement was styled a Memorandum of Understanding rather 
than a fully-fledged treaty. Furthermore, the MoU's very brevity serves to emphasise 
the interim nature of the joint development arrangement which does not prejudice either 
state's sovereignty claim to the whole of the Defined Area. 
100 
101 
102 
103 
United States, 1970: 1; Charney and Alexander, 1998: 2,335-2,344. 
Calculated using DELMAR. 
Offshore, November 1996: 40. 
Offshore, September 1998: 14-16. 
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The primary motivation behind the conclusion of the joint development 
agreement between the two states was clearly their mutual desire to gain access to the 
hydrocarbon resources perceived (and now proven) to be present within the overlapping 
claims area. A further incentive encouraging Malaysia and Vietnam to enter into a joint 
development arrangement may have been the success of other joint development 
projects, particularly in the region such as the Australian-Indonesian Zone of 
Cooperation 104 and even within the Gulf of Thailand itself, with the conclusion of the 
Thai-Malaysian agreement on implementing their joint development MoU on joint 
development (see Section 6.2.4). External political reasons have also been suggested to 
explain both the successful realisation of the MoU between the parties and the timing of 
it. At the time of the accord's negotiation and conclusion Vietnam was in the process of 
applying for membership in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
The peaceful settlement, or rather shelving, of a contentious maritime boundary dispute 
with a key ASEAN member such as Malaysia, it can be argued, did Vietnam's ASEAN 
candidature no harm whatsoever. A rather more sinister explanation for the MoU' s 
completion relates to the fact that both states are involved in wider maritime and island 
disputes in the South China Sea. It has been argued that the joint development 
agreement amounted to Malaysia and Vietnam showing a united front to the main 
protagonist in the South China Sea maritime disputes, the People's Republic of China, 
at a time of heightened tensions in the region. 105 
6.5 Thailand - Vietnam: Maritime Boundary Agreement 
The Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the 
Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on the Delimitation of the Maritime 
Boundaries between the Two Countries in the Gulf of Thailand was signed on 9 August 
1997 and subsequently ratified on 28 February 1998 (Appendix 16). 106 
104 
105 
106 
See, for example, Burmester, 1990: 128-140; Robson, 1995: 13-; Bundy, 1995: 33-36; Stormont 
and Townsend-Gault, 1995: 65-67; Ong, 1995: 85-89; and, Miyoshi, 1999: 17-21. 
Charney and Alexander, 1998: 2,336. 
Bangkok Post, 29/5/98. Voice of Vietnam (Hanoi, 15/2/98 (SWB FE/3153) reported that 
instruments of ratification would be exchanged during Thai Foreign Minister Surin Phitsuwan' s 
visit to Vietnam on 27-28 February 1998. It was subsequently reported in The Nation on 3 March 
that the exchange had been made and the agreement had gone in to affect "last weekend" (28 
February-1 March 1998). As the Thai Foreign Minister left Hanoi on 28 February (Voice of 
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The agreement marks the end of a dispute resolution process initiated in January 
1978 by a visit of the Vietnamese Foreign Minister to Bangkok which resulted in a Joint 
Statement107 in which it was agreed that the dispute should be settled "on the basis of 
. bl . . l "108 equtta e prmClp es. Progress in negotiations was interrupted by political 
differences, particularly in relation to Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia from 1979. 
However, negotiations resumed in late 1990 and in October 1991, at the first meeting of 
the Thai-Vietnamese Joint Committee on Economic, Scientific and Technological 
Cooperation, the two sides adopted a Protocol on maritime boundary delimitation as 
follows: 109 
a) both sides should cooperate in defining the limits of the maritime zones 
claimed by the two countries; 
b) both sides should try to delimit the maritime boundary in the overlapping area 
between the two countries; and 
c) such delimitation should not include the overlapping zones which are also 
claimed by any third country. 
Both sides also agreed that, pending such delimitation, no development activities 
or concessions in the area of overlap should be assigned or awarded to any 
operator. The two sides informed each other that there are no development 
activities or concessions in the area claimed by Vietnam which overlaps the Joint 
Development Area between Thailand and Malaysia. 
In this context the Thai side proposed that failing the attempt in 'b' the two sides 
might consider implementing the Thai concept of [a] joint development area. 
In total it took Thailand and Vietnam nine meetings over a period of five years to 
achieve agreement. 110 Thao also notes that a change of government in Thailand was an 
important factor, together with progress on fisheries and marine security issues. 111 
Article 1 of the treaty defines the maritime boundary between the two parties in 
the relevant part of their overlapping continental shelf claims as being a "straight line" 
107 
108 
109 
110 
Ill 
Vietnam, Hanoi, 28/2/98 (SWB FE/3166)) it can be deduced that the ratification took place on 
that day. 
Dated 1211/78. 
Prescott, 1981: 28; McDorman, 1985: 296. Exploratory talks were apparently held as early as 
1972 but proved fruitless (The Nation, 3/3/98). 
Thao, 1997: 75-76. 
For a review of this negotiating process see Thao (1997: 74-78). 
Thao (1997: 76-77) states that after the election of the new Thai Prime Minister, ties between 
Thailand and Vietnam were "boosted to a new level" and that the fourth meeting of the two 
sides' Joint Committee on Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation coupled with the 
third meeting of their Joint Committee on Fisheries and Order at Sea "did much to improve 
relations" between them. 
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joining Point C 112 and Point K113 (Figure 6.5) Point C is identified as coinciding with 
the northernmost point of the pre-existing Thai-Malaysian joint development area and 
Point 43 of Malaysia's continental shelf claim of 1979. Point K, rather more 
contentiously, is defined as being: 
.. . situated on the maritime boundary between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
and the Kingdom of Cambodia, which is a straight line equidistant from the Tho 
Chu islands and Pula Wai [sic.] drawn from Point 0 Latitude N 09° 35' 
00".4159 and Longitude 103° 10' 15".9808. 
Article 1 goes on to relate the coordinates mentioned to British Admiralty Chart 
No.2414 and, in contrast to other Gulf of Thailand maritime agreements, specifies a 
particular geodetic datum - "Ellipsoid Everest-1830-/ndian Datum." Despite this, 
rather uncharacteristic specificity, at least in the context of the Gulf of Thailand, it is 
nonetheless noted that the actual locations of Points C and K are, at an unspecified time 
in the future, to be determined by hydrographic experts appointed by the two 
governments. It is also stated that the delimitation line constitutes the boundary 
between both the continental shelf and the EEZ of each state. It therefore represents an 
example of what is often termed a 'single' maritime boundary. As the latter includes the 
continental shelf and both states have claimed EEZs, this represents something of an 
overclarification. 114 
Article 2 provides that the parties shall enter into negotiations with Malaysia "in 
order to settle the tripartite overlapping continental shelf claim area ... within the Thai-
Malaysian Joint Development Area." This makes it readily apparent that the agreement 
covers only a partial delimitation between the two states' maritime interests and 
represents an admission on Thailand's part of the existence of Vietnamese claims to part 
of the Thai-Malaysian joint zone. Recognition of the existence of such claims does not, 
however, equate to an acceptance of their validity. Article 2, therefore, opens the way to 
trilateral negotiations to resolve this problem of what might be termed an overlap of 
overlapping claims (see Section 7.6). 
112 
113 
114 
Latitude N 07° 49' 00".0000, Longitude E 103° 02' 30".0000. 
Latitude N 08° 46' 54".7754, Longitude E 102° 12' 11".5342 
Prescott (I 998: 42) refers to this distinction between the continental shelf and EEZ as something 
"which a non-legal person would regard as a tautology." However, the reason behind the 
inclusion of both terms may lie in the fact that both countries have outlined the extent of their 
continental shelf claims but have not done the same in relation to their EEZs (see Sections 5.3 
and 5.5). 
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Article 3 merely states that each side shall respect the other's jurisdiction and 
sovereignty over the continental shelf and EEZ on their respective sides of the boundary 
line. This seems something of a statement of the obvious, given that the objective of 
concluding international boundary agreements is, logically, to determine the limits of 
state jurisdiction. Nevertheless, this statement does serve to reinforce the principle 
purpose of the accord. The following article includes what, from assessing earlier Gulf 
of Thailand maritime agreements, is by now a familiar commitment to the reaching of 
agreement jointly on the exploitation of an oil or gas deposit extending across the 
boundary line. Proceeds from such an arrangement are to be equitably shared. 
Similarly, the penultimate article of the agreement provides for the peaceful settlement 
of any disagreement arising out of the interpretation or implementation of the treaty 
through consultation or negotiation between the two governments - a passage virtually 
identical to others in agreements elsewhere in the Gulf of Thailand. The final article, 
Article 6, simply determines that entry into force of the agreement is to take place upon 
the exchange of instruments of ratification or approval between the two states. As 
mentioned, this took place on 28 February 1998. 
On the face of it, the Thai-Vietnamese treaty deals with a reasonably 
straightforward maritime boundary, consisting of a single straight line 75.75nm 
(140.25km) in length linking two mid-Gulf points. 115 There are, however, several 
aspects of the agreement which deserve closer examination. 
In common with other maritime agreements concluded by the Gulf of Thailand 
littoral states, the Thai-Vietnamese accord is uncertain in its dealings with technical 
details. Once again the terminology "straight line" is used to describe the delimitation 
line without further comment or explanation. It is therefore unclear whether the line 
defined is a loxodrome (or rhumb) line or a geodesic line. As a straight line was plotted 
on an extract of a Mercator projection chart annexed to the text of the agreement, it 
could be concluded that the line is a loxodrome but this is nowhere explicitly stated. 
This issue may seem of limited importance, given that the difference in the areas 
accorded to each side by using the different types of line is relatively small. However, 
the central Gulf of Thailand, given existing oil and gas discoveries, must be considered 
as highly prospective for hydrocarbon exploration. Uncertainty over seemingly 
115 Measured on British Admiralty Chart 2414, 1967 edition at a scale of 1: 1 ,500,000. 
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insignificant offshore areas raises the possibility of dispute over millions of dollars' 
worth of seabed resources. 
By far the most significant cause for concern in relation to the Thai-Vietnamese 
agreement is its implications for Cambodia. This arises principally because of the 
extension of the boundary in a northwesterly direction to terminate at what the treaty 
purports to be the tripoint between Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia. As Prescott 
points out, the justification contained in the Thai-Vietnamese agreement for the 
positioning of Point K - that it is located on the pre-existing Cambodia-Vietnam lateral 
maritime boundary - "might come as a surprise to the Cambodian authorities." 116 
This is so because so little evidence has come to light of the actual existence of any such 
agreement between Cambodia and Vietnam, either as to the location of Point 0, the 
meeting point of the two states' straight baseline systems on the seaward limit of their 
joint historic waters area, or concerning any maritime boundary between them, 
equidistance-based or otherwise. 117 Indeed, aside from the reference to it in the treaty 
itself, the only other mention of a Cambodian-Vietnamese boundary agreement which 
has been located is in an article written by Nguyen Hong Thao, Deputy Director of the 
Marine Affairs Department, of the Continental Shelf Committee of the Government of 
Vietnam. 118 In this article Nguyen states that Point K is located "on the working 
arrangement line between Vietnam and Cambodia, agreed in 1991 as being equidistant 
from Tho Chu islands and Paulo Wai." While Dr Nguyen is certainly in a position to 
know, it seems odd, to say the least, that other reports of this agreement have failed to 
emerge in the seven years since its alleged conclusion. Even if Cambodia and Vietnam 
did indeed agree to use an equidistance line as some form of de facto working 
jurisdiction line, it is certainly questionable whether both governments view such a 
seemingly informal arrangement to be of such a binding nature as to represent the 
definitive maritime boundary between them beyond their joint historic waters area. Thai 
Foreign Minister Surin did, however, suggest that the working arrangement line between 
Cambodia and Thailand had been agreed between them in 1982. It is therefore possible 
that the two states undertook preliminary discussions on delimitation at the time their 
Historic Waters Agreement was concluded and that these, presumably non-binding, 
116 
117 
118 
Prescott, 1998: 41. 
Inquiries with Thai authorities revealed that Bangkok relied wholly on Vietnamese assurances 
that such an agreement existed (Interview with Admiral Thanom Charoenlaph (Rtd.), Bangkok, 
18 December 1998). 
Nguyen Hong Thao, 1997: 74-78. 
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provisional arrangements or suggestions have been used by Vietnam as a de facto 
boundary and justification for delimitation of the Thai-Vietnamese boundary up to the 
equidistance line. 119 
Where a tripoint has not been agreed, the common practice among states dictates 
that the parties to a bilateral agreement terminate their delimitation comfortably short of 
where a theoretical tripoint is deemed to be. There is, then, a tendency to await the 
convening of trilateral negotiations to confirm the location of the tripoint and link 
together bilateral boundary agreements between the states concerned. Numerous 
examples of this trend exist around the world, however, situations where such trilateral 
negotiations have actually taken place are rather more rare. Examples of the latter case 
include Poland, Sweden and the (former) Soviet Union in the Baltic Sea; 120 between 
India, Indonesia and Thailand in the Andaman Sea121 and between Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Thailand in the Straits of Malacca. 122 It is notable that Thailand, a party to the 
agreement with Vietnam under discussion here, was also a signatory of two trilateral 
maritime boundary agreements designed to complete necessarily partial bilateral 
agreements concluded at an earlier date. This experience makes the Thai-Vietnamese 
decision to determine bilaterally the tripoint with Cambodia all the more surprising. 
The apparently bilateral fixing of the tripoint between Cambodia, Thailand and 
Vietnam by the latter two parties would therefore seem to run contrary to well 
established international practice and to infringe Cambodia's rights in principle. This 
potential cause of dispute is exacerbated by the actual location of the putative "tripoint" 
as determined by the Thai-Vietnamese treaty. Point K is, in fact, not strictly equidistant 
from the nearest coastal points of the three states - Cambodia's Poulo Wai islands, 
Thailand's Ko Kra islet and Vietnam's Tho Chu islands. Instead, Point K is actually 
located approximately 7nm northeast of where strict equidistance from the three islands 
119 
120 
121 
122 
Personal communication with Daniel J. Dzurek, 11/5/99. 
Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden, the Government of the People's 
Republic of Poland and the Government of the USSR Concerning the Junction Point of the 
Maritime Boundaries in the Baltic, 30 June 1989 (Charney and Alexander, 1993: 2,097-2,104). 
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India, the Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia and the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand Concerning the Determination of the 
Trijunction Point and the Delimitation of the Related Boundaries of the Three Countries in the 
Andaman Sea, 22 June 1978 (Charney and Alexander, 1993: I ,379-1 ,388). 
Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of Indonesia, the Government of Malaysia 
and the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental 
Shelf Boundaries in the Northern Part of the Strait of Malacca, 21 December 1971 (Charney and 
Alexander, 1993: 1,413-1,454). 
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mentioned would place the tripoint. 123 As Cambodia was not a party to the Thai-
Vietnamese agreement, and thus to the determination of Point K as the Cambodia-
Thailand-Vietnam tripoint, and as questions remain over the existence of and/or binding 
nature of the Cambodia-Vietnam agreement mentioned in Article 1 of the former treaty, 
it was perhaps unsurprising that on 17 February 1998 Cambodia issued a formal protest 
note delivered to the Embassies of both Thailand and Vietnam in Phnom Penh. 
Firstly, the Cambodian protest note refers to the Cambodia-Vietnam lateral 
boundary agreement mentioned in the Thailand-Vietnam treaty as the "so-called" 
maritime boundary between Cambodia and Vietnam which "Cambodia has never 
agreed to" and which "constitutes a violation of Cambodia's sovereignty" and of her 
EEZ and continental shelf rights in the area concerned. Secondly, the protest note 
makes it explicit that "all provisions" of the Thai-Vietnamese agreement are "without 
prejudice with respect to Cambodia" and are neither binding upon that country or affect 
its rights and legitimate interests in the area in question. Thirdly, the Cambodian note 
refers to general international law and specifically UNCLOS as the appropriate 
background against which agreements on continental shelf and EEZ boundary 
delimitation are to be concluded, with the emphasis being on "all states concerned" 
achieving an "equitable solution." Fourthly, the protest note states that Cambodia 
"totally reserves her position" in relation to any maritime boundary delimitation that 
has or may be made in the part of the Gulf of Thailand in question without the 
agreement of the Cambodian government. The note concludes with what is termed a 
reiteration of Cambodia's "readiness and determination to work in a positive, 
productive and friendly way with its neighbours in order to reach a provisional 
arrangement of a practical nature or a final agreement" on the issue under 
consideration as soon as possible - thus leaving the possibility of applying a joint zone 
solution to the problem open (see Appendix 17). 
Speaking on 7 May 1998, at the end of a two-day visit to Bangkok, Cambodian 
Second Prime Minister Hun Sen stated that Thailand and Vietnam had "colluded" in 
signing a secret agreement on maritime boundary delimitation which had resulted in a 
loss to Cambodia of "several square kilometres" on maritime territory. He went on to 
state that he would get this portion of Cambodia's maritime territory back "at all costs", 
but would do so through negotiations rather than military means. Hun Sen also 
123 Prescott, 1998: 43 and measured on British Admiralty Chart 2414, 1967 edition at a scale of 
1: I ,500,000. 
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anticipated that tripartite Cambodia-Thailand-Vietnam negotiations would soon be 
forthcoming and raised the possibility of applying joint development principles to the 
problem based on the Thai-Malaysian model. 124 On the following day Thai Foreign 
Minister Surin Pitsuwan responded by stating that Thailand was prepared to discuss 
Cambodia's concerns. However, Thailand's position was that the Thai-Vietnamese 
delimitation was based on a "working arrangement" line agreed between Cambodia and 
Vietnam in 1982 and that Hun Sen had himself signed that document in his capacity as 
Foreign Minister at that time: "Therefore, Cambodia should hold talks with Vietnam 
concerning the line. If Vietnam determines that the issue should be discussed, we are 
ready to have a triangular meeting and reconsider the delineation with Vietnam. "125 In 
response, a spokesman for the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry stated that the Thai-
Vietnamese agreement was "totally in compliance with international law" including the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and that the maritime areas dealt with in the 
agreement "are those belonging to Vietnam and Thailand. "126 Cambodian First Prime 
Minister Ung Huot127 was duly despatched to Hanoi for talks on this issue on 1-2 June 
1998. 128 The outcome of these talks was, however, not made public although the First 
Prime Minister did state that he was confident that the border problem with Vietnam 
would be resolved before the year 2000. 129 
A related issue with the potential to cause dispute between Cambodia and 
Vietnam is Vietnam's apparently unilateral determination of the position of Point 0 on 
the limits of the two states' joint historic waters area (see Figure 4.1 ). The 1982 
Cambodia-Vietnam Historic Waters Agreement explicitly states in Article 3 that Point 
0, on the straight baseline linking the Tho Chu archipelago and Poulo Wai islands "will 
be determined by mutual agreement" at an unspecified time in the future (see Section 
6.3 and Appendix 3). Once again, evidence as to whether such an agreement has in fact 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
National Radio of Cambodia, Phnom Penh, 11/5/98 (FBIS-EIS-98-131); Kyodo news agency, 
Tokyo, 12/5/98 (FBIS-EAS-98-132); Reaksmei Kampuchea, Phnom Penh, 11-12/5/98 (FBIS-
EAS-98-135). Hun Sen also responded to apparent calls for him to retake Kampuchea Krom 
(southern Vietnam) and "the five provinces in Surin" (in Thailand) by force by saying on 
national radio that he could not do so and "if we send troops to retake the territory, we may ever 
lose Phnom Penh." 
Bangkok Post, 8/5/98; The Nation, 8/5/98. 
Voice of Vietnam, Hanoi, 12/598 (SWB FE/3228). 
Ung Huot replaced Prince Ranariddh as First Prime Minister after the Hun Sen-led coup in 
Cambodia in July 1996. 
Cambodian Radio, 31/5/98 (SWB FE/3241); Vietnamese Radio, 1-2/6/98; Voice of Vietnam, 
l/6/98 (SWB FE/3242-3245). 
Ung Huot did not, however, indicate whether he was referring to land or maritime boundary 
problems (National Voice of Cambodia, Phnom Penh, 25/6/98 (SWB FE/3264)). 
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been concluded is sparse. The Thai-Vietnamese treaty refers to Point 0 as a fixed 
location 130 and gives its position. Nguyen also supports this by implication. However, 
no copy of the text of such agreement seems to have entered the public domain and no 
other reports supporting the contention that the two states have reached agreement on 
the location of Point 0 are evident. 
The location of Point 0 naturally determines the starting point for the Cambodia-
Vietnam maritime boundary beyond, i.e. seaward of the joint historic waters area. The 
Thai-Vietnamese agreement indicates that this boundary has actually been defined by 
the parties concerned on the basis of equidistance (Article 1(3) of the treaty; Nguyen's 
"working arrangement" line). This contention again lacks corroborative evidence in 
that no independent report on the public record seems to exist that such an agreement 
has actually been seen. It is worth noting here that it is understood that although 
Vietnam favours the location for Point "0" and the alignment of the Cambodian-
Vietnamese delimitation as suggested in the Thai-Vietnamese agreement, Cambodia has 
traditionally favoured the application of the colonial-era Brevie Line, drawn in 1939 as a 
dividing line determining jurisdiction over islands, as the maritime boundary (see 
Section 7.5). The effect of giving the Brevie Line the status of an international maritime 
boundary in the portion of the delimitation seaward of the joint historic waters area 
would be to shift the Cambodia-Vietnam lateral boundary marginally to the west of an 
equidistance line between them in the central Gulf of Thailand (i.e. at the seaward 
terminus of the boundary). Closer to the joint historic waters area, the Brevie Line lies 
somewhat to the east of a Cambodian-Vietnamese equidistance line-based delimitation. 
Ironically, therefore, if Cambodia retains its claim to the Brevie Line as the basis of a 
maritime boundary between the two states, the 'tripoint' defined by the Thai-Vietnam 
accord in fact lies beyond waters claimed by Cambodia (see Figure 6.5). It should be 
noted, however, that it is far from clear whether Cambodia currently uses the Brevie 
Line as the basis for its maritime boundary claims with respect to Vietnam (see Section 
7.3). 
All this begs the question, however, of why the tripoint outlined in the Thai-
Vietnamese agreement is located where it is, i.e. not in a position in accordance with 
strict equidistance, and why the Thai-Vietnamese boundary is aligned as it is. An 
examination of the division of the overlapping claims area according to the Thai-
130 
"Latitude N 09°35'00".4259 and Longitude E 103° 10' 15".9808" (see Appendix 16). 
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Vietnamese agreement IS revealing in this regard. Of the total area, 1, 718nm2 
(5,893km2), of the Thai-Vietnamese overlapping claims, Thailand secured 1, 145nm2 
(3,928km2) (66.6%) while Vietnam secured 573nm2 (1,965km2) (33.3%). 131 As 
Prescott wryly observes: "it is hard to escape the conclusion that Thailand negotiated 
very successfully. " It therefore appears that Thailand and Vietnam agreed to an uneven 
division of their overlapping claims area with two-thirds being allotted to Thailand and 
one-third to Vietnam. As the two states appear to have regarded Point C, the 
northwestern corner of the Thai-Malaysian joint development area, as a natural terminus 
for one end of the boundary line, the one-third: two-thirds split of the overlapping claims 
area was apparently achieved by shifting the alignment of the delimitation line, with 
Point C acting as a fixed point or hinge. The location of Point K therefore appears to 
have been determined by shifting the 'tripoint' northwards along a Cambodia-Vietnam 
equidistance line until the required proportions of disputed maritime space were left on 
either side of the line - thus explaining the position of Point K approximately 7nm 
northeast of the location of a tripoint according to strict equidistance. 
The reasoning behind this unequal division of the Thai-Vietnamese overlapping 
claims area is unclear. The treaty itself, in common with many maritime boundary 
agreements, offers no explanation for the alignment of the boundary line constructed. 
Although not mentioned in the text of the agreement, the key determining factors are 
understood to have been the role of the two states' islands rather than their claimed 
straight baselines. 132 In the absence of a clear rationale for the course of the boundary in 
the text of the treaty itself, it is impossible to offer a definitive explanation for its 
alignment. This is particularly true in this case where equidistance has been abandoned 
as a method of delimitation in favour of a single straight line delimitation the eastern 
end of which (Point C) is fixed with the western end (Point K) adjusted to take into 
account factors agreed in the course of negotiations but not specified in the treaty text. 
Nevertheless, for the purposes of the current analysis, the delimitation in 
question has the distinct advantage that, at approximately 76nm in length, it concerns a 
relatively small part of the Gulf of Thailand. In consequence, only one island or island 
group on each side of the line is directly relevant to the delimitation - Ko Losin on the 
Thai side and the Tho Chu (Poulo Panjang) group on the Vietnamese side- simplifying 
matters considerably. It will be recalled that (South) Vietnam's claim line in this area, 
131 
132 
Calculated using DELMAR. 
Nguyen, 1997: 75-77. 
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which defined the southern limit of the zone of overlapping claims, applied equidistance 
giving full effect to its islands, including the Tho Chu group, but ignoring Thailand's 
feature Ko Losin (see Section 6.3.4). Thailand, in contrast, used equidistance as a basis 
for its claim which formed the northern limit of the zone of overlapping claims, ignoring 
both Ko Losin and the Tho Chu group of islands which were considerably further 
offshore than Ko Losin (see Section 5.3.3). 
In the event, it is understood that Thailand conceded that Ko Losin be accorded 
no effect on the delimitation line in exchange for a substantially reduced effect for the 
Tho Chu group. 133 As Prescott points out, if the Tho Chu group were given full effect 
and Ko Losin ignored, Vietnam would have acquired the entirety of the overlapping 
claims area. Even though Ko Losin was apparently ignored for the purposes of 
delimitation, Vietnam only secured 33.3% of the zone of overlapping claims, meaning 
that the Tho Chu group were discounted by 66.6%. 134 
On the face of it Vietnam was successful in that it secured at least some 
consideration for the Tho Chu group on the delimitation while simultaneously 
persuading Thailand to entirely discount Ko Losin. However, the insular features 
concerned are by no means identical in character. 
As previously noted in reference to the Thai-Malaysian JDA, Ko Losin is a 
small, isolated, barren and uninhabited rocky feature described by the British Admiralty 
Pilot for the area as being "llh m (5 ft) high and steep-to all round. " 135 There is 
precious little to suggest that Ko Losin has or could sustain human habitation or an 
economic life of its own and the feature is therefore a "rock" within the meaning of 
UNCLOS Article 121(3). As such, Thailand would only be able to claim a 12om 
territorial sea from Ko Losin rather than extensive continental shelf or EEZ rights. 
In contrast, Tho Chu island, the principle island of the group of the same name, 
is large enough to support a settled population. As the Admiralty Pilot notes: 
133 
134 
135 
Interview with Admiral Thanom Charoenlaph (Rtd.), Bangkok, 18 December 1998. Admiral 
Charoenlaph, as well as being a former Chief Hydrographer to the Royal Thai Navy, at the time 
of the interview held a position as Special Advisor on maritime boundary issues to the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the Royal Thai Government. From the Vietnamese perspective Nguyen 
(1997: 75-77) reveals that Thailand held the view that Tho Chu produced an "excessive 
distortion" and initially suggested using Thailand's 1973 claim line as the basis for negotiations. 
This was apparently the source of much "legal wrangling." Subsequently, however, Thailand 
was to concede first one-quarter and then one-third effect for Tho Chu. 
Prescott, 1998: 44. Prescott actually gives the proportion of the overlapping area falling to 
Vietnam as 33% giving a discount on Tho Chu of 67%. This finding is consistent with Nguyen's 
(1997: 76) report that Thailand was willing to consider according Tho Chua one-third effect in 
delimitation. 
Hydrographer of the Navy, 1978: 85. 
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Paulo Panjang is of a nearly uniform elevation of 167m (548ft), and has the 
appearance of a table-land from all directions. On the W side of the island, 
which is inhabited, there is a bay which affords shelter and good anchorage 
during the NE monsoon ... [emphasis added]. 136 
The fact that Tho Chu is inhabited obviously indicates that the island can "sustain 
human habitation" and also lends credence to the contention that it also has an 
"economic life of its own"- the conditions laid out in UNCLOS Article 121(3) to test 
whether a particular feature is a "rock" or not (i.e. if it cannot fulfil either requirement 
the feature is a rock). 137 This is significant since it can therefore be argued that, unlike 
Ko Losin, Tho Chu is a fully-fledged island meaning that the sovereign is entitled to 
claim title to continental shelf and EEZ. 
For the purposes of delimitation, therefore, Ko Losin and Tho Chu are simply 
not comparable features. Thus, it is entirely appropriate that Ko Losin is wholly 
discounted and that Tho Chu island influences the delimitation equation, particularly as 
UNCLOS Article 121(2) specifically states that, save if defined as a "rock": 
... the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the 
continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions 
of this Convention applicable to other land territory [emphasis added]. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that Thailand gained the advantage in negotiations, securing a 
significant reduction in the weight accorded to the Tho Chu islands and, crucially, the 
majority of the overlapping claims area at stake. It is difficult to explain this apparent 
generosity on the part of Vietnam and it is as well to be cautious when ascribing motives 
to states for their actions in the absence of confirmation. However, such confirmation 
has rarely been forthcoming and, bearing in mind the necessarily tenuous nature of such 
observations, it is worth outlining several factors which may go some way to explaining 
why Thailand apparently negotiated so successfully. 
One reason why Vietnam may have been prepared to accept a smaller portion of 
the disputed area than Thailand may lie in external political factors which outweighed 
136 
137 
Hydrographer of the Navy, 1978: 108. 
In addition, Chanda (1986: 13) has noted that when Khmer Rouge forces occupied Tho Chu on 
10 May 1975, they "evacuated at gunpoint five hundred Vietnamese inhabitants, who were 
never heard of again." It was also reported in 1992 that the Vietnamese army's newspaper Quan 
Doi Nhan Dan had in August of that year carried a small article concerning families settling on 
Tho Chu with Vietnamese government assistance- a move clearly designed to bolster Vietnam's 
sovereignty claim and the full insular status of the feature (FEER, 3/9/92). Furthermore, Nguyen 
(1997: 74) put the population of the island at 500-600 in 1997. 
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the apparent concessions Vietnam made. Several factors could have led the Vietnamese 
government to give a high priority to the conclusion of a maritime boundary agreement 
with Thailand. As in the case of the Malaysian-Vietnamese joint development 
agreement (see Section 6.3), it can be argued that the peaceful resolution of a maritime 
boundary dispute with a fellow ASEAN member had major political advantages for 
Vietnam. The agreement served to bolster Vietnam's standing within ASEAN and that 
organisation's internal unity, particularly vis-a-vis the sovereignty and jurisdictional 
disputes in the South China Sea. Vietnam may very well have perceived the latter 
disputes, notably over the Paracel and Spratly islands, as being more extensive, complex 
and ultimately more important that those in the Gulf of Thailand, and that the need to 
present a united ASEAN front in the face of an alleged Chinese threat was worth the 
price of conceding a certain amount of its Gulf of Thailand claim to Thailand. The 
agreement with Thailand also casts Vietnam in the role of a state prepared to resolve 
peacefully maritime boundary disputes - something that can only enhance Vietnam's 
standing in the international community as a whole and specifically in relation to the 
other maritime disputes in which Hanoi is embroiled. 
This argument is obliquely supported by Nguyen Hong Thao's observations in 
relation to the Thai-Vietnamese boundary agreement. Dr Nguyen emphasises that the 
agreement is the first to be concluded in South East Asia since the ratification of 
UNCLOS in 1994 as well as being "the first agreement on the delimitation of all the 
maritime zones belonging to the coastal states concerned in the region" and "the first 
agreement ending a marine dispute in all aspects in the Gulf of Thailand. "138 The 
triumphal tones of Dr Nguyen's presentation of the agreement are illustrative of the 
political stock Vietnam appears to have set on the conclusion of the treaty with 
Thailand. 139 Dr Nguyen goes on to contrast, somewhat mischievously, the "relatively 
short" five year negotiating process that delivered the agreement with the extended time 
it took Malaysia and Thailand to implement their joint development MoU (see Section 
6.2.4). The article also refers to the accord as Vietnam's "first agreement on maritime 
delimitation concluded with a neighbouring country." This statement seems at odds 
138 
139 
Nguyen, 1997: 77-78. As the Thai-Vietnamese boundary is one between opposite coasts more 
than 48nm apart it therefore does not involve delimitations between the two states' territorial seas 
or contiguous zones. By "all maritime zones" Dr Nguyen probably means the delimitation 
covers both continental shelf and EEZ. 
See also, Valencia and Van Dyke,(l994: 242-243) who outline Vietnam's desire to enhance its 
standing as a member of the international community and assert that Vietnam's "main strategy" 
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with the author's earlier contention that Cambodia and Vietnam had agreed on the 
course of their lateral maritime boundary seaward of the joint historic waters area as 
early as 1991. The concluding paragraph of Dr Nguyen's article provides a clear 
indication of the Vietnamese view of the significance of the Thai-Vietnamese treaty: 
The Thai-Vietnamese agreement on maritime boundary delimitation creates 
good conditions for future cooperation between the two nations. It also 
contributes to the strength, security and stability of maritime activities in the 
Gulf of Thailand and to peace, prosperity and the furthering of mutual interests 
and development within ASEAN. It also constitutes a precious gift to ASEAN on 
0 30 h 0 140 zts t annzversary. 
The concerns outlined above over the location of the Cambodia-Thailand-Vietnam 
tripoint, of Point "0" and in relation to the alignment of the Cambodia-Vietnam 
boundary beyond their joint historic waters area could, of course, be resolved through 
Cambodia's unequivocal acceptance of the provisions of the Thai-Vietnamese treaty 
which relate to it and/or hard evidence of the existence of the Cambodia-Vietnam 
maritime boundary agreement emerging. However, despite the statement contained in 
the text of the treaty that the Thai-Vietnamese agreement was determined without 
prejudice to the rights of third parties, Cambodia's rights do seem to have been 
infringed upon and for Cambodia to accept Point K as the location of the Cambodia-
Thailand-Vietnam tripoint would mean Cambodia accepting a starting point for its 
delimitation with Thailand which is highly advantageous to the latter. Cambodia's 
February 1998 protest note makes it clear that Cambodia rejects the assertion that it had 
previously agreed on a maritime boundary delimitation with Vietnam in the relevant part 
of the Gulf of Thailand, makes it clear that Phnom Penh considers the Thai-Vietnamese 
agreement to constitute a violation of its sovereignty and offshore rights and reserves its 
position with regard to delimitation in the area. It is therefore abundantly clear that a 
maritime boundary dispute between the three states exists (see Section 7.4). 
is to "attempt to enmesh its interests and policies within the much larger regional network of 
interlocking economic and political activity. " 
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6.6 Conclusions 
Considerable progress has therefore already been achieved in terms of the conclusion of 
agreements related to maritime jurisdiction in the Gulf of Thailand. Indeed, all four 
littoral states are signatories to at least one such accord with a neighbouring state and 
this indicates that tangible progress has been made towards resolving, or at least 
defusing, several contentious maritime boundary disputes. Nevertheless, the 
delimitation picture in the Gulf of Thailand remains profoundly incomplete. The 
remaining unsettled delimitations include substantial areas of overlapping claims to 
maritime jurisdiction, most notably that between Cambodia and Thailand. These 
undelimited boundaries issues and boundary disputes will be examined in detail in 
Chapter 7. 
Furthermore, as highlighted by the foregoing analysis of existing agreements, the 
agreements themselves throw up uncertainties and problems which the coastal states 
have to face, even if not immediately. Issues such as the instability of the coastline in 
the vicinity of the Thai-Malaysian boundary at the Golok River's mouth on the coast 
and its effects on the location of the first point in the two states' territorial sea boundary; 
the seemingly overly long nature of that boundary; the question of establishing a 
position for the Cambodia-Thailand-Vietnam tripoint which is acceptable to all the 
parties; and, technical uncertainties over the actual locations of geographic coordinates 
and the meaning of 'straight' lines as mentioned in the various agreements all fall into 
this category. In addition, several of the agreements outlined in this chapter merely put 
the question of delimitation to one side for a specified period in order that resource 
exploitation and management may proceed through the mechanism of a joint 
development zone. It should be recognised that such practical resource-oriented 
arrangements are fundamentally interim in nature and thus designed to be of temporary 
duration. It is therefore highly likely that in due course the states concerned will seek to 
conclude a definitive delimitation of the maritime space concerned. Finally, it is also 
worth acknowledging that the maritime boundary and joint zone agreements that have 
been concluded within the Gulf of Thailand are themselves not necessarily free from 
dispute. These issues will be addressed in the following chapter. 
140 Nuguyen, 1997: 78. 
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Undelimited Maritime Boundaries and Boundary Disputes 
in the Gulf of Thailand 
7.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter clearly demonstrates that maritime boundary delimitation in the 
Gulf of Thailand is far from complete. Only three maritime boundary delimitation 
agreements have been concluded in the Gulf; the Thai-Malaysian territorial sea treaty 
and two partial delimitations between Thailand a!ld Malaysia and Thailand and 
Vietnam. In addition, three joint zone agreements have been entered into between 
Malaysia and Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam, and Cambodia and Vietnam. The 
existing maritime boundary agreements are themselves not free from controversy (see 
Chapter 6) and, in due course, the various joint zones established in the Gulf of Thailand 
will need to be divided between the coastal states. Furthermore, extensive areas of the 
Gulf are subject to overlapping claims to jurisdiction, most notably between Cambodia 
and Thailand, which have not been subject to any delimitation or joint zone 
arrangements. 
The objectives of this chapter are to elucidate the background to undelimited 
boundary situations in the Gulf of Thailand; to detail their scope; to provide a critique of 
the parties' claims; to review progress in negotiations between the interested parties (in 
so far as information on such sensitive discussions is available); and finally to offer 
some insights as to possible options for dispute resolution together with an assessment 
of the likelihood of such options being taken up. 
It is ~ell worth pointing out that maritime boundary delimitation negotiations 
are, in the mid to late-1990s, occurring in a profoundly different political context from 
that experienced by the Gulf of Thailand littoral states from the end of World War IT 
until that time. The region, particularly Indochina, has been beset by conflict and 
ideological schisms which have to a significant extent undermined efforts towards 
resolving maritime boundary conflicts. No fewer than three Indochinese wars were 
fought in the period 1945-79, while from 1979-93 the 'Cambodian Question' bedevilled 
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relations between western-leaning Malaysia and Thailand on the one hand and 
communist-oriented Cambodia and Vietnam on the other. This impasse finally broke 
down with the end of the Cold War and the UN's intervention in Cambodia in 1991-
1993. The four Gulf of Thailand coastal states are now all fully accepted members of 
the international community and are also all members of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN). The general political climate in which maritime boundary 
delimitation negotiations can proceed must therefore be considered to be more 
favourable than at any previous point in modern times. 
7.2 Cambodia - Thailand 
7.2.1 Introduction 
No maritime boundary has been agreed between Cambodia and Thailand in respect of 
territorial sea, continental shelf or exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Negotiations have 
been stymied by ideological divides and political instability. 
7.2.2 Historical Background 
The alignment of the modern land boundary between Cambodia and Thailand is the 
consequence of treaties concluded between France (on behalf of Cambodia) and Siam 
(Thailand) in the latter half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 1 These 
agreements, briefly reviewed below, are crucial to the issue of maritime boundary 
delimitation in that they determine where the land boundary between Cambodia and 
Thailand intersects with the coast and, therefore, the starting point for any maritime 
boundary. Additionally, the treaties in question define sovereignty over islands of 
potential significance to maritime boundary delimitation. 
In July 1862 France effectively confirmed its dominance over Vietnam when the 
government of Annam (Vietnam) sued for peace and signed the Treaty of Saigon. In the 
wake of the signing of this treaty, France also held that it had inherited Annam's rights 
and interests in Cambodia, which at the time was a weak buffer state commonly subject 
to influence and intervention from both Annam and Siam.2 In August 1863 French 
2 
Prescott, 1975: 438-465. 
Prescott, 1975: 428; Prescott et al., 1977: 58; and StJohn, 1998: 9. By the 1862 treaty France 
secured a foothold at the mouth of the Mekong when Annam ceded the provinces of Bien Hao, 
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officials secured the Cambodian king's signature to a secret treaty one ofthe principal 
provisions of which was that Cambodia became a French protectorate. 3 However, only 
four months later, in December 1863, the Cambodian ruler signed another secret 
agreement, this time with Siam (Thailand), containing similar undertakings to those 
concluded with the French in that Cambodia was acknowledged as a tributary state of 
Siam (Thailand).4 In due course France became aware of the Siamese-Cambodian 
agreement and in July 1867 France and Siam eventually resolved this conflicting 
situation through an agreement whereby Siam recognised France's protection of 
Cambodia and relinquished any rights to tribute from Cambodia it may have had in 
return for French recognition of Siamese sovereignty over what had been the 
Cambodian provinces of Angkor (Siem Reap) and Battambang.5 
France made further territorial advances at the expense of Siamese interests, 
particularly in Laos which were confirmed by a Franco-Siamese treaty in 1893 and two 
in 1904.6 From the point of view of maritime boundary delimitation, the treaty of June 
1904 was potentially significant. By this treaty, France acquired approximately 2,500 
square miles (6,473km2) of territory at the southern terminus of the Siamese-Cambodian 
boundary on the coast.7 The territory ceded by Siam (Thailand) included a large part of 
the Cardamones mountain range and the coastal plain in the vicinity of Trat. This 
served to extend Cambodia's coastline considerably, giving the French authorities m 
. 3 
4 
6 
Gia Dinh and My Tho. By the same treaty Annam renounced any claims to sovereignty over 
Cambodia but Admiral Pierre de Ia Grandi ere, Governor of Cochin-China, and his administration 
argued that France was heir to these rights, and despatched a junior officer to Cambodia to 
collect information and sign a treaty safeguarding French interests. These efforts led to the 
August 1863 treaty between France and the Cambodian sovereign being signed. 
Article 1 of the treaty provided for French protection over Cambodia while Article 4 gave France 
exclusive influence over Cambodia's foreign relations. The limits of Cambodia's territory were 
not, however, specified (Prescott, 1975: 428). 
Prescott, 1975: 430; Prescott et al., 1977: 58; and StJohn, 1998: 9. When the August 1863 was 
forwarded to Paris for ratification delays ensued as Emperor Napoleon III was concerned over 
"uncertain overseas commitments" and the possibility of offending Britain. This delay 
undermined the Cambodian king's confidence in the agreement such that he sought to "offset the 
possible wrath of Thailand" by signing another secret treaty with that country (Prescott, 1975: 
428-430). 
The French authorities only became aware of the Siamese-Cambodian accord after it was 
published in the Straits Times newspaper in August 1864 (StJohn, 1998: 9). In Apri11865 
France and Siam reached agreement that Siam would recognise France's protectorate over 
Cambodia and regard the December 1863 treaty as null and void in return for French recognition 
of Thailand's existing frontiers and recognition of Cambodia as free and independent and thus 
not subject to the suzerainty of any state. These arrangements provoked considerable criticism in 
France over the extent of territorial concessions to Siam (StJohn, 1998: 11) and the "quasi-
condominium" status accorded to Cambodia (Prescott, 1975: 430). As a result the 1865 treaty 
was not ratified by Paris, necessitating the negotiations leading to the July 1867 agreement 
(Prescott, 1975: 430; StJohn, 1998: 9-11). 
Prescott, 1975:430-435;Prescottetal., 1977:58;andStJohn, 1998:12-18. 
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Cambodia control over coastline on the Gulf of Thailand between Laem [point] Ling 
and Laem Samit including the port of Trat, Ko Chang island and all the islands lying 
between Ko Chang and Laem Samit (see Figure 7.1). 8 Unfortunately for Cambodia, at 
least from the perspective of its maritime rights, the Franco-Siamese treaty of 23 March 
19079 partially reversed the provisions of the June 1904 agreement (see Appendix 18). 
This agreement is particularly significant as it marks the last major alteration in the 
delimitation of the land boundary between Cambodia and Siam (Thailand). 10 By the 
March 1907 agreement France retroceded part of the Cardamones and the lowlands 
around Trat, amounting to 650 square miles (1,683km2), to Siam (Thailand) as well as 
the headwaters of the Nam Huang (Dan Sai) on the Laos border. 11 In return, Cambodia 
regained the provinces of Battambang, Sisophon and Siem Reap. Overall, the 
agreement was highly favourable to Cambodia - in exchange for approximately 950 
square miles (2,460km2) of territory Cambodia gained 12,400 square miles 
(32,104km2). 12 Of particular significance for Cambodians was the return of Ankor and 
Battambang, predominantly Cambodian populated and regarded as the "cradle of the 
Khmer people. "13 The 1907 treaty also included provision for the demarcation of the 
boundary which was duly conducted by a joint commission and completed without 
serious problems within a year. 14 
Nevertheless, the treaty of 23 March 1907 severely compromised Cambodia's 
maritime rights in that not only did it curtail Cambodia's coastline on the Gulf of 
Thailand but also confirmed several islands, particularly Ko Chang and Ko Kut, as 
belonging to Siam (Thailand). In the vicinity of the coast, the 1907 boundary line 
follows western edge of the Cardamones range to terminate on the coast just north of 
Pyam, opposite Ko Kut. 15 The effect of this delimitation is to provide Thailand with 
sovereignty over a narrow coastal strip which fringes Cambodian territory further inland 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
Prescott, 1975: 434. 
Prescott, 1975:434. 
Coupled with a subsequent "verbal understanding" of 8 February 1909 (Siddayao, 1978: 77). 
Boundary changes favourable to Thailand were effected in 1941 but these were reversed after the 
end of World War II (see below). 
Prescott, 1975: 435. 
Prescott et al., 1977: 58. 
StJohn, 1998: 11. StJohn ( 1998: 16) further noted that "For Cambodians, no settlement [with 
Thailand] could be complete which left Angkor and Battambang, the provinces they felt were the 
most Cambodian of all Cambodian provinces, in the hands of the Siamese. " 
Prescott, 1975: 435; and, Prescott et al., 1977: 58-59. The dispute over the Temple of Preah 
Vihear did, however, subsequently arise (see Section 7.2.3). 
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and thus deprives it of a coastal front. 16 Furthermore, the 1907 treaty provided that 
France ceded to Siam "all the islands situated to the south of Cape Lemling as far as 
and including Koh-Kut" (see Appendix 18). Cambodia therefore lost the coastline 
fronting a considerable portion of its land territory as well as significant islands offshore 
including Koh Kut which, lying as it does directly offshore the terminus of the two 
states' land boundary on the coast, has a significant potential influence on the course of 
any maritime boundary in this vicinity. This has constricted Cambodia's coastal front 
and has had a significant, negative, bearing on its claims to maritime jurisdiction. 
The only other major change in the course of the Thai-Cambodian boundary was 
an ephemeral one which took place in the 1940s. The rise of Japan as a power in 
Southeast Asia in the late 1930s and early 1940s emboldened Thailand to seek the return 
of territories previously lost to France. French attempts to secure a non-aggression pact 
with Thailand in exchange for amendments along their Mekong border were overtaken 
by Germany's occupation of France. 17 Exploiting the changing balance of power in the 
region, Thailand increased its demands to include the retrocession of Battambang, Siem 
Reap and Sisophon, and hostilities broke out between Thai and French forces in the 
autumn of 1940. While the land campaign was apparently a low-key affair, 18 French 
naval forces did score a notable, if Phyrrhic, victory over a numerically superior Thai 
flotilla in the vicinity of Ko Chang. 19 Japan moved quickly to the aid of its Thai allies 
and moved to 'arbitrate' in the dispute. As a result of this intervention a treaty was 
signed on 9 May 1941 which returned to Thailand most of the territory France had 
gained under the accords of 1904 and 1907 (see Figure 7.2).20 These Thai gains were, 
however, reversed in the wake of Japan's defeat under the terms of the Treaty of 
Washington of 17 November 1946 which served to annul the May 1941 agreement. 21 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
The United States Department of State study on the boundary indicates that this part of its course 
"follows the watershed of the coastal range of the Cardamomes" for a distance of 103 miles 
from the vicinity of Koh Kong peninsula on the coast (US Department of State, 1966: 5). 
The boundary in vicinity of the coast did, however, represent an ethnolinguistic divide with Thai 
inhabiting areas to the west of the coastal range and Khmers to the east (US Department of State, 
1966: 4). 
Prescott, 1975: 435-436; and, StJohn, 1998: 19. 
Prescott (1975: 436) describes the fighting as "desultory" while StJohn (1998: 19) terms it 
"sluggish." 
StJohn, 1998: 19. 
Prescott, 1975: 436; and, StJohn, 1998: 19-21. 
Prescott, 1975: 436; and, StJohn, 1998: 40. 
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7.2.3 Sovereignty Issues 
The key instrument governing the disposition of territories between Cambodia and 
Thailand is therefore the Franco-Siamese treaty of 23 March 1907. The international 
boundary so defined was demarcated by the end of 1908. Despite this, two significant 
sovereignty questions subsequently arose - possession of the ancient temple ruins at 
Preah Vihear22 and sovereignty over Koh Kut. 23 
The dispute over Preah Vihear, described as one of the most impressive temple 
sites in Southeast Asia, emerged in 1949.24 Following the failure of negotiations on the 
issue in the 1954-1958 period, Cambodia referred the dispute to the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) in October 1959. In June 1962 the ICJ duly ruled that the temple 
complex belonged to Cambodia.25 While Thailand formally accepted the Judgment of 
the Court and withdrew from Preah Vihear, the Thai authorities condemned the Court's 
ruling as a miscarriage of justice "26 and subsequent Cambodian attempts in the early 
1960s to gain formal Thai acceptance of the 1904 and 1907 treaties and withdrawal of 
its reservations over the ICJ decision met with mixed success. Although Thailand 
accepted that the 1904 and 1907 treaties established the Thai -Cambodian boundary, 
Bangkok rejected the Dangrek map (on which the Preah Vi hear case turned) and other 
French maps in the same series depicting the boundary as inaccurate and invalid, on the 
grounds that they had not been approved by the mixed commissions established by the 
treaties, and maintained its reservations concerning the award of the temple to 
Cambodia.Z7 StJohn notes that there have also been occasional indications, for instance 
the publication of maps showing Preah Vihear as part of Thai territory, that Thailand 
may harbour irredentist ambitions concerning the temple. 28 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Known as Khao Phra Viharn in Thailand (StJohn, 1998: 40). 
StJohn, 1998: 43. 
StJohn, 1998: 40. 
See, for example, Smith (1965: 144-151). 
Quoted in Smith, 1965: 149. In the immediate aftermath of the case, some Thai officials even 
went so far as to threaten that any Cambodian entering Thai territory (i.e. Preah Vihear) would be 
shot of sight (Smith, 1965: 150). Thailand officially made a reservation and protest concerning 
the Court's judgment in a note to the UN Secretary-General dated 6 July 1962. This was, in turn, 
regarded by the Cambodian authorities as a "future threat and serious manifestation of 
contempt" on the part of Thailand towards its treaties and international obligations (Smith, 1965: 
151). 
US Department of State, 1966: 4. 
StJohn, 1998: 41-43. In particular, StJohn (1998: 41) highlights the fact that when the Thai 
authorities eventually surrendered the temple in 1962, the Thai flag and flagpole were removed 
from the site and kept in a Thai museum - something which contemporary observers interpreted 
as indicating that certain members of the Thai government were still "determined to return the 
Thai standard to Preah Vihear at a later date." 
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While the dispute over Preah Vihear is not directly relevant to maritime 
boundary delimitation issues between Cambodia and Thailand in the Gulf of Thailand, 
the fact that Thailand lost is potentially significant. This is because Thailand's failure 
before the ICJ may be viewed as having a bearing on the means of dispute resolution 
likely to be favoured by Thailand in other disputes, including that with Cambodia in the 
Gulf of Thailand. Given Thailand's experience in the Preah Vihear case, it must be 
considered highly unlikely that Thailand would willingly countenance submitting 
another boundary dispute to internationallitigation.29 
As noted, the March 1907 treaty makes it plain that Koh Kut island is a Siamese 
(Thai) possession, as are the islands to the north of it (Appendix 18). Nevertheless, in 
the wake of the Preah Vihear case, Thailand apparently felt the need to reinforce its 
sovereignty over Koh Kut. This led to Cambodian allegations that Thailand was 
"attempting to take over" the island and a response from Thailand's Foreign Minister 
that Cambodia was faced with a choice of "peace or confrontation" over the issue. 30 
Thai and Cambodian forces subsequently clashed on the border in 1965 with UN 
mediation efforts coming to nothing. According to StJohn, Koh Kut "remains an open 
territorial issue, at least in the minds of some Cambodians. "31 Such attitudes are 
exemplified by the comments reportedly made by a senior Cambodian naval officer, 
Commodore Khieng Savan, Commander of Cambodia's Maritime Crime Suppression 
Division and Deputy-Commander of the Khmer Royal Navy, as recently as January 
1996: 
29 
30 
31 
32 
Although the Thais have not used their forces to violate our territorial waters, 
we have lost the island of Kaoh Kok [Koh Kut}, located near the border between 
Koh Kong and the Thai province of Trat, to them. This [island} has always 
belonged to Cambodia and we want it back, but we do not have enough forces to 
take it back. 32 
A view supported by Englefield ( 1994: 36-37) and Dzurek (1998: 130) among others. 
StJohn, 1998: 43. 
StJohn, 1998: 43. Buchholz (1987: 41) noted that "Cambodia ... also claims Koh Kut island" but 
also stated that "sovereignty over Koh Kut Island seems unclear even in Cambodia." It was 
similarly noted in 1977 that the Khmer Rouge had been carrying out "land nibbling" 
encroachments on Thai territory in the vicinity of the land boundary terminus on the coast 
"aimed at gaining control of the small coastal spur which supports Thai claims to disputed 
waters in the GulfofThailand" (FEER, 18//8177). In contrast, Kittichaisaree (1987: 37) 
maintains that: "Cambodia as successor to France, has never disputed Thailand's (or Siam's) 
sovereignty over Kut Island." 
BBC SWB FE/2542, B/3; summarised in Boundary and Security Bulletin, 4, 1 (Spring 1996): 
36-37. 
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With regard to claims to maritime jurisdiction, Koh Kut, situated directly offshore the 
terminus of Thailand and Cambodia's land boundary on the coast, would be of great 
value to Cambodia were Phnom Penh to regain sovereignty over it. This must, of 
course, be regarded as extremely unlikely but given the islands potential value to 
Cambodia's offshore claims it is, perhaps, unsurprising that a Cambodian desire for 
sovereignty over the island is occasionally articulated - just as there are infrequent 
irredentist rumblings from the Thai side of the border concerning the fate of Preah 
Vi hear. 
Cambodian claims to Koh Kut also reflect deep-seated Cambodian distrust of its 
neighbours and a hankering for a return of Cambodia's 'lost territories'. As Figure 7.3 
illustrates, modern Cambodia is a fraction of the size of the area under the influence of 
the Khmer Empire at its height. This has led Cambodia to adopt an extremely defensive 
and inflexible view in relation to issues of boundaries and territory: 
... the fear of national extinction at the hands of more powerful neighbours 
prompted the Khmers to approach questions of territorial sovereignty with an 
uncompromising rigidity. 33 
Although the Khmer Rouge regime was particularly aggressive on this issue, 
"irredentist rhetoric" has "frequently coloured official Cambodian statements "34 and 
"even the supple Sihanouk made the non-negotiability of Kampuchea's borders a major 
object of his diplomacy in the 1960s. "35 Apparent Cambodian claims to Koh Kut 
should therefore be assessed against this context. There is, however, no indication that 
Cambodia maintains a realistic official claim to sovereignty over Koh Kut and none has 
been advanced in the course of maritime boundary negotiations with Thailand.36 
33 
34 
35 
36 
Elliott, 1981: 5. 
StJohn, 1998: 43. 
Elliott, 1981: 5. 
Any such claim could be considered likely to provoke a swift termination in negotiations by the 
Thais. 
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Source: StJohn, 1998. 
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7.2.4 Scope of Dispute 
Cambodia's and Thailand's claims, dating from 1972 and 1973 respectively, resulted in 
an overlapping claims area in the Gulf of Thailand measuring 9,336nm2 (30,020km2) 
(see Figure 7.4).37 The resolution of Cambodia's and Vietnam's dispute over islands 
has, however, significantly reduced the area disputed by Thailand and Cambodia (see 
Section 7.3). Nevertheless, these two states maintain the largest overlapping claims area 
remaining within the Gulf of Thailand, covering an area of 7,550nm2 (25,895km2) of 
maritime space (see Figure 7.5).38 
This dispute exists because the two states have applied differing methods to 
construct their claims between adjacent coasts. Additionally, with respect to their 
delimitation between opposite coasts, although both Cambodia and Thailand have used 
the same method, equidistance, as the basis of their claims, they have used different 
basepoints and thus have dissimilar interpretations of equidistance(see Sections 5.2 and 
5.3). 
In relation to its territorial sea boundary with Thailand, Cambodia's claim is 
based on a rather unusual, to say the least, interpretation of historic evidence, primarily 
the 1907 Franco-Siamese boundary treaty. It will be recalled that Cambodia's Kret 
No.518172-PRK of 12 August 1972 states that Cambodia's territorial sea "follows the 
division of maritime waters determined by the historic frontier stipulated in the Treaty 
of 23 March 1907 and confirmed by the map annexed thereto" (see Section 5.2.1). As 
this phrase was repeated almost verbatim in Cambodia's July 1982 decree, it can be 
considered to constitute Phnom Penh's current claim.39 
The March 1907 treaty, as previously mentioned, relates to the allocation of 
certain islands and territories and is predominantly concerned with the land boundary. 
Nevertheless, it was used as the basis for projecting a straight line claim almost due west 
from the terminus of the Thai-Cambodian land boundary on the Gulf of Thailand. The 
key phrase in the 1907 Treaty referred to the use of the summit of Koh Kut island as a 
reference point for the position of the terminus of the land boundary on the coast as 
follows: 
37 
38 
39 
Calculated using DELMAR. 
Calculated using DELMAR. The southeastern limit of the area of overlap was taken to be a 
theoretical equidistance line between Cambodia and Vietnam. Were the seaward extension of the 
Brevie Line used as this limit instead, the area of overlap would be reduced by approximately 
54nm2 (185km2). 
Article 3 of Cambodia's July 1982legislation omitted reference to the map annexed to the 1907 
treaty. 
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Malaysia - Vietnam 
Agreed Common Area 
Figure 7.4: Thai-Cambodian Overlapping Claims in the 1970s 
Source: Author's research. 
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Malaysia - Vietnam 
Agreed Common Area 
Figure 7.5: Thai-Cambodian Overlapping Claims in the 1990s 
Source: Author's research. 
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... the boundary between French Indo-China and Siam leaves the sea at the point 
opposite the highest point on Ko Kut island (Appendix 18). 
The map annexed to the treaty illustrated this, shows a solid line connecting the highest 
point on Koh Kut to the first point of the international boundary between the two states 
on the mainland coast (see Figure 7.6). Cambodia has interpreted the above statement, 
coupled with the accompanying map, as justification for Cambodia to project a maritime 
boundary in a straight line from the land boundary terminus on the coast offshore in the 
direction of the highest point on Koh Kut island. As far as the continental shelf claim 
between adjacent coasts is concerned, beyond the terminus of Cambodia's 12nm 
territorial sea claim, the claim follows the same straight line towards the central Gulf of 
Thailand, passing over Koh Kut through the island's highest point. Cambodia's lateral 
claim terminates at 'Point P', equidistant between the Cambodian and Thai opposite 
mainland coasts (see Section 5.3.1).40 
For its part, Thailand maintains a continental shelf claim in its lateral boundary 
situation with Cambodia at variance with strict equidistance.41 The boundary claim 
departs from the terminus of the Thai-Cambodian land boundary on the Gulf of 
Thailand and projects in a straight line towards the central Gulf until a point equidistant 
from the straight baselines enclosing Thailand's Area 2 and basepoints on islands in the 
immediate vicinity of the Cambodian mainland coast, such as Koh Rong, is reached. 
This long straight line claim to continental shelf is consistent with a bisector line 
between the two countries' straight baseline systems (see Section 5.3.3). Thailand's 
claim is therefore based on equidistance in a general sense, particularly close inshore, 
but is by no means strictly equidistant between Thai and Cambodian adjacent coasts 
and, significantly, islands. 
As far as their delimitation between their opposite coastlines is concerned, both 
Cambodia and Thailand have based their claims on equidistance. The significant 
overlap between their claims in the central Gulf of Thailand is the consequence of the 
selective use of island basepoints in constructing each sides claim lines. Cambodia has 
40 
41 
The text of Kret No.439/72-PRK (Appendix 6) actually indicates that the continental shelf 
proceeds in "a straight line joining the frontier point "A" on the coast with the highest summit 
on the Island of Koh Kut and thence [still in a straight line] up to Point "P" in the central Gulf 
of Thailand. 
It is worth noting that Thailand defined a continental shelf claim extending directly offshore from 
the terminus of the Thai-Cambodian land boundary on the coast. Technically, the first 12nm of 
this claim should have constituted a claim to territorial sea (see Section 5.2.3). 
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used features such as Poulo Wei, Koh Veer and Koh Prins in making its claim while 
entirely discounting the Thai islets of Ko Kra and Ko Losin. In contrast, Thailand has 
discounted Cambodia's straight baseline claims and all island basepoints significantly 
offshore, including its own features Ko Kra and Ko Losin, in defining the limits of its 
claim. As the Cambodian islands mentioned are well offshore, the resulting 
equidistance line between the Thai and Cambodian mainlands (including islands in 
close vicinity thereto) is to Thailand's advantage when compared to the Cambodian 
claim, thus generating the overlapping zone (see Section 5.3). 
7.2.5 Delimitation between Adjacent Coasts 
Cambodia's territorial sea claim and the 1907 Franco-Siamese treaty 
As previously noted, Cambodia's boundary claims to both territorial sea and continental 
shelf with regard to its lateral delimitation with Thailand are inspired by a controversial 
reading of the Franco-Siamese treaty of 23 March 1907. In the course of negotiations 
Thailand can be expected to find substantive grounds for criticism of Cambodia's 
interpretation of the aforementioned treaty, and its resulting adoption of maritime 
boundary claim lines on that basis. 
Cambodia's contention that its territorial sea claim follows the "division of 
waters determined by the historic frontier" laid down in the March 1907 treaty is simply 
not supportable.42 Firstly, and crucially, while the treaty in question did deal with 
sovereignty over islands, including Koh Kut, it is manifestly clear that it is primarily 
concerned with the land boundary. The fact that the 1907 treaty did not deal with the 
issue of maritime boundary delimitation is betrayed by the wording of the treaty which 
states that the boundary being delimited "leaves the sea" at the point opposite the 
highest point on Ko Kut island and from this point it "follows a northeasterly direction 
to the crest of Pnom-Krevanah." In other words, the boundary line proceeds inland 
rather than offshore. Furthermore, no mention is made of the apportionment of 
maritime rights between the parties, as surely would have been the case had the treaty 
been intended to effect such a division. 
42 Ranariddh (1976: 408) notes that this represents "une solution sans basejuridique solide" [a 
solution without any judicial basis]. 
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Indeed, even if the treaty had purported to distribute maritime space between its 
parties, the line linking the summit of Koh Kut to the mainland coast could not have 
formed a maritime delimitation line. This is the case because not only does it describe a 
path over land territory from the highest point on Koh Kut to the island's coast but also, 
at the time of its signature, claims to maritime jurisdiction seldom exceeded 3nm from 
the coast, which represented the customary rule (see Section 2.2). As the distance 
between the eastern coast of Koh Kut and the first point of the land boundary on the 
mainland coast is approximately I 8nm (33.4km), the 1907 treaty could not have 
legitimately delimited a maritime boundary in the central part of the strait between Koh 
Kut and the mainland coast (let alone the maritime area to the west of the island) as this 
area, beyond 3nm from the coast, represented part of the high seas in I 907.43 
The reference to Koh Kut in the treaty text as the boundary leaving the sea 
opposite the island's highest peak, merely represents a means to aid the fixing of the 
location of the land boundary terminus on the coast from which point the land boundary 
proceeds inland. This is supported by a close examination of the map annexed to the 
treaty which was mentioned in Cambodia's Kret No.518172-PRK of 12 August 1972 as 
confirming the supposed historic division of waters between Siam and French 
Indochina. The map in question (see Figure 7.6) does show a line linking the highest 
summit on Koh Kut to the terminus of the land boundary on the coast of the Gulf of 
Thailand. However, the symbols used to illustrate this line, thin dashes, are clearly 
distinct from those used to depict the international boundary on land. This can be 
interpreted as support for the idea that the line linking the highest point of Koh Kut to 
the first point of the land boundary on the coast was intended by the treaty-makers as no 
more than a direction line designed to illustrate the location of the intersection of the 
land boundary with the coast. 
Having made these observations, it is well to note that, up to the midpoint in the 
channel between the mainland and Koh Kut,44 the alignment of the first part of the 
territorial sea delimitation claimed by Cambodia immediately offshore the two states' 
mainland coasts is, in fact, closer to a theoretical delimitation line constructed according 
43 
44 
This analysis is based on the well established doctrine of inter-temporallaw (see Shaw, 1991: 
294-295). As Max Huber, Arbitrator in the Island of Palmas case stated: 
... a juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it, and 
not of the law in force at the time when a dispute in regard to it arises orfalls to be 
settled. 
The midpoint in the channel separating the mainland from Koh Kut is located approximately 9nm 
offshore. 
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to strict equidistance (ignoring straight baselines) than the alignment claimed by 
Thailand (see Figure 7.7).45 However, Cambodia's lateral territorial sea claim is not 
only exclusively north of a strict equidistance line between the two states' mainland 
coasts to Thailand's disadvantage, but also wholly discounts the presence of Koh Kut 
island. As a result, the Cambodian territorial sea claim extends approximately 3nm 
beyond the midpoint between Koh Kut and the mainland coast.46 As such, Cambodia's 
claim cuts through Thailand's Area I straight baseline claim, leaving areas Thailand 
considers part of its internal waters on the Cambodian side of the line. Indeed, even a 
claim based on equidistance between the mainland coasts of the two states and Koh Kut 
would have been viewed as unacceptable by Thailand as such a line ignores the straight 
baselines of Area I which Thailand regards as legitimate and which have not met with 
approbation from the international community. 
It is therefore clear that Cambodia's territorial sea claim with respect to Thailand 
is based on historical arguments. It may be recalled that while it can be concluded from 
Article 15 of UNCLOS that for the delimitation of the territorial sea there is a clear 
presumption in the law of the sea in favour of equidistance, Article 15 does provide that 
equidistance need not apply under exceptional circumstances, namely the presence of 
"historic title" or "other special circumstances" (see Section 3.1.1 ). It is precisely this 
'loophole' in Article 15 which may be used to justify Cambodia's claim to a territorial 
sea boundary with Thailand as Cambodia's claim is based specifically on "the historic 
frontier stipulated in the Treaty of 23 March 1907" (emphasis added) (Appendix 18). 
Although terms such as "historic title" and "other special circumstances" are 
not defined in the UN Convention, it is clear that it is up to the state claiming the 
exception to the general rule to provide the burden of proof demonstrating its case. For 
example, the claimant state must show that historically it has exercised sufficient 
influence and control over the area in question to the exclusion of all others, thus 
justifying a departure from the principle of equidistance (see Section 3.6.4). 
45 
46 
Prescott (1998: 4 7 -48) tentatively suggests that as far as the median line between Koh Kut and 
the mainland the equidistance line based on all territory may lie "vel}' close" to the line linking 
the boundary terminus on the coast and the highest point on Koh Kut but that this could not be 
confirmed for lack of calculations based on a large scale chart. These lines are illustrated in 
Figure 7 .!0 which is based on cartographic work using British Admiralty Chart 3967, 1957 
edition at a scale of 1 :240,000 as a base. 
Measured on British Admiralty Chart 3967, 1957 edition at a scale of I :240,000. 
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Unfortunately for Cambodia there is little evidence to support any such 
contention.47 Certainly, Cambodia has never publicly articulated in any detail its case 
for claiming a maritime boundary line vis-a-vis Thailand contrary to equidistance on the 
grounds of historic rights. Kittichaisaree has theorised that Cambodia could advance 
arguments based on the fact that it was deprived of the 50km-long and 5km wide strip of 
coastal territory north of the land boundary terminus on the coast which it had acquired 
in 1904 as a consequence of the 1907 treaty. This, coupled with the fact that the Klong 
Yai Bay between Koh Kut and the northern Thai islands has been ''frequented for 
decades by Cambodian fishermen", could form the basis for claiming special 
circumstances justifying Cambodia's claim.48 However, Kittichaisaree goes on to state 
that such arguments can be refuted by Thailand. Indeed, Thailand's traditional use of 
the waters of Klong Yai Bay is demonstrated by the fact that the whole bay has been 
claimed as part of Thai internal waters following Thailand's Area I straight baseline 
claim (see Section 4.4.3).49 Cambodia's justification of its lateral boundary claims vis-
a-vis Thailand on the basis of historical arguments, particularly with regard to the 
territorial sea, must therefore be regarded as weak and susceptible to serious challenge 
by the Thai authorities. 
Cambodia's continental shelf claim between adjacent coasts 
Beyond the territorial sea, Cambodia has made a claim to continental shelf (see Section 
5.3.1). As previously outlined, the limits of this claim with regard to Thailand between 
the two states' opposite coasts represent a continuation of the territorial sea claim, 
proceeding in a straight line offshore.50 The alignment of this claim is consistent with 
47 
48 
49 
50 
For example, while it may well be possible for Cambodia to argue that its fishing communities 
have traditionally used the waters in question, it must be deemed unlikely that they did so 
exclusively or that the Cambodian authorities were able to exert long-standing administration and 
control over the maritime areas immediately offshore the Thai-Cambodian land boundary 
terminus on the coast. The latter point seems particularly likely to be the case when Cambodia's 
troubled political history is taken into account. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the colonial 
French authorities in Indochina regarded the waters in question as exclusively their preserve. 
Indeed, although the French authorities did establish an exclusive fishing zone off the territories 
under their control in the mid-1930s, this zone was 20km (10.8nm) in breadth. As a result, 
measured from Cambodian territory as provided for under the Franco-Siamese treaty of March 
1907, Cambodia's exclusive fishing zone would not have extended as far offshore as Koh Kut 
(see Section 5.4 ). 
Kittichasaree, 1987: 52-53. 
Kittichaisaree, 1987: 53-54. 
As previously mentioned, the Cambodian continental shelf claim embodied in Kret No.439/72-
PRK actually states that the claim proceeds from "the frontier point "A" on the coast" in a 
straight line offshore. Technically, the first 12nm of this claim should have constituted a claim to 
territorial sea rather than continental shelf. In fact, within two months of Cambodia promulgating 
321 
Undelimited Boundaries in the Gulf of Thailand 
the directional line linking the summit of Koh Kut to the first point of the land frontier 
but projected seawards. The continental shelf claim therefore stretches from the 
terminus of the territorial sea claim, 12nm offshore the two states' mainland coasts, up 
to and apparently directly over Koh Kut, and then seaward to the central part of the Gulf 
of Thailand (see Figures 1.1 and 7.7). 
Cambodia's adjacent continental shelf boundary claim line is therefore clearly 
not based on equidistance, since Thailand's coastline in the northern Gulf, and indeed 
the island of Koh Kut itself and the Thai islands in Area 1 of the Thai straight baseline 
claim of 1970 (as well as the straight baselines themselves), are discounted. Moreover, 
in a similar fashion to the Cambodian territorial sea claim, Cambodia's lateral 
continental shelf claim does not simply discount Thailand's Area 1 straight baseline 
claim but actually cuts through it. The consequence of this is that Cambodia claims 
areas which Thailand has itself claimed as internal waters (see Figure 7.7). 
Indeed, Koh Kut is accorded no maritime jurisdiction at all south of the 
Cambodian claim line - thus the Cambodian claim apparently comes right up to the 
coast of the southern third of the island itself. It should be noted, however, that even 
though the claim line as laid down in Cambodia's Kret No.439172-PRK does traverse 
Koh Kut, the 1972 continental shelf claim in fact only refers to maritime space - the 
"plateau continental" - rather than to any part of the territory of the island itself. 
Cambodia's claim cannot therefore be considered as extending to that part of Koh Kut 
standing above the high-water mark. 
That the Thai island of Koh Kut is apparently allocated no territorial waters 
around its southern coast, such that the Cambodian claim extends right up to Thai land 
territory, must be viewed as being an extremely difficult position for Cambodia to 
defend in negotiations with Thailand. Certainly, in this author's view, were this claim 
to be put before an international legal tribunal it would be, treated with derision as 
lacking legal credibility.51 It can be anticipated that in the context of bilateral 
negotiations, Thailand will press Cambodia strongly on the maritime rights to be 
accorded to Koh Kut. Furthermore, even if the questions of Koh Kut, Thailand's 
51 
its claim to continental shelf, the Phnom Penh authorities issued a further Kret, No.518/72-PRK 
making a claim to territorial sea along the same alignment as that claimed for the 12nm section 
continental shelf immediately offshore (see Sections 5.2.1 and 5.3.1 ). The latter decree 
presumably superseded the earlier Kret. 
The March 1907 treaty explicitly states that Koh Kut belongs to Siam (Thailand). Koh Kut is a 
substantial, populated island. However, even if it were a mere rock under UNCLOS Article 
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straight baseline claims, and the other Thai islands forming part of Area I are set to one 
side, the fact that Cambodia's claim discounts the Thailand's northern and eastern 
mainland coasts is highly likely to prove a point of contention. 
The Cambodian claim's departure from equidistance, discounting parts of 
Thailand's mainland coast, certain islands and straight baselines is, however, more 
defensible from a Cambodian perspective than its claim to territorial sea. In contrast to 
the legal position concerning the territorial sea, with regard to continental shelf there is 
no presumption in favour equidistance. The basis for a continental shelf or EEZ 
boundary is therefore simply that it be based on 'equitable principles' (see Sections 
3.1.2 and 3.3) Cambodia can, therefore, construct a defence of its lateral continental 
shelf claim in the Gulf of Thailand on the basis that the alignment claimed constitutes an 
equitable division of the maritime space in question. 
The central pillar of any such argument is likely to be the inequitable nature of a 
delimitation utilising equidistance as a consequence of Cambodia's geographically 
disadvantaged status (see Section 7.2.7). 
Thailand's lateral boundary claims 
Thailand's lateral maritime boundary claim in its delimitation with Cambodia between 
their adjacent coasts consists of a single straight line, approximately 130nm (240km) in 
length, 52 extending from the terminus of the two states' land boundary on the coast to a 
point in the central Gulf of Thailand. This claim was formulated, rather 
unconventionally, on the basis of a bisector of the landwardmost segments of the 
Cambodian straight baselines established in 1957 and Thai Area 1 's of 1970 (see 
Figures 1.1 and 7.7). As such, it may be subject to criticism from the Cambodian 
authorities on a number of grounds. 
Firstly, Cambodia revised its legislation relating to straight baselines in 1972 and 
then again in 1982 resulting in a progression of Cambodian baselines further offshore 
the mainland coast (see Section 4.2.1 ). Despite the fact that Cambodia claimed revised 
straight baselines (including an initial leg from the land boundary terminus further 
seaward than had been the case in 1957), a year prior to Thailand's continental shelf 
claim being issued, these baselines were ignored for the purposes of constructing the 
52 
121(3) (which it is not),Thailand would still be entitled to claim a 12nm-breadth territorial sea 
from it. 
Measured on British Admiralty Chart 2414, 1967 edition at a scale of l: l ,500,000. 
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Thai claim line. Instead, Thailand used the first segment of Cambodia's earlier, and 
more conservative, baseline claim in order to calculate the angle of the bisector line. 
Furthermore, Thailand did not subsequently alter its continental shelf claim in response 
to the further development of the Cambodian straight baseline system in 1982. 
Cambodia is therefore likely to argue that the Thai claim wrongly discounts its 
current straight straight baselines and to seek redress. Having made this observation, it 
is worth acknowledging that Cambodia's straight baseline claims are themselves not 
without their critics, particularly those established in 1982 (see Section 4.2). Thailand is 
thus likely to counter Cambodian accusations that its straight baselines have not been 
taken into account with arguments questioning the validity of these baselines in 
international law. 
Furthermore, even if Cambodia's straight baselines are set aside, it is clear that 
Thailand's bisector line also entirely discounts the presence of the Cambodian islands, 
which act as basepoints for its straight baseline system, as basepoints in their own right 
- Koh Kusrovie, Veer island and the Poulo Wei group. Indeed, the Thai claim line 
passes within 12nm of Koh Kusrovie. As this feature is clearly not a low-tide elevation 
(see below) Cambodia is able to, at the least, claim a territorial sea from it. Thailand 
therefore claims continental shelf rights over maritime areas which Cambodia considers 
part of its territorial sea. 
While these islands are not relevant to supporting Cambodia's lateral boundary 
claims since these are fundamentally based on historic arguments, were a compromise to 
be sought, Cambodia is highly likely to argue that the discounting of its insular features 
as well as its baselines is inequitable. Thailand is, however, likely to counter this on the 
grounds that beyond the territorial sea there is in fact no presumption in international 
law explicitly in favour of equidistance. Moreover, even were an equidistance line to be 
taken as a starting point, it has been well established that with regard to delimitations 
between adjacent coasts, the presence of islands can have a "disproportionately 
distorting" effect and lead to inequitable results (see Section 3.4.4). 
The use of the first segments of the Thai and Cambodian straight baseline 
systems of 1970 and 1957 respectively in isolation is also distinctly to Thailand's 
advantage. This is so because the first segment of Thailand's Area 1 straight baseline 
claim seaward of the terminus of the land boundary on the coast proceeds in a west-
southwesterly direction. In contrast, the first leg of Cambodia's 1957 straight baselines 
claim follows a south-southeasterly bearing. It could therefore be argued that while the 
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Cambodian baseline segment accords with the general direction of the coast, the Thai 
segment in question, linking as it does Koh Kut island to the mainland coast, clearly 
does not (see Figures 4.1, 4.13 and 7.7). The consequence of this approach is that the 
Thai claim not only discounts other straight baseline segments claimed by Cambodia in 
1957 which are located further to the south but also takes no account of the Cambodian 
mainland itself, particularly between Point Yai Sen and Point Samit. 
As noted in Section 2.3.3, the US State Department's guidelines on straight 
baselines suggest that the directional trend of a fringe of islands should not depart from 
the general direction of the coast by more than 20°. However, in circumstances where 
the baseline segment is linking the fringe of islands to the mainland coast it is provided 
that the 20° angle may be exceeded. 53 The Thai baseline segment between Koh Kut and 
the mainland coast seems to fit this scenario. Thailand's use of this exceptional baseline 
alignment to push its lateral maritime claims southwards at Cambodia's expense is, 
however, likely to be challenged by Cambodia. It is worth noting here that Cambodian 
complaints over the Thai claim between the two states' adjacent coasts discounting the 
Cambodian mainland coast are likely to be mirrored by almost identical Thai arguments 
concerning the Cambodian lateral claim's treatment of the northern and eastern Thai 
mainland coast. In this regard at least it appears that the two sides' claims are in 
principal as bad as each another. 
7.2.6 Delimitation between Opposite Coasts 
As already outlined, both Cambodia and Thailand have relied on equidistance to 
construct their continental shelf claim lines between opposite coasts. The application of 
this method to cases of delimitation between opposite coasts has certainly found support 
both before international legal tribunals such as the ICJ and in state practice (see Section 
3.4.4). Overlapping claims between Cambodia and Thailand have, however, been 
caused by the discounting of straight baseline claims and the selective use of island 
basepoints by the claimant states. 
53 US Department of State, 1987: 21. 
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Baselines 
It is unclear whether Cambodia's claim discounts Thailand's Area 2 straight baselines 
claim as the Cambodian claim line falls slightly short of a strict equidistance line 
between its islands and the Thai coast on the western shore of the Gulf of Thailand. For 
its part, Thailand's claim line appears to ignore the straight baselines Cambodia claimed 
in 1972 and has not been rolled back in response to Cambodia's 1982 extension in its 
straight baselines system offshore.54 Thailand can, however, also argue that even if 
Thailand's 1973 claim was also not altered in light of Cambodia's 1972 and 1982 
advancements in its straight baselines system offshore, the same is also true of 
Cambodia's claim with regard to Thailand's 1992 extension to its straight baselines 
system- Area 4 (see Section 4.2.4). 
The question of islands 
The islands which form the basepoints of the Cambodian straight baseline claim of 
1982, Koh Kusrovie, Koh Veer and the Poulo Wei group, are disregarded by Thailand 
as basepoints for delimitation in their own right. 55 In turn, Cambodia's claim line 
ignores the Thai features Ko Kra and Ko Losin. This apparently identical treatment of 
islands is not, however, equal. This is so firstly, because several of Cambodia's islands 
are substantially further offshore than are Thailand's (see Table 7.1) such that were all 
islands to be discounted for boundary delimitation purposes, this would be distinctly to 
Thailand's advantage. 
Table 7.1 Distances of Islands Offshore 
Island Distance Offshore 
Cambodian Islands 
Koh Kusrovie 
Poulo Veer 
Poulo Wei 
16.3nm (30.25km) 
39.69nm (73.5km) 
53.05nm (98.25km) 
Thai Islands 
54 
55 
Ko Kra 
Ko Losin 
Source: Author's research. 
27.5nm (Slkm) 
37 .26nm (69km) 
Kittichaisaree (1987: 65) notes that Thailand has not used its own Area 2 straight baselines in the 
construction of its claim lines. 
Thailand's attitude in this regard is summarised by Kittichaisaree (1987: 65): "Thailand would 
prefer the equitable principles to be determinative in the Gulf of Thailand so that the 'natural 
prolongation' of land territory as propounded by the International Court of Justice in 1969 
could properly be attributed despite any purely accidental geographical feature or 
circumstance. " 
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Secondly, as mentioned in relation to the maritime boundary agreement concluded 
between Thailand and Vietnam (see Section 6.5), the islands on the eastern and western 
sides of the Gulf of Thailand are not equivalent. Ko Kra and Ko Losin on the Thai side 
and Poulo Wei in particular on the Cambodian side, are by no means comparable 
features geographically or legally. 
Both Ko Kra and Ko Losin are small, isolated, barren and uninhabited rocky 
features. 56 The relevant passages relating to the two features in the British Admiralty's 
China Sea Pilot bear this interpretation out. Ko Kra is deemed such a minor feature that 
the only information recorded in the Pilot concerning it are its height, location and the 
fact that a navigation light is exhibited from it.57 Similarly, Ko Losin is described as 
being "lllz m ( 5 ft) high and steep-to all round" together with details as to its location 
and the fact that it hosts another light beacon.58 Strong arguments can be marshalled to 
the effect that Ko Kra and Ko Losin are unable to support human habitation or an 
economic life of their own and should therefore be considered to be "rocks" as set out 
in UNCLOS Article 121(3). As such Thailand would be restricted to claiming a 
maximum 12nm territorial sea from these features and it would be correct to discount 
them for the purposes of delimiting a continental shelf boundary between Thailand and 
Cambodia. 
In contrast, it can be argued that Cambodia's insular features on the eastern side 
of the Gulf of Thailand are fully-fledged islands rather than mere rocks. While the 
China Sea Pilot describes Koh (Kaoh) Kusrovie as a "rock",59 a recent visitor to the 
feature noted the existence of a hut and shrine on the islet together with vegetation 
leading him to state that in his opinion there was "no doubt" that Koh Kusrovie is an 
island rather than a rock under Article 121 of UNCLOS.60 Apart from its location, 
Poulo (llot) Veer's entry in the Pilot merely provides that the feature is "37m (120ft) 
high and steep-to. " However, the recent visitor to the area mentioned above also 
observed that llot Veer was long, narrow, completely covered in vegetation and "clearly 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
See British Admiralty Charts 3983, 1963 edition at a scale of 1:500,000 and 3542, 1960 edition 
at a scale of 1:500,000. 
Hydrographer of the Navy, 1978: 87. 
Hydrographer of the Navy, 1978: 85. 
Hydrographer of the Navy, 1978: 108. 
The individual concerned visited the Cambodian offshore area in mid-1998 and is an experienced 
western international boundary consultant. Interview conducted in December 1998 and identity 
of interviewee withheld by request. 
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an island" within the meaning of the international law of the sea. 61 The Pilot is rather 
more forthcoming with regard to Paulo Wei: 
Paulo Wai [Wei]. .. consists of two wooded islands. TheW island is 9lm (299ft) 
high at its SE end and rocks extend from its Nand NE extremities. There is a 
sandy bay on its NE side. 
A light is exhibited from the E point of the island. 
TheE island, 61m (200ft) high at its N end, is separated from theW island by a 
channel 7 cables wide, with depths o.f over 18m (60ft) in the fairway. There are 
fresh water wells on theE island. 
Good anchorage can be obtained o.ff the NW side o.f the E island of Paulo Wai, 
but the best anchorage is off the sandy bay on the NE side of the W island. 
Once again it is worth mentioning the first-hand experience of the recent visitor to 
Cambodia's islands referred to above, which indicates that Paulo Wei is indeed a fully-
fledged island rather than a rock in relation to Article 121 of UNCLOS. The individual 
in question also stated that Paulo Wei was, at the time of his visit in mid-1998, host to a 
detachment of Cambodian soldiers (as was Koh Tang).62 
The fact that Paulo Wei has been inhabited in the past and is currently occupied 
clearly supports the contention that it can "sustain human habitation" even if it is still 
ambiguous as to whether it has an "economic life of its own." As such Paulo Wei can 
be considered to be a fully-fledged island rather than a "rock" capable of being used as 
a basepoint for claims to continental shelf and EEZ rights. 
Despite the valuable eye-witness account mentioned above, Cambodia's case 
concerning the insular status of its islands is somewhat stronger with regard to Paulo 
Wei than either llot Veer or Koh Kusrovie. While the latter features are clearly islands 
rather than low-tide elevations, it is somewhat less clear that they can support habitation 
or an economic life of their own. This goes to the heart of the longstanding debate over 
whether particular features are to be properly defined as 'full' islands or rocks (see 
Section 3.5). Nevertheless, Cambodia is likely to stand by its claim to these features as 
fully-fledged islands - a stance in keeping with that of many states elsewhere in the 
world. Thailand, in contrast, is likely to argue strongly that these features be discounted 
on this basis. However, Paulo Wei is substantially larger than either Koh Kusrovie or 
61 
62 
Interview conducted in December 1998 and identity of interviewee withheld by request. 
Interview conducted in December 1998, and identity of interviewee withheld by request. 
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llot Veer, 63 has a history of supporting human habitation and currently does so, albeit in 
the form of a number of Cambodian military personnel. 
Furthermore, Thailand has already agreed to a role in maritime boundary 
delimitation for a similar island in the Gulf- Tho Chu (Poulo Panjang). As detailed in 
Section 6.5, Tho Chu did influence the alignment of the Thai-Vietnamese maritime 
boundary agreed in August 1997. Although Tho Chu is somewhat larger than Poulo 
Wei,64 it is over 27nm (50km) further offshore. The fact that Tho Chu has been 
accorded weight in delimitation must be vie\\:'ed as strengthening Cambodia's 
contention that Poulo Wei should be treated likewise. 
Finally, and tellingly, should Thailand push for Cambodia's islands to be 
discounted for the purposes of delimitation between the two states, Cambodia is likely 
to raise the issue of Thailand's treatment of insular features elsewhere. As detailed in 
Section 6.2.4, in the course of negotiating its joint development agreement with 
Malaysia, Thailand accorded Ko Losin full weight in determining the southern limit of 
its claims in the area in question. This claim line, giving Ko Losin full effect, in due 
course became the southeastern limit of the Thai-Malaysian JDA. With reference to 
Cambodia, however, Thailand's claim line wholly discounts the very same feature in 
order to justify the discounting of Cambodia's own islands to Thailand's overall 
advantage. This can only be described as a manifestly inconsistent position. This 
demonstrates how Thailand, by no means alone among the Gulf of Thailand coastal 
states, has interpreted the law of the sea to its maximum advantage according to the 
circumstances. Furthermore, it provides Cambodia with a powerful argument that 
Thailand's 1973 continental shelf claim is contrary to Thailand's own previous practice 
and is merely intended to discount inequitably Cambodia's islands. 
7.2. 7 Factors Applicable to the Delimitation as a Whole 
A number of other relevant factors may well also come under consideration m any 
negotiations (or other form of peaceful dispute settlement procedure) between 
Cambodia and Thailand. Likely to be salient among these additional considerations 
relevant to the delimitation as a whole are the inter-related questions of the relative (and 
relevant) coastal lengths of the parties, the concept of proportionality and the issue of 
whether either state is geographically disadvantaged. 
63 See British Admiralty Chart 3985, 1987 edition, at a scale of 1:500,000. 
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Relative coastal lengths and proportionality 
Thailand, possessing as it does a considerably longer coastline than that of Cambodia 
(1,450km:280km according to Snidvongs65) is highly likely to deploy arguments based 
on this fact. In effect, in recognition of its substantially longer coastline, Thailand may 
contend that it should be accorded a greater, perhaps correspondingly greater share of 
the maritime area to be delimited between the two states. The latter argument is based 
upon the concept of proportionality. 
As outlined in Section 3.4.5, maJor disparities between the relevant coastal 
lengths of the parties to a dispute has been acknowledged as a relevant factor in 
international jurisprudence, notably in the Libya-Malta case where the ICJ adjusted the 
median line between the coasts of the two states in order to take account of this 
circumstance. However, attempts to apply proportionality directly tend to encounter 
significant problems. 
In any case it is, in fact, unclear whether Thailand does possess a significantly 
longer coastline relevant to the delimitation.66 With regard to Cambodia and Thailand, 
it is clear that large sections of Thailand's northern coastline are not relevant to the 
delimitation and relate instead to maritime areas which are exclusively composed of 
Thai waters to which Cambodia has advanced no competing claim. Prescott has noted 
that if, for example, an equidistance line based on all territory including islands is 
considered, it appears that "the relevant [coastal] segments have similar lengths",67 
thus significantly undermining any Thai argument advanced the basis of the possession 
of a longer coastline. 
With regard to proportionality, any Thai attempt to introduce this as a directly 
relevant factor to be considered in delimitation negotiations is likely to be robustly 
resisted by Cambodia. In this the Cambodian authorities are likely to highlight the flaws 
that have become apparent when attempts have been made to apply proportionality in 
practice (for example, the problem of scale, see Section 3.4.5). Additionally, Cambodia 
65 
66 
67 
Snidvongs, 1998: 11. 
The question of determining which parts of the parties' coastlines are relevant to a particular 
delimitation is itself often problematic - running into similar practical difficulties as those which 
have bedevilled attempts to apply proportionality considerations. 
Prescott, 1998: 53. Prescott found that the lateral section of the boundary was almost exclusively 
based on a small portion of the coastline of Koh Kut on the Thai side and the small island of Koh 
Kusrovie on the Cambodian side. The delimitation between opposite coasts was, in turn, 
determined by Ko Phangan and Ko Kra on the Thai side and Koh Kusrovie and Poulo Wei for 
Cambodia. The distance between these islands was found to be 92nm and 73nm respectively 
(Prescott, 1998: 53). 
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can point to the fact that the ICJ has repeatedly rejected the use of proportionality as a 
relevant circumstance and has instead treated it with distinct caution, relegating it to the 
status of a general test of the equitability of a delimitation (see Section 3.4.5). 
Are Cambodia and/or Thailand geographically disadvantaged? 
Thailand is likely to argue that the configuration of its coastline m companson to 
Cambodia's, means that the application of strict equidistance to determine the course of 
the maritime boundary between them would be inequitable. In particular, the Thai 
authorities can point to the generally concave nature of Thailand's coastline on the Gulf 
of Thailand as a source of such geographical disadvantage. 68 Pursuing this theme, 
Thailand could further contend that the (arguably) convex configuration of Cambodia's 
mainland coastline and islands serves to 'cut off' or encroach upon maritime areas 
which Thailand properly regards as properly appertaining to it. 
Contrary to this interpretation of the macro-geographical situation in the Gulf of 
Thailand, Cambodia can counter-argue that it is in fact Cambodia rather than Thailand 
that is geographically disadvantaged.69 Indeed, Cambodia is unquestionably doubly 
disadvantaged by the presence not only of Thailand but also a third state, Vietnam, to 
the south. The existence of Thai and Vietnamese territories, most especially the Thai 
island of Koh Kut and Vietnamese island of Phu Quoc directly offshore the termini of 
Cambodia's land boundaries with these two states on the coast, would be nothing short 
of calamitous for Cambodian maritime jurisdictional claims should strict equidistance 
be utilised as the method of delimitation between adjacent coasts. Such a delimitation 
would result in a pronounced 'cut off' effect whereby maritime areas constituting what 
Phnom Penh considers the rightful natural prolongation of its territory would be denied 
68 
69 
In the course of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, Thailand attempted to join the 
group of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states, primarily with a view to bolstering 
its negotiating position concerning gaining access to its neighbouring states fishery resources. 
However, "Thailand was not accepted as a member of this group, and its claim of being a 
geographically disadvantaged state has not been recognized" (McDorman, 1985: 294-295, 
1986: 186-187). See also, Ake-uru (1987: 420). It is also worth noting that of the Gulf of 
Thailand states only Cambodia lacks a coastline on another sea. 
Prescott (1998: 46) advances the view that Cambodia is geographically disadvantaged in making 
maritime claims in comparison to its neighbours, Thailand and Vietnam. He demonstrates this 
(without suggesting that a direct link be made) by noting that while the land territories of 
Thailand and Vietnam are respectively 2.8 and 1.8 times the size of Cambodia's, their potential 
maritime claims are fully 5.8 and 13 times that of Cambodia. Similarly, in what could be 
construed as an economic argument as well, Johnston and Valencia ( 1991: 143), when suggesting 
equidistance as the basis for delimitation, state that this could be "tempered by equitable 
considerations in light of Cambodia's disadvantaged and impoverished situation." 
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to Cambodia.7° From Cambodia's perspective, therefore, Cambodia is severely 
geographically disadvantaged and a lateral delimitation based on strict equidistance 
would be clearly inequitable. Cambodia's situation in the Gulf of Thailand can 
therefore be considered to be analogous to West Germany's in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases (see Sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.5) and provides a strong justification 
for a departure from equidistance in Cambodia's claims between adjacent coasts - if, 
perhaps, not to the extent that Cambodia claimed with regard to Thailand in 1972.71 
Both Cambodia and Thailand thus consider themselves to be geographically 
disadvantaged. In a sense this is true for both states in that neither, because of its 
position within a semi-enclosed sea and the proximity of its maritime neighbours, is 
able to extend its maritime claims to a distance of 200nm from its baselines. Thailand's 
possible claim to such status on the basis of its coastal configuration is diluted by the 
same factor that undermines arguments concerning the length of its coastline in 
comparison to Cambodia's. Only part of Thailand's coastline is relevant to delimitation 
with Cambodia and the two broadly opposite facing coastlines concerned appear to be 
similar in their configuration as well as their length. 
In contrast, Cambodia's argument concerning the inequitable nature of applying 
strict equidistance to its maritime boundaries between adjacent coasts where islands 
belonging to other states lie directly offshore its mainland coast is compelling. 
Other factors 
As outlined in Section 3.3, there is effectively no limit to the potentially relevant 
circumstances which states may raise in the course of efforts to resolve their maritime 
boundary disputes in accordance with the international law of the sea. The factors 
outlined above, predominantly based on the physical geography of the coastlines 
concerned, are likely to represent the principal factors considered in relation to the Thai-
Cambodian maritime boundary dispute. Nevertheless, a number of other non7coastal 
geography-related factors have proved significant in other delimitations. 
70 It is worth recalling here that under the Franco-Siamese treaty of 1907, Cambodia lost not only 
Koh Kut and the islands to the north of it as far as Cape Lemling but also a long narrow strip of 
land territory which consisted of the coastline fronting a significant par of the Cambodian 
mainland, effectively amputating Cambodia's maritime rights. As outlined in Section 3.4.3, 
however, factors such as natural prolongation, and the geology and geomorphology of the seabed 
are, since the ICJ's judgment in.the Libya-Malta case, not considered relevant within 200nm of 
the coast and are not, therefore likely to accorded weight in future delimitations within the Gulf 
of Thailand. 
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Among these are issues related to the conduct of the parties, economic and 
environmental factors and political issues. Despite Cambodia's claims based on historic 
arguments, there does not appear to be any form of traditional or 'working arrangement' 
dividing line respected by the two sides which could conceivably form the basis of a 
maritime boundary (see Section 3.6.4). As far as economic and environmental 
considerations are concerned, it is often unclear when these factors have influenced a 
delimitation (see Section 3.6.3). However, even though international tribunals have 
rejected an economic disparity between states as a relevant circumstance in delimitation, 
economic and environmental factors are by no means excluded from negotiated 
agreements. It is therefore likely that Cambodia, as the less developed state, will raise 
the issue of its economically disadvantaged status in comparison to Thailand. Whether 
this argument is given any weight is, of course, likely to be dependent on the political 
climate between the two states. Maritime boundary delimitation is an inherently 
political exercise (see 3.6.1 ). Ultimately, the existence of the political will to address 
the problem will be fundamental to the peaceful resolution of the Thai-Cambodian 
maritime boundary dispute. 
7.2.8 Progress in Negotiations 
In 1970, before either Cambodia and Thailand declared the limits of their continental 
shelf claims, the two states did, reportedly, initiate talks on maritime boundary issues. 
These discussions apparently broke down over the problem of the proper interpretation 
of the Franco-Siamese treaty of March 1907.72 From the early 1970s to the 1990s, 
however, negotiations between the two states towards the resolution of their overlapping 
claims dispute were stymied by political factors. The possibility of engaging in bilateral 
negotiations on maritime jurisdictional issues in the immediate aftermath of the two 
states articulating their claims to continental shelf rights in the Gulf of Thailand was 
undermined by Cambodia's embroilment in the Vietnam-American War (the Second 
Indochina War), the Cambodian government's increasing preoccupation with domestic 
conflicts and its waning hold on power culminating in the Khmer Rouge's triumphant 
entry into Phnom Penh on 17 April 1975.73 
71 
72 
73 
Dzurek (1998: 124) supports this in his observation that "Because coastal geography restricts its 
potential shelf area, Cambodia has more to gain than Thailand from an equitable settlement." 
Bangkok Post, 15/12/94. 
Shelton Woods, 1997:418-420. 
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Relations between Cambodia's Khmer Rouge government and its neighbours, 
including Thailand, were far from cordial and Bangkok correspondingly adopted a 
confrontational posture. Thailand's stance remained largely unchanged in the wake of 
Vietnam's December 1978 invasion of Cambodia. Although the Vietnamese action 
removed the hostile Khmer Rouge administration from Phnom Penh, Vietnam helped to 
establish the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) in Cambodia. This was regarded 
by Thailand as a Vietnamese puppet regime and Bangkok refused to recognise its 
legitimacy. As a result of this political and ideological divide, discussions related to 
issues such as maritime boundaries remained firmly off the agenda. 
As far as oil exploration activities are concerned, prior to the either state making 
the limits of its continental shelf claims explicit, Thailand had in 1971 granted several 
concessions to major international oil companies in the central Gulf of Thailand. Once it 
became clear that these areas formed part of the Thai-Cambodian overlapping claims 
area, Thailand suspended the concessionaires' work commitments. 74 Although no 
exploration has been undertaken in the disputed area since the early 1970s, in May 1982 
Cambodia issued a protest over the issue of concessions by Thailand to areas claimed as 
Cambodian, stating rather ominously that: 
... any foreign company which searches for oil on the Kampuchean [Cambodian] 
continental shelf without Kampuchea's permission will be responsible for all 
consequences which may arise from their illegal actions. 75 
Far from uniquely, the demise of the Soviet Union and a dissolving of Cold War 
tensions had a profound influence on the region, including Thai-Cambodian relations. 
Concerted pressure from ASEAN, China, Russia and the UN pushed the multiple 
factions involved in the 'Cambodian Question' towards peace talks. These negotiations 
ultimately yielded the Paris Peace Agreements of 1991 which, in turn, led to the 
deployment of the UN' s Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNT A C). UNT AC was 
tasked with ensuring free and fair elections in 1993.76 The resulting government was 
composed of the incumbent former-communist administration, the CPP77 and the 
74 
75 
76 
77 
Chandler, 1991: 6, 1993: 18. 
Bangkok Post, 30/3/82, cited in Johnston and Valencia, 1991: 138. McDorman (1985: 296) also 
notes that Cambodia issued a protest over Thai activities in the overlapping claims area in mid-
1983. 
For a detailed survey of UNTAC' s activities and performance see Findlay ( 1995). For details on 
UNTAC, the election process and events in its aftermath up to 1998 see Brown and Zlasoff 
( 1998). 
The Cambodian People's Party. 
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principal winner in the elections, King Sihanouk's FUNCINPEC. 78 Hun Sen, leader of 
the PRK in the wake of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and Prince Norodom 
Ranariddh, son of King Sihanouk, took the roles of Co-Prime Ministers. 79 
These events led to a warming in Cambodia's relations with the west in general 
and set the scene for a rapprochement with its western-leaning neighbours such as 
Thailand. Cambodia's reintegration into the international community also led to 
renewed international commercial interest in the country, particularly from oil 
companies, despite lingering concerns over the country's political stability and endemic 
corruption. It is important to realise that Cambodian contacts with Thailand in the 
1990s concerning their overlapping claims area in the Gulf of Thailand have been 
largely driven by Cambodia's own desire to gain access to the seabed resources believed 
to be at stake, coupled with international oil companies' shared desire to exploit these 
reserves. This section will therefore, necessarily, trace developments in oil exploration 
efforts in the vicinity of the disputed area in conjunction with formal boundary 
negotiations. 
Indeed, initial contacts between the Thai and Cambodian authorities concerning 
the overlapping claims area were conducted through the medium of an international oil 
company which had been mandated to represent the Cambodian government. 80 
Exploratory discussions are understood to have taken place between representatives of 
the oil company and Thai petroleum officials in July 1991. Even at this early stage it is 
understood that Cambodia proposed the establishment of a joint development 
arrangement in the overlapping claims area. 
Subsequently, Cambodia formally awarded its first oil exploration block to a 
foreign oil firm in almost 20 years in October 1991.81 By early 1992 five offshore oil 
concessions in exclusively Cambodian waters had been taken up by international oil 
companies.82 In February-March 1992 these developments were followed by another 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
The National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (the 
acronym FUNCINPEC being derived from the French title of the party). 
Shelton Woods, 1997: 418-420. Prince Ranariddh took the position of First Prime Minister and 
Hun Sen as Second Prime Minister. 
Interview with oil company executive, July 1995. Identity withheld by request. 
This was awarded to Enterprise Oil of the UK (Offshore, January 1993; November 1994). 
Four groups were involved in Cambodia at this stage: Enterprise Oil of the UK together with 
Compagnie Europeene des Petroles (CEP) of France won two offshore blocks; Japan Petroleum 
Exploration (Japex) in cooperation with Nissho Iwai won one offshore block; Premier 
Consolidated Pacific (UK), Repsol (Spain) and Ampol Exploration and Santos (Australia) 
secured one offshore block; and Hungary-based Nawa Oil won one onshore and one offshore 
block (FEER, 917192). 
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meeting in Bangkok, this time between representatives of the Cambodian Ministry of 
Industry and their Thai counterparts. 83 Preliminary discussions were then undertaken on 
the possibility of establishing a joint commission for the overlapping claims area with a 
view to relaunching hydrocarbon exploration activities in the disputed area at the 
earliest opportunity and for the benefit of both states. 84 At this stage the two sides 
agreed in principle to resolve the dispute.85 
In the 1992-1994 period Cambodia appears to have been largely preoccupied 
with the progress of the various oil companies operating in its uncontested aquatory and 
negotiations with Thailand did not progress. A number of test wells were drilled in 
Cambodian waters in 1994 with initial indications being described as "unusually 
positive" and Cambodia was being touted as having strong potential as a future oil and 
gas producer. 86 However, developments in the Thai sector of the Gulf of Thailand 
served to refocus attention on the Thai-Cambodian overlapping claims area. In February 
1994 it was reported that a large gas annulation had been discovered on the border 
between exclusively Thai-claimed waters and the overlapping claims area and that the 
accumulation "extends into the overlapping zone. "87 The overlapping claims area, 
encompassing the entire northern extension and eastern margin of the Pattani Trough 
which hosts major proven hydrocarbon reserves in uncontested Thai waters,88 has been 
variously described by oil industry sources as "some of the best undrilled acreage in 
Southeast Asia "89 and as having "more promise than any other area in the Gulf "90 
Although estimates of the potential oil and gas reserves lying within the overlapping 
claims area vary wildly, oil industry sources indicated in early 1995 that the disputed 
zone could yield "anything from three to eight trillion cubic feet of gas and oil" and 
that a field yielding two trillion cubic feet of gas would net US$2.8 billion.91 On this 
basis the portion of the Pattani Trough in the overlapping claims area could yield 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
Chandler, 1993: 20. 
Interviews conducted with Cambodian government officials, Phnom Penh, March and July 1995. 
Identities withheld by request. 
Dzurek, 1998: 127. Dzurek also notes that Thailand's August 1992 extension of its straight 
baseline claims (Area 4) may represent "a gambit to offset the Cambodian and Vietnamese 
baselines in anticipated negotiations. " 
Four exploration wells were drilled offshore, three of which reportedly tested positively for oil, 
gas or condensate (Offshore, November 1994: 42). Enterprise Oil was sufficiently encouraged to 
commit itself to an extensive 3D seismic survey as a result. 
Offshore, February 1994. 
Praing, 1997: 2. 
Offshore, August 1993. 
Offshore, February 1994. 
Interview with Triton Oil analysts, cited in Phnom Penh Post, Vol.4, No.2, 27/l/95. 
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Cambodia and Thailand a total of the order of US$3.5 billion each at US$150-200 
'11' . 92 m1 Ion per year m revenues. 
These considerations probably lie behind Cambodian Foreign Minister Ung 
Huot's December 1994 comments in the course of a visit to Bangkok that while 
Cambodia recognised that it would take time to "sort out" issues relating to overlapping 
claims in the Gulf of Thailand, Cambodia also "firmly believes that this should not 
delay arrangements for the joint exploitation of the Gulf. .. lf our neighbours were to 
agree, Cambodia is prepared to commence the earliest possible negotiations on joint 
development. "93 In the following month Cambodia renewed its push for a joint 
development solution to its dispute with Thailand. Speaking on 19 January 1995 
Cambodian Minister for Industry, Mines and Energy, Pou Sothirak, stated that the two 
Cambodian prime ministers had reached consensus to approach Thailand in order to 
"get together 50150" to exploit the resources of the overlapping zone and that "we are 
thinking of moving very fast" to realise the proposed joint project. 94 
On 27-28 April 1995 Cambodia and Thailand held consultations on their 
overlapping continental shelf claims in Bangkok. This meeting was described in their 
joint press release as "the first formal occasion for the two sides to discuss the question 
of overlapping continental shelves after a long lapse of almost 25 years. "95 According 
to the same document the two sides held an "extensive and in-depth exchange of views" 
found discussion "meaningful and constructive" and were "highly encouraged" by 
progress made. 
It is clear that each side, as might be expected, maintained its existing claims as 
its opening position.96 Cambodia reiterated its desire for the swift establishment of a 
joint development zone but elaborated on this topic to indicate that any agreement on 
joint development should be 'sovereignty neutral' and that a 'clean slate' approach be 
adopted as far as previously granted concessions within the overlapping claims area 
were concerned. Cambodian Industry, Mines and Energy Minister Pou Sothirak, one of 
the leaders of the Cambodian team, stated that a joint development agreement should be 
sovereignty neutral in the sense that "no acts taking place under such a treaty can 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
Interview with Triton Oil analysts, cited in Phnom Penh Post, Vol.4, No.2, 27/1/95. 
Bangkok Post, 15112194. 
Phnom Penh Post, Vol.4, No.2, 27/1/95. 
Joint press release retrieved from http://www.nectec.or.th 
For example, Cambodian Industry, Mines and Energy Minister Pou Sothirak, one of the leaders 
of the Cambodian team, stated at the time that "Questions of Cambodia's sovereignty over the 
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prejudice the claimed rights and interests of either Cambodia or Thailand in the 
future. "97 Despite Thai Deputy Foreign Minister Dr Surin Pitsuwan's comment that 
"we believe that eventually we will have to jointly develop overlapping claims, but the 
basis for each country's claims still needs to be clarified", it is understood that while 
Thailand did not rule out the possibility of joint development, it favoured the 
establishment of a delimitation line.98 
At the April 1995 meeting the two sides did agree to hold further meetings and 
to use the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea as the framework for their negotiations 
despite the fact that while both states have signed the Convention, at the time of writing, 
neither has ratified it (see Section 2.5).99 Additionally, Cambodia and Thailand agreed 
to establish a Joint Technical Working Group to assist in the resolution of their maritime 
boundary disputes. 10° Finally, "while recognising the complexities and difficulties" 
involved, the two states reaffirmed their "mutual desire to achieve an equitable 
l . . h ll d ,JOJ so utwn ... wlt a spee . 
In the first meeting of the Cambodia-Thailand Joint Technical Working Group, 
which took place on 18-19 July 1995 in Bangkok, the two states articulated their 
positions in detail, each seeking to justify its own claim lines while undermining the 
validity of the other's. It is understood that issues such as the status and interpretation 
of the Franco-Siamese treaty of March 1907, the role of islands, the geographical 
configuration of the parties' coastlines and the question of the application of 
proportionality considerations were all touched upon. Each side was apparently robust 
. . d c f. I . 102 m 1ts e1ence o 1ts c mms. 
Having rehearsed the pros and cons of the existing continental shelf claims 
dating from the early 1970s, Cambodia once again pressed strongly for the adoption of a 
joint development arrangement encompassing the whole of the overlapping claims area 
as an equitable means of resolving the dispute. Nady Tan, Secretary-General of the 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
continental shelf in the overlapping area are non-negotiable and the delimitation lines declared 
represent the position of the Cambodian government" (The Nation, 29/4/95). 
Quoted in The Nation, 2914195. The 'clean slate' approach also mentioned by Minister Sothirak 
is an idea likely to be inspired by the international oil companies operating in exclusively 
Cambodian waters but with an interest in the overlapping claims area where only Thailand of the 
two claimants has previously granted concessions. 
Bangkok Post, 2914195, 1817/95. 
Bangkok Post, 18/7/95. 
Bangkok Post, 2914195. 
Joint press release retrieved from http://www.nectec.or.th 
These comments are based on interviews with Cambodian government officials in July 1995. 
Identities withheld by request. 
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Cambodian Government and leader of the Cambodian delegation to the July talks 
stressed the benefits of joint development as a 'win-win' solution, citing one of the 
teachings of Buddha in support of Cambodia's case: "Victory creates hatred, defeat 
creates suffering and humiliation. Those who are wise strive for neither victory or 
defeat." Nady Tan went on to observe that the 25 year impasse over the overlapping 
claims area had existed "as a result of both sides' preoccupation with boundary claims 
rather than joint development", that delimitation negotiations could go on 
"indefinitely" and that the joint development option "offers a very practical, fair and 
0 bl h 0 ,]03 equzta e way to overcome t at lmpasse. 
Over and above a frank exchange of views, the outcome of the July 1995 
meeting was that both sides maintained their original positions but reiterated their joint 
objective of achieving an equitable solution as quickly as possible. 104 In their joint press 
statement issued after the meeting it was indicated that although Cambodia and Thailand 
"held different views on the priority to be adopted in the process of resolving their 
overlapping continental shelves, neither of them ruled out at this stage any available 
option, be it joint development or a delimitation solution. "105 It is therefore clear that in 
contrast to Cambodia, Thailand still favoured the delimitation of a single line as the 
maritime boundary. Nevertheless, Thailand conceded to Cambodia's desire that an 
early agreement on joint development be given "special consideration. "106 However, in 
October 1995 Thailand proposed the delimitation of a boundary line and indicated that 
negotiations towards the conclusion of a joint development arrangement would take a 
I 0 107 ong time. 
At this point progress in negotiations appears to have stalled. Prior to a visit to 
Thailand in April 1996, Cambodian Foreign Minister Ung Huot once again endorsed 
Cambodia's position in favour of joint development as a solution, saying that 
"Cambodia hopes the overlapping boundaries with Thailand could be resolved rapidly, 
at least not take the 14 years it took Thailand and Malaysia to resolve their problems" 
(see Section 6.2.4). 108 However, in October of the same year, in an interview with a 
Thai newspaper, Sakthip Krairiksh, on his return home after completing his posting as 
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107 
Bangkok Post, 2917195, 4110/96. 
Director-General of the Department of Treaties and Legal Affairs at the Thai Foreign Ministry, 
Krit Garnjana-goonchorn, noted encouragingly that "We have discussed in depth Cambodia's 
proposal. We're definitely getting somewhere" (Bangkok Post, 2917195). 
Joint statement quoted in Bangkok Post, 2917195. 
Bangkok Post, 2917195. 
Dzurek, 1998: 128. 
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the Thai Ambassador to Phnom Penh, indicated that Thailand remained firm in its 
claims in the Gulf of Thailand and its desire to see the delimitation of a boundary rather 
than a joint zone. The former Ambassador, having taken up the post of Deputy 
Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs noted that bilateral talks had made no headway 
and stated that "We [i.e. Thailand] simply cannot accept that the offshore area is not 
ours." This bears out Dzurek's comment that during 1996 Cambodia "appeared to 
grow more desperate for a resolution. "109 
This trend continued into 1997. Although reports of exploratory drilling in the 
disputed area by the Thais were discounted by the Cambodians, renewed calls were 
made to allow foreign companies to conduct survey work with a view to future joint 
development. 110 The deadlock in negotiations with Thailand over the overlapping 
claims area was exacerbated from a Cambodian perspective by developments in its own 
offshore sector. Although a number of wells were drilled in exclusively Cambodian 
waters in 1996, the Cambodian aquatory failed to live up to its early promise. 111 
Accordingly, in March 1997 it was reported that Cambodia was losing operators 
because its "disappointing offshore province [was] proving to be of less and less 
interest. "112 
The issue of overlapping claims was reportedly on the agenda during Thai Prime 
Minister Chavalit' s June 1997 visit to Cambodia but the coup which took place the 
following month and as a result of which Hun Sen seized control in Phnom Penh at 
Prince Ranariddh's expense, is likely to have undermined efforts to resolve the maritime 
b d . d" 113 oun anes tspute. 
In January 1998, however, it was reported that Cambodia had granted 
conditional licences to five international oil and gas companies for drilling rights in four 
concessions designated within the overlapping claims area. 114 This may be interpreted 
as a move to try and 'kick-start' the stalled negotiation process and a means by which 
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Quoted in Dzurek, 1998: 128. 
Dzurek, 1998: 128. 
Dzurek, 1998: 128. 
For example, Enterprise Oil drilled 'wildcat' wells 'Da-1' and 'Preah Khan-1' in July 1996 while 
Campex drilled 'Poulo Wai-l' in October 1996 (Offshore, July 1996: 20; October 1996: 22). 
It was reported that Enterprise Oil and Cambodia Petroleum Exploration had encountered 
nothing but dry holes and that Premier was also pulling out leaving only ldemitsu to carry on 
(Offshore, March 1997: 1 0). The latter drilled a wildcat called 'Koah Pring- I' but this also 
proved to be disappointing and was plugged and abandoned (Offshore, August 1998: 18). 
Dzurek, 1998: 128. 
The five companies involved were BHP (Australia), Conoco (US), Enterprise Oil (UK), Inpex 
and Idemitsu (both Japan) (Offshore, January 1998: 12). 
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Cambodia can balance the fact that Thailand issued licences relating to the disputed area 
in the early 1970s. It remains to be seen whether this tactic will prove successful. 115 
While "a border agreement on overlapping areas along the Cambodian-Thai 
maritime border" was listed as one seven points that the two states needed to address as 
a result of bilateral meetings in Phnom Penh on 27-30 April 1998, at the time of writing 
no further progress appears to have on the overlapping claims dispute. 116 A major 
reason for this is the fluid post-coup political situation in Cambodia. The largely 
successful conduct of elections in Cambodia in 1998 has, however, led to the realisation 
of a degree of stability in Cambodia and thus the hope that negotiations concerning 
overlapping maritime claims can be revitalised with a view to at long last making some 
substantive progress. A potentially positive sign in this regard is the Cambodian 
Council of Minister's 1 March 1999 decision to establish joint committees in relation to 
its borders with Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. 117 
7.2.9 Prospects 
As of mid-1999, negotiations between Cambodia and Thailand on maritime boundary 
issues apparently remain deadlocked with the positions of the two sides essentially 
where they were when formal discussions were initiated in 1995. While instability in 
Cambodia has hampered progress, this situation does seem to be the result of the two 
sides' different approaches to the dispute - Cambodia consistently promoting joint 
development and Thailand favouring delimitation - coupled with their intransigent 
maintenance of these positions. In addition, the high level of expectation that both sides 
appear to harbour in relation to the potential oil and gas resources of the overlapping 
claims area, while on the one hand providing a key reason for negotiations to proceed, 
may also contribute to stalemate with neither side willing to compromise with so much 
at stake. 
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117 
It is understood that a side benefit of the granting of these licences is that it provides the 
Cambodian government with a fund, contributed to by the licencees, for technical assistance in 
its negotiations with Thailand (Interview with oil company executive, January 1998. Identity 
withheld by request). As a result of this it was reported in October 1998 that Cambodia had 
indeed brought in technical experts to assist them. As Minister without portfolio Sok An said: 
"We've brought in some experts to study the geographical situation of the islands ... to determine 
their value and role and to be aware about international law in determining the sea border" 
(Bangkok Post, 21/10/98). 
National Voice of Cambodia, Phnom Penh, l/5/98 (BBC SWB FE/3216, B/4, 2/5/98). 
National Voice of Cambodia, Phnom Penh, 1/3/99 (SWB FE/3473). 
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Turned on its head, however, the fact that the parties claims are so far apart does, 
at least in theory, provide significant scope for compromise. 118 It can be argued that 
the impetus to resolve the dispute is clearly present in the shape of a mutually 
acknowledged desire to gain access to the oil and gas resources believed to exist in the 
overlapping claims area. Both states are anxious to unlock these potential riches -
Cambodia as a developing state in sore need of the massive financial windfall oil 
revenues would represent; and Thailand as a rapidly industrialising state with escalating 
energy demands. In addition, it may be observed that the conclusion of the Thai-
Vietnamese maritime boundary agreement (see Section 6.5) has eliminated one major 
maritime boundary concern from the Thai agenda. It would seem logical for Thailand to 
now turn its attention to resolving it dispute with Cambodia- the largest overlapping 
claims area in the Gulf and the only one dispute in the Gulf involving Thailand on 
which Bangkok lacks any form of agreement. Once again it may be useful to consider 
the delimitation in two sections - that between adjacent coasts and that between 
opposite coasts. 
Delimitation between adjacent coasts 
The first important factor to acknowledge here is that both Cambodia's and Thailand's 
lateral maritime boundary claims offshore their common land boundary are constructed 
on the basis of rather unconventional methodologies which are open to serious 
challenge. In light of the discussion outlined above (see Section 7 .2.5) it is 
inconceivable that Cambodia's historic claim line could be deemed acceptable by 
Thailand. This is particularly true in relation to the territorial sea boundary in the 
vicinity of Koh Kut. Similarly, Thailand's bisector claim is likely to prove anathema to 
the Cambodian side. Thus, it can be reasonably assumed that neither claim line is likely 
to form the final boundary between the parties and a compromise between these two 
. h l"k I 119 extremes ts t e 1 e y outcome. Several options present themselves as potential 
methods of delimitation between the Cambodian and Thai mainland adjacent coasts, 
notably equidistance, bisector lines, and lines perpendicular to the general direction of 
the coast. 
Applying equidistance as the basis for delimitation immediately begs the 
question of what basepoints should be used. Prescott has calculated that while an 
118 
119 
Prescott, 1998: 52. 
An assumption also made by Prescott (1998: 48). 
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equidistance line based on the two states' mainland coasts, ignoring all islands would 
favour Cambodia and one based on all territory including islands would favour Thailand 
(with an equidistance line using straight baselines lying in between), in the lateral 
section of the delimitation these lines in fact lie not more than 8nm apart. 120 
Taking a strict equidistance line between all territories as a starting point, 
Thailand would no doubt seek to depress such a line southwards on the grounds of the 
invalid nature of Cambodia's straight baseline claims, that Cambodian islands should be 
accorded no, or at least reduced, effect. Thailand would also be likely to deploy 
arguments based on its claimed geographical disadvantage were strict equidistance to be 
used, its longer coastline, and the concept of proportionality. 
Cambodia is, however, likely to counter these arguments with contentions of its 
own. For example, even if Koh Kusrovie is a significantly smaller feature than Koh 
Kut, it would still be entitled to a territorial sea even were it a mere rock (an 
interpretation Cambodia is likely to contest). Furthermore, in Phnom Penh's view it is 
clearly Cambodia rather than Thailand which is geographically disadvantaged and the 
application of strict equidistance would merely serve to inequitably amputate 
Cambodia's maritime rights. This provides grounds for the alignment of the 
equidistance line to be modified northwards to Cambodia's advantage. 
With regard to delimitation of the territorial sea in particular, where equidistance 
is the favoured means of delimitation in the law of the sea (see Section 3.1.1), given the 
controversial nature of the two states baseline claims (see Sections 4.2 and 4.4), an 
equidistance line between all features may ultimately prove to be an equitable dividing 
line. 121 Concerning the lateral boundary beyond the territorial sea, it is clear that the 
parties are finely balanced with each state apparently convinced that it has a case for the 
line to be adjusted in its favour. In this situation it can be argued that a strict 
equidistance line at least provides an unambiguous solution. As noted in Section 7.2.7, 
however, Cambodian arguments that it is geographically disadvantaged by the presence 
of Thai islands directly offshore its land territory are compelling, and an adjustment of a 
strict equidistance line between all features or the use of a equidistance line between 
mainland coasts would therefore prove to be a more equitable solution. 
120 
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Prescott, 1998: 48. 
Prescott (1985b: 86) has noted that while Cambodian arguments based on its geographically 
disadvantaged status "might carry some weight" with the Thai authorities it is likely that for 
security reasons Thailand "will insist on an equidistance boundary" for the territorial sea. 
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Alternatively, the methodology used by Thailand to construct its continental 
shelf claim between adjacent coasts - a bisector line - could be applied. As noted, 
Thailand's claimed bisector between the first segments of its Area I straight baselines 
and Cambodia's 1957 straight baselines is extremely unlikely to be acceptable to 
Cambodia. Instead, a bisector line could be drawn between the two states' current 
baseline claims - that is, between the first offshore legs of Thailand's Area 1 and 
Cambodia's straight baseline claim of 1982 (see Figure 7.8). 122 Another option would 
be for the parties to simply 'split the difference' between their claims. As both the 
Cambodian and Thai claims between their adjacent coasts describe straight lines from 
the terminus of their land boundary on the coast towards the central Gulf of Thailand, a 
bisector line between these two claim lines could be readily calculated (see Figure 7.8). 
A further delimitation method that has been used between adjacent coasts a line 
perpendicular to the general direction of the coast (see Section 3.2.3). There are, 
however, problems associated with the practical application of this method (see Section 
3.2.3). With regard to the Thai-Cambodian case, these drawbacks are illustrated on 
Figure 7.9. Both of the lines shown are perpendicular to two different but still 
conceivably valid interpretations of the general directions of the coast. The difference in 
area between them extending as far offshore as Cambodia's 1972 continental shelf claim 
line is 515nm2 (1 ,767km\ 123 There does not appear to be a reliable and 
uncontroversial means by which the general direction of the coast can be determined as, 
in a similar fashion to questions of relevant coasts and proportionality, the problem to a 
large extent turns on what scale of analysis is used. Nevertheless, a delimitation based 
on a line perpendicular to the general direction of the coast does provide a useful 
appreciation of the wider macro geographical context of the parties' coastlines and 
avoids reliance on equidistance with all its pitfalls related to the role of baselines and 
islands. •. 
Additionally, Prescott, working on the basis that the mmtmum demand of 
Cambodia is likely to be some discount on the weight accorded to Koh Kut in the 
delimitation, while the minimum Thai demand is anticipated to be for Koh Kut to be 
provided with territorial waters, has suggested a hypothetical Thai-Cambodian lateral 
122 
123 
The first segment of Cambodia's 1982 straight baseline claim coincides with that of its 1972 
claim (see Section 4.2.4 ). 
Calculated using a planimetre and British Admiralty Chart 2414, 1967 edition at a scale of 
1: I ,500,000. 
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12" 
boundary delimitation. 124 Prescott suggests that Thailand might be persuaded to accept 
a modification in Cambodia's 1972 claim such that instead of joining Point A (the 
terminus of the land boundary on the coast) and Point P, the Cambodian claim would 
instead proceed from Point A to Point Pck 1, located to the south of Point P (see Figure 
7.1 0). Were this to be adopted, the potential delimitation line would not intersect Koh 
Kut itself but would need to be modified in such a way as to provide Koh Kut with a 
territorial sea and therefore meet Thailand's minimum requirements. Such a line would 
leave Thailand with 49% of the area between Cambodia's 1972 claim line and a line of 
equidistance giving full effect to Koh Kut. 125 In fact this proposal is very similar to the 
northern limit of the continental shelf claim Cambodia made in February 1970 (see 
Section 5.3 .1 and Figure 1.1). 
124 
125 
Prescott, 1998: 49-50. 
J.R.V. Prescott, personal communication, 21/5/98. The text of Prescott's 1998 monograph 
incorrectly asserts that this hypothetical line represents a 49% discount for Koh Kut. 
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In this context it is worth recalling that the Thai-Cambodian dispute has been 
strongly driven by the parties' interest in potential hydrocarbon reserves believed to lie 
in the overlapping claims area. However, as the most prospective areas are understood 
to lie in the central part of the Gulf, there seems scope for compromise at least with 
regard to the inshore part of the lateral boundary as the maritime areas at stake are 
perceived by the two states to be of less importance than those further offshore. 
Compromise concerning the highly prospective central potion of the Gulf is, however, 
likely to be more problematic for the claimant states. 
Delimitation between opposite coasts 
Both Cambodia and Thailand have themselves utilised equidistance as the basis of their 
own claims between their opposite coasts. These claims cover a band of maritime space 
varying in width from 13.8nm (25.5km) in the north to 24.3nm (45km) in the south. 126 
It is therefore reasonable to suggest that this method will form the basis of any agreed 
delimitation between them in the central Gulf of 1_hailand. The key challenge will 
therefore be reconciling the two states' differing interpretations of equidistance. 
Clearly there are well nigh limitless variations on equidistance that can be 
plotted. Figure 7.11 serves to illustrate three of these. This map shows a strict 
equidistance line between all territories, including islands on the Cambodian side but 
ignoring the Thai features of Ko Kra and Ko Losin which can legitimately be considered 
to be mere rocks for the purposes of delimitation. It is notable that sections of this line 
extend to the west of Cambodia's 1972 claim line into undisputed Thai waters. The 
map in question also shows a strict equidistance line between the Thai mainland and 
islands (including Koh Kut but not Ko Kra or Ko Losin) and the Cambodian mainland 
coast (and islands in close proximity to it), ignoring Koh Kusrovie, Ilot Veer and Poulo 
Wei. The line between these two 'full effect' and 'no-effect' equidistance lines 
represents a 'half-effect' line for Koh Kusrovie, Ilot Veer and Poulo Wei. It is quite 
conceivable that such a half-effect line will eventually be adopted as a definitive 
maritime boundary delimitation between the parties' mainland coasts. 
However, as already mentioned, the central part of the Gulf of Thailand IS 
regarded as having significant potential as a source of oil and gas deposits. This fact has 
tended to limit the perceived scope for compromise. Furthermore, it is understood that 
126 Measured on British Admiralty Chart 2414, 1967 edition at a scale of I: I ,500,000. 
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the most prospective potentially oil and gas-bearing structures are located on the eastern 
margins of the Pattani Trough which extends into the overlapping claims area from 
exclusively Thai waters. It is quite possible, therefore, that the main oil and gas deposits 
within the disputed area are unevenly distributed and predominantly located on its 
western side. This perception may go a long way to explaining Thailand's enthusiasm 
for a delimitation solution, which could (presuming such a line represents a compromise 
between the parties claims) potentially leave the lion's share of the hydrocarbon reserves 
of the overlapping claims area in Thai waters, and Cambodia's consistent push for a 
joint development arrangement encompassing the whole of the contested area. 
Summary 
Cambodia has demonstrated itself to be resistant to Thai suggestions that their 
overlapping claims area be divided by a delimitation line and has been an unwavering 
enthusiast of a joint development solution. Thailand has in turn proved itself to be 
reluctant to accept the existing limits of the overlapping claims area as the basis for a 
joint development zone. The key bone of contention in this regard is likely to be the 
fact the Cambodian claim wholly discounts Koh Kut, even in relation to territorial sea 
rights. Another factor that may lie behind Thailand's insistence on delimitation over 
joint development is its past experience of the latter option in partnership with Malaysia 
(see Section 6.2.4). The fact that it took in excess of a decade to iron out problems and 
actually implement this agreement may well be acting as a significant disincentive, 
dissuading the Thai authorities from adopting the same type of dispute resolution 
mechanism again. Furthermore, Thailand successfully resisted Vietnam's suggestion of 
applying joint development to their overlapping claims area, instead persuading the 
Vietnamese to accept a delimitation line the alignment of which must be considered to 
be favourable to Thailand (see Section 6.5). This may also encourage Thailand to resist 
Cambodia's joint development overtures. 
Can Cambodia's distaste for delimitation and Thailand's antipathy towards joint 
development in the Thai-Cambodian context be overcome and a compromise between 
these two differing approaches be reached? It is conceivable that a 'package' deal could 
be worked out involving both delimitation and joint development. 
As far as Thailand's aversion to joint development is concerned, the fact that, 
despite the long delays, the Thai-Malaysian JDA is functioning successfully (see Section 
6.2.4) and that the much simpler and more swiftly realised Malaysia-Vietnam "Defined 
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Area" has also enjoyed similar success (see Section 6.4) must be deemed to be 
encouraging developments. Were Cambodia to adjust its claim such that Koh Kut was 
accorded a 12nm territorial sea, the possibility of the remainder of the overlapping 
claims area becoming a joint development zone would certainly be enhanced. However, 
this amendment to Cambodia's claims alone is probably unlikely to prove enough to 
entice the Thai's down the joint development road. It is probable that before joint 
development is seriously contemplated by Bangkok, Thailand may press for further 
adjustments to the Cambodian claim such that it represents what the Thais may regard 
as a 'realistic' zone of overlap. While Cambodia can certainly argue that the 
overlapping claims area has been treated by both sides as such for over 20 years, 127 it 
may be necessary to narrow the gap between the parties. This could be achieved 
through delimitation of the Thai-Cambodian boundary between adjacent coasts. 
Were Cambodia to abandon its claim based on the Franco-Siamese treaty of 
1907 altogether and Thailand correspondingly abandon its lateral bisector line claim, it 
is abundantly clear that they would have multiple options at their disposal as far as 
delimitation of their maritime boundary between adjacent coasts is concerned. Even if 
the eventual lateral delimitation line was one of the options favourable to Cambodia, 
this would still probably represent a major concession on Cambodia's part in terms of 
maritime area and therefore might still prove attractive to the Thais in that this would 
place the whole northern extension of the Pattani Trough in Thai waters. To 
compensate for accepting a delimitation solution in relation to the area between adjacent 
coasts, Cambodia could then argue that the whole of the overlapping claims area 
between opposite coasts should become a joint development zone. The latter would be 
likely to be attractive to Cambodia in that the most prospective parts of the overlapping 
claims area, the eastern margins of the Pattani Trough, would fall within the joint zone 
even though they are likely to be located on the Thai side of that zone. 128 While the 
potential agreement outlined above is necessarily hypothetical, the combination of 
partial delimitation and limited joint development does demonstrate the sort of trade off 
likely in boundary delimitation negotiations and could prove the basis for an equitable 
resolution of the Thai-Cambodian maritime boundary dispute. 
127 
128 
Praing, 1997: 3. 
While there is a perception that the most prospective areas lie on the western side of the 
overlapping zone in the central Gulf of Thailand, based primarily on the existence of proven 
reserves in exclusively Thai waters nearby, there are certainly no guarantees that this will prove 
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Ultimately, however, division or joint development of the Thai-Cambodian 
overlapping claims area will rest on the political will of the parties to reach a settlement. 
In this there are suspicions that Thailand may be playing on the fact that as well as being 
by far the more experienced partner in the negotiations, Thailand is also an established 
oil and gas producer, whereas Cambodia is desperate to gain access to the resources 
thought to exist in the overlapping claims area in order to bolster its parlous economic 
situation. 129 However, even though the Thai economy has slowed significantly in the 
wake of 1998's financial crisis in the Far East, Thailand is on the verge of becoming an 
industrialised nation and has soaring energy demands to cope with. Indeed, Thailand is 
already importing gas from Burma and is seriously contemplating doing so from 
Indonesia's giant Natuna gasfield. 13° Furthermore, urgent Thai energy requirements 
were noted as one of the factors that persuaded Thailand to embark on joint 
development with Malaysia (see Section 6.2.4). The same scenario may eventually 
work in Cambodia's favour further north in the Gulf of Thailand. 
Finally, it should be noted that if Cambodia and Thailand do eventually opt for a 
boundary delimitation rather than joint development, they will be faced with the 
problem of relating the end point of any agreed boundary with the Thai-Vietnamese 
boundary agreement of August 1997 (see Sections 6.5 and 7.4). 
7.3 Cambodia - Vietnam 
7.3.1 Introduction 
No maritime boundary has been agreed between Cambodia and Vietnam in respect to 
territorial sea, continental shelf or exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In the vicinity of the 
terminus of their land boundary on the coast the two states are blessed with a complex 
coastal geography, characterised by a highly indented coastline and numerous islands, 
129 
130 
the case and it is quite possible that the eastern side of the overlapping zone, i.e. nearer to 
Cambodia, may prove more productive. 
For example, prior to Thailand and Cambodia's negotiations in April 1995, it was reported that 
discussions were likely to be difficult because of strained political relations between the two 
countries "and the fact that Thailand does not share Cambodia's urgency to exploit the 
resources" (Bangkok Post, 25/4/95). 
For example, growth in Thai energy needs in the 1995-96 period alone was put at II%. Along 
with imports from Burma and perhaps from Indonesia, it has also been reported that Thailand is 
expected to plug its "gas gulf" with gas supplies from the Thai-Malaysian JDA, the area 
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large and small, which complicates boundary delimitation. The area to be delimited 
includes waters in close proximity to the two states' coasts and is therefore vital to their 
national security. In addition, the area concerned is a significant source of fisheries 
resources
131 
and it is as well to remember that abundant oil and gas reserves have been 
located and exploited elsewhere in the region, particularly in the central Gulf of 
Thailand. It is unknown whether the maritime zone between Cambodia and Vietnam 
will yield such resources but the potential, particularly further offshore, remains to be 
explored. 
7.3.2 Historical Background 
A key element to the Cambodia-Vietnam dispute over maritime rights relates to 
contested sovereignty over several islands off the two states' mainland coasts. The 
history of Cambodia and Vietnam's (formerly Annam) territorial relations is complex. 
The following section is therefore necessarily extensive. 
chronological approach has been adopted. 
The pre-colonial period 
For convenience a 
An appreciation of the history of relations between Cambodia and Vietnam is 
fundamental to an understanding of the conduct of border and sovereignty issues 
between them. From its rebirth as an independent state in 939AD, following a 
millennium as a Chinese province, Vietnam began its legendary Nam Tien or "march to 
the south. "132 The direction of this Vietnamese expansion was constrained by the 
presence of China to the north, the mountains of Annam to the west and the South China 
Sea to the east. 133 Having disposed of the Kingdom of Champa, from approximately the 
sixteenth century onward (Figure 7.12), Vietnam's territorial gains were made at the 
expense of the declining Khmer Empire which at its apogee covered a significantly 
greater area than that of modem-day Cambodia (see Figure 7 .3). 
Thus by the time the French arrived in the region in the nineteenth century, the 
Vietnamese had ejected the Cambodians from the Mekong delta region, referred to as 
Kampuchea Krom by the Cambodians. Additionally, Cambodia was by that point 
131 
132 
133 
formerly disputed with Vietnam and the Cambodian-Thai overlap area as well as potentially from 
Cambodia and Vietnam themselves (Offshore, December 1996: 8). 
Johnston and Valencia, 1991: 141. 
Chanda, 1986:49;StJohn, 1998:4. 
Chanda, 1986: 49. 
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reduced to being a buffer state over which Vietnam and Thailand competed for 
influence. These territorial losses, coupled with vigorous attempts to 'Vietnamise' the 
'barbaric' Khmers on the part of the Vietnamese, particularly in the nineteenth century, 
and the violent quelling of several revolts against Vietnamese rule unsurprisingly 
generated intense feelings of racial hostility and prejudice among Cambodians against 
the Vietnamese. 134 Such feelings were reciprocated by the Vietnamese who perceived 
their country as a 'Middle Kingdom' surrounded by barbarians, including the 
Cambodians. 135 
Cambodian perceptions of the Vietnamese as their "hereditary foe" 136 and as the 
"swallowers of Khmer soil"137 should, therefore, not be underestimated and have had a 
profound impact on Cambodian-Vietnamese relations post-independence. Indeed, 
Chanda has observed that "Cambodian rulers- from King Ang Duong (1848-60) to Pol 
Pot- never ceased to complain about the loss of territory to the Vietnamese. " 138 As 
noted in Section 7.2.3, this historical inheritance has led Cambodia to approach 
questions of borders, territory and sovereignty as issues of national survival and to adopt 
extremely defensive postures. This is particularly true with regard to Cambodia's 
relations with Vietnam. 
Colonial period 
While French intervention m Indochina arguably saved Cambodia from partition 
between Thailand and Vietnam, the borders established by the French authorities in the 
region were by no means favourable to Cambodia. As Cochin China (i.e. southern 
Vietnam including the Mekong delta) was a full French colony, rather than simply 
having protectorate status like Cambodia, the French authorities made certain that their 
boundary delimitations favoured the former. 139 According to Reder: 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
140 
... the French arbitrarily annexed to what is now Vietnam large tracts of land 
that, at the time of their conquest of the region, were inhabited primarily by 
Khmers or similar ethnic groups and were either under the administrative 
influence of or owed some form of fealty to the Khmer court. 140 
Chanda, 1986: 51-53. 
Chanda, 1986: 53. 
StJohn, 1998: 22. 
Chanda, 1986: 53. 
Chanda, 1986: 56. 
Chanda, 1986: 54. 
Reder, 1981: 23. 
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Accordingly, in discussing the section of the boundary stretching across the low alluvial 
plain closest to the coast, Prescott notes that the boundary was agreed between the King 
of Cambodia and the Governor of Cochin China in 1873 and that, despite the fact that 
the borderland was mainly inhabited by Cambodians, this delimitation, "in common 
with all the others, favoured France at Cambodia's expense. "141 
With regard to islands in the vicinity of Cambodia's and Vietnam's land 
boundary terminus on the coast such as Phu Quoc (Koh Tral in Cambodian), however, 
there are clear indications that in the early years of French penetration into Indochina 
these were under Cambodian jurisdiction. This is borne out by the fact that in 1856, the 
French attempted to obtain Phu Quoc from the government of the Khmer Kingdom 
(Cambodia) rather than the authorities of Annam (Vietnam). This led the US State 
Department to conclude that: "Historical evidence strongly indicates that Cambodia 
had sovereignty over these islands and others in the Gulf of Thailand. "142 
Following the establishment of the French colony of Cochin China (Vietnam) 
and protectorate over Cambodia, however, it appears that at least some of the islands 
concerned were in fact administered as part of Cochin China's Ha-tien Province. 
Indeed, in 1913, the French administrators of Ha-tien Province and the neighbouring 
Cambodian Province of Kampot received applications for mining rights on some of the 
islands offshore their two administrative areas. The two provincial administrations 
proved unable to resolve the question of ownership over the islands themselves and 
referred the problem to the Governor-General of Indo-China. 143 
The Brevie Line 
Governor-General Jules Brevie eventually issued a decision on the islands question on 
31 January 1939 (Appendix 19). His memorandum acknowledged that possession of 
certain islands was disputed between Cambodia and Vietnam but that those islands 
"scattered along the Cambodian coast" in particularly close vicinity to that coast 
"logically and geographically requires that these islands be under the Administration of 
Cambodia. " 
Concerning the other islands, the Governor-General divided the islands between 
the two administrations such that: 
141 
142 
143 
Prescott, 1977: 64. See also, Prescott (1975: 463-480; and 1977: 66-67). 
United States, 1976: 11. 
United States, 1976: 11. 
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All the islands located north of the line perpendicular to the coast starting from 
the border between Cambodia and Cochin China and making an 140 grad angle 
with the north meridian, in accordance with the attached chart, will from now 
on be administered by Cambodia. 
All the islands south of this line, including the island of Phu Quae, will continue 
to be administered by Cochin China ... the demarcation line thus made will make 
a line around the north of the island Phu Quae, passing three kilometres from 
the extreme ends of the north shore of this island (see Figure 7.13). 
The precise meaning of the phrase "the line perpendicular to the coast ... making a 140 
grad angle with the north meridian" subsequently caused confusion. 
Misunderstandings seem to have derived from the fact that the French 'grad' is 
equivalent to 11400th of a circle in contrast to the international degree which IS 
equivalent to 1/360th of a circle. Furthermore, under the grad system angles are 
measured counter-clockwise unlike the degrees which are traditionally measured in a 
clockwise manner. Thus, a 140 grad angle is equivalent to an international bearing of 
234° or 126° measured counter-clockwise from the north meridian. 
Confusion between the two methods of defining a line of bearing may explain 
why Cambodia initially accepted the Brevie Line but subsequently extended its claim to 
include the southern Pirate islands (Quan-Dao Hai Tac, see Figure 7.13). This claim 
may well have arisen from a misinterpretation of the Governor-General's decision, 
taking it to mean a line 140° rather than 140 grad counter-clockwise from the north 
meridian. Such a line, 14 o divergent from the true Brevie Line passes south of the 
southern Pirate islands, therefore wrongly placing them on the Cambodian side of the 
line. 144 
It should be noted that in conclusion the Governor-General was at pains to point 
out that: 
It is understood that the above pertains only to the administration and policing 
of those islands, and that the issue of the islands' territorial jurisdiction remains 
entirely reserved. 
This subsequently gave rise to contention between the independent Cambodian and 
Vietnamese authorities as to whether the Brevie Line represented a line of mere 
administrative convenience or did indeed serve to allocate sovereignty over islands. 145 
144 
145 
United States, 1976: 12. 
Kittichaisaree, 1987:41. See also, Chhak, 1966: 158-159. 
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Post-Colonial Claims 
Following the end of World War II, France embarked on a campaign to reassert its 
control over its colonial territories in Indochina. Indigenous resistance to the return of 
French colonialism sparked what has been termed the First Indochina War from 1945-
1954. The involvement of the United States in what it perceived to be a battle against 
communist expansion led to the Second Indochina War of 1959-1975. Boundary and 
territorial issues between Cambodia and Vietnam were therefore at least to some extent 
submerged beneath the joint struggle to rid the region of first French colonialism and 
later American intervention. 
Nevertheless, national interests were never wholly absent from the dealings of 
the various resistance factions with one another. 146 For example, in September 1945 
Cambodia, in its first dealings with Ho Chi Minh's new government in Hanoi, 
demanded the return of Vietnam's two southernmost provinces - amounting to 
Kampuchea Krom - as a precondition for talks. This demand was vigorously rejected 
by the Vietnamese side. 147 Similarly, when in 1949 Cochin China was incorporated into 
a united Vietnam by France, the Cambodian authorities protested. 148 Cambodia's desire 
for the return of Kampuchea Krom, therefore, became a distinctive feature of its 
immediately post-independence dealings with Vietnam. 
This stance was adopted by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodia's first post-
independence leader, in the 1953-1970 period. The Sihanouk government initially held 
that Cambodia retained sovereignty over Kampuchea Krom and demanded its return. 
Over time, however, Phnom Penh was forced to acknowledge that the return of its 'lost 
territories' in southern Vietnam would be well nigh impossible. As an alternative, 
Sihanouk developed a strategy whereby Cambodia would accept the "unjust and 
illegal" boundaries drawn up by the French in return for Vietnamese compliance to two 
key principles. 149 Firstly, that the boundaries were "non-negotiable" and secondly that 
Cambodia alone would be in a position to propose minor adjustments to those border 
alignments. The first principle was designed to definitively put an end to what 
Cambodia viewed as Vietnam's progressive annexation of Cambodian territory, while 
the second was intended to ensure that Cambodia would receive some compensation for 
146 
147 
148 
149 
Chanda (1986: 57) notes that "Even the growth of the supposedly internationalist Communist 
movement in Cambodia was not immune from the racial prejudices. " 
StJohn, 1998: 23-25. 
Chanda, 1986: 56. 
Heder, 1981:23. 
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what it viewed as the major concession of giving up its claim to Kampuchea Krom. 150 
Tellingly, Reder states that "it cannot be emphasised too greatly that by the mid-1960s 
this posture had become defined, both in Kampuchea's diplomacy and in terms of 
popular domestic political perceptions, as a minimal position. "151 
The Vietnamese approach, whether that of Saigon or Hanoi, was, however, very 
different and thoroughly incompatible with Sihanouk's approach. In contrast to 
Cambodia, which viewed itself as the sole aggrieved party, Vietnam regarded its 
colonially inherited border with Cambodia as disadvantageous to both sides because of 
colonial quirks and irrationalities in its course. As a consequence of this "the 
Vietnamese negotiating stance ... always stressed the possibility of mutual benefit 
through territorial exchanges that would eliminate these quirks. "152 
To complicate the picture, on 9 March 1960 South Vietnam reportedly sent an 
official note to Cambodia "reasserting" Vietnamese sovereignty over certain islands in 
the Gulf of Thailand on the basis of claimed Vietnamese colonisation and 
administration. 153 The islands claimed were Baie (Koh Ta Kiev), Milieu (Koh Thmei), 
Eau (Koh Ses) and Pic (Koh Tonsay) which lie northwest of Phu Quoc island, and the 
northern Pirate islands which lie to the north of the Brevie Line in the vicinity of the two 
states~ land boundary terminus on the coast (see Figure 7.13). 154 Cambodia apparently 
rejected the Vietnamese claim as contrary to fact. 155 The Vietnamese claim coincided 
with the construction of Cambodia's new port at Sihanoukville. Cambodia feared 
Vietnamese attempts to subjugate Cambodia. According to Sihanouk, "the loss of the 
islands and territorial waters surrounding them would lead to a stifling of the port of 
[Sihanoukville]. .. and very soon to the end of our independence. "156 
Having found the South Vietnamese authorities to be intransigent on border and 
territorial issues, Sihanouk used North Vietnam's desire for Cambodia to adopt a more 
150 
151 
152 
153 
154 
155 
156 
Heder, 1981:23-24. 
Heder, 1981: 24. 
Heder, 1981: 25. 
Chhak, 1966: 151. The US Department of State (1976: 11) notes that the dispute emerged in 
1958. On 23 March the Vietnamese representative at the Second United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea stated during the Conference that Vietnam reserved "all its rights" over the 
"Phu-Du Archipelago" including Phu Quoc (United Nations, 1960: 43). 
US Department of State, 1976: 11. 
US Department of State, 1976: 11. Although the US report does not explicitly say so it seems fair 
to conclude that when "Vietnam" is used in this context, it is the government of South Vietnam 
which is being referred to. For a detailed refutation of South Vietnam's claims see Chhak (1966: 
151-157). 
Quoted in Smith, 1965: 159. See also, Farrell, 1992. 
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anti-South Vietnam and anti-US stance as a lever to try to secure boundary concessions. 
Sihanouk later explained this policy in the following terms: 
The reason I decided to cooperate with the Vietnamese was to put Communist 
Vietnam in Kampuchea's debt in such a way that it would never again dare raise 
a hand, so to speak, against our country and our people, its benefactors. 157 
Cambodia duly broke off diplomatic relations with both South Vietnam and the USA in 
1963 and 1965 respectively and engaged in negotiations with the Vietnamese 
communist National Liberation Front (NLF). 158 Sihanouk's strategy was not 
immediately rewarded. When the Cambodians demanded adjustments to the land 
boundary in their favour and asserted sovereignty over several islands on the southern 
(i.e. Vietnamese) side of the Brevie Line, the NLF rejected these claims out of hand. 159 
Subsequently, however, Cambodia was able to exert more pressure on the North 
Vietnamese, threatening to make the presence of their forces in neutral Cambodia, vital 
to the communist war effort against South Vietnam, conditional on the achievement of 
some form of border settlement. 160 A solution to the problem was found in May 1967 
when Sihanouk demanded and received a unilateral declaration of respect for 
Cambodia's "existing borders" from the NLF. This was endorsed by the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam (i.e. North Vietnam) in June of the same year. 161 Sihanouk 
portrayed these developments as a triumph for Cambodia. He argued that the statements 
amounted to Vietnamese acceptance of Cambodia's position on the boundary question 
such that the principle of non-negotiability of the border had been established. 162 
Further, Vietnam's unilateral statement and the lack of a parallel one on the part of 
Cambodia was viewed as ensuring that Cambodia had the sole right to interpret any 
ambiguities in the course of the colonial boundary. Sihanouk also interpreted the term 
"existing borders" to mean the border alignment Cambodia had proposed to Vietnam in 
the past but which had been rejected by the Vietnamese. 163 
157 
158 
159 
160 
161 
162 
163 
Chanda, 1986: 61. See also Ton, 1989: 143. 
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President of the NLF, Prince Sihanouk laid out Cambodia's negotiating position: "We give up all 
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sovereignty over the coastal islands illegally claimed by the Saigon administration ... " 
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So far as islands and maritime boundary questions were concerned it is clear that 
the Vietnamese side saw their statements as constituting acceptance of the Brevie Line 
as the maritime boundary between the two states, not merely as the dividing line 
indicating sovereignty over islands. 164 Phan Hien, Vietnamese Vice-Foreign Minister, 
when challenged in 1977 as to whether Vietnam had recognised the Brevie Line replied: 
Yes, we did, but at the time we agreed to the Brevie Line, we were not aware of 
problems of territorial waters, of continental shelf, etc. - those new 
phenomena. 165 
For its part, the Sihanouk government ordered maps to be drawn up showing 
Cambodia's interpretation of the land boundary between the two states but leaving off 
offshore islands and the Brevie Line. This move was apparently designed to hold open 
the possibility of Cambodia making a renewed claim to islands south of the Brevie Line 
in the future. 166 
The Vietnamese authorities made no public objections to Cambodia's claims. 
While it is highly likely that they did not concur with Sihanouk's interpretations of their 
statements, it is probable that the North Vietnamese side recognised that protests would 
only serve to jeopardise Cambodian acquiescence to their use of technically neutral 
Cambodia's territory in order to prosecute their campaign against South Vietnam. 167 
In 1968 the Khmer Rouge began their armed struggle for control of Cambodia 
and in March 1970 Sihanouk was removed from office in a coup d'etat and replaced by 
General Lon Nol. These events forestalled any further substantive discussions of 
boundary questions until both the Vietnamese and Cambodian communists emerged as 
victors in 1975. However, during this period both Cambodia and South Vietnam made 
claims to specific areas of continental shelf in the Gulf of Thailand. 
Claims to maritime jurisdiction and islands 
As previously mentioned, on 9 June 1971 the South Vietnamese government unilaterally 
defined the limits of the continental shelf appertaining to Vietnam (see Section 5.3.4). 
This claim to maritime jurisdiction also included claims to sovereignty not only to Phu 
Quoc but to the Phu-Du group (principally Koh Thmei and Koh Ses) to the northwest 
164 
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167 
Heder 1981: 26; Chanda, 1986: 33. 
Interview with Nayan Chanda in June 1977, quoted in Chanda (1986: 33). 
Heder, 1981: 26. 
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and all the other islands in the eastern half of the Gulf of Thailand south of latitude 10° 
north. Among the latter islands were the Poulo Wai group and Poulo Panjang (Thu 
Chu) groups of islands considerably further offshore than Phu Quoc and therefore of 
great significance in relation to claims to maritime jurisdiction, particularly vis-a-vis the 
opposite Gulf of Thailand states, Thailand and Malaysia. 
On 1 July 1972 Cambodia followed suit, unilaterally defining the boundary of 
Cambodia's continental shelf by Kret No.439172 (see Section 5.3.1 ). This claim to 
maritime space was also promulgated on the basis of sovereignty over the Phu-Du 
group, Phu Quoc and associated islets and the vital Poulo Wai and Poulo Panjang 
groups towards the centre of the Gulf of Thailand. 
Furthermore, within a week of Vietnam announcing its claim to an EEZ on 12 
May 1977, Radio Phnom Penh broadcast listing no less than 44 islands "in our 
territorial sea. "168 Significantly, Phu Quoc was not included in the list. 169 The 
Cambodian radio station subsequently repeated the Cambodian governments claims to 
islands and warned that Cambodia, "will not tolerate any aggression or encroachment 
by any enemy from near or distant lands against our territorial waters and islands. " 170 
In addition to issuing these formal claims to maritime jurisdiction, the 
Cambodian Lon Nol and the South Vietnamese (Saigon) governments became 
embroiled in a dispute over offshore oil exploration. Despite reports in October 1972 
that Cambodia and South Vietnam would soon be actively engaged in maritime 
boundary negotiations and in early 1973 that such a boundary between them was "more 
or less agreed upon" relations deteriorated over the oil exploration issue in late 1974. 171 
In February 1974 it had been reported that the South Vietnamese Petroleum Board had 
made a proposal to the Cambodian Directorate of Mines which would have resulted in a 
roughly equal division of the area of overlap with Cambodian sovereignty over Poulo 
Wei and Vietnamese ownership of Phu Quoc and Tho Chu being confirmed. This 
I I " . . -F. ll . d "172 proposa was apparent y m1 orma y reJecte . 
In September 1974, however, an Elf-Esso joint venture, holding an exploration 
licence issued by Cambodia drilled a 'wildcat' well southwest of Poulo Wei at a point 
just to the north of the Brevie Line. Following vigorous protests from Saigon, including 
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a threat to dismantle the offending drilling rig by force if necessary, the Cambodian's 
intensified naval patrolling in the area and deployed a 300-strong battalion of marines to 
a nearby naval base. 173 With the safety of their crew in jeopardy, however, the oil 
companies involved took the decision to suspend exploration activities. 174 This incident 
appeared to run counter to South Vietnam's earlier willingness to relinquish its claim to 
the Poulo Wei group and maritime areas north of the Brevie Line. The fact that when 
the oil dispute was made public, the Khmer Rouge made an explicit claim to Poulo Wei 
and the site where the drilling took place while their Vietnamese counterparts took no 
position "implied to the Kampucheans that the Vietnamese might be planning to take 
advantage of the ambiguities of the situation to make claims on territory to the north of 
the Brevie Line. "175 This serves as a striking illustration of the depth of the suspicion 
and latent animosity that existed between the Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese 
communists, despite their shared ideological background. 
The conflict over islands 
No sooner had the Second Indochina War come to a close, with the Khmer Rouge and 
Viet Minh triumphant in Cambodia and Vietnam respectively, than "the hitherto 
submerged antagonisms between the three parties - China, Vietnam and Kampuchea -
came to the surface"176 leading to renewed armed conflict and the Third Indochina 
War. 177 Clashes between Cambodian and Vietnamese forces occurred in the immediate 
aftermath of the Khmer Rouge's capture of Phnom Penh in April 1975. 178 While the 
skirmishes along the land boundary were minor, 179 those offshore were more significant. 
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Friction between the two sides had, in fact, already been growing in the early 1970s as a result of 
Khmer Rouge attempts to exert control over Vietnamese-controlled areas on Cambodian territory 
(Heder, 1981: 27). 
According to Heder (1981: 27-28) these largely involved skirmishes between local security 
forces stemming from Vietnamese forces not evacuating territory considered by the Cambodians 
to be theirs as a result of the Vietnamese statements of 1967. He does, however, acknowledge 
that the Cambodians did not make a concerted attempt to evict the Vietnamese and that some of 
the Cambodian crossings into Vietnam proper which also caused clashes were "probably 
inadvertent." In contrast, StJohn (1998: 25) states that Khmer Rouge troops invaded Vietnam 
on 1 May 1975, the day after the fall of Saigon, with the intention of reoccupying Kampuchea 
Krom, but that the Vietnamese successfully repelled these attacks. See also Kiernan ( 1980). 
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The possibility of conflict in the maritime arena were enhanced as a result of 
mutual suspicions leading to more intensive patrolling by their naval forces. The 
Cambodians were distrustful of the Vietnamese in the wake of the 1974 drilling 
incident, while the Vietnamese were in turn on guard because of Prince Sihanouk's 
ambiguous policy concerning the Brevie Line and offshore islands. 180 In early May 
1975 Cambodian and Vietnamese patrol boats exchanged fire off the coast of Phu Quoc 
island. 181 The Cambodians followed this up by shelling the Vietnamese patrol boats' 
bases on Phu Quoc182 and launching a seaborne assault against Vietnamese positions on 
the island on 4 May. 183 Six days later, Khmer Rouge forces occupied Tho Chu (Poulo 
Panjang) and "evacuated at gunpoint five hundred Vietnamese inhabitants, who were 
never heard of again. "184 Then, on 12 May, the Cambodians captured an American 
container ship, the Mayaguez, off Koh Tang. 185 
Both the Americans and Vietnamese swiftly took punitive action against the 
Khmer Rouge. The Americans forced the Cambodians to release both its captured ship 
and crew while the Vietnamese launched an air and sea assault that resulted in the 
recapture of Tho Chu. 186 Chanda contends that it is conceivable that Cambodia's brief 
offensive against Vietnamese islands in 1975 was the consequence of overzealous 
commanders interpreting their orders to defend Cambodian territory so as to include 
such aggressive actions. 187 However, he suggests that it is more likely that the attacks 
were the result of a "high-level directive" and that the Khmer Rouge may have 
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claimed by Vietnam. 
According to Chanda ( 1986: 9-10), US forces launched a rescue mission against Koh Tang on 15 
May, not realising that the crew of the Mayaguez had already been taken to the mainland and 
then released. The resulting firefight left 15 Americans dead together with an unknown number 
of Cambodians. The US Marine rescue team was itself pinned down by unexpectedly stiff Khmer 
Rouge resistance but Americans were able to deploy such overwhelming force that the 
Cambodians were forced to give in (Chanda, 1986: 9-10; Sager, 1991: 124). Van Ginneken 
(1983: 133) describes the US action as a final military retaliation and expression of their 
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considered "actual occupation was the strongest argument in any territorial dispute" 
thinking that in the wake of the fall of Saigon and disorder in southern Vietnam that 
"the time was ripe to make good the claim by physical occupation. "188 
Vietnam's swift and effective response to Cambodia's actions caused an almost 
immediate backtracking in Phnom Penh's position. On 2 June, Vietnamese Politburo 
member Nguyen Van Linh met Pol Pot in the Cambodian capital who, in Chanda's 
words, "pleaded guilty. "1R9 Pol Pot stated that encroachments on Vietnamese territory 
had occurred but that the resulting "painful, bloody clashes" were simply due to 
soldiers' "ignorance of local geography. "190 The Vietnamese side clearly did not set 
much store by Cambodian professions that mistakes had been made and launched 
further attacks resulting in the capture of Poulo Wei - an action ironically coinciding 
with a visit by Pol Pot and two other senior Khmer Rouge leaders to Hanoi. 191 In 
August 1975 Vietnam acknowledged that the Poulo Wei group constituted Cambodian 
territory and handed them back to the Cambodians in what appears to have been a 
gesture of good faith. 192 The border issue then reportedly remained relatively quiescent 
until mid-1976. 193 
The May 1976 technical negotiations 
In April 1976 Cambodia and Vietnam agreed to hold a high-level summit scheduled for 
June of the same year to discuss outstanding problems between the two states. These 
talks were prefaced by technical discussions which took place in Phnom Penh in May 
1976. 194 At the technical meeting the two sides agreed in principle that the colonial-era 
land boundary remained valid. However, the Vietnamese side apparently either made 
no mention of their statements of 1967 or took the position that they had been 
misinterpreted by Sihanouk and proposed mutual readjustments to the border. 195 
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The Vietnamese position therefore contradicted Prince Sihanouk's 
understanding of the concessions he had wrung from Vietnam in 1967. As previously 
mentioned, these concessions - the inviolability of the border in principle and the 
unilateral right of Cambodia to propose minor readjustments to it- were regarded as the 
absolute minimum compensation for Cambodia in exchange for Phnom Penh 
relinquishing its claim to Kampuchea Krom. 196 Although Sihanouk was no longer in 
power in Cambodia, the ultranationalist Khmer Rouge were likewise hostage to severe 
domestic political constraints in their approach to the border question: 
Moreover, in some ways these constraints operated more strongly than in the 
past because the Pol Pot government claimed to be, and perceived itself as, a 
regime of national liberation that was more capable ofprotecting Kampuchea's 
national interests than its predecessors. Thus ... the position adopted on the 
frontier issue was a key barometer, both at the elite and the mass levels, of its 
fidelity to Kampuchean nationalism and therefore is related to its national 
l . . 197 egltlmacy. 
The Cambodian side therefore clung to Sihanouk' s 1967 formula. 198 Cambodia 
continued to renounce its former claims to its 'lost territories', rejecting any calls for 
mutual renegotiation of the border line. Furthermore, the Cambodians raised objections 
to what they viewed as de facto Vietnamese aggression through Vietnamese occupation 
of areas which Prince Sihanouk's government had designated on its maps as 
Cambodian, and demanded Vietnamese withdrawals from these zones as a confidence-
building measure before further talks. 199 Perhaps unsurprisingly the Vietnamese 
rejected Cambodian calls for withdrawals as a precondition for talks, instead viewing 
them as a possibility in the aftermath of talks and a mutually beneficial settlement of the 
border question potentially involving two-way territorial exchanges.200 
The technical meeting's dealings on the question of islands and the maritime 
boundary generated further significant divergences in the parties' views. The 
Cambodians made what they perceived to be a major concession by abandoning any 
claims to islands south of the Brevie Line as had been Prince Sihanouk's cherished 
ambition, and accepting the Brevie Line as the dividing line not only for islands but also 
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Heder, 1981: 30. 
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as the maritime boundary. 201 This was clearly a position that could be justified on the 
basis of Vietnam's 1967 statements as this "was evidently in line with the Vietnamese 
understanding of the import of those statements at the time. "202 Vietnam rejected 
Cambodia's proposal and instead proposed a readjustment to the Brevie Line in the 
vicinity of Phu Quoc so as to give Vietnamese vessels better access to the island. Thus, 
Cambodia's minimal position was undermined and instead of gaining some 
compensation for giving up its historic claims to islands south of the Brevie Line, 
Cambodia was asked to give up waters to the north of that line. It is worth quoting 
Reder at some length on this issue: 
The Kampucheans saw the Vietnamese proposals at the technical conference as 
an attempt to undermine the principle of the non-negotiability of the borders, to 
deny the existence of the recompensory elements that Sihanouk had linked to his 
renunciation of historical claims to Kampuchea Krom, to take advantage of the 
Kampuchean renunciation of historical claims on islands south of the Brevie 
Line and on Phu Quae by annexing territorial waters north of it, and to rely on 
their military presence in a number of Kampuchean zones in order to negotiate, 
in a big power way, from a position of strength. Acceptance of the Vietnamese 
proposals would have made the Kampuchean regime vulnerable to charges of 
lack of fidelity to and inability to protect Kampuchea's national interests. 203 
As a result of these major differences, the Cambodian delegation announced the 
suspension of the technical talks which resulted in the cancellation of the summit 
meeting planned for June. Cambodia stated that the talks had broken down because of 
Vietnamese attempts to redraw the "frontier of Kampuchea-Vietnam, particularly the 
maritime frontier, introducing plans of annexation of a big part of the seas of 
Kampuchea" and accused Vietnam of completely rejecting the maritime boundary 
delimitation agreed upon in the mid-1960s.Z04 Subsequently, a senior Vietnamese 
diplomat, commented that: "We don't accept the Brevie Line as an international 
boundary" and that the 3km zone of Vietnamese waters around Phu Quoc was 
"insufficient for the defence of the island. "205 
201 
202 
203 
204 
Heder, 1981: 30-31. Heder states that the Brevie Line was accepted by Cambodia as the border 
delineating sovereignty over islands and "territorial waters." It is unclear whether the author 
meant the latter term in its law of the sea meaning. It is likely that Cambodia was adopting the 
Brevie Line as the maritime boundary for the continental shelf as well as territorial waters. 
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The slide towards war 
Cambodia's suspension of the negotiations was designed to demonstrate to Hanoi the 
unacceptability of its stance and Phnom Penh's own commitment to its position. 
Unfortunately, this did not induce any shift in Vietnam's stance. Initially, tensions 
along the border were low and any incidents were handled by bilateral liaison 
committees. However, as frustrations over the deadlock in negotiations mounted, so 
tensions escalated. 206 Khmer Rouge statements on the border issue dating from this 
period were characterised by ultranationalist sentiments, for example, "enemies of all 
stripes, near and far, big and small have always nurtured criminal ambitions of 
swallowing our territory and subjugating our people. "207 Similarly, according to 
Phnom Penh the conflict with Vietnam did not constitute "an ordinary border dispute" 
but was the consequence of Hanoi's attempts "to turn Cambodia into its satellite in an 
Indochinese federation and spread its influence and power over Southeast Asian 
. . h fi ,208 countrzes m t e uture. In response to Cambodia increasing its patrols in areas 
Phnom Penh believed the Vietnamese were illegally occupying, Vietnam sent more 
reinforcements to the border. 209 The military situation on the border continued to 
escalate in 1977 and Cambodia officially broke off diplomatic relations with Vietnam at 
the end of the year. Fighting along the border continued intermittently in 1978 until 
ultimately Vietnam invaded Cambodia and deposed the Khmer Rouge in December 
1978.210 
In analysing the Third Indochina War, it is worth highlighting not only the 
historical antipathy, what Chanda terms their "scarred historical memory",211 between 
Cambodians and Vietnamese as a factor, but also that between Vietnamese and Chinese. 
However, ethnic and racial tensions and border issues alone did not foment the war. 
Chanda contends that although "a certain tension" was inevitable as a result of the 
traditional distrust that obtained between the parties and that a "re-emergence of 
irredentism and a contest over resources, so long frozen by colonial rule and foreign 
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intervention" was also natural, these factors did not make war inevitable. 212 Instead, 
ideological and superpower rivalries were crucial: 
The superpowers played a critical, if indirect role in the escalation of the 
conflict. Vietnam's friendship treaty with the Soviet Union preceded its invasion 
of China's ally Kampuchea by one month, and China's attack on Vietnam 
followed shortly after signing the normalisation pact with the United States. 213 
While the Cambodians viewed their relations with Vietnam in terms of national survival 
- a factor heavily played on by the Khmer Rouge to bolster their legitimacy - the 
Vietnamese saw the Cambodian problem as secondary to the threat of China. Hanoi 
feared that China, its own traditional enemy, was threatening Vietnam with a pincer 
movement from the north and southwest and pursuing a greater-Han hegemonic 
strategy?14 The Vietnamese also considered that, as the prime victors in the conflict 
against the French and Americans in the first two Indochina wars, they had a right to act 
as senior partner in a 'special relationship' with both Cambodia and Laos- an idea that 
was anathema to the Cambodians who saw Vietnamese ambitions to take a regional lead 
in the context of the two states' troubled history and as equating to Vietnamese 
hegemony.215 Cambodia therefore regarded its links with China as a means to 
counteract the perceived Vietnamese threat and to safeguard Cambodian independence 
and territorial integrity?16 China in turn appears to have viewed Vietnam as a Soviet 
satellite and part of a Soviet policy to contain China in a ring of anti-Chinese states, 
therefore regarding Vietnam as the "Cuba of Southeast Asia. "217 Elliott notes an 
"ironic parallelism" in that: 
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In the ascending hierarchy of size and power, each actor regarded its own 
relations with the lesser power as reasonable and innocuous, and ascribed the 
source of conflict to the threatening behaviour of the greater power. Only 
Kampuchea, at the bottom of the ladder, had no such bifarious view. 218 
It is precisely the latter point that Elliott highlights, Cambodia's "single-minded 
obsession with Vietnam", as providing the key explanation for Cambodia's actions in 
the build up to the Third Indochina War.219 It is also important to acknowledge that the 
Khmer Rouge-North Vietnamese alliance prior to 1975 was one based on the necessity 
to unite against common foes but was an uneasy one, not least because of serious 
ideological rifts between the two sides.220 The disintegration of the Cambodian-
Vietnamese alliance and genesis of the Third Indochina War is therefore unsurprising 
when all the historical, ethnic and racial and ideological factors, set in the context of 
Cold War rivalries, are taken into account. 
Agreements between the People's Republic of Kampuchea and Vietnam 
The establishment of the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) in the wake of the 
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia unsurprisingly led to significantly more cordial 
relations between the two states. Several agreements related to land and maritime 
boundary issues were signed between Vietnam and the PRK during the 1980s. Among 
these, the most significant as far as maritime boundary delimitation is concerned was the 
Agreement on Historic Waters of Vietnam and Kampuchea signed on 7 July 1982. This 
agreement is dealt with in detail in Section 6.3. 
The other agreements concluded between Cambodia and Vietnam in this period 
referred primarily to the two sides' land boundary. On 20 July 1983 a treaty on the 
settlement of border problems and an agreement relating to border regulations was 
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signed, according to which both sides agreed to regard their international boundary as 
the "present line" between them as defined on a I: 1 00,000-scale map published by the 
geographic service of Indochina in or about 1954.221 Cambodia and Vietnam undertook 
to delimit their land and sea borders in a spirit of "equality and mutual respect" in the· 
interests of the special relations between them and in conformity with international law 
d . 222 an practice. 
The other boundary-related agreement reached between Cambodia and Vietnam 
in the 1980s was the Treaty on the Delimitation of the Vietnam-Kampuchea Frontier 
signed on 27 December 1985.Z23 Under the terms of this treaty the parties agreed to 
respect the "present demarcation line" specified as "the line that was in existence at the 
time" of independence. 224 The 1: I 00,000-scale map mentioned in the 1983 accord was 
also cited in the 1985 treaty as the basis for delimitation. 
As noted in relation to the joint Historic Waters Agreement, there is some 
uncertainty as to the continued validity of agreements concluded between the PRK and 
Vietnam. It is, however, likely that these agreements do remain in force (see Section 
6.3). 
7.3.3 Scope of the dispute 
As a result of conflicting claims to sovereignty over islands, which still existed in the 
early 1970s, the Cambodian and Vietnamese unilateral continental shelf designations 
overlapped to a significant degree encompassing an area of approximately 18,068nm2 
(61,973km2) (see Figure 7.14).225 To date neither of these maritime jurisdictional 
claims has been officially retracted. Nevertheless, as has been demonstrated, the dispute 
over island sovereignty has been resolved, thus implicitly undermining the validity of 
large parts of both Cambodia and Vietnam's continental shelf claims which were based 
on each state's position that it owned all contested islands. 
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within the limits of the overlapping claims area are included. However, their area is considered 
sufficiently small not to have a significantly distorting effect on the overall calculation of the 
extent of the overlapping claims area. 
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Figure 7.14: Overlapping Claims between Cambodia and Vietnam in the 1970s 
Source: Author's research. 
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Within their straight baseline systems the two states, by means of their Historic 
Waters Agreement, have defined the extent of their disputed waters. This joint claim 
encompasses an area of 2,802nm2 (9,609km2) of the Gulf of Thailand (see Section 
7 .3).226 Beyond their straight baselines, the area of overlap appears to be confined to the 
difference between an equidistance line between Cambodia's Poulo Wei islands and 
Vietnam's Tho Chu (Poulo Panjang) islands on the one hand and an extension of the 
Brevie Line offshore on the other. 
Approximately midway between the limit of the joint historic waters area and 
the limits of Cambodia and Vietnam's claims in the central Gulf of Thailand the 
equidistance line and Brevie Line cross. Thus, immediately seaward of the straight 
baseline linking Poulo Wei to Tho Chu, the Brevie Line is located to the southeast of the 
equidistance line. Further offshore, however, the Brevie Line lies to the northwest of 
the equidistance line. Were Cambodia to claim the Brevie Line in preference to the 
equidistance line, therefore, it would gain approximately 1 00nm2 (344km2) of maritime 
space in the vicinity of the historic waters area but lose approximately 57nm2 ( 195km2) 
further offshore (see figure 7.15).227 
7.3.4 Progress in Negotiations 
Relations between the new Royal Government of Cambodia, installed in Phnom Penh in 
mid-1993 following UN-sponsored elections, and Vietnam in the 1990s have been 
dominated by two issues - border questions and concerns over the treatment of ethnic 
Vietnamese in Cambodia. Discussions on border problems have, however, been largely 
concentrated on concerns over the land rather than maritime boundary between the two 
states. 
A number of high-level meetings have been held in the post-1993 period, all of 
which have stressed the two states' maintenance of friendly, cooperative relations and 
the need to solve any bilateral problems, including border issues, peacefully through 
negotiations. Additionally, discussions have been undertaken between expert groups 
established by both parties to specifically deal with border questions228 and through the 
226 
227 
228 
Measured with a planimetre on a copy of British Admiralty Chart 3879, 1957 edition at a scale of 
1:240,000. 
Calculated using DELMAR and British Admiralty Chart 2414, 1967 edition at a scale of 
1: 1 ,500,000. 
The first meeting of the working groups on border issues took place in ho Chi Minh City on 20-
23 May 1996 (Amer, 1997a: 86). 
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Figure 7.15: Overlapping Claims between Cambodia and Vietnam in the 1990s 
Source: Author's research. 
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Vietnam-Cambodia Joint Commission for Scientific and Technical Cooperation?29 
These discussions led to agreement on a mechanism for solving border problems 
whereby any incident would be addressed at the local level first. 230 
Despite these positive developments, tensions have been engendered in relations 
as a result of numerous accusations of Vietnamese violations of the common land 
boundary. In a message to the people of Cambodia broadcast on 31 October 1993, King 
Sihanouk stated that the issue of Cambodia's territorial integrity was one of the key 
issues facing the country and accused Vietnam of "slicing and annexing" Cambodia's 
"land, sea and continental shelf. "231 In May 1994 Cambodian head of state King 
Sihanouk stated that Vietnam had been "nibbling away" at Cambodian territory by 
moving border demarcation markers.232 Similarly, Cambodian First Prime Minister 
Norodom Ranariddh has made repeated allegations, particularly in the first half of 1996, 
accusing Vietnam of the "annexation" of Cambodian territory and even going so far as 
to threaten the use of force to redress the situation. 233 For their part the Vietnamese 
authorities have consistently denied that their forces have undertaken any incursions into 
Cambodian territory and have called for peaceful negotiations to resolve outstanding 
problems. 
It is highly probable that the causes of these accusations lie within Cambodian 
domestic politics rather than being the result of Vietnamese actions on the border. This 
is supported by the fact that the two sides have agreed in principle that the colonial 
French boundary line should be adopted as the basis for their delimitation. It is 
therefore fair to say that, from a technical point of view, Cambodia and Vietnam are 
faced with questions of demarcation rather than delimitation. 234 While Vietnam has 
spoken with one voice, Cambodia's co-premiers have provided conflicting assessments 
of the border problem, King Sihanouk's statements concerning Vietnam have often 
proved to be ambivalent and the opposition Khmer Rouge have advanced virulently 
. v· 1. . ns anti- tetnamese po tctes. -
229 
230 
231 
232 
233 
234 
235 
Meetings of the Joint Commission took place in Hanoi on 8-10 September 1995 and in Phnom 
Penh on 26-28 February 1997 CArner, 1997a: 83 and 87). 
Amer, 1997a: 83; Bangkok Post, 1114/96; The Nation, 11/4/96. 
Voice of the Great National Front of Cambodia, 8/11193 (SWB FE/1844 ). 
Amer, 1997a: 82. 
The Nation, 16/3/96; Bangkok Post, 17/3/96; Amer, 1997a: 83-86. For example, on 24 January 
1996 Prince Ranariddh claimed that whereas in the past the Khmer Empire had been immense 
nowadays Cambodia had shrunk to a "barely visible dot on the world map" (Boundary and 
Security Bulletin, 4, !(Spring): 37-38). 
Amer, 1997a: 88; StJohn, 1998: 30. 
StJohn, 1998: 30. 
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It seems clear that anti-Vietnamese sentiment remains a powerful weapon in 
Cambodia's domestic political arena. Parallels may therefore be drawn between the 
1990s and Cambodia's past dealings with Vietnam. The same constraints that obtained 
in the post-independence Sihanouk and Khmer Rouge eras are still in evidence today 
and there is clearly the possibility of the border question being used as a 'political 
football' on Cambodia's domestic political scene. With regard to the offshore area, the 
events outlined above have resulted in a fixation with the land boundary and have 
therefore retarded progress towards maritime boundary delimitation. 
Some hope for the future does, however arise from events m June 1998. 
Following Cambodian First Prime Minister Ung Huot' s visit to Hanoi on 1-2 June to 
discuss Cambodia's protests over the conclusion of the Thai-Vietnamese maritime 
boundary treaty (see Section 6.5), it was reported that Cambodia and Vietnam held the 
first meeting of their newly established joint border commission on 17 June 1998.236 
Although disputed offshore areas were not on the agenda of this initial meeting, which 
was devoted to issues of principle, it is encouraging that bilateral negotiations, possibly 
including maritime boundary concerns in the future, have been resumed. 237 
Furthermore, on 1 March 1999 a meeting of Cambodia's Council of Ministers decided 
to establish joint committees devoted to Cambodia's borders with each of Laos, 
Thailand and Vietnam. 238 
236 
237 
238 
Bangkok Post, 18/6/98. 
Cambodian-Vietnamese relations were put under renewed strain in July-September 1998, 
however, after several attacks on ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia resulting in at least seven 
deaths and the vandalisation of the Cambodia-Vietnam friendship monument. The Vietnamese 
Foreign Ministry released a strongly-worded statement in response to these incidents on 7 
September 1998: 
The Vietnamese government and people vehemently protest these barbarous acts taken 
by a number of extremist elements which seriously violate human rights, and further 
complicate the situation in Cambodia, undermine the friendship between the 
neighbours of Vietnam and Cambodia, and poison the atmosphere of peace, 
cooperation and development in Southeast Asia (VNA news agency, Hanoi, 9/9/98 
(SWB FE/3327)). 
National Voice of Cambodia, Phnom Penh, l/3/99 (SEB FE/3473). The border joint committees 
appear to be 'joint' in the sense that they are interdepartmental. for instance, the Cambodia-
Vietnam border joint committee consists of the government advisor in charge of border issues 
plus representatives from the armed forces, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation, Governors of the relevant border provinces, the Geography Department of the 
Urbanisation and Construction Ministry, the Interior Ministry's Land Borders Department, the 
Border Defence Department of the Chief of Staffs office, the Interior Ministry's Maritime 
Border Department and the Justice Ministry. 
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7.3.5 Delimitation Within the Joint Historic Waters Area 
Unlike unsettled delimitations elsewhere in the Gulf of Thailand, instead of the disputed 
area being defined by the competing overlapping claims of the parties, in the case of 
Cambodia and Vietnam's historic waters claim, the parties have jointly defined the 
extent of the zone disputed between them that ultimately requires division. This is not 
least because their original continental shelf claims of the early 1970s have been 
rendered redundant as a realistic indication of the extent of their overlapping claims as a 
consequence of the resolution of the two states' dispute over island sovereignty. 
It is also worth emphasising that the delimitation called for between Cambodia 
and Vietnam in the area in question is for a historic waters boundary. As mentioned in 
Section 6.3, as most claims to historic waters are made by one state alone, historic 
waters boundaries are extremely rare. As a result the international Jaw of the sea and 
customary law based on state practice is largely underdeveloped and gives minimal hints 
as to the appropriate rules to apply in such circumstances. Perhaps the best case 
comparable to the Cambodia-Vietnam situation is that between India and Sri Lanka 
through the Palk Strait and Bay. Here a historic waters boundary was delimited which 
I d " l if "d. ,239 emp oye e ements o equz zstance. However, it is well to note that the 
geographical circumstances are different. Whereas in the India-Sri Lanka case the 
delimitation was exclusively between opposite coasts, the delimitation between 
Cambodia and Vietnam within the confines of their joint historic waters area involves 
situations of both oppositeness and adjacency. With regard to delimitations between 
areas of historical waters, it is therefore probable that the parties should simply be 
guided by equitable principles (see Section 3.1.2). 
As previously mentioned, Article 2 of the Cambodia-Vietnam Agreement on 
Historic Waters states that: 
The two sides will hold at a suitable time negotiations in the spirit of equality, 
friendship, and respect for each other's independence, sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, and the legitimate interests of each side in order to delimit the 
maritime frontier between the two countries ... 
On this basis Cambodia is likely to construct its arguments primarily on the basis of its 
position as a geographically disadvantaged state. Cambodia can contend that the 
presence of the Vietnamese island of Phu Quoc directly offshore and fronting 
239 Charney and Alexander, 1993: 1,412. 
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approximately 26nm (48km) of its mainland coast240 provides a severe impediment to 
its potential maritime claims were strict equidistance to be applied as a delimitation 
method. Accordingly, Cambodia can argue that any such delimitation would be highly 
inequitable and would be to Cambodia's detriment. 
Vietnam would be likely to counter such arguments on the grounds that there is 
no question of the substantial island of Phu Quoc being anything other than a fully 
fledged island under the definition provided by Article 121 of UNCLOS (see Section 
3.5). As such Phu Quoc is entitled to the same maritime jurisdictional rights accorded 
to other land territory. In the context of a historical waters delimitation, therefore, 
Vietnam could argue that there is no justification for giving Phu Quoc a reduced weight 
in delimitation. 
Cambodia could, however, also advance the claim that the Brevie Line should 
constitute the maritime boundary through the historic waters area. Cambodia can 
strongly argue that the Brevie Line has been established over a considerable period of 
time since its formulation in 1939 and that during that time it has been respected by both 
sides as the proper limits ofthdr jurisdiction. Furthermore, Cambodia can point to past 
Vietnamese actions, crucially the statements made by the NLF and North Vietnamese 
government in 1967, which can be viewed as proof of Vietnam's acceptance of the 
Brevie Line as the maritime boundary between the two states and not merely as the line 
distinguishing sovereignty over islands. Additionally, Cambodia could support its case 
by reference to state practice and, in particular, highlight the fact that Vietnam itself 
maintains a historic maritime boundary claim which is arguably analogous to a 
Cambodian claim to the Brevie Line as a maritime boundary- that is Vietnam's claim 
vis-a-vis China in the Gulf of Tonkin.241 While no two boundary delimitations are 
identical it does appear manifestly inconsistent for Vietnam to recognise the dividing 
line between islands as the maritime boundary with China but reject it in relation to 
Cambodia - after all, both lines were of French colonial inspiration. 
Were Cambodia to make such claims, Vietnam would in all probability raise the 
fact that Governor-General Brevie himself stated that "the issue of the islands' 
territorial jurisdiction remains entirely reserved" (Appendix 19). Moreover, Vietnam 
240 
241 
Measured on British Admiralty Chart 2414, 1967 edition at a scale of 1: I ,500,000. 
In 1974 Vietnam advanced the claim that the Sino-French Convention on the delimitation of the 
frontier between China and Tonkin (Vietnam) of 1887 defined both land and maritime 
boundaries such that the sea boundary line between the parties should be longitude 108° 3' 13" 
E. (Prescott, 1985a: 225; Johnston and Valencia, 1991: 146). 
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Figure 7.16: Hypothetical Delimitations in the Joint Historic Waters Area 
Source: Author's research. 
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would be likely to argue that the 1967 statements have no legal meaning having been 
signed under duress and that they have in any case been superseded by the 1982 Historic 
Waters Agreement which specifically provides for delimitation in the future, thus 
making it clear that no maritime boundary existed at the time of the conclusion of the 
agreement. 
For its part, Vietnam is likely to favour an equidistance-based solution as this 
would clearly be significantly more favourable to it than one utilising the Brevie Line 
(see Figure 7.16). Such an approach would most probably be contested by Cambodia 
for the reasons outlined above. 
The area lying between the Brevie Line and a strict equidistance line running 
through the historic waters area is 768nm2 (2,635km2), equivalent to 27.4% of the joint 
area.242 Were the Brevie Line confirmed as the maritime boundary Cambodia would 
gain 69.9% of the joint historic waters area with Vietnam receiving the remaining 
30.1%.243 If a strict equidistance line were applied, Cambodia's share of the zone would 
fall dramatically to approximately 42.5% to Vietnam's 57.5%.244 
Several potential delimitations are therefore immediately available to the parties: 
• Firstly, the parties could accept the Brevie Line as the maritime boundary between 
them within the historic waters area. This would be advantageous to Cambodia 
inshore where the potential influence of Phu Quoc island is greatest were 
equidistance to be used as the method of delimitation. Such a delimitation would 
not, however, address Vietnam's concerns over access to and security for Phu Quoc 
which under this scenario would be accorded Vietnamese waters of only 3km breadth 
around it. 
• Secondly, the Brevie Line could be used as the basis for delimitation but modified to 
ameliorate Vietnam's most pressing problems with such a boundary. Thus, the 
Vietnamese zone around Phu Quoc could conceivably be extended to 12nm 
(equivalent to territorial sea breadth by way of example). In the channel between Phu 
Quoc and the Cambodian mainland coast, which is less than 24nm broad, an 
equidistance line could be employed but on the western side of Phu Quoc Vietnam 
242 
243 
244 
Measured using a planimetre and British Admiralty Chart 3879, 1957 edition at a scale of 
1:240,000. 
Of the total area of the historic waters of 2,802nm2 (9609km2), Cambodia would gain! ,958nm2 
(6,716km2) to Vietnam's 844nm2 (2,893km2). 
Cambodia would gain 1,190nm2 (4,08lkm2) while Vietnam would receive 1,612nm (5528km2). 
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would acquire the historic waters within 12nm of the island's coast and to the south 
of the Brevie Line. An arrangement along these lines would be somewhat more 
favourable to Vietnam in that its immediate concerns over Phu Quoc would be dealt 
with, but the lion's share of the historic waters area seaward of the island would be 
allocated to Cambodia. 
• Alternatively, a delimitation could be constructed on the basis of equidistance. 
Clearly there are many potential variations to such an equidistance line. Figure 7.17 
shows a strict equidistance line between all features but both using Depond Reef and 
discounting it in order to demonstrate just one potential variation.245 As noted, a 
delimitation based on strict equidistance would be highly favourable to Vietnam with 
Phu Quoc having a significant impact on the division of the historic waters area 
between the parties. 
It is also possible that Cambodia and Vietnam could opt to forego delimitation and 
retain their joint historic waters area. This arrangement is already well established and 
has many of the attributes associated with joint development areas elsewhere. Its joint 
development and management provisions could perhaps be enhanced by mutual 
agreement, removing the need for the delimitation of a maritime boundary. The 
advantages of continuing and developing the joint historic waters area should not, 
therefore, be underestimated. 246 
7.3.6 Delimitation Beyond the Joint Historic Waters Area 
As is the case for delimitation within the historic waters area, the delimitation of the 
lateral boundary between Cambodia and Vietnam seaward of the historic waters area, 
encompassing territorial sea and continental shelf or EEZ rights, is likely to be based 
either on historical grounds or equidistance. Were Cambodia to argue for the adoption 
245 
246 
It is worth noting that Depond Reef is a low-tide elevation whose charted position is almost 
exactly l2nm from the nearest feature in the Poulo Wei island group (British Admiralty Chart 
3879). However, its position is approximate and it would only be a valid basepoint for territorial 
sea delimitation purposes if it lies within 12nm of the nearest island or mainland coast 
(Hydrographer, 1978: 108). If equidistance were adopted as the method of delimitation, Depond 
Reef would in all probability be disregarded in the construction of an equidistance line. 
However, the delimitation Cambodia and Vietnam are dealing with in this case is one relating to 
historical waters rather than territorial sea, continental shelf or EEZ so it is not impossible that 
Depond Reef could be used as a basepoint. 
In this context, one of the delimitation line options discussed - and particularly the Brevie Line in 
light of the reasons for its establishment- could be used as the dividing line for criminal 
jurisdiction in a similar fashion to that running through the Thai-Malaysian JDA. 
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(or reconfirmation) of the Brevie Line as the maritime boundary between the parties 
within the historic waters area it is quite possible that it might maintain that the same 
line should form the maritime boundary seaward of that zone also. Alternatively, 
equidistance could be used to determine the boundary line. As there is a territorial sea 
delimitation involved, equidistance could be viewed as being particularly suitable (see 
Section 3.1.1). Additionally, comparable islands and/or baselines provide the key 
basepoints for a delimitation based on equidistance which as a result could be viewed as 
providing an equitable solution. 
It is clear from Vietnam's maritime boundary agreement with Thailand of 7 
August 1997 that Vietnam considers that the lateral maritime boundary between 
Cambodia and Vietnam, as well as the location of Point "0" on the limit of the historic 
waters area, has already been established, at least as a "working arrangement" line, on 
the basis of equidistance.247 Cambodia has protested over this, stating that it has "never 
agreed to" such a boundary which "constitutes a violation of Cambodia's sovereignty." 
These issues are dealt with in detail in Section 6.5. 
Adoption of the Brevie Line as the maritime boundary between the two states 
seaward of the historic waters area would be of net benefit to Cambodia in comparison 
with a strict equidistance line (see Section 7.3.3). The opposite, of course, holds true for 
Vietnam. One complicating factor that should be considered, however, is that the most 
prospective areas in the Gulf of Thailand as far as oil and gas resources are concerned 
are those in the central part of the Gulf. It may therefore be advantageous to acquire the 
maximum maritime space in this key area, which is precisely where Cambodia would 
lose out, albeit marginally relative to its overall claim, if it adopted the Brevie Line over 
a strict equidistance line. 
7.3. 7 Prospects 
It is clear that Cambodia and Vietnam's longstanding dispute relating to sovereignty 
over islands has been resolved. Indeed, the two states most recent maritime boundary 
agreement, the Historic Waters Agreement of July 1982, definitively allocated 
ownership of islands on the basis of the Brevie Line. The resolution of the dispute over 
islands coupled with the Historic Waters Agreement has had a profound knock-on effect 
on the parties' maritime boundary dispute. The area of overlapping claims between the 
247 Thao, 1997: 77; The Nation (Internet version), 9/5/98 (FBIS-EAS-98-128). 
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two states has been significantly limited, despite the fact that the Cambodian and 
Vietnamese continental shelf claims dating from the early 1970s have never been 
officially withdrawn or modified. This is the case because neither the Cambodian nor 
Vietnamese continental shelf claims, based on their respective sovereignty over all the 
contested islands, can realistically be maintained. 
The differences between the two states have therefore been narrowed to a 
considerable degree. As Figure 7.5 and 7.15 demonstrate, the maritime space at stake-
that between the Brevie Line and an equidistance line - is minimal in comparison to the 
area of overlapping claims contested between Cambodia and Thailand. Viewed from a 
non-partisan standpoint, therefore, it seems entirely reasonable to suggest that the 
outstanding differences between the two sides' positions can be bridged. This could 
perhaps be achieved by means of a modified version of either the Brevie Line or 
equidistance or a combination of the two as suggested in Section 7.3.5. 
However, as is the case with all maritime boundary negotiations, the critical 
factor is political will. As the tortuous history of Cambodia-Vietnam relations attests 
and as progress (or lack of it) in negotiations in the 1990s more recently has 
demonstrated, it would be unwise to underestimate the sensitive nature of border issues 
to the two states. Moreover, the potential for disagreements over land boundary issues 
to disrupt efforts towards maritime boundary delimitation remains strong. In the 
absence of a definitive delimitation agreement, however, Cambodia and Vietnam may 
very well be content with the status quo. 
7.4 Cambodia- Thailand- Vietnam 
A dispute emerged in 1997 over the location of the Cambodia-Thailand-Vietnam 
tripoint, the location of which Thailand and Vietnam appear to have bilaterally 
determined as part of their maritime boundary treaty of 9 August that year. Cambodia 
issued a protest note in February 1998, reserving its position on this issue. The 
implications of the Thai-Vietnamese treaty and the tripoint dispute are considered in 
some detail in Section 6.5. ·This section will therefore be devoted to examining some of 
the possible means by which this problem may be resolved. 
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It will be recalled that the terminal point, Point K, of the Thai-Vietnamese 
maritime boundary is located approximately 7nm northeast of the Cambodia-Thailand-
Vietnam tripoint as determined by strict equidistance. Several possible ways of 
overcoming this problem exist: 
• The most obvious method of resolving the problem would be for Cambodia to simply 
accept Point K as the tripoint. However, as Cambodia was not party to the Thai-
Vietnamese treaty, it is by no means obliged to do so and such a tripoint would 
provide a terminal point for the undelimited Cambodia-Thailand maritime boundary 
at a considerable disadvantage to Cambodia. 
• Cambodia could accept equidistance as the basis for its lateral maritime boundary 
with Vietnam, as the latter appears to believe that this is already the case at least in 
terms of there being a 'working arrangement' based on equidistance. If this were so, 
then the Thai-Cambodian maritime boundary, could be constructed such that it 
terminates on a Cambodia-Vietnam lateral equidistance line. As a result, the final 
point of the future Thai-Cambodian boundary need not necessarily coincide with 
Point K. Instead, the final point of the Thai-Cambodian delimitation and Point K 
could be joined by a 'step' of boundary line equidistant between Cambodia and 
Vietnam, thus eliminating the need for a tripoint. 
• Alternatively, if Cambodia and Vietnam ultimately agree on the use of the Brevie 
Line as the maritime boundary between them, as outlined in Section 7.3.3, Point K 
would fall short of Cambodian waters. A trilateral negotiation would then be 
required to join Point K to the Brevie Line - a negotiation which would also 
encourage Thailand and Cambodia to clarify the extent of their claims in the central 
Gulf of Thailand either through delimitation or the establishment of some form of 
joint development zone (see Section 7.2). 
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7.5 Malaysia - Thailand 
7.5.1 Problems Relating to Existing Boundaries 
Two problems have been identified concerning the Thai-Malaysian territorial sea 
boundary agreement of October 1979. The first of these involves the initial point of the 
boundary and how this relates to the shifting mouth of the Golok River. The second 
concerns he fact that the territorial sea boundary appears to extend almost 13.5nm 
offshore - that is, approximately 1.5nm beyond the 12nm-breadth territorial sea claims 
of the two states. These problems and potential solutions to them are considered in 
Section 6.2.2. 
7.5.2 Dividing the Joint Development Area (IDA) 
Despite the long drawn out process of implementing the Thai-Malaysian Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) on joint development, the arrangement now appears to be 
functioning smoothly, such that oil and gas exploration is proceeding apace and there is 
every indication that significant production of hydrocarbons will be realised (see Section 
6.2.4). There is therefore nothing to suggest that either party is dissatisfied with the 
status quo. Nevertheless, the MoU, in Article II, was at pains to stress that: 
Both parties agree to continue to resolve the problem of delimitation of the 
boundary of the continental shelf in the Gulf of Thailand between the two 
countries by negotiations or such other peaceful means as agreed to by both 
Parties, in accordance with the principles of international law and practice ... 
(see Appendix 13). 
It is therefore clear that both Malaysia and Thailand anticipate extending their partial 
continental shelf delimitation offshore and dividing the JDA between them at an 
unspecified future date. Such a delimitation is, however, likely to take place only once 
the hydrocarbon reserves within the joint zone have been fully exploited. 
Thai-Malaysian attempts to divide the JDA are also likely to be bedevilled by the 
same factors which generated the overlapping claims which became the joint zone in the 
first place. Essentially, these were Thailand's insistence that Ko Losin constituted a 
valid basepoint for continental shelf rights, and Malaysia's contention that it was a mere 
rock entitled to no more than territorial sea jurisdiction. These positions are unlikely to 
have changed. However, an additional, complicating, factor has been introduced by 
Thailand which was absent from the two states delimitation negotiations in the 1970s. 
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This is Thailand's 1992 extension of its straight baseline system to incorporate Ko Kra 
and Ko Losin into Area 4 (see Figure 4.6). These baselines are potentially relevant to 
any delimitation through the JDA and could be seen as strengthening Thailand's hand 
in negotiations. 
Malaysia would, however, almost certainly argue that Thailand's Area 4 straight 
baselines profoundly depart from the terms and spirit of Article 7 of UNCLOS and 
should therefore be ignored (see Section 4.4.4). On the subject of Ko L~sin, Malaysia 
can also highlight inconsistencies in Thailand's treatment of the feature. While 
maintaining that Ko Losin is a fully-fledged island capable of generating claims to 
continental shelf in relation to Malaysia, Thailand's 1973 continental shelf claim 
relating to Cambodia and Vietnam, Ko Losin was ignored as a potential basepoint. 
Furthermore, in its August 1997 maritime boundary agreement with Vietnam, Thailand 
apparently agreed to Ko Losin being wholly discounted. 
Once the usefulness of the JDA as a source of oil and gas resources has been 
exhausted, however, most of the urgency will have been removed from the dispute and a 
compromise solution should be achievable. It is worth noting that a dividing line 
between the jurisdiction of the two states does exist within the JDA. This relates to 
criminal jurisdiction and would be an obvious candidate for eventual adoption as the 
maritime boundary through the JDA. Article V of the Thai-Malaysian MoU, however, 
emphatically states that this line: 
... shall not in any way be construed as indicating the boundary line of the 
continental shelf between the two countries in the joint development area ... nor 
shall such definition in any way prejudice the sovereign rights of either Party in 
the joint development area (see Appendix 13). 
In any case, the division of the JDA according to the criminal jurisdiction line is uneven, 
according slightly more of the area to Thailand than to Malaysia. 248 Such a solution 
would probably prove unacceptable to Malaysia which appears to have a strong case for 
insisting on a heavily reduced effect for Ko Losin. 
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7.6 Malaysia/Thailand - Vietnam 
As previously noted, the seaward part of the Thai-Malaysian JDA is also subject to a 
claim by a third state, Vietnam. This claim covers an area of approximately 256nm2 
(879km2) (see Figure 7.17 and Section 6.2.4)?49 However, Article 2 of the Thai-
Vietnamese maritime boundary treaty of 7 August 1997 provides that its parties: 
.. . shall enter into negotiation with the Government of Malaysia in order to settle 
the tripartite overlapping continental shelf claim area of the Kingdom of 
Thailand, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and Malaysia, which lies within the 
Thai-Malaysian Joint Development Area (see Appendix 16). 
The scene was therefore set for trilateral negotiations to proceed with a view to 
resolving this problem. Indeed, it was subsequently reported that senior officials of the 
three countries had met in Hanoi on 24-26 February 1998. While this event was 
considered a significant step forward, the trilateral talks were expected to proceed 
slowly.250 Vietnam is likely to argue for a three-way split in the revenues accruing from 
oil and gas production in the zone of Vietnamese overlap with the JDA. Thailand and 
Malaysia are, however likely to argue that in light of the reduced effect accorded to the 
islands on which its claim is based, notably in the Thai-Vietnamese maritime boundary 
agreement, Vietnam should be accorded a lesser share in the zone. This could be 
achieved either through a narrowing of the zone of trilateral overlap, or, more elegantly, 
by simply reducing Vietnam's percentage share in the proceeds from the current area of 
trilateral overlapping claims. The outcome of these negotiations remains to be seen. 
248 
249 
250 
Malaysia's zone is approximately 1,038nm2 (3,560km2) and Thailand's 1,069nm2 (3,666km2) in 
area. Calculated using DELMAR. 
Calculated using DELMAR and British Admiralty Chart 2414, 1967 edition at a scale of 
l: 1 ,500,000. 
The Nation, 3/3/98. 
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Figure 5.17: Overlapping Claims between Thailand/Malaysia and Vietnam 
Source: Author's research. 
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7.7 Malaysia- Vietnam 
As noted in Section 6.4, Malaysia and Vietnam have each retained their sovereignty 
claims to the whole of the "Defined Area" subject to their joint development agreement 
of 5 June 1992. According to this agreement joint exploration and exploitation is to be 
undertaken within the "Defined Area" "pending delimitation of the boundary lines" 
(see Appendix 15, Article 2). It is therefore clear that at some stage the two states 
intend to divide the "Defined Area" between them. In the meantime, however, as is the 
case for the Thai-Malaysian JDA, the apparent success of the joint development 
arrangement indicates means that neither party is likely to press for delimitation at an 
early stage. 
The "Defined Area" comprises Malaysia and Vietnam's overlapping continental 
shelf claims. This overlap was caused by differing interpretations of equidistance with 
islands being either counted or ignored on either side to maximise each state's claims 
therefore producing a long, thin zone of overlapping claims (see Section 5.3 and Figure 
7 .20). It is therefore likely that once the joint development arrangement has run its 
course and any oil and gas resources contained therein have been exhausted, a 
compromise solution may be reached. This could be in the form of an equidistance line 
between mainland coasts, or one between all features. Alternatively, Malaysia and 
Vietnam could adopt a pragmatic view, in light of the similar arguments relating to 
islands that both sides are liable to bring to bear in delimitation negotiations, and simply 
divide the "Defined Area" equally between them by means of an equidistance line 
between the two claim lines. 
7.8 Problems of Ocean Management 
While this study is devoted primarily to maritime boundary delimitation, it should be 
acknowledged that a number of trans-boundary problems and disputes afflict the Gulf of 
Thailand littoral states. These include disputes over fishing rights, concerns over 
security of navigation as a result of piracy as well as transboundary environmental issues 
(see Section 1.3.4). Perhaps the most pressing of these relates to competition over 
fisheries resources. 
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lllegal fishing has proved a particularly poisonous issue in relations between the 
Gulf of Thailand coastal states and has generated a considerable body of literature 
devoted to the problem.251 The main problem appears to stem from activities by Thai 
fishermen but incidents have also occurred between the other Gulf of Thailand states, 
particularly involving Malaysia and Vietnam. The key causes of fisheries conflicts 
between Thailand (and to a lesser extent Malaysia) and its maritime neighbours have 
been identified as being: 
• The development and implementation of the EEZ concept - This must be viewed as 
the crucial factor in generating fisheries conflict in the Gulf of Thailand. The 
declaration of EEZs by Thailand's neighbours placed large maritime areas 
traditionally fished by Thai fleets out of bounds. It has been estimated that this 
development has entailed a loss to Thailand of c.300,000km2 of fishing grounds 
formerly used by Thai fishermen. 252 
• Fishing capacity- Thailand's large fishing fleet, 85% of which based on Thailand's 
Gulf of Thailand coast, was faced with the fact that Thai waters had been subject to 
overfishing and had been effectively 'fished out', while those of its neighbours, 
where Thai fishermen had in any case traditionally fished, were relatively plentiful.253 
In McDorman's words, the temptation for Thai fishermen to stray into Cambodian, 
Malaysian or Vietnamese waters in these circumstances was "very great. "254 As a 
result it has been estimated that as much as 30-40% of Thailand's marine catch has 
come from outside Thai waters.255 As time has progressed it is also clear that 
Thailand's neighbours have enhanced their own fishing capacities resulting in 
increased friction with 'poaching' Thai vessels. 
• Maritime boundary disputes- Uncertainties over the limits of jurisdiction of the Gulf 
of Thailand states because of overlapping continental shelf claims and reticence 
concerning the limits of EEZ claims have clearly contributed to disputes over access 
to fisheries. 
251 
252 
253 
254 
See, for example, Ake-uru (1987); Hamzah (1987, 1988 and 1998); Hao (1998); Kittichaisaree 
(1990a and 1990b); McDorman (1986 and 1990); Menasveta (1998); Navavichit (1998); Torell 
(1988); and Valencia (1990). 
McDorman, 1986: 183. In contrast Ake-uru (1987: 418) puts the figure at "300,000 square 
miles." 
McDorman, 1990: 42. McDorman (1986: 189-190) has also commented that the Thai 
fishermen's retreat to Thai waters in the Gulf of Thailand "led immediately to serious ave/fishing 
and the grave potential of severely damaging the stocks that were already in a poor state." 
McDorman, 1990: 42. 
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• Politics - As McDorman has noted, "fishery conflicts between Thailand and its 
Indochinese neighbours were intensified by the broader bilateral animosity" 
between the communist regimes of Cambodia and Vietnam and Thailand. 256 
• Fisheries regulation and enforcement- In the wake of making EEZ declarations, the 
Gulf of Thailand states have sought to enact legislation designed to protect and 
conserve the resources therein. Of particular note here is Malaysia's Fisheries Act of 
May 1985.257 This legislation appears to have been framed with Thai fishing 
activities in mind and its strict enforcement resulted in countless seizures of Thai 
fishing vessels and arrests of Thai fishermen?58 The Malaysian Act requires fishing 
vessels in transit through Malaysian waters to give prior notification to the Malaysian 
authorities, to stow their gear and to proceed without lingering. Failure to do so 
automatically gives rise to a presumption that illegal fishing has been undertaken or 
attempted. Thailand has protested against these provisions as seriously undermining 
freedom of navigation and as being inconsistent with the relevant provisions of 
UNCLOS.259 These incidents have also repeatedly led to violent clashes between 
Thai fishermen and Malaysian coastguards?60 In the mid-1980s and 1990s, 
255 
256 
257 
258 
259 
260 
Ake-uru, 1987: 418; Asian Development Bank (1985: 72) quoted in Torell, 1990: 134-136. 
McDorman, 1990: 46. An appreciation of the scale of the problem is provided by the fact that in 
the period 1983-86 alone Vietnam arrested and detained 1,000 Thai fishermen (Valencia and 
Van Dyke, 1994: 231). 
For a copy see Hamzah (1988: 53-95). 
For example, in the period three year period following the enactment of the Malaysian fishery 
legislation (1985-87), Malaysia arrested 178 Thai vessels (McDorman, 1990: 46). 
For example, Thailand formally protested the Malaysian Fisheries Act of 1985 in a memorandum 
dated 15 December 1987 (Kittichaisaree, 1990a: 321). It is also highly likely that the Thai 
authorities had Malaysia in mind when it issued its Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
to the UN Secretary-General of3 May 1993 (copy on file with the author). Kittichaisaree (1990a: 
321) has described the Malaysian Act's provisions as "not well-found in international law 
and ... impractical" and the requirement of prior notice as unreasonable and excessive. In 
contrast, Hamzah (1988) has offered a robust defence of Malaysia's fisheries legislation, 
concluding that the core issue is the sovereign right of a nation to explore and exploit, conserve 
and manage its natural resources: "Malaysia, as a sovereign nation, cannot be coerced or 
intimidated to give up its rights to others no matter what the pretext may be" (Hamzah, 1988: 
22). See also, Valencia (1985: 116-120); and Haller-Trost,(1996: 328-332). 
For example, in one of the worst incidents in recent years, in early November 1995, a clash 
between a Malaysian patrol boat and a Thai trawler led to two Thai fishermen being shot dead. 
This provoked a furious response from the Thai fishing community who variously threatened to 
go on strike and blockade key ports in order to pressure the Thai government to resolve the 
problem. The incident even led the Director-General of the Thai Fisheries Department, 
Plodprasob Surassawadee, to threaten to lead a Thai fishing fleet into Malaysian waters in protest 
(Bangkok Post, 29-30111195, 27/12/95; The Nation, 10111195, 28-29111195, 1112/95, 5112/95, 
20/12/95). Such incidents are also not unique to Thai-Malaysian fisheries relations. For instance, 
it was reported in early June 1995 that a Thai naval vessel had exchanged fire with three armed 
Vietnamese boats (believed to belong to the Vietnamese navy) which had allegedly attacked 
several Thai trawlers leaving one Thai and two Vietnamese sailors dead (Bangkok Post, 4/6/95; 
The Nation, 2-4/6/95). 
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therefore, the fisheries issue proved the most significant strain on relations between 
Malaysia and Thailand. Over time all the Gulf of Thailand states have sought to 
increase their surveillance and enforcement capabilities, resulting in a heightened 
level of confrontation between suspected illegal fishermen and the coastal state 
authorities. 261 
With the notable exception of improved political relations between Cambodia and 
Vietnam and the other Gulf states, none of the factors contributing to conflict over 
fisheries in the Gulf of Thailand has been removed or even very significantly reduced. 
EEZs are now clearly established in international maritime law and Thailand has 
reluctantly been forced to acknowledge that reality. Thailand has complained bitterly 
that its acceptance of the EEZ concept was: 
... conditional upon the equitable sharing of the living resources in the zone 
between the coastal States and developing countries which had traditionally or 
habitually exercised in the EEZ areas that had previously been the high seas the 
. h if l . . if h l" . 262 ng t o exp oztatwn o t e zvmg resources. 
However, the key provisions of UNCLOS dealing with this issue, contained in Articles 
61 and 62, whereby once a state has determined the total allowable catch (T AC) within 
its waters and its own harvesting capacity, "where the coastal State does not have the 
capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall ... give other States access to the 
surplus of the allowable catch "263 have failed to address Thai concerns and 
requirements. This is because: 
Even under the strict wording of the LOS Convention, the coastal state has 
discretion in determining domestic harvesting capacity, resource surpluses, and 
to whom and upon what terms the surpluses would be distributed to other 
states. 264 
In any case, none of the Gulf of Thailand littoral states (including Thailand) has adopted 
T AC in their fisheries management practices. 265 
261 
262 
263 
264 
265 
For example, in July 1999 Vietnam issued a Decree on the management of fishing activities by 
foreigners and in the following month established a marine police force to enforce the decree's 
provisions (VNA news agency, Hanoi, 16/7/99, 3118/99 (SWB FE/3282 and 3321)). 
Kittichaisaree, 1990a: 316. 
UNCLOS, Article 62. 
McDorman, 1990: 42. 
Menasveta, 1998: 209. 
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Additionally, Thailand in particular has failed to address the problem of fishing 
capacity, described as the "key to the reduction and elimination of future fishery 
conflicts in the Gulf of Thailand" 266 and regulate the Thai fishing industry effectively -
a problem that the Thai government has itself recognised.267 In McDorman's words: 
A reduced Thai fishing effort, or containment within Thai waters, or access 
agreements rely upon the Government of Thailand obtaining and exercising a 
degree of control over the Thai fishing industry that is currently 
. . bl 268 ummagma e. 
Fundamentally, the profitability of illegal fishing activities, despite the escalating risks 
posed by Thai efforts at regulation and the increasing efforts of the other Gulf of 
Thailand states to enforce their rights, argues against swift resolution of the problem. 
Furthermore, extensive areas of overlapping claims to jurisdiction in the Gulf of 
Thailand persist (see in particular Section 7.2), the littoral states have remained guarded 
concerning the precise extent of their EEZ claims (see Section 5.4), and tension 
continues to be generated over Malaysia's enforcement of its controversial fisheries 
regulations. 
Some encouragement can, however, be gleaned from private joint ventures 
which Thai companies have entered into . with their counterparts in other Gulf of 
Thailand coastal states, giving Thai fishermen legal access to fishery resources in other 
states EEZs.269 Furthermore, progress has recently been made on joint management of 
fish stocks, including joint survey work, and on joint patrolling operations. For 
instance, Thailand and Vietnam agreed in principle on joint patrols in the overlapping 
claims area in April 1996.270 The two states have also established a Thai-Vietnamese 
Joint Commission on Fisheries and Law and Order at Sea, and in the wake of their 
August 1997 maritime boundary agreement have agreed to conduct a joint survey of 
fisheries resources in their formerly disputed area.271 In addition, the Thai and 
Vietnamese navies reached agreement in May 1998 on procedures for joint maritime 
266 
267 
268 
269 
270 
271 
McDorman, 1990: 50. 
McDorman, 1986: 195; 1990: 51. 
McDorman, 1990: 51. 
McDorman, 1990: 47.1t should be noted, however, that there has been significant resistance, for 
example from the Malaysian fishing community, to granting Thailand formal access agreements 
as a result of "perceived destructive Thai fishing practices and alleged intimidation of 
Malaysianfishermen" (McDorman, 1990: 50). 
Bangkok Post, 2914196. 
Bangkok Post, 11/5/97, 22/11/97. 
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boundary patrols.Z72 Similarly, Malaysia and Thailand have in the past established join 
patrols under the auspices of their Joint General Border Comrnittees273 and Thailand and 
Cambodia agreed to undertake joint maritime patrols in July 1998.274 
7.9 Technical Issues 
As has been noted in relation to all the maritime boundary agreements discussed in 
Chapter 6, these agreements are technically vague. Where the term "straight line" is 
used, the agreements in question invariably fail to specify whether a geodesic or 
loxodrome line is being referred to. A geodesic is one which is the shortest distance 
between two points on the reference ellipsoid.275 On a Mercator projection chart the 
only geodesics which appear as straight lines are the meridians and the equator, all other 
geodesics appear as curved lines. Except is a meridian or the equator, a straight line on 
a Mercator chart is a loxodrome or rhumb line- a line of constant compass bearing.276 
While the differences between the two types of line are relatively small, for instance the 
maximum distance between geodesic and loxodrome lines for the 75nm-long Thai-
Vietnamese maritime boundary is approximately 37 metres, it should be recognised that 
in areas with significant potential as a source of oil and gas resources, such a difference 
ld . 277 cou prove very Important. 
Furthermore, where geographic coordinates are mentioned, common practice 
appears to be not to relate these to a specific spheroid and datum. This devalues 
considerably the positional information included in the various agreements. Instead, 
there is a tendency to include a blanket statement to the effect that these issues will be 
determined at some unspecified future time. The following excerpt from the 1979 Thai-
Malaysian territorial sea treaty is typical of this: "the actual location at sea of the points 
mentioned ... shall be determined by a method to be mutually agreed upon by the 
competent authorities of the two Parties. " There has been no indication that any 
272 
273 
274 
275 
276 
277 
Bangkok Post, 29/5/98. 
Hamzah, 1987: 366. 
Bangkok Post, 15/7/98. 
Beazley, 1994a: 4-6. 
Beazley, 1994a: 4. 
The author is indebted to Dick Gent, Law of the Sea Division, UKHO, who kindly made the 
appropriate calculations of the differences between geodetic and loxodrome lines (personal 
conununication, 1115/99). 
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technical negotiations between relevant competent authorities have in fact taken place 
between any of the Gulf of Thailand states. 
Alternatively, the Gulf of Thailand states have tended to relate the coordinates 
listed in their agreements to specific charts. The favoured chart for this purpose has 
proved to be British Admiralty Chart 2414 at a scale of 1:1,500,000. Unfortunately this 
chart is most unsuitable as a reference point for coordinates as it includes no datum 
information! This is partially attributable to the fact that datum information is generally 
not included on charts of such a small scale. In this particular case, however, the lack of 
datum information on the chart is the result of the way in which the chart was put 
together. Chart 2414 is in fact a patchwork of larger scale surveys put together on a grid 
and "fitted" or "fudged" together. 278 It therefore lacks a unified datum and the Geodesy 
Section of the United Kingdom Hydrographic Office (UKHO) has stressed that it would 
be "very risky" to assume that the chart was based on any particular datum.279 Indeed, a 
member of the UKHO's Law of the Sea Division has stated that Chart 2414 is in fact 
really "no more than a pretty picture" from the point of view of using it for maritime 
b d d I. . . 280 oun ary e ImitatiOn purposes. 
Ultimately, these technical ambiguities should be relatively easily resolved. 
Coordination between the Gulf of Thailand states could result in all the littoral states 
adopting the same definition as to what is meant by the term "straight line" and relating 
their maritime boundary coordinates to a uniform datum.281 In the meantime, a degree 
of uncertainty will remain over the precise position of the Gulf states' maritime claims 
and agreements. 
278 
279 
280 
281 
Personal correspondence with Geodesy Section, UKHO, 15110/97 and with Dick Gent, Law of 
the Sea Division, UKHO, 13/8/98. 
Personal correspondence with Geodesy Section, UKHO, 15110/97. 
Interview with Dick Gent, Law of the Sea Division, UKHO, 23/3/99. 
For example, WGS-84 which has been adopted by the International Hydrographic Organization 
as its global referencing system for nautical charts (International Hydrographic Bureau, 1990: 
67). 
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Conclusions: Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of 
Thailand and Prospects for Dispute Resolution 
8.1 Introduction 
As outlined in Chapter 1, the core aim of this study has been to examine critically the 
development and distinctive characteristics of maritime jurisdictional claims and 
boundary agreements in the Gulf of Thailand. This analysis has been conducted against 
the backdrop of the international law of the sea, albeit from a geographers perspective. 
The ultimate objective of the research has been to provide a detailed assessment of the 
challenges to be overcome to complete the process of maritime boundary delimitation in 
the Gulf of Thailand, and thus the prospects for the resolution of the remaining 
undelimited maritime boundaries in the Gulf sub-region. 
The need for maritime boundary delimitation in the Gulf of Thailand is readily 
apparent and becoming increasingly urgent. As Blake has written in reference to land 
boundaries, "Boundary denwrcation is not the end of the process ... but the beginning, 
and the subsequent quality of boundary management can fundamentally qffect relations 
between states. "1 If anything, the case for maritime boundary delimitation is even more 
acute as overlapping claims are frequently extensive and are set in the marine 
environment which itself poses significant challenges. It is therefore important to view 
the unilateral claims and actions that have characterised the approaches of the littoral 
states to the Gulf of Thailand in context. It is undeniable that many marine resources 
are transnational by nature and in their distribution. Many maritime activities are 
similarly inherently transboundary in character. Moreover, the ocean environment, as a 
continuous, fluid system, transmits pollutants and the consequences of states' actions 
without regard for national jurisdictional limits? 
Maritime boundary delimitation can be viewed as an essential precursor to the 
full realisation of the resource potential of the Gulf of Thailand and its peaceful 
Blake, 1998: 55. 
2 Valencia and Kent, I 985: 369. 
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management. With regard to seabed resources which could prove crucial to the well-
being and political stability of the economically disadvantaged countries surrounding the 
Gulf, extensive overlapping claims areas forestall development while maritime 
boundaries remain unsettled. The rational exploitation and preservation of the 
important living resources of the Gulf of Thailand, is similarly undermined by failure to 
address jurisdictional issues in a comprehensive and cooperative manner. 
The marine environment and its resources clearly transcend national maritime 
claims and tend to frustrate exclusively national attempts to address them. Uncertainty 
over jurisdictional limits inevitably exacerbates these problems, leading to 
uncoordinated policies which, in turn, can result in destructive competition for resources 
and ultimately to political tension. The severe overfishing that afflicts the Gulf of 
Thailand can be viewed as symptomatic of this trend has led to numerous armed clashes, 
including fatalities, and has soured diplomatic relations (see Section 7 .8). The 
economic, environmental and political impacts of these conflicts may be extremely 
serious. Maritime boundary delimitation and subsequent transboundary management of 
resources therefore offers an opportunity to remove·<a potentially explosive issue from 
bilateral agendas. In the Gulf of Thailand these problems, particularly relating to 
fisheries and pollution, are likely to multiply in the future as a function of increasing 
coastal populations, economic development, escalating resource requirements and the 
associated pressures that this places on the marine environment. The littoral states' 
desire to gain access to the Gulf's resources is likewise set to increase. This situation 
denwnds the delimitation of maritime boundaries as a prelude to collaborative and 
peaceful management of the littoral states' shared resources, environment and heritage 
all of which are encapsulated within the Gulf of Thailand. 
The following section will provide an overview of the key findings of the 
research undertaken. The options for maritime boundary dispute resolution will then be 
examined. The chapter will conclude with an assessment of the key opportunities and 
constraints facing the Gulf of Thailand coastal states with a view to evaluating the 
prospects for maritime boundary delimitation in the Gulf of Thailand. 
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8.2 Overview of Findings 
Chapter 1 of this study demonstrates that the Gulf of Thailand is of crucial importance 
to its coastal states. The presence of proven oil and gas resources together with 
significant living resources as well as the Gulf's role as a key trade route and in terms of 
attracting tourists to the region provides the Gulf with a vital role in the littoral states' 
economies. Chapter 1 also outlines the scope of the challenges facing maritime 
boundary delimitation in the Gulf, notably the Gulf's restricted geographical space and 
complex coastal geography, the presence of multiple overlapping claims, uncertainty 
over the extent or status of several claims and agreements and a political inheritance 
characterised by antagonism among the coastal states coupled with external 
intervention. 
While only two of the four Gulf of Thailand coastal states, Malaysia and 
Vietnam, are full parties to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), it can 
be concluded from the discussion in Chapter 2 that UNCLOS, having largely entered 
into customary law, will n~vertheless provide the legal framework for the conclusion of 
maritime boundary agreements throughout the Gulf. Chapter 2 details the genesis of 
UNCLOS and the key concepts of baselines and the zones of maritime jurisdiction that 
may be claimed from such baselines. While it can be concluded here that the 
delimitation of maritime areas between two or more states is governed by the principles 
and rules of public international law, Chapter 2 also demonstrates that the international 
law of the sea provides only limited guidance as to how maritime boundary delimitation 
is to be achieved. The primacy of geography, particularly coastal geography, as a factor 
in the delimitation equation is nonetheless clear. 
This statement remains valid with regard to negotiated boundary delimitations as 
much as for those submitted to third party settlement. Distinctions can, however, be 
drawn between these forms of dispute settlement. In a resolution by negotiation, states 
are free to agree to any boundary they want provided that the rights and interests of third 
states, or of the international community, are not prejudiced. Nevertheless, international 
law generally provides the context within which negotiations take place. 
Where agreement cannot be reached, customary international law - now largely 
reflected in UNCLOS -will apply. While this does not mean that states are obliged to 
settle their maritime differences or to submit such differences to adjudication or other 
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means of third party settlement, international law does provide the relevant framework 
for analysing the respective merits of each side's position. 
Chapter 3 examines the delimitation of maritime boundaries and contrasts the 
rules for the delimitation of the territorial sea on.the one hand and the continental shelf 
and EEZ on the other. Methods of maritime boundary delimitation are surveyed and 
assessed as are the relevant circumstances that may be raised in the delimitation process. 
From this analysis it is clear that there exist a multitude of methods of maritime 
boundary delimitation. However, the equidistance method, even if not obligatory, has 
proved far and away the most popular delimitation method. The reasons for this relate 
to its mathematical precision, lack of ambiguity and its accordance with equity where 
the parties' coastlines are broadly comparable. Where the coastlines in question are not 
comparable and a strict equidistance line would result in an inequitable delimitation, the 
equidistance method has frequently been used as a starting point and then modified. 
Equidistance has therefore proved an adaptable and flexible method of delimitation, 
particularly in opposite coast situations. 
It is also evident that those tasked with reaching maritime boundary agreements, 
while they are likely to be guided by the law of the sea, are by no means bound by strict 
rules. As outlined in Chapter 3, there has been no systematic definition of the criteria 
which should be used to determine an equitable delimitation. As a result, equitability 
remains a rather vague and imprecise concept. 
Thus, there is ample scope for differing interpretations as to which factors are 
applicable to a particular case and therefore potential for dispute and deadlock in 
delimitation negotiations. In a similar fashion, there is much potential conflict in the 
stances of states as to the emphases to be afforded to the principles or rules that might 
be applicable to a particular delimitation. 
There is, however, a clear distinction between the factors considered before 
international courts and tribunals and those raised in the course of negotiations. 
Although in many cases the factors considered under both types of maritime boundary 
dispute resolution will predominantly overlap, it is well to recall that while courts and 
tribunals are bound to render a decision on the basis of international law, in the context 
of negotiations the states concerned are merely required under international law to 
negotiate in good faith. 
In the course of maritime boundary negotiations, however, as long as third party 
rights are not infringed, states are free to divide their offshore areas as they wish and any 
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argument can be raised and accorded weight. In certain instances states may therefore 
give greater weight to factors than an international court or tribunal might, for example 
the relative levels of economic development of each party, and may even tie the 
question of maritime boundary delimitation to considerations unrelated to that boundary 
or, indeed, maritime jurisdiction in general. 
Economic factors represent a good example of this contrast in approaches. For 
instance, in its maritime boundary negotiations with Australia, Papua New Guinea 
(PNG) was able to secure a delimitation distinctly skewed in its favour, apparently on 
the grounds of its economically disadvantaged status. 3 Such an argument would cut 
little ice before the International Court of Justice in the Hague. 
As this study is focused on maritime boundary delimitation, it inevitably draws 
on the relevant law as well as on geographical thought and practice. The research 
undertaken revealed a certain degree of tension between lawyers and other disciplines, 
including geography, which make up the multi-disciplinary community of maritime 
boundary and ocean affairs scholars. This largely stems from legal schools of though 
emphasising the importance of enhancing the rule of law. In the context of maritime 
boundary delimitation this translates into an insistence that as rules are developed, 
boundary delimitation will be strictly governed by them such that they acquire universal 
binding force. 4 This approach conflicts with more 'functionalist' approaches to ocean 
boundary making where the emphasis is placed on context and flexibility in approaching 
particular delimitation problems.5 
The characterisation of lawyers as blinkered in their pursuit of the rule of law is, 
of course, largely a fallacy. Indeed, there are encouraging trends regarding the 
integration of the legal and geographical disciplines. These are evident in the Gulf of 
Thailand, which has hosted important joint development arrangements. Such joint 
"provisional arrangements of a practical nature" are explicitly encouraged by 
UNCLOS6 and have emerged as a functional response to deadlock over maritime 
4 
Prescott ( 1988: 36-37) describes the Australia-PNG agreement in the Torres Strait as "very 
generous" to the latter state, not least because not only did the PNG gain more maritime space 
than would otherwise have been the case but the Australian government "even managed to 
finesse the Australian constitution and cede three islands which had been considered to be part 
o{Australia for 99 years!" Prescott goes on to note that it is believed that the agreement was 
approved by both major political parties in Australia "because ojfears that our {Australia's] 
good name would be blackened in international circles by Papua New Guinea's allegations of 
Australian greed and unreasonableness." 
Johnston, 1992: 444. 
Johnston, 1992: 444. 
Articles 74(3) and 83(3). 
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delimitation yet set firmly within detailed legal frameworks. Law and geography are 
therefore thoroughly intertwined in the law of the sea and the legal-geographical nexus 
in maritime boundary delimitation is particularly well established. This ground truth, 
confirmed by the present study, shows no signs of weakening, even if the two subjects 
occasionally make for uncomfortable bedfellows. 
The conclusion that UNCLOS is a flexible instrument providing few hard-and-
fast rules on delimitation is inescapable. This is partly as a consequence of its intended 
global applicability - an aim that frustrates the development of strict guidelines given 
the geographical complexity and diversity of the world's coastal and marine areas. 
There is therefore ample potential for maritime boundary disputes resulting from 
overlapping claims in the Gulf of Thailand and elsewhere. Indeed, the Gulf of Thailand 
states provide nothing short of an object lesson in the flexible interpretation of the UN 
Convention's provisions in order to maximise the maritime areas accruing to the 
particular claimant state. 
This assessment is supported by analysis of the straight baseline claims of the 
Gulf of Thailand states (Chapter 4) and is reinforced when their claims to extended 
jurisdiction, particularly to continental shelf and historic waters (Chapter 5) are 
evaluated. All four Gulf of Thailand littoral states have advanced straight baseline 
claims encompassing areas totalling just over 11% of the Gulf. With the exception of 
Thailand's Area 1,7 all the current straight baseline claims made within the Gulf of 
Thailand are flawed, particularly when tested against a strict interpretation of Article 7 
of UNCLOS. The key problems associated with these straight baseline claims in 
question relate to overly long straight baseline segments, straight baselines along 
coastlines not deeply indented, 'fringing' islands linked by straight baselines not in the 
immediate vicinity of the coast, straight baselines departing from the general direction 
of the coast, and maritime areas claimed as internal waters within straight baseline 
systems not sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be justified as such. 
Resolution of this confusion is, however, complicated by the lack of clear, 
mathematically precise, rules to apply. 
The arguably excessive straight baseline claims made by the Gulf of Thailand 
states have, however, had a strictly limited impact on the extent of their maritime 
claims. For example, in the central Gulf of Thailand Cambodia's continental shelf 
Even here with the US Department of State finding fault on the grounds that the land:water ratio 
within the straight baseline system is "comparatively high" (US Department of State, 1971 a). 
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claim line falls short of the equidistance line between all features, while Thailand's 
claim also ignores straight baselines - its own as well as those of neighbouring states. 8 
Further south, South Vietnam's continental shelf claim was promulgated well before 
straight baseline claims were advanced and Malaysia's inferred straight baselines were 
apparently not used as a basis for its claim as illustrated by the Peta Baru (see Chapter 4 
and Section 5.3). 
Where straight baselines have had a palpable effect on a claim is Thailand's 
lateral claim in relation to Cambodia. It will be recalled that Thailand employed a 
bisector line approach in determining the entirety of its claim between adjacent coasts. 
The bisector chosen was that between the Thai (1970) and Cambodian ( 1957) straight 
baseline segments immediately offshore the terminus of their land boundary on the Gulf 
of Thailand. The Cambodian segment in question clearly accords with the general 
direction of the coast and trends almost due south (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2). In contrast, 
the Thai straight baseline segment linking Koh Kut to the last point of the land boundary 
on the coast is almost perpendicular to the general north-south directional trend of the 
mainland coast on the eastern side of the Gulf of Thailand (see Figures 4.1 and 7.8). As 
a result of using these particular straight baseline segments, the Thai lateral territorial 
sea and continental shelf clam is shifted significantly to the south of a strict equidistance 
line between all features (see Figures 1.1 and 4.8). 
Apart from this isolated, though significant, case, straight baseline claims in the 
Gulf of Thailand, despite their extensive nature, have been remarkable for their minimal 
influence on claims to maritime jurisdiction. It seems probable that claims have been 
advanced in a tit-for-tat manner, designed more to balance the 'other' side's claims and 
develop a strong bargaini!'lg position than to further maritime claims and be used as the 
basis for delimiting maritime boundaries. Thailand's decision to extend its straight 
baseline claims considerably through the declaration of its Area 4 claim in 1992 should 
therefore be viewed as an action likely to have been motivated by a desire to enhance its 
negotiating position prior to maritime boundary talks with Cambodia and Vietnam. 
Notably, negotiations with the latter state resulted in a maritime boundary agreement in 
which it is believed that straight baselines were ignored (see Section 6.5). Straight 
baselines also apparently played no part in determining the alignment of the other agreed 
maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Thailand between Malaysia and Thailand (see 
In fact, at the time of its 1973 continental shelf claim, of Thailand's maritime neighbours only 
Cambodia claimed straight baselines. 
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Section 6.2). This view of straight baselines as more of a negotiating tool than a means 
of radically extending maritime claims offshore is supported by the fact that revisions to 
the Gulf of Thailand states' straight baseline claims have not resulted in corresponding 
alterations to their maritime boundary claims. 
Despite the restricted influence of straight baselines on claims to maritime 
jurisdiction, freedom of navigation and access concerns remain over the straight 
baseline claims advanced in the Gulf of Thailand because of the large maritime areas 
that have been arguably unjustifiably appropriated by the coastal states as additional 
internal and territorial waters. Thailand's Area 4 straight baseline claim exemplifies this 
trend. The claim encompasses an area of 7,825nm2 (26,837km2) 55% of which is 
located beyond 12nm from the nearest coastal point. Furthermore, significant maritime 
areas, amounting to 19.8% of the total area within the straight baselines defined by Area 
4 lie beyond 24nm from Thailand's mainland or island coasts. Concerning the territorial 
sea claimed seaward from Area 4's straight baselines, fully 75% lies beyond Thailand's 
territorial sea claim in the absence of the straight baselines claim (see Section 4.4.4 and 
Figure 4.6). Thailand's Area 4 claim may be the most extreme example of additional 
waters claimed, but it is certainly in keeping with other claims within the Gulf of 
Thailand (see Section 4.6 Table 4.20). 
As previously noted, despite the fact that of the four Gulf of Thailand states only 
Malaysia and Vietnam are full parties to UNCLOS, they have not been slow in 
advancing claims to extended maritime jurisdiction (Chapter 5). All four Gulf of 
Thailand littoral states have claimed 12nm-breadth territorial seas while Cambodia and 
Vietnam have also claimed contiguous zones extending a further 12nm offshore. In 
principal these claims are in accordance with the relevant provisions of UNCLOS. 
Generally it is reasonable to conclude that it is the baselines from which the territorial 
sea (and other maritime zones) are measured, rather than the claimed breadth of 
territorial sea itself which have been the cause of controversy between the states 
concerned. However, Cambodia's lateral claim with Thailand is problematic (see 
below), as is the fact that despite both Malaysia and Thailand claiming 12nm-breadth 
territorial seas their agreed territorial sea delimitation extends beyond 12nm from their 
respective baselines (see Section 6.2.2). 
With regard to the continental shelf, the Gulf of Thailand states' claims can all 
be considered to some extent compromised by their selective use of islands as 
basepoints and consequent manipulation of equidistance as a method of delimitation in 
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order to secure the maximum advantage. Historic claims have also proved influential in 
generating extensive areas of overlapping claims. Of particular note in this context is 
Cambodia's lateral claim in relation to Thailand, based on a controversial interpretation 
of the Franco-Siamese Treaty of 23 March 1907. Cambodia and Vietnam's unique 
Historic Waters Agreement has also been a source of dispute with other littoral states 
(see Section 6.3). A gauge of the maximalist nature of the littoral states' claims is 
provided by the fact that by the end of the 1970s, overlapping claims to maritime 
jurisdiction in the Gulf of Thailand totalled over 80,000km2 equivalent to 29% of the 
Gulf's entire surface area.9 Additionally some confusion remains because of the Gulf 
states' general failure to articulate the limits of their EEZ claims. 
Turning to maritime boundary agreements concluded in the Gulf of Thailand, 
considerable progress has been made with one territorial sea boundary, one partial 
continental shelf boundary, one 'single' maritime boundary and three joint zones being 
agreed upon between the littoral states (see Chapter 6). The application of joint 
arrangements as a means to overcome deadlocked negotiations and gain access to 
resources in disputed overlapping claims zones must be regarded as a particularly 
positive development. These agreements, coupled with the resolution of Cambodia and 
Vietnam's dispute over island sovereignty which implicitly undermines the validity of 
significant parts of their continental shelf claims dating from the early 1970s, has served 
to cut the area of overlapping claims dramatically to of the order of 9.4% of the Gulf's 
total surface area (see Section 5.3.5). 10 
However, these agreements have themselves raised uncertainties and possible 
areas of dispute which will in due course need to be addressed. These include issues 
such as the instability of the coastline in the vicinity of the Thai-Malaysian boundary at 
the Golok River's mouth on the coast and its effects on the location of the first point in 
the two states' territorial sea boundary; the seemingly overly long nature of that 
boundary; the question of establishing a position for the Cambodia-Thailand-Vietnam 
tripoint which is acceptable to all the parties; and, technical uncertainties over the actual 
locations of geographic coordinates and the meaning of 'straight' lines as mentioned in 
the various agreements. These problems and potential solutions to them are outlined in 
Chapter 6. 
10 
Overlapping claims in the 1970s totalled 24, 179nm2 (82,931 km\ 
Overlapping claims in the 1990s total 7 ,755nm2 (26,597km2). 
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It is also worth observing that several of the maritime agreements concluded in 
the Gulf merely put the question of delimitation to one side for a specified period in 
order that resource exploitation and management may proceed through the mechanism 
of a joint development zone. Such practical resource-oriented arrangements are 
fundamentally interim in nature and thus designed to be of temporary duration. It is 
therefore highly likely that in due course the states concerned will seek to conclude a 
definitive delimitation of the maritime space concerned. 
Chapter 7 reviews the remaining undelimited maritime boundaries in the Gulf of 
Thailand, details the obstacles that have thus far prevented their resolution and offers 
some indication of progress in negotiations to resolve the disputes in question. Of 
particular note here is the Cambodia-Thailand overlapping claims area, the largest in the 
Gulf of Thailand, measuring c.7,500nm2. The overlapping claims area, encompassing 
the entire northern extension and eastern margin of the Pattani Trough which hosts 
major proven hydrocarbon reserves in uncontested Thai waters. From the early 1970s, 
when these two states articulated their claims to continental shelf rights in the Gulf of 
Thailand, to the 1990s negotiations towards the resolution of their overlapping claims 
dispute were stymied primarily by political factors. Cambodia has consistently pressed 
for a joint development agreement to be applied to the Thai-Cambodian overlapping 
claims area while Thailand has favoured delimitation. It remains to be seen whether 
Cambodia's distaste for delimitation and Thailand's antipathy towards joint 
development in the Thai-Cambodian context be overcome and a compromise between 
these two differing approaches be reached. It is, however, conceivable that a 'package' 
deal could be worked out involving both delimitation and joint development (see 
Section 7.2.9). 
It can be concluded from Chapter 7 that Cambodia and Vietnam's longstanding 
dispute relating to sovereignty over islands has been resolved. Indeed, the two states 
most recent maritime boundary agreement, the Historic Waters Agreement of July 1982, 
definitively allocated ownership of islands on the basis of the Brevie Line. The 
resolution of the dispute over islands coupled with the Historic Waters Agreement has 
had a profound knock-on effect on the parties' maritime boundary dispute. The area of 
overlapping claims between the two states has been significantly limited, despite the fact 
that the Cambodian and Vietnamese continental shelf claims dating from the early 
1970s have never been officially withdrawn or modified. This is the case because 
neither the Cambodian nor Vietnamese continental shelf claims, based on their 
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respective sovereignty over all the contested islands, can realistically be maintained (see 
Section 7.3). 
The differences between the . two states have therefore been narrowed to a 
considerable degree and the maritime space at stake- that between the Brevie Line and 
an equidistance line - is minimal in comparison to the area of overlapping claims 
contested between Cambodia and Thailand. It therefore seems reasonable to suggest 
that the outstanding differences between the two sides' positions can be bridged. This 
could perhaps be achieved by means of a modified version of either the Brevie Line or 
equidistance or a combination of the two. 
However, as the tortuous history of Cambodia-Vietnam relations attests and as 
progress (or lack of it) in negotiations in the 1990s more recently has demonstrated, it 
would be unwise to underestimate the sensitive nature of border issues to the two states. 
Moreover, the potential for disagreements over land boundary issues to disrupt efforts 
towards maritime boundary delimitation remains strong. In the absence of a definitive 
delimitation agreement, however, Cambodia and Vietnam may very well be content 
with the status quo. 
With regard to Vietnam's claim to the seaward part of the Thai-Malaysian JDA, 
it is understood that the three states have reached agreement in principle on the joint 
development of the tripartite overlapping claims area. If a Malaysia-Thailand-Vietnam 
joint development area is indeed realised, it will represent the first instance of 
multilateral joint development in the world. 
While this study is devoted primarily to maritime boundary delimitation, it is 
clear that a number of trans-boundary problems and disputes afflict the Gulf of Thailand 
I ittoral states. These include disputes over fishing rights, concerns over security of 
navigation as a result of piracy as well as transboundary environmental issues. 
Additionally, all the maritime boundary agreements discussed in Chapter 6 are 
technically vague and in due course this issue will need to be addressed by the coastal 
states. 
Finally, it can be concluded that, in common with maritime boundary disputes 
worldwide, the elusive factor often termed 'political will' is cited as the key variable 
which will determine the success or failure of efforts to conclude further delimitation or 
joint development zone agreements in the Gulf of Thailand. 
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8.3 Prospects for the Gulf of Thailand 
8.3.1 Options for Dispute Resolution in the Gulf of Thailand 
The International Context 
The international community has, over the years, developed a sophisticated array of 
mechanisms through which disputes between states may be managed. The Gulf of 
Thailand states, in common with other members of the international community are 
bound to settle disputes through peaceful means. Thus, Article 2 of the United Nations 
Charter requires that: 
All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a 
nwnner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. 
The traditional means of dispute resolution between states are outlined in Chapter VI of 
the United Nations Charter specifically dealing with the pacific settlement of disputes, 
Article 33(1) of which states that: 
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a 
solution by negotiation, enquiry, ntediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlnnent, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful 
,F h . h . 11 nwans OJ t elr own c Olce. 
It should be noted that the list of means of dispute resolution open to states contained in 
Article 33(1) of the UN Charter is not intended to be comprehensive- states retain a 
free choice as to the method of dispute resolution to be applied. Similarly, the methods 
of dispute settlement are not listed in any order of priority - states are not bound to 
pursue these methods in series. Nevertheless, the means of international dispute 
settlement included in Article 33(1) are without doubt the most frequently used methods 
and are clearly potentially applicable to the Gulf of Thailand. 
UNCLOS also places several important obligations on its parties. UNCLOS 
encourages cooperation on a wide variety of issues, notably with regard to the 
conservation of living resources, enforcement of law and order at sea, marine scientific 
II United Nations, 1992: 3. This legal framework has been subsequently reaffirmed and expanded 
upon by means of several declarations and resolutions of the UN General Assembly. These 
documents reinforce the key principles of the peaceful settlement of disputes; the non-use of 
force in international relations; non-intervention in the internal or external affairs of states; equal 
rights and the self-determination of peoples; the sovereign equality of states; the sovereignty, 
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research, and protection and preservation of the marine environment. Indeed, 146 of 
UNCLOS's 320 Articles (Part XVill) are devoted to the latter topic and include the 
obligation for states to protect and preserve the marine environment (Article 192). 12 
Furthermore, in the context of the Gulf of Thailand, Article 123, dealing with 
cooperation of states bordering enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, is potentially 
significant: 
States bordering an enclosed or se1ni-enclosed sea should cooperate with each 
other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their duties under 
this Convention. To this end they shall endeavour, directly or through an 
appropriate regional organization: 
(a) to coordinate the management, conservation, exploration and 
exploitation of the living resources of the sea; 
(b) to coordinate the implementation of their rights and duties with 
respect to the protection and preservation of the marine environment,· 
(c) to coordinate their scientific research polices and undertake where 
appropriate joint programmes of scient~fic research in the area; 
(d) to invite, as appropriate, other interested States or international 
organizations to cooperate with them in the furtherance of the provisions 
of this article (Article 123, emphasis added). 
The obligation for states to cooperate on ocean resource management 1ssues, and 
particularly in the context of enclosed.and semi-enclosed seas, is therefore quite clear. 
What is unclear, however, is what is actually 1neant by the term "cooperation." These 
documents, together with Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 arising from the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) call for cooperation, coordination and for the 
harmonisation of approaches with respect to a wide variety of ocean management issues. 
A positive framework has therefore been established for 'regime-building' in the Gulf of 
Thailand within which maritime boundary delimitation can be pursued. 13 Friction can, 
however, be detected between traditional concepts of absolute state sovereignty (and the 
qualified extension of that sovereignty out to sea) with an emphasis on statist 
entitlements and the requirements of globalisation and global trends in environmental 
and natural resource security which stress state responsibilities. Unsurprisingly, states 
have proved reluctant to compromise on their sovereign prerogatives. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that the elimination of confusion over jurisdictional limits would provide access to 
potentially significant seabed resources currently 'frozen' under overlapping 
12 
independence and territorial integrity of states; and the duty of states to act in good faith (United 
Nations, 1992: 3-7). 
Kittichaisaree, 1992:503-515. 
Kittichaisaree, 1992. 
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jurisdictional claims, thus addressing the economic needs of the littoral states, and 
would represent a major step towards facilitating the integrated and sustainable 
management of the Gulf of Thailand's living resources and environment. 
Traditional Means o.fDispute Settlement 
Negotiations are the principle means of handling disputes among states, including those 
related to maritime boundaries. They may therefore also be regarded as the most 
effective means of dispute settlement. In contrast to other methods, negotiations may be 
regarded as a universally accepted means of dispute settlement 14 and are an essential 
prerequisite to the application of any other form of peaceful dispute resolution. In the 
North Sea Continental Shelf cases, for example, the ICJ held that: 
The Parties are under an obligation to enter into negotiations with a view to 
arriving at an agreement, and not merely to go through a formal process of 
negotiation as a sort of prior condition for the autmnatic application of a certain 
method of delimitation in the absence o.f agreement; they are under an 
obligation so to conduct themselves that the negotiations are meaningjitl, which 
will not be the case when either of them insists upon its own position without 
contemplating any mod(fication of it. 15 
Indeed, even if there were no duty for states to negotiate, the nature of international 
relations means that they almost inevitably would do so. Additionally, exploratory 
negotiations, often termed 'consultations', can be employed in order to pre-empt 
disputes and prevent them arising. 16 In the Gulf of Thailand negotiations have resulted 
in several maritime boundary agreements as well as interim arrangements designed to 
put disputes to one side in the interests of mutual gain in terms of joint resource 
management and exploitation (see Chapter 6). 
It should also be noted that use of existing diplomatic contacts to conduct 
negotiations is likely to be cost effective, particularly when compared to other dispute 
settlement mechanisms (see below). The negotiating machinery is already in place and 
the participants often have experience of dealing with their counterparts, aiding the 
negotiation process. The principle advantage afforded by negotiations as a means of 
international dispute resolution lies in the .flexibility of the method. Negotiations can be 
applied to any type of dispute and, significantly, the states concerned retain full control 
14 
15 
16 
Eytfinger, 1996: 21. 
North Sea Continental Shelf cases, para.85, quoted in United Nations, 1992: 18. 
Merrills, 1991: 3. 
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over dispute resolution process. 17 This is inevitably of particular importance where 
sensitive issues of national interest such as boundaries and sovereignty are involved. 
Negotiations are therefore likely to be the most promising form of dispute settlement in 
the Gulf of Thailand. 
Where negotiations between the parties to an international dispute fail to yield a 
settlement, the intervention of a third party may have the effect of preventing a further 
deterioration in relations, breaking the deadlock and providing a way forward towards 
the peaceful resolution of the dispute. Such involvement by a third party may be termed 
an offer of its 'good offices' or mediation. 18 It is conceivable that mediation could be 
employed in the Gulf of Thailand, once negotiations have reached deadlock. Indeed, the 
good offices of the UN Secretary-General have been employed in the region in the past, 
albeit not with regard to maritime issues. For example the good offices of the UN 
Secretary-General were used in relation to disputes between Cambodia and Thailand in 
1960, with the process yielding four sets of exchanges of letters between the parties. 19 
The possibility of applying mediation to the Gulf of Thailand maritime disputes has 
been enhanced by the easing of ideologically-based antagonisms in the 1990s and the 
integration of the Gulf of Thailand states into the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN clearly has the potential to act as a mediator or conduit for 
other dispute resolution procedures, but hitherto does not seem to have been called 
upon. 
With regard to inquiry and conciliation as methods of dispute resolution, there 
has been no indication that such approaches have been considered in the Gulf of 
Thailand, presumably because negotiations are not considered to have been exhausted. 20 
17 
I X 
19 
20 
Merrills, 1991: 1-26. 
The UN Secretary-General has referred to good offices, the offering of which is a fundamental 
part of his role, as being "a flexible term as it may mean very little or very much" (United 
Nations, 1992: 35). 
Sucharitkul, 1991: 20. Sucharitkul (1991: 20-21) describes good otlices as the "most palatable" 
or "least objectionable" mode of third-part dispute resolution in Thailand's experience but states 
that as far as Thailand is concerned "mediation is a method to avoid." . There is, however, no 
clear distinction between these terms and in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions for the 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes the terms good offices was used interchangeably 
with mediation. However, mediation has been defined as being "an extension of the function of 
good offices" (Eyffinger, 1996: 24) with a mediator going beyond the limited role envisaged by 
good offices of providing a point of exchange between the parties and becoming involved in the 
intricacies of the dispute itself 
Additionally, Thailand has one, disappointing, experience of a conciliation commission which 
ruled on a dispute with France in 1946. The commission found in favour of France and Thailand 
felt that it was "heavily lopsided" in favour of that country such that "once bitten, she 
[Thailand] became shy and more careful of western procedures of pacific settlement of dispute" 
(Sucharitkul, 1991: 22-23). 
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An inquiry consists of an impartial, frequently third-party conducted, fact-finding and 
investigation procedure, usually applied where a dispute exists over points of fact. 
Conciliation may be viewed as a more formal type of mediation, incorporating elements 
of inquiry, and has been defined as involving the setting up of a commission by the two 
parties (either permanent or ad hoc) to examine the evidence and to define terms for a 
settlement.21 The Gulf of Thailand coastal states are likely to prove cautious about 
surrendering control, however slightly, over an issue viewed as vital to the national 
interest such as boundary delimitation. Nevertheless, these procedures remains options 
with proven track records. For example, Iceland and Norway established a Conciliation 
Commission in 1980 tasked with making recommendations on the division of the area 
of continental shelf between Iceland and Jan Mayen Island. Following detailed 
investigations, the Commission proposed a joint development zone. This was accepted 
and incorporated in a treaty signed in 1981 which effectively ended the dispute. 22 
International litigation, in the form of arbitration or judicial settlement, IS 
resorted to when a binding decision is desired to resolve a dispute. The consent of the 
parties to submit their dispute to international litigation is crucial. 23 In the international 
context there is no compulsory jurisdiction such that one state could take another to 
court against it's will. The decision to opt for one of the forms of international litigation 
is therefore a political one and one that should not be taken lightly as both arbitration 
and judicial settlement can be expensive, time-consuming and uncertain methods of 
dispute resolution.24 · 
Parties to a dispute have the option of submitting their dispute either to an ad 
hoc arbitration tribunal of their own design or to a standing tribunal. Two standing 
tribunals are of direct relevance to the resolution of international maritime boundary 
disputes. These are the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at the Hague in the 
Netherlands and the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) located in 
Hamburg, Germany. 25 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Merrills, 1991:59. 
Charney and Alexander, 1993: 1,755-1766. 
Consent is often expressed in terms of a special agreement relating to a specific dispute which is 
frequently known by its French name, compromis. Alternatively, consent may be given at large, 
for example under the terms of a multilateral treaty concerning disputes over the interpretation of 
that treaty. The dispute resolution mechanisms of UNCLOS fall into this category (Rosenne, 
1998: 57). 
Rosenne, 1998: 59. 
While the has adjudicated some 22 cases involving boundaries and territory, ITLOS only began 
work in 1998 and as ofmid-1999 had heard only one case which was unrelated to maritime 
boundary delimitation. 
412 
Conclusions 
Although there has been some debate as to the ability of the ICJ to judge cases 
that have a strong political dimension, litigation may be seen as a method of 
depoliticising a dispute by submitting it to an impartial third-party decision - something 
that has been described as a means to get governments "off the hook. "26 Submitting a 
case to the ICJ or ITLOS has other advantages. Unlike in arbitration, states do not need 
to go through the laborious task of establishing a new tribunal whenever a dispute arises 
as both permanent tribunals have its own supporting Registry and Rules of Court. 
Though the ICJ has not managed to resolve all the disputes placed before it, 
international litigation remains a very useful option for states wanting to resolve a 
dispute. 
As already alluded to, the key disadvantages of submitting a dispute to judicial 
settlement lie in the costs incurred, time taken to go through the process and the 
possibility that the state concerned will-come away with nothing- the latter point being 
something that the state concerned may find hard to swallow. As far as the costs of a 
case before the ICJ are concerned, Bowett has estimated as follows: "By and large, one 
can expect the total cost for a full case, from application to judgment, to be anything 
between [US]$3 and $10 million. "27 Highet has also stated that the fastest likely time-
frame for the ICJ to consider a case will be of the order of 36 months- three years. 28 It 
remains to be seen how swiftly ITLOS will work, but it is clear that one of its aims is to 
operate more swiftly than the ICJ has hitherto done. 
Southeast Asia as a whole has traditionally been viewed as being generally luke-
warm about the prospects of employing international litigation as a means of dispute 
resolution. 29 However, Malaysia and Indonesia and Malaysia and Singapore have in 
recent times submitted cases to the ICJ. Nevertheless, it is unlikely in the extreme that 
Thailand in particular would contemplate submitting a dispute to any international 
litigation procedure. Thailand's antipathy towards the process stems primarily from the 
fact that the ICJ found in favour of Cambodia over Thailand in the Temple case - a 
judgment which Thailand took serious exception to and to which it adhered to only with 
strong reservations (see Section 7.2.3). Consequently, Thailand's experience of 
international litigation has been described as a "bitter disappointment. "30 The 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Rosenne, 1998: 59. 
Bowett, 1997: 7. 
Highet, 1998. 
See, for example, Englefield, 1994:36-37 and Valencia and Van Dyke, 1994:220. 
Sucharitkul, 1991: 23. 
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considerable resource which the process demands, in terms of finance, human resources 
and time, are likely to argue against its adoption in relation to maritime boundary 
delimitation in the Gulf of Thailand unless severe and prolonged dispute makes it a 
more attractive alternative to continued deadlock. 
It is also worth noting that UNCLOS includes detailed provisions concerning the 
settlement of disputes set out in Part XV (Articles 279-299). The first of these articles, 
Article 279, includes an obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means in accordance 
with the UN Charter. UNCLOS does not, however, restrict states to the dispute 
resolution techniques laid down in the Convention but specifically allows states to settle 
their disputes "by any peaceful means of their own choice" (Article 280). UNCLOS 
also includes an obligation to "exchange views" regarding dispute settlement (Article 
283) and the possibility of submitting the dispute to conciliation procedures (Article 284 
and Annex V). 
Where no settlement can apparently be achieved between the parties, UNCLOS 
further offers dispute resolution through "compulsory procedures resulting in binding 
decisions" (Part XV, Section 2). Article 287 of the Convention allows a choice of 
method between the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) 31 , the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), an arbitral tribunal32 or a special arbitral tribunal in 
relation to specific issues.33 These compulsory procedures are binding between parties 
to UNCLOS - ratification of the Convention equating to consent to these provisions. 34 
The proliferation in the options available for the pacific settlement of disputes has not 
received undiluted praise. For example, Thailand's reaction has been described as "less 
than enthusiastic" given that states preference for negotiation or good offices as dispute 
resolution procedures.35 
Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution- Joint Develop1nent Zones 
In addition to the conventional means of dispute resolution outlined Ill the previous 
section, alternatives have also emerged including what are termed confidence building 
32 
33 
34 
35 
Established in 1996-1997 in Hamburg in accordance with Annex VI of the Convention. 
Constituted in accordance with Annex VII of the Convention, which covers fisheries, protection 
and preservation of the marine environment, marine scientific research, and navigation including 
pollution from vessels and dumping. 
Constituted in accordance with Annex VIII of the Convention. 
For a detailed analysis of the system for settlement of disputes under UNCLOS, see Aclede 
( 1987). 
Sucharitkul, 1991: 28. 
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measures such as 'track-two' diplomatic initiatives36 and other, frequently functionalist 
oriented, measures designed to defuse or at least partially ameliorate contentious 
disputes. In relation to maritime jurisdictional disputes the most significant innovative 
form of dispute resolution, or at least deferral, that has developed over recent years 
relates to the use of maritime joint development zones. 
Joint development arrangements are encouraged under UNCLOS as both 
Articles 74(3) and 83(3) dealing with the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone 
and continental shelf respectively state that: 
Pending agree1nent as provided for in paragraph I, the States concerned, in a 
spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into 
provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional 
period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such 
arrangements shall be without prejudice to the final delimitation. 
Joint development zones have been heralded as a means of overcoming seemingly 
intractable maritime boundary disputes where the parties concerned inflexibly cling to 
overlapping claims. In this situation, where there appears to be no prospect of 
agreement on a boundary line in the foreseeable future, it has been argued that joint 
development agreements seem to offer an ideal way forward. As Richardson noted in 
his influential article, if the parties agree to such an arrangement: 
... the focus would be placed where it belonged: on a fair division of the 
resources at stake, rather than on the determination of an art~ficial line, thus, 
... eliminating competition over the ownership of resources ... especially where the 
k 37 resources are un nown. 
The rationale behind this contention is that such cooperative arrangements are entirely 
logical - allowing states to retain their claims unaltered in principle and proceed with 
desired offshore development, for example of oil and gas resources, or fisheries 
management. Joint development zones have also been welcomed as evidence of the 
emergence of a more broad-based, functionalist and comprehensive approach to ocean 
36 
37 
An excellent example of this process is the Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea 
project which, through a series of non-governmental gatherings attended by government officials, 
has sought ways to engender cooperation among the South China Sea states. Rather than 
addressing the contentious issues of jurisdiction and boundaries, the project has instead 
attempted, with a qualified success, to build consensus on issues of mutual concern such as the 
environment, ecology and marine research; shipping navigation and communications and living 
resources management (see the South China Sea Informal Working Group's web-site at: 
http://www.law.ubc.ca.cntres/scsweb ). See also, Evans, 1993. 
Richardson, 1988: 451-452. 
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management as opposed to more traditional legalistic and thus confrontational 
approaches focusing on the definition of a particular dividing line.38 Additionally, the 
drawing of a definitive boundary line can be regarded as a 'once and for all' process and 
can represent something of a lottery with regard to undiscovered resources. With a joint 
zone, lack of knowledge as to the precise location of resources assumes less importance 
and no longer acts as a deterrent to resolution. Instead, both sides can be confident that 
a fair and equitable sharing has been achieved - no 'winners' and 'losers' should 
therefore emerge from such arrangements. 
Conversely, it seems inappropriate to promote joint development arrangements 
simply because the parties to a dispute have proved unable to resolve their differences 
over overlapping maritime claims. Furthermore, the practical task of establishing and 
maintaining such potentially dauntingly complex arrangements should not be 
underestimated as this requires considerable political commitment from all parties. 
Joint development zones cannot, therefore, be divorced from the overall political 
context between the states involved. As Stormont and Townsend-Gault maintain, joint 
development should not be suggested lightly as: 
The conclusion of any joint development arrangement, in the absence of the 
appropriate level of consent between the parties, is merely redrafting the 
problem and possibly complicating it further. 39 
Similarly, Jagota has noted that: 
... sensltzve security conditions in the area, incompatible political relations 
between the disputants, vertical or dependent economic relations, reluctance to 
transfer technology or to codevelop technology, and other similar 
inconsistencies may generate resistance to joint development zones, with or 
. h . . b d 40 wlt out a 1nantune oun ary. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that emerging state practice appears to favour joint development 
arrangements and that this accords with the evolving general duty of states to facilitate 
optimum ocean management. As such, joint development arrangements do offer a 
functional, flexible and equitable way forward for states with seemingly intractable 
disputes over overlapping maritime claims with their neighbours. Such a practical, 
problem-solving approach with the emphasis firmly placed on promoting inter-state 
38 
39 
40 
Ong, 1995: 91; Jagota, 1993: 114. 
Stormont and Townsend-Gault, 1995: 52. 
Jagota, 1993: 117. 
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cooperation and effective ocean resource development and management must be 
considered welcome and is likely to prove of increasing significance in the future. In 
total seventeen such zones have come into being around the world to date and are not 
confined to a particular geographical region although Southeast Asia is well represented 
(see Figure 8.1 ). 
The Gulf of Thailand itself is host to two fully-fledged joint development 
agreements between Malaysia and Thailand and Malaysia and Vietnam and a further 
joint arrangement in the Cambodia-Vietnam Historic Waters Agreement (see Chapter 
6). This makes the Gulf one of the leading concentrations of state practice in joint 
development worldwide. The prospects of further joint development arrangements 
being realised in the Gulf are, however, undermined by Thailand's reluctance to adopt 
another joint zone solution, particularly with regard to Cambodia (see Section 7.2.8). It 
is notable that Thailand resisted a joint zone solution in its delimitation with Vietnam 
(see Section 6.5). This negative attitude towards joint development probably stems 
from the difficulties experienced in implementing the Thai-Malaysian joint development 
area (see Section 6.2.4). The potential benefits of joint development are, however, 
-
attractive, as has been demonstrated by successful exploration activities in both the 
Thai-Malaysian JDA and Malaysia-Vietnam "Defined Area". Indeed, the estimated I 0 
trillion cubic feet of gas reserves in the Thai-Malaysian JDA have been touted by both 
governments concerned as providing the foundation for their economic recovery (see 
Section 6.2.4). It remains to be see whether continuing lack of progress in delimitation 
negotiations coupled with economic necessity will soften Thailand's stance and 
encourage further joint development initiatives in the Gulf of Thailand. 
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Conclusions 
8.3.2 Opportunities and Constraints in the Gu(j'ofThailand 
The preceding discussion demonstrates that the Gulf of Thailand littoral have a wide 
variety of means of maritime boundary dispute resolution available to them. In many 
ways this does not represent the problem. This concluding section will explore what 
factors serve to promote or frustrate efforts towards maritime boundary dispute 
resolution in the Gulf of Thailand. 
Many of the attributes of the Gulf of Thailand outlined in Chapter I which have 
made the delimitation of maritime boundaries problematic have not been removed. 
There have, however, been significant, positive developments which provide grounds 
for optimism. 
The geographical realities of the Gulf of Thailand remain unaltered. The littoral 
states have to face the fact that they border a semi-enclosed sea of restricted dimensions. 
The coastal states are therefore immediately disadvantaged in that the full extent of their 
maritime rights out to 200nm from the coast are curtailed by the presence of 
neighbouring states. The complex coastal geography of the Gulf remains a significant 
challenge. For example, both Cambodia and Thailand have grounds for considering 
themselves geographically disadvantaged - a situation unlikely to promote swift 
resolution of their overlapping claims. 
In particular, islands are likely to prove a maJor impediment to maritime 
boundary negotiations. While the resolution of sovereignty disputes over islands 
disputed in the early 1970s represents a particularly positive development in light of the 
almost insurmountable difficulties such disputes have caused elsewhere around the 
world,41 their role in delimitations is likely to prove contentious. Nevertheless, 
problems over the weight to be accorded to islands in maritime delimitation have been 
resolved in the Gulf of Thailand. This was demonstrated by the conversion of 
overlapping Thai-Malaysian claims caused by a dispute over the role of the Thai islet of 
Ko Losin into delimitation into a JDA agreement (see Section 6.2.4). Similarly, the 
successful conclusion of the Thai-Vietnamese maritime boundary treaty in 1997, despite 
the presence of islands in the area to be delimited, represents an encouraging sign that 
difficulties relating to islands can be overcome (see Section 6.5). 
The geographical challenges which the Gulf of Thailand poses are, without 
doubt, the key problems which the littoral states have to overcome if delimitation is to 
41 For an overview of the impact of island sovereignty disputes on maritime boundary delimitation 
see Smith and Thomas, 1998. 
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be achieved successfully. Nevertheless, if the political will exists, there is ample scope 
for compromise either on a boundary line or by means of an 'agreement not to agree' in 
order to allow resource exploitation and management to proceed in the shape of a joint 
development zone. 
If anything, the national maritime claims of the Gulf of Thailand coastal states 
have become more extreme with age. The trend has been towards the progressive 
advancement of straight baseline claims offshore, as illustrated by Thailand's Area 4 
claim of 1992. Despite the fact that these extreme claims largely remain in force and in 
some cases have been extended, this has not prevented the resolution of maritime 
boundary disputes in the Gulf of Thailand (see Chapter 6). Indeed, the disparities 
between the parties' claims can be viewed as offering considerable scope for 
compromise. 
The most important developments which favour boundary delimitation 111 the 
late 1990s are, however, political in nature. Political will has been identified as the key 
ingredient in securing a maritime boundary agreements. The end of the Cold War and 
removal of Cambodia as a serious impediment to regional political relations, has 
transformed the geopolitical environment. While the Gulf of Thailand states may fall 
victim to the influences of resurgent nationalism, the prospects for fruitful negotiations 
must be considered better today than ever before. Indeed, an easing in the ideological 
divide across the Gulf has already yielded the Malaysia-Vietnam joint zone and Thai-
Vietnamese maritime boundary agreement. 
As SEAPOL has noted in relation to the Gulf of Thailand region in outlining the 
rationale for its project on the Gulf: 
... an area of conflict for many decades. It used to be a barrier to cooperation 
among some of the four littoral states. Now, with the enzergence of' a new spirit 
of cooperation throughout the entire region of Southeast Asia, the ol~jective of 
regional cooperation in the Gulf of Thailand appears to be closer at hand. 42 
This assessment is reinforced by the fact that all four Gulf of Thailand coastal states are 
now full ASEAN members. This must be viewed as another very positive development, 
even if some commentators have noted that inter-ASEAN relations "are cordial but 
competitive and perhaps unstable in the long term. "43 While long-standing animosities 
between the states concerned cannot be said to have been overcome, the fact that all four 
42 
43 
Matics and McDorman, 1994: 5. 
Valencia and Van Dyke, 1985: 381. 
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Gulf of Thailand states are ASEAN members suggests that these latent tensions can be 
managed and overcome. The ASEAN states have a successful history of managing 
disputes through the application of what has become known as the "A SEAN way". As a 
result no armed conflict has broken out between ASEAN members since the 
organisation's inception in 1967.44 With regard to territorial disputes, the ASEAN way, 
a term that is commonly used in reference to the region but lacks a precise definition, 
tends to refer to the establishment of codes of conduct among ASEAN members which 
set out guidelines and "unwritten norms" which are binding on member states.45 Key 
elements of the ASEAN way include stressing the virtue of self-restraint, the adoption 
of the practices of ntusyawarah and muafakat (consultation and consensus), the use of 
third-party mediation to resolve disputes and a commitment to agree to disagree and 
shelve disputes. 46 The latter point may perhaps be viewed as encouraging maritime 
joint development. As a result, most disputes have been contained, but few have been 
settled. Additionally, internal political problems which distracted certain states, notably 
Cambodia, from devoting attention to maritime boundary issues have also, at least to 
some extent, been addressed. 
The Gulf of Thailand states' economic requirements provide a potentially 
double-edged sword as far as the prospects for maritime boundary delimitation is 
concerned. On the one hand, desire to gain access to resources locked in overlapping 
claim zones at the earliest possible stage may promote agreement and compromise. 
Conversely, the perceived value of the resources may undermine efforts to reach an 
agreement as each party may fear losing out in negotiations and adopting maximalist, 
intransigent bargaining positions. Nevertheless, such economic needs are becoming 
increasingly pressing in view of rapidly growing populations and resource requirements 
coupled with the current economic plight of the region. The threat to the Gulf's marine 
environment will also increasingly generate pressure to resolve jurisdictional disputes in 
order to facilitate cooperative management and preservation of the Gulf's unique living 
resources. There has, however, been a noticeable preoccupation among the coastal state 
authorities with immediately offshore areas which may act as an impediment to dispute 
resolution.47 Nevertheless, the factors outlined above will encourage the delimitation of 
44 
45 
46 
47 
ASEAN's performance in conflict management has therefore been termed "impressive" (Amer, 
1997b: 337). 
Hoang, 1996: 62. See also, Amer (l997b) 
Hoang, 1996: 63. 
Kittichaisaree, 1992: 516. 
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further maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Thailand, as will the growing list of 
obligations on the littoral states to cooperate in relation to the Gulf's resources and 
environment. These obligations, even if ill-defined, will tend to create an atmosphere 
conducive to maritime boundary delimitation. Furthermore, there is a growing 
realisation among the Gulf of Thailand states that their maritime interests can only be 
maximised through such cooperation, including maritime boundary delimitation.48 
Overall, the Gulf of Thailand is one of the world's most important laboratories 
m which the problems of maritime boundary delimitation in semi-enclosed seas are 
being examined and slowly resolved. There are no quick solutions. The issues are 
politically delicate, technically complex and legally challenging, but there are signs of 
progress and prospects for the future, particularly in the wake of the geopolitical 
transformation of the region in the 1990s, must be considered to be good. The issues 
faced by the Gulf of Thailand littoral states in terms of maritime boundary delimitation 
and the resolution of their maritime disputes deserve to be better known and understood 
and it is hoped that this thesis makes some small contribution towards this end. 
48 Kittichaisaree, 1992: 501-503. 
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Appendix 1 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38 
I. The Court whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a) International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting States; 
b) International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c) The general principles of law recognized by civilised nations; 
d) Subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of 
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means 
for the determination of rules of law. 
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo 
et bono, if the parties agree thereto. 
Source: Reproduced in Brown, 1994, Voi.II: 19. 
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Appendix 2 
Cambodian Council of State Decree on Territorial Waters, 
31 July 1982 
The chairman of the Council of State, considering that the PRK has full sovereignty and 
inviolable rights over its territorial waters and its continental shelf; 
Considering that the PRK must watch over its sovereignty, security and national defence 
toward the sea and ensure the best exploitation of natural resources in its territorial 
waters and continental shelf in order to serve the national defence and reconstruction 
efforts and the improvement of the people's living standards; 
Considering the Constitution of the PRK; 
And the Council of Ministers having been informed; 
Has decreed the following: 
Article 1 
The full and entire sovereignty of the PRK extends beyond its territory and internal 
waters to a maritime zone adjacent to its coasts and its internal waters, designated by the 
name of the territorial waters of the 
PRK. 
This sovereignty also extends to the airspace above the territorial waters of the PRK as 
well as to the seabed and subsoil of these waters. 
Article 2 
The width of the territorial waters of the PRK is 12 nautical miles (1 nautical mile 
equalling 1,852 meters) measured from straight baselines, linking the points of the coast 
and the furtherest points of Kampuchea's [Cambodia's] furtherest islands; these 
baselines are traced along the low-water mark. 
These straight baselines are concretely defined in Annex 1 of this decree. 
The internal waters of the PRK are the waters located between the baseline of the 
territorial waters and the coasts of Kampuchea [Cambodia]. 
Article 3 
The outer limit of the territorial waters of the PRK is a line each point of which is at a 
distance equal to the width of the territorial waters from the closest point of the baseline. 
In the maritime zone between Kach Kut Island and the terminus of the land border 
between Kampuchea [Cambodia] and Thailand, the limit of the territorial water of the 
PRK follows the dividing line of the maritime waters determined by the historic border 
stipulated in the Franco-Siamese treaty of 23 March 1907. 
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Article 4 
The contiguous zone of the PRK is a maritime zone located beyond and adjacent to its 
territorial waters, with a width of 12 nautical miles measured from the outer limit of the 
territorial waters of the PRK. 
In its contiguous zone, the PRK exercises necessary control in order to oversee its 
security and to prevent and check violations of its customs, fiscal, health and emigration 
and immigration laws. 
Article 5 
The exclusive economic zone of the PRK is a maritime zone located beyond its 
territorial waters and adjacent to the latter. This zone extends to 200 nautical miles 
measured from the baseline used to measure the width of the territorial waters of the 
PRK. 
The PRK has sovereign rights over the exploration and exploitation and the preservation 
and management of all organic or inorganic natural resources of the seabed, of its 
subsoil and of the waters above it and over other activities leading to the exploration and 
exploitation of its exclusive economic zone. 
In its exclusive economic zone, the PRK has exclusive jurisdiction regarding the setting 
up and use of installations, devices and artificial islands and marine research; and has 
jurisdiction over the preservation of the marine environment and the control of 
pollution. 
Without prior authorisation or agreement by the PRK. foreign ships are forbidden to fish 
or exploit any natural resources in any form, or to undertake scientific research in the 
exclusive economic zone of the PRK. When they have obtained prior authorisation or 
agreement, they must conform with the Jaws and regulations of the PRK concerning 
fishing, the exploitation of other natural resources and scientific research, and with other 
regulations relating to them decreed by the PRK, and must strictly carry out all 
obligations provided in the licenses or the contracts. 
Article 6 
The continental shelf of the PRK comprises the seabed and the subsoil of the submarine 
areas that extend beyond the territorial waters throughout the natural prolongation of its 
land territory to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baseline used to measure the 
width of the territorial waters of the PRK. 
The PRK exercises sovereign rights over its continental shelf for the purposes of 
exploration, exploitation. preservation and management of its natural resources 
comprising mineral resources and other inorganic or organic resources belonging to 
sedentary species living on the continental shelf. 
The PRK has the exclusive right to regulate the setting up and use of installations, 
devices and artificial islands or drilling on its continental shelf for the purposes of 
exploration, exploitation or any other purpose. 
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All activities carried out by foreigners on the continental shelf of Kampuchea 
[Cambodia], for whatever end, must be the object of an authorisation or an agreement 
by the PRK Government and conform with the laws and regulations of the PRK. 
Article 7 
The PRK will settle, by means of negotiations with interested states. all problems 
concerning the maritime zones and continental shelf in a fair and logical manner on the 
basis of mutual respect for sovereignty. independence and territorial integrity. 
Article 8 
The PRK will negotiate and agree with the SRV [Vietnam] on the maritime border in 
the historic waters zone of the two countries fixed in the agreement on the historic 
waters of the two countries signed on 7 July 1982 in line with the spirit and letter of the 
Treaty of Peace. Friendship and Cooperation between the two states signed on 18 
February 1979. 
Article 9 
All provisions contrary to this decree are purely and simply abrogated. 
Article 10 
The minister of national defence, the minister of interior and the ministers concerned are 
charged each in his proper field, with the implementation of this decree. 
ANNEX 1 
The Baseline Retained for the Limitation of the Territorial Waters of the PRK 
The baseline retained for the limitation of the territorial waters of the PRK is made up of 
segments of a line passing successively" through the following points, the coordinates of 
which are expressed in degrees, minutes and tenths of a minute. the longitude being 
counted from the meridian of Greenwich. 
Number Geographical Place 
Border point on low-water mark between Thailand 
and the PRK according to treaty of23 March 1907 
2 Kack Kusrovie 
3 Kack Voar 
4 Poulo Wai 
5 Point 0 out at sea on the southwest limit of the 
historic waters of the PRK 
Source: Reproduced in Smith, I 986: 91-94. 
Latitude 
(North) 
I I o 38' 8" 
I 1° 06' 8" 
10° 14' 0" 
09° 55' 5" 
Longitude (East) 
102° 54' 3" 
102° 47' 3" 
102° 52' 5" 
102° 53' 2" 
According to the agreement of7 July I 982 
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Appendix 3 
Agreement on Historic Waters of Vietnam and Kampuchea 
7 July 1982 
The Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Government of the 
People's Republic of Kampuchea, 
DESIROUS of further consolidating and developing the special Vietnam-Kampuchea 
relations in the spirit of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the People's Republic of Kampuchea signed on 
February 18, 1979. 
CONSIDERING the reality that the maritime zone situated between the coast of Kien 
Giang Province, Phu Quoc Island, and the Tho Chu ~rchipelago of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam on the one side, and the coast of Kampot Province and the Poulo 
Wai group of islands of the People's Republic of Kampuchea on the other, encompasses 
waters which by their special geographical conditions and their great importance for the 
national defence and the economy of both countries have long belonged to Vietnam and 
Kampuchea, 
HAVE AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING: 
Article 1 
The waters located between the coast of Kien Giang Province, Phu Quoc Island, and the 
Tho Chu archipelago of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on the one side, and the coast 
of Kampot Province and the Poulo Wai group of islands of the People's Republic of 
Kampuchea on the other, form the historical waters of the two countries placed under 
the juridical regime of their internal waters and are delimited (according to the 
Greenwich east longitude): 
To the northwest by a straight line stretching from coordinates 09 degrees 54'2" north 
latitude- 102 degrees 55'2" east longitude and coordinates 09 degrees 54'5" north 
latitude- 102 degrees 57'2" east longitude of Poulo Wai Islands (Kampuchea) to 
coordinates 10 degrees 24' 1" north latitude- 103 degrees 48 '0" east longitude and I 0 
degrees 25'6" north latitude- 103 degrees 49'2" east longitude of the Koh Ses Island 
(Kampuchea) to coordinates 10 degrees 30'0" north latitude- 103 degrees 47'4" east 
longitude of Koh Thmei Island (Kampuchea) to coordinates 10 degrees 32 '4" north 
latitude- 103 degrees 48 '2" east longitude on the coast of Kampot Province 
(Kampuchea). 
To the north by the coast of Kampot Province stretching from coordinates I 0 degrees 
32' 4" Lat. N.- I 03 degrees 48'2" Long. E. on the terminus of the land border between 
Vietnam and Kampuchea on the coast. 
To the southeast by a line stretching from the terminus of the land border between 
Vietnam and Kampuchea on the coast to coordinates 10 degrees 04'42" Lat. N.- 104 
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degrees 02'3" Long. E. from the An Yet point of Phu Quoc Island (Vietnam) and along 
the northern coast of this island to the Dat Do point situated at coordinates I 0 degrees 
02'8" Lat. N.- I 03 degrees 59' 1" Long. E., and from there to coordinates 09 degrees 
1 0' 1" Lat. N. - 103 degrees 26' 4" Long. E. of Thu Chu Island (Vietnam) to coordinates 
09 degrees 15'0" Lat. N. - I 03 degrees 27'0" Long. E. of Hon Nhan Island in the Tho 
Chu archipelago (Vietnam). 
To the southwest by a straight line stretching from coordinates 09 degrees 55'0" Lat. N. 
- 102 degrees 53'5" Long. E. from Puolo Wai Islands (Kampuchea) to coordinates 09 
degrees 15'0" Lat. N.- 103 degrees 27'0" Long. e. of Hon Nhan Island in the Tho Chu 
archipelago (Vietnam). 
Article 2 
The two sides will hold at a suitable time negotiations in the spirit of equality, 
friendship, and respect for each other's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, 
and the legitimate interests of each side in order to delimit the maritime frontier between 
the two countries in the historical waters mentioned in Article 1. 
Article 3 
Pending the settlement of the maritime border between the two States in the historical 
waters mentioned in Article I: 
The meeting point 0 of the two baselines used for measuring the width of the territorial 
waters of each country situated on the high seas on the straight baseline linking the Tho 
Chu archipelago and Poulo Wai Islands will be determined by mutual agreement. 
The two sides continue to regard the Brevie Line drawn in 1939 as the dividing line for 
the islands in this zone. 
Patrolling and surveillance in these territorial waters will be jointly conducted by the 
two sides. 
The local populations will continue to conduct their fishing operations and the catch of 
other sea products in this zone according to the habits that have existed so far. 
The exploitation of natural resources in this zone will be decided by common 
agreement. 
DONE in Ho Chi Minh City on the 7th 9f July 1982, in two languages, Vietnamese and 
Khmer, both being equally valid. 
For the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Nguyen Co Thach, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 
For the Government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea: Hun Sen, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Kampuchea. 
Source: Reproduced in Kittichaisaree, 1987. 
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Survey of Longest Baseline Segments 
State 
Albania1 
Burma (Myanmar)2 
Cambodia3 
Canada 
Chile4 
China (PRC)5 
Colombia6 
Croatia (former Yugoslavia)7 
Cuba8 
Denmark 
Faeroes (Denmark)9 
Djibouti 10 
D . . R bl' II om1mcan epu IC 
Ecuador 12 
Egypt 13 
Finland 
France 14 
Germany 15 
Guinea 16 
Guinea-Bissau 17 
Haiti 18 
Iceland 19 
Iran20 
Ireland21 
2 
4 
6 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
US Department of State, 1994b: 4. 
US Department of State, 1970g: 4. 
See Table 4.7. 
US Department of State, 1978: 4. 
US Department of State, 1996: 15. 
US Department of State, 1985: 4. 
US Department of State, 1970e: 4. 
US Department of State, 1977: 6. 
US Department of State, 1970f: 2. 
US Department of State, 1992: 3. 
US Department of State, 1970d: 3. 
US Department of State, 1972d: 5. 
US Department of State, 1994b: 11. 
US Department of State, 1972a: 5. 
Longest segment 
16nm 
222.3nm 
51.8nm 
IOOnm 
65nm 
1 21.7nm 
I30.5nm 
22.5nm 
69.24nm 
21.81 nm 
60.8nm 
8.2nm 
45nm 
136nm 
40.5nm 
8nm (maximum) 
39nm 
22.8nm 
I20nm 
29nm 
89nm 
74.lnm 
I 13.4mn 
25.2nm 
Appendicies 
15 US Department of State, 1973c: 4. This was the longest segment in East Germany's claimed 
straight baselines. The longest segment in West Germany's straight baselines claim was 21.5nm 
long. 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
US Department of State, 1972b: 2. 
US Departmant of State, 19701: 4. 
US Department of State, 1973a: 3. 
US Department of State, 1974: 8. 
US Department of State, 1994a: 5. 
US Department of State, 1970b: 6. 
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State 
Italy 
Korea (ROC)22 
?1 Madagascar-· 
Malaysia (east peninsula coast)24 
Mexico25 
M b. 26 ozam 1que 
Norway 
Svalbard (Norway)27 
Oman28 
Portugal (excluding islands)29 
Russia (former Soviet Union)30 
Senegal31 
Sweden 
Thailand32 
Turkey33 
United Kingdom34 
V . 35 zetnam 
Average 
Source: Author's research. 
22 US Department of State, I 979: 7. 
23 US Department of State, I 970h: 5. 
24 See Table 4.9. 
25 US Department of State, I 970c: 4. 
26 US Department of State, I 970k: 5. 
27 US Department of State, I 972c: 4. 
28 US Department of State, I 992: 4. 
29 US Department of State, I 970j: 4. 
30 US Department of State, I 987b: 23. 
31 US Department of State, 1973b: 5. 
32 See Table 4. 15. 
33 US Department of State, 1971 b: 2. 
34 US Department of State, 1970i: 4. 
35 See Table 4.17. 
Longest segment 
60nm 
60.3nm 
123.lnm 
90.2nm 
39.4nm 
60.4nm 
43.6nm 
18.5nm 
23.6nm 
31.25nm 
106.3nm 
22nm 
30nm 
94.9nm 
23.5nm (bay), c.20nm 
40.25nm 
J61.8nm 
64.8nm 
Appendicies 
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Appendix 5 
Statement of the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Exclusive 
Economic Zone, and the Continental Shelf of Vietnam, 12 May 1977 
The statement which is dated May 12, 1977, and has been approved by the Standing 
Committee of the SRV National Assembly, reads in full as follows: 
The Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 
After approval by the Standing Committee of the National Assembly of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, 
Declares that it has defined the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive 
economic zone and the continental shelf of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam as 
follows: 
1. The territorial sea of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has a breadth of 12 nautical 
miles measured from a baseline which links the furthest seaward points of the coast and 
the outermost points of Vietnamese offshore islands, and which is the low-water line 
along the coast. 
The waters on the landward side of the baseline constitute internal waters of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam exercises full and complete sovereignty over its 
territorial sea as well as the superjacent air space and the bed and subsoil of the 
territorial sea. 
2. The contiguous zone of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a 12-nautical-mile 
maritime zone adjacent to and beyond the Vietnamese territorial sea, with which it 
forms a zone of 24 nautical miles from the baseline used to measure the breadth of the 
territorial sea. 
The Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam exercises the necessary control in 
its contiguous zone in order to see to its security and custom and fiscal interests and to 
ensure respect for its sanitary, emigration and immigration regulations within the 
Vietnamese territory or territorial sea. 
3. The exclusive economic zone of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is adjacent to the 
Vietnamese territorial sea and forms with it a 200-nautical-mile zone from the baseline 
used to measure the breadth of Vietnam's territorial sea. 
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring, 
exploiting, conserving and managing all natural resources, whether living or non-living, 
of the waters, the bed and subsoil of the exclusive economic zone of Vietnam; it has 
exclusive rights and jurisdiction with regard to the establishment and use of installations 
and structures, artificial islands; exclusive jurisdiction with regard to other activities for 
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the economic exploration and exploitation of the exclusive economic zone; exclusive 
jurisdiction with regard to scientific research in the exclusive economic zone of 
Vietnam; the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has jurisdiction with regard to the 
preservation of the marine environment, and activities for pollution control and 
abatement in the exclusive economic zone of Vietnam. 
4. The continental shelf of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam comprises the seabed and 
subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond the Vietnamese territorial sea 
throughout the natural prolongation of the Vietnamese land territory to the outer edge of 
the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baseline used to 
measure the breadth of the Vietnamese territorial sea where the outer edge of the 
continental margin does not extend up to that distance. 
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam exercises sovereign rights over the Vietnamese 
continental shelf in the exploration, exploitation, preservation and management of all 
natural resources, consisting of mineral and other non-living resources, together with 
living organisms belonging to sedentary species thereon. 
5. The islands and archipelagos, forming an integral part of the Vietnamese territory and 
beyond the Vietnamese territorial sea mentioned in Paragraph I, have their own 
territorial seas, contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones and continental shelves, 
determined in accordance with the provisions of Paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of this 
statement. 
6. Proceeding from the principles of this statement, specific questions relating to the 
territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone, and the continental 
shelf of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam will be dealt with in detail in further 
regulations, in accordance with the principle of defending the sovereignty and interests 
of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and in keeping with international law and 
practices. 
7. The Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam will settle with the countries 
concerned, through negotiations on the basis of mutual respect for independence and 
sovereignty, in accordance with international law and practices, the matters relating to 
the maritime zones and the continental shelf of each country. 
Source: FBIS Daily Report: Asia and Pacific, 24 May l 977. 
432 
Appendicies 
Appendix 6 
' . ' 0 . 1 ~.·· .. M~~;.,tStire 
. ~~~G'~i 
T DELIMITATION 
TIMENT AL KHMER 
~!\~'#li:~·~·.'<. 
SERVICE NATIONAL DES MINES, 
DE LA GEOLOGII: ET DU PETROLE . 
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REPUBLIQUE KHMERE 
JE-i'.: JR. JE 'J[' 
LE PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBUOUE KHMERE 
Vu Ia Constitution de Ia Republlque Khmere: 
Vu !'Ordonnance N··lf7l-CE du 18 Octobre 19?1 reglssant !es questlons 
relevant du domainc de Ia Lol; 
Vu !'Ordonnance N··l7f72-CE du 12 Mars 1972 definlssant le titre du Chef 
de I'Etat de Ia Republique Khmere; 
Vu J'Ordonnance N··2f72-PRI< du 12 Mars 1972 ~onferant Jes pouvoirs du 
Chef du Gouvernement au President de Ia Republique Kluuere • 
Vu Je Kret N·-187/72-PRK du 21 Mars 1972 modifie par tes textes subse-
quents portant nomination du Cabinet Mlnisteriel; 
L.e Consell des Minlstres entendu ; 
OR DONNE: 
ARTICLE PREMIER.- En application des clauses de Ia Convention de 
Geneve du 29 Avril 1958 sur Ie Plateau Continental a laquelle Ia Republique Khmere 
a adhere ct du Traite Fra11Co-Siamols du 23 Mars !907 et le Proces-Verbal de· delimi· 
tation de Ia frontiere du 8 Fcvrier 1908, Ia limite exterieure du Plateau Continental 
de Ja Repub!ique l(hmere est fixec cornmc l'indique Ia carte N·-1972 de Ia Marine 
fran~alse a I' echclle 111.096.000 anncxee au present Kret avec Jes coordonnees de ses 
points reperes &uivantes 1 
La delimitation Jateralc Nord entre les zones du Platea~1 Continental rclt:· 
vant de Ia souveralnete respective de Ia Republique Khm~re et de Ia Tllarlande est 
constituee par une ligne droite joignant le point frontiere "A" sur Ia cute au plus 
haut somrnet <.le l'ile de Koh J<ut "S" ei se prolongcant jusqu'au point P, ces- points 
A et P sont dHinls ci-apr~s: 
... 2 
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POINT A 
Cc point etant Jc point fronticre sur .Ia cote 
(Traite de Bangkok du 23 Mars 1907). . 
POINT P 
Point equidistant de Ia base -c~u~bo.dgienne 
A- l!Bt Kusrovie et de Ia lignc de base 
thailandaise oppose.e . • • . . 
I.ON.GITUDES 
EST· GRCSNWICH 
102'54'81 
101 '20'00 
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LATITUDES 
... NORD .... 
11'38'88 
11•32'00 
ARTICLE 2.- La delimitation de Ia iigne mediane (direction· Nord-sud). 
est constituee par line llgne brisee partant du point P et passant successivement sur 
Ies points Pckl - Pck2 - pck3 • Pck4 • Pck5 - Pck6 • Pcki • Pck8 • Pck9 • PckiO • 
Pckll _ Pckl 2 • Pckl 3 et B point frontiere avec le Sud-Vietnam cl-apres detinis et 
~eportes sur la carte jointe en annexe 1 
LONGITUDES LATITUDES 
.. EST GREENWICH . NORD 
. 
Pel< 1 . , . . . . 
' 
. . . . . 101•13'00 10•59'00 
Point equidistant d'une part de l'ilot 
cambodgicn de Kusrovie ~t d'autrc part des 
points thailandais suivants . ilot Koh Charn . 
. •. 
et point 8 Area 2 ( Hin Bai ) . ..... .. ' 
Pck2 . . . . . . . . 101 '29'00 10•16'50 
· Pck3 .. . . . . . . . . 101'36'00 9·0~'00 : 
pck4 I !• ~,.,_;,. l(t•tt.• 1(./,,~ I 101'57'50 8•31 '00 . .. . . . . . . . 
Pck5 · . ~t. ~-~~..;..I,J (';,./,; I "1"'1.( .. 102•59'50 7·42'00' 
' 
.. . . . " . ' 
. . 
P· . I < ~'...;.,., • !; 
·.• 103•21'00 · ck6 ,, . . . . . 7'34'00 
pck7. f f:./:, ..... ;' .. .f·:·.-.1,:/. i ).; :_ 
. 104•08'00 9'01'00 . . . 
p ... 
ck 8 . . . . . . . 104·01 '00 9•18'00 
Pck9 . . . . . . . 104·08'50 9•38'50 
Pck!O . . . . . . 104'16'50 . 9'56'00 
pckll . . . . . . 104•15'00 10'01 '00 
Pck12 . . . . . . . 104'10'50 10•05'00 
Pckl3 . . . . 
' 
104'09'00 10'12'00 
B point frontic1·e avec Sud-Vietnam . . 104•26'53 10'25'23 
. ' . 3 
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ARTICLE 3.- La carte marine· n·· 1972 d~; Ia Marine fran~aise · Edition 
1949 a l'ecllelle 1(1.096.000' est join~e au present l<rl:!t. 
Toute niference au !\ret !mplique en m~mr:: temps une reference a Ia carte 
n·· 1972. 
ARTICLE 4.- Toutes dispositions contraires au present !<.ret sont pure-
ment et simplement abrogees. 
ARTICLE 5.- Lc Mlnistrc <les Affaires Etrangeres et le Minlstre de 
I' rndustrie, des Ressourccs minicres ct des Pechcs maritimes sont charges, chacun en 
ce qui. le concernc, de !'execution du present Kret.f. 
Fait ci Phnom-Penh, le ter Juitlet 1972 
Presente' a le signature du 
PRES! DENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE KHMERE 
pur 
Signe : LON NOL 
POUR AMPLIA TJON, 
LE MINISTRE DE L'INDUSTRIE, DES RESSOURCES 
MINIERES ET DES PECHES MARl fiMES, 
LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL 
DU GOUVERNEMENT, 
Signe : CHHANN SOKHUM 
DESTINATAIRES z 
- Vircablnet du Presi<lonl do la 
R"pu1Jlh1\1u Kluut:re 
- '?rcconscil (SGG) ~ JOC. 
- IGARK ~ IAPA, 
- Tous ;'rhmiclpalites • Khcts ct 
AnoucklH'!ts. 
- Tom; Mini~:;tet•es- Tresor. 
- Cab·DG-IG·Toutcs Directions 
ct lnspectlons~Scc P&M et 
tous l>ill'eaux relevant du 
~Hnlndiu.;trle. 
- E:\. ,\~:sclnblt•e Canstttu:mtc. 
- Archive:; ot BillliotMqtto Nlc. 
Source: On file with the author. 
Signe : OUK 50UN 
; ~!' I 
/) ·~·).4·_,.. '··,.·<., 
/Lv·< tz 1'5? o 
POUR COPIE CONFORME 
P.LE MJNISTRE DE L'INDUSTRIE, 
DES RESSOURCES MINIERES 
ET DES PECHES MARITIMES, 
LE DIRECTEUR DU SERVICE NATIONAL 
DES MINES, Dt LA GEOLOGIE ET DU 
PETROLE, 
SEAN PENGSE 
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Appendix 8 
Proclamation 
on 
Demarcation of the Continental Shelf of Thailand 
in the Gulf of Thailand, 
18 May 1973 
His Majesty the King is graciously pleased to proclaim that 
Appendicies 
For the purpose of exercising the sovereignty rights of Thailand in exploring and 
exploiting natural resources of the Gulf of Thailand, the continental shelf shall therefore 
be demarcated according the map and geographical co-ordinates of each point 
constituting the continental shelf of Thailand annexed to this Proclamation as the 
continental shelf of Thailand in the Gulf of Thailand. 
The continental shelf has been demarcated on the basis of the right according to the 
generaJJy accepted principles of international law and the Convocation on the 
Continental Shelf done at Geneva on 29th April 1958 and ratified by Thailand on 2nd 
July 1968 has been taken into account. 
The map and connecting points determining geographical co-ordinates under this 
Proclamation are to show the general demarcation lines of the continental shelf. As for 
the sovereignty rights over the territorial sea adjacent to the territorial sea of the 
neighbouring countries, which will be taken as starting point of the line dividing the 
continental shelf, it will be according to future agreement on the basis of the provisions 
of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone done at Geneva on 
29th April 1958. 
Given the 18th May B.E. 2516, being the 28th year of the present Reign. 
Countersigned by 
Field Marshall Thanom Kittikachorn 
Prime Minister 
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Geographical coordinates of the connecting points constituting 
the continental shelf of Thailand in the Gulf of Thailand 
Numerical point Latitude North Longitude East 
I 11 °39' .0 I 02°55' .0 
2 09°48' .5 101 °46' .5 
3 09°43'.0 101°48'.5 
4 09°42'.0 I 01 °49' .0 
5 09°28' .5 101°53'.5 
6 09°13'.0 101°58'.5 
7 09°11 '.0 101°59'.0 
8 08°52' .0 I 02° 13' .0 
9 08°47' .0 102° 16' .5 
10 08°42' .0 102°26'.5 
11 08°33' .0 102°38' .0 
12 08°29'.0 102°43'.0 
13 O]D49'.5 103°05'.5 
14 O]D25'.0 103°24'.8 
15 06°50'.0 102°21'.2 
16 06°27' .8 102°09'.6 
17 06°27' .5 102° 10'.0 
( 18) 06° 14' .5 102°05' .6 
Source: On file with the author. 
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Appendix 9 
Coordinates of South Vietnam's 6 June 1971 Continental Shelf Claim 
Points Latttude Longitude Points Latitude Longitude 
&0 19'j'; 104°50'E. !3 10°03' ~03°31. 
.· sa-~• 
.:u !05°27' :9 i0"'22' t03°4l' 
~ 9"00' lC5°40' 2•J l0°29' 103,~5' 
4 9C2S' 106°45' 21 !00'3!. ;03"'45' 
5 10°09' 107°06' 22 ~0"3!' 103°47' 
6 10"''32' l 08°00' 23 !O"JO' 10.3"'54' 
i 11 ~oo· 108"36' 24 !0°30' 103"57' 
3 i 1 ~ao· t lC,OO' 25 :0°19. 104°04' 
9 7e05' l ) 0°00' 26 10":24' :04°; l' 
10 5~20' l07°'20' ~'7 L. 1 0"23' !04°20' 
l! :~o;· 103°52' 28 10"28' 104°21' 
' i2 7'0J4' 103°19' i 29 10"!4' 104"22' 
i 13 7e42' I 02°58' ::a 10°23' !04~4' 
I 
!04°31 \ 14 8°31' !0! 0 56' I 21 toooo· 
i5 9°36' l01°31)' i 32 o9 36' l04°3l' i 
I 
16 10°09' \01°27' ! 33 ~.,.26' 104°36' j: 
17 10°09' I 0:2°$8' I I 
Source: On tile with the author. 
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Appendix 10 
Treaty between the Kingdom of Thailand and Malaysia Relating to the 
Delimitation of the Territorial Seas of the Two Countries, 
24 October 1979 
THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND AND MALAYSIA, DESIRING to strengthen the 
existing historical bonds of friendship between two countries, NOTING that the coasts 
of the two countries are adjacent to each other in Northern part of the Straits of Malacca, 
as well as in the Gulf of Thailand, AND DESIRING to establish the common 
boundaries of the territorial is of the two Countries, HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS: 
Article I 
( 1) The boundary of the Thai and the Malaysian territorial seas in the part of the Straits 
of Malacca between the islands known as the 'Butang Group' and Pulau Langkawi 
where overlapping occurs shall be formed by the straight lines drawn from the point 
situated in mid-channel between Pulau Terutau and Pulau Langkawi referred to in the 
Boundary Protocol annexed to the Treaty dated March lOth, 1909 respecting the 
boundaries of the Kingdom of Thail~md and Malaysia, whose co-ordinates are hereby 
agreed to be Latitude 6° 28' .5 N Longitude 99° 39' .2 E, in a north-westerly direction 
to a point whose co-ordinates are Latitude 6° 30' .2 N Longitude 99° 33' .4 E and 
from there in a south-westerly direction to a point whose co-ordinates are Latitude 6° 
28' .9 N Longitude 99° 30' .7 E and from there in a south-westerly direction again to 
the point whose co-ordinates are Latitude 6° 18' .4 N Longitude 99° 27' .5 E. 
(2) The outer limit of the territorial seas of the islands known as the 'Butang Group' to 
the south of the said islands shall be formed by the boundary lines joining the points 
whose co-ordinates are Latitude 6° 18'.4 N Longitude 99° 27'.5 E referred to in 
paragraph (1) above and from there to the point whose co-ordinates are Latitude 6° 
16' .3 N Longitude 99° 19' .3 E and from there to the point whose co-ordinates are 
Latitude 6° 18'.0 Nand Longitude 99° 06'.7 E. 
(3) The co-ordinates of the points specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) are geographical 
co-ordinates derived from the British Admiralty Charts No. 793 and No. 830 and the 
boundary lines connecting them are indicated on the charts attached as Annexures 
'A(l)' and 'A(2)' to this Treaty. 
Article II 
(I) The boundary of the Thai and the Malaysian territorial seas in the Gulf of Thailand 
shall be formed by the straight line drawn from a point whose co-ordinates are 
Latitude 6° 14' .5 N Longitude I 02° 05' .6 E to a point whose co-ordinates are 
Latitude 60° 27' .5 N Longitude 102" 10' .0 E. 
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(2) The co-ordinates of the points specified in paragraph (1) are geographical co-
ordinates derived from the British Admiralty Chart No. 3961 and the boundary line 
connecting them is indicated on the chart attached as Annexure 'B' to this Treaty. 
Article III 
(I) The actual location at sea of the points mentioned in Article I and Article II above 
shall be determined by a method to be mutually agreed upon by the competent 
authorities of the two Parties. 
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (I), 'competent authorities' in relation to the Kingdom 
of Thailand means the Director of the Hydrographic Department, Thailand, and 
includes any person authorised by him and in relation to Malaysia, the Director of 
National Mapping, Malaysia, and includes any person authorised by him. 
Article IV 
Each Party hereby, undertakes to ensure that all the necessary steps shall be taken at the 
domestic level to comply with the terms of this Treaty. 
Article V 
Any dispute between the two Parties arising out of the interpretation or implementation 
of this Treaty shall be settled peacefully by consultation or negotiation. 
Article VI 
This Treaty shall be ratified in accordance with the legal requirements of the two 
Countries. 
Article VII 
This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of the Instruments of 
Ratification. 
DONE IN DUPLICATE AT Kuala Lumpur the Twenty-fourth day of October, Nineteen 
Hundred and Seventy-nine in the Thai, Malaysian and English Languages. In the event 
of any conflict' between the texts, the English text shall prevail. 
FOR THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND 
(Signed) 
(GENERAL KRIANGSAK 
CHOMANAN) 
Prime Minister 
FOR MALAYSIA 
(Signed) 
(DATUK HUSSEIN 
ONN) 
Prime Minister 
Source: Reproduced in Charney and Alexander, 1993: I ,096-1,098. 
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Appendix 11 
United Kingdom- Siam Boundary Treaty, 10 March 1909 
His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the 
British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the King of 
Siam, being desirous of settling various questions which have arisen affecting their 
respective dominions, have decided to conclude a Treaty, and have appointed for this 
purpose as their Plenipotentiaries: 
His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ralph Paget, Esq., his Envoy Extraordinary and 
Minister Plenipotentiary, &c.; 
His Majesty King of Siam, His Royal Highness Prince Devawongse Varoprakar, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, &c.; who, after having communicated to each other their 
respective full powers, and found them to be in good and due form, have agreed upon 
and concluded the following Articles:-
Article 1 
The Siamese Government transfers to the British Government all rights of suzerainty, 
protection, administration, and control whatsoever which they possess over the States of 
Kelantan, Tringganu, Kedah, Perl is, and adjacent islands. The frontiers of these 
territories are defined by the Boundary Protocol annexed hereto. 
Article 2 
The transfer provided for in the preceding Article shall take place within thirty days 
after the ratification of this Treaty. 
Article 3 
A mixed Commission, composed of Siamese and British officials and officers. shall be 
appointed within six months after the date of ratification of this Treaty, and shall be 
charged with the delimitation of the new frontier. The work of the Commission shall be 
commenced as soon as the season permits, and shall be carried out in accordance with 
the Boundary Protocol annexed hereto. 
Subjects of His Majesty the King of Siam residing within the territory described in 
Article I who desire to preserve their Siamese nationality will, during the period of six 
months after the ratification of the present Treaty, be allowed to do so if they become 
domiciled in the Siamese dominions. His Britannic Majesty's Government undertake 
that they shall be at liberty to retain their immovable property within the territory 
described in 
Article I. 
444 
Appendicies 
It is understood that in accordance with the usual custom where a change of suzerainty 
takes place, any Concessions within the territories described in Article 1 hereof to 
individuals or Companies, granted by or with the approval of the Siamese Government, 
and recognised by them as still in force on the date of the signature of the Treaty, will be 
recognised by the Government of His Britannic Majesty. 
Article 4 
His Britannic Majesty's Government undertake that the Government of the Federated 
Malay States shall assume the indebtedness to the Siamese Government of the territories 
described in Article 1. 
Article 5 
The jurisdiction of the Siamese International Courts, established by Article 8 of the 
Treaty of the 3rd September, I 883, shall, under the conditions defined in the Jurisdiction 
Protocol annexed hereto, be extended to all British subjects in Siam registered at the 
British Consulates before the date of the present Treaty. 
This system shall come to an end, and the jurisdiction of the International Courts shall 
be transferred to the ordinary Siamese Courts after the promulgation and the coming 
into force of the Siamese codes, namely, the Penal Code, the Civil and Commercial 
Codes, the Codes of Procedure, and the Law for organisation of Courts. 
All other British subjects in Siam, shall be subjected to the jurisdiction of the ordinary 
Siamese Courts under the conditions defined in the Jurisdiction Protocol. 
British subjects shall enjoy throughout the whole extent of Siam the rights and 
privileges enjoyed by the natives of the country, notably the right of property, the right 
of residence and travel. 
They and their property shall be subject to all taxes and services, but these shall not be 
other or higher than the taxes and services which are or may be imposed by law on 
Siamese subjects. It is particularly understood that the limitation in the Agreement of the 
20th September, 1900, by which the taxation of land shall not exceed that on similar 
land in Lower Burmah, is hereby removed. 
British subjects in Siam shall be exempt from all military service, either in the army or 
navy, and from all forced loans or military exactions or contributions. 
Article 7 
The provisions of all Treaties, Agreements, and Conventions between Great Britain and 
Siam. not modified by the present Treaty, remain in full force. 
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Article 8 
The present Treaty shall be ratified within four months from its date. 
In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and 
affixed their seals. 
Done at Bangkok, in duplicate, the lOth day of March, in the year 1909. 
Ralph Paget. 
Devawongse Varoprakar. 
Boundary Protocol Annexed to the Treaty, 10 March 1909 
[I] The frontiers between the territories of His Majesty the King of Siam and the 
territory over which his suzerain rights have by the present Treaty been transferred to 
His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland are as follows:-
Commencing from the most seaward point of the northern bank of the estuary 
of the Pedis River and thence north to the range of hills which is the watershed between 
the Pedis River on the one side and the Pujoh River on the other; then following the 
watershed formed by the said range of hills until it reaches the main watershed or 
dividing line between those rivers which flow into the Gulf of Siam on the one side and 
into the Indian Ocean on the other; following this main watershed so as to pass the 
sources of the Sungei Patani, Sungei Telubin, and Sungei Perak, to a point which is the 
source of the Sungei Pergau; then leaving the main watershed and going along the 
watershed separating the waters of the Sungei Pergau from the Sungei Tehibin, to the 
hill called Bukit Jeli or the source of the main stream of the Sungei Golok. Thence the 
frontier follows the thalweg of the main stream of the Sungei Golok to the sea at a place 
called Kuala Tabar. 
This line will leave the valleys of the Sungei Patani, Sungei Telubin, and Sungei 
Tanjung Mas and the valley on the left or west bank of the Golok to Siam and the whole 
valley of the Perak River and the valley on the right or east bank of the Golok to Great 
Britain. 
Subjects of each of the parties may navigate the whole of the waters of the Sungei Golok 
and its affluents. 
The island known as Pub Langkawi, together with all the islets south of mid-channel 
between Terutau and Langkawi and all the islands south of Langkawi shall become 
British. Terutau and the islets to the north of mid-channel shall remain to Siam. 
With regard to the islands close to the west coast, those lying to the north of the parallel 
of latitude where the most seaward point of the north bank of the estuary of the Penis 
River touches the sea shall remain to Siam, and those lying to the south of that parallel 
shall become British. 
All islands adjacent to the eastern States of Kelantan, and Tringganu, south of a parallel 
of latitude drawn from the point where the Sungei Golok reaches the coast at a place 
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called Kuala Tabar shall be transferred to Great Britain, and all islands to the north of 
that parallel shall remain to Siam. 
A rough sketch of the boundary herein described is annexed hereto. 
[2] The above-described boundary shall be regarded as final, both by the Government of 
His Britannic Majesty and that of Siam, and they mutually undertake that, so far as the 
boundary effects any alteration of the existing boundaries of any State or province, no 
claim for compensation on the ground of any such alteration made by any State or 
province so affected shall be entertained or supported by either. 
[3] It shall be the duty of the Boundary Commission, provided for in Article 
3 of the Treaty of this date, to determine and eventually mark out the frontier above 
described. 
If during the operations of delimitation it should appear desirable to depart from the 
frontier as laid down herein, such rectification shall not under any circumstances be 
made to the prejudice of the Siamese Government. 
In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol and 
affixed their seals. 
Done at Bangkok, in duplicate, the lOth day of March, 1909. 
Source: Reproduced in Prescott, 1975: 424-427. 
Ralph Paget. 
Devawongse Varoprakar. 
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Appendix 12 
Memorandum of Understanding between Malaysia and the Kingdom 
of Thailand on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Boundary 
between the Two Countries in the Gulf of Thailand, 
24 October 1979 
MALAYSIA AND THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND, 
DESIRING to strengthen the existing historical bonds of friendship between the two 
Countries, 
AND DESIRING to establish the continental shelf boundary of the two countries in the 
Gulf of Thailand, 
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS: 
Article I 
(I) The boundary of the continental shelf in the Gulf of Thailand between Malaysia and 
the Kingdom of Thailand shall consist of straight lines joining in the order specified 
below the points whose co-ordinates are: 
(i) Latitude 6° 27' .5 N 
Longitude 102° 10' .0 E 
(ii) Latitude 6° 27' .8 N 
Longitude 102° 09' .6 E 
(iii) Latitude 6° 50' .0 N 
Longitude 102° 21 '.2 E 
(2) The co-ordinates of point (ii) above have been determined by reference to a point 
whose co-ordinates are Latitude 60 16'.6 N Longitude 1020 03'.8, this point being the 
former position of Kuala Tabar under the Boundary Protocol annexed to the Treaty 
between Siam and Great Britain signed at Bangkok on the I Oth March I 909. 
Article II 
(I) The co-ordinates of the points specified in Article I above are geographical co-
ordinates derived from the British Admiralty Chart No. 3961 and the boundary lines 
connecting them are indicated on the chart attached as an Annexure to this 
Memorandum. 
(2) The actual location of these points at sea and of the lines connecting them will be 
determined by a method to be mutually agreed upon by the competent authorities of the 
two Countries. 
(3) For the purpose of paragraph (2) of this Article, the term "competent authorities" in 
relation to Malaysia shall mean the Director of National Mapping and include any 
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person authorised by him, and in relation to the Kingdom of Thailand the Director of the 
Hydrographic Department and include any person authorised by him. 
Article III 
The Governments of the two Countries shall continue negotiations to complete 
delimitation of the continental shelf boundary of the two Countries in the Gulf of 
Thailand. 
Article IV 
If any single geological petroleum or natural gas structure or field, or any mineral 
deposit of whatever character, extends across the boundary lines referred to in Article I, 
the two Governments shall communicate to each other information in this regard and 
shall seek to reach agreement as to the manner in which the structure, field or deposit 
will be most effectively exploited; and all expenses incurred and benefits derived 
therefrom shall be equitably shared. 
Article V 
Any difference or dispute arising out of the interpretation or implementation the 
provisions of this Memorandum shall be settled peacefully by consultation or 
negotiation between the Parties. 
Article VI 
This Memorandum shall be ratified in accordance with the constitutional requirements 
of each Country. It shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of the Instruments 
of Ratification. 
DONE IN DUPLICATE at Kuala Lumpur, the Twenty-fourth day of October, One 
Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-nine in the Malaysian, Thai and English 
languages. In the event of any conflict between the texts, the English shall prevail. 
FOR MALAYSIA 
THAILAND 
(Datuk Hussein Onn) 
Chomanan) 
Prime Minister 
FOR THE KINGDOM OF 
(General Tun Kriangsak 
Prime Minister 
Source: Reproduced in Charney and Alexander, 1993: I, I 05-1, I 07. 
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Appendix 13 
Memorandum of Understanding between the Kingdom of Thailand 
and Malaysia on the Establishment of a Joint Authority for the 
Exploitation of the Resources of the Sea-Bed in a Defined Area of the 
Continental Shelf of the Two Countries in the Gulf of Thailand, 
21 February 1979 
The Kingdom of Thailand and Malaysia, 
DESIRING to strengthen further the existing bonds of traditional friendship 
between the two countries; 
RECOGNIZING that, as a result of overlapping claims made by the two 
countries regarding the boundary line of their continental shelves in the Gulf Thailand, 
there exists an overlapping area on their adjacent continental shelves; 
NOTING that the existing negotiations between the two countries on the 
delimitation of the boundary of the continental shelf in the Gulf of Thailand may 
continue for some time; 
CONSIDERING that it is in the best interests of the two countries to exploit 
resources of the sea-bed in the overlapping area as soon as possible; and, 
CONVINCED that such activities can be carried out jointly through mutual 
cooperation. 
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS: 
Article I 
Both Parties agree that as a result of overlapping claims made by the two countries 
regarding the boundary line of their continental shelves in the Gulf of Thailand, there 
exists an overlapping area, which is defined as that area bounded by straight lines 
joining the following coordinated points:-
(A) N 6° 50'.0 El02°21'.2 
(B) N r 10'.25 E 102° 29'.0 
(C) N 7o 49'.0 E 103°02'.5 
(D) Nr 22'.0 E 103° 42'.5 
(E) N r 20'.0 E 103° 39'0 
(F) N 7o 03'.0 E 103° 06'.0 
(G) N 6° 53'.0 E 102° 34'.0 
and shown in the relevant part of the British Admiralty Chart No.2414, Edition 1967, 
annexed hereto. 
Article II 
Both Parties agree to continue to resolve the problem of the delimitation of the boundary 
of the continental shelf in the Gulf of Thailand between the two countries by 
negotiations or such other peaceful means as agreed to by both Parties, in accordance 
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with the principles of international law and practice especially those agreed to in the 
Agreed Minutes of the Malaysia-Thailand Officials' Meeting on Delimitation of the 
Continental Shelf Boundary Between Malaysia and Thailand in the Gulf of Thailand and 
in the South China Sea, 27 February-! March 1978, and in the spirit of friendship and in 
the interest of mutual security. 
Article III 
(I) There shall be established a Joint Authority to be known as "Malaysia-Thailand Joint 
Authority" (hereinafter referred to as "the Joint Authority") for the purpose of the 
exploration and exploitation of the non-living natural resources of the sea-bed and 
subsoil in the overlapping area for a period of fifty years commencing from the date this 
Memorandum comes into force. 
(2) The Joint Authority shall assume all rights and responsibilities on behalf of both 
Parties for the exploration and exploitation of the non-living natural resources of the 
sea-bed and subsoil in the overlapping area (hereinafter referred to as the joint 
development area) and also for the development, control and administration of the joint 
development area. The assumption of such rights and responsibilities by the Joint 
Authority shall in no way affect or curtail the validity of concessions or licences hitherto 
issued or agreements or arrangements hitherto made by either Party. 
(3) The Joint Authority shall consist of:-
(a) two joint-chairmen, one from each country, and 
(b) an equal number of members from each country. 
(4) Subject to the provisions of this Memorandum, the Joint Authority shall exercise on 
behalf of both Parties all the powers necessary for, incidental to or connected with the 
discharge of its functions relating to the exploration and exploitation of the non-living 
natural resources of the sea-bed and subsoil in the joint development area. 
(5) All costs incurred and benefits derived by the Joint Authority from activities carried 
out in the joint development area shall be equally borne and shared by both Parties. 
(6) If any single geological petroleum or natural gas structure or field, or other mineral 
deposits of whatever character, extends beyond the limit of the joint development area 
defined in Article I, the Joint Authority and the Party or Parties concerned shall 
communicate to each other all information in this regard and shall seek to reach 
agreement as to the manner in which the structure, field or deposit will be most 
effectively exploited; and all expenses incurred and benefits derived therefrom shall be 
equitably shared. 
Article IV 
(1) The rights conferred or exercised by the national authority of either Party in matters 
of fishing, navigation, hydrographic and oceanographic surveys, the prevention and 
control of marine pollution and other similar matters (including all powers of 
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enforcement in relation thereto) shall extend to the joint development area and such 
rights shall be recognised and respected by the Joint Authority. 
(2) Both Parties shall have a combined and coordinated security arrangement in the joint 
development area. 
Article V 
The criminal jurisdiction of Malaysia in the joint development area shall extend over 
that area bounded by straight lines joining the following coordinated points:-
(A) N 6° 50'.0 E102°21'.2 
(X) N 7° 35'.0 E 103° 23'.0 
(D) Nr 22'.0 E 103° 42' .5 
(E) N 7o 20'.0 E 103° 39'0 
(F) N]O 03'.0 E 103° 06' .0 
(G) N 6° 53'.0 E 102° 34'.0 
The criminal jurisdiction of the Kingdom of Thailand in the joint development area shall 
extend over that area bounded by straight lines joining the following coordinated 
points:-
(A) 
(B)· 
(C) 
(X) 
N 6° 50'.0 
N 7o 10'.25 
N 7o 49'.0 
N r 35'.0 
E 102° 21 '.2 
E 102° 29'.0 
E 103° 02'.5 
E 103° 23' .0 
The areas of criminal jurisdiction of both Parties defined under this Article shall not in 
any way be construed as indicating the boundary line of the continental shelf between 
the two countries in the joint development area, which boundary is to be determined as 
provided for by Article II, nor shall such definition in any way prejudice the sovereign 
rights of either Party in the joint development area. 
Article VI 
(1) Notwithstanding Article III, if both parties arrive at a satisfactory solution on the 
problem of the delimitation of the boundary of the continental shelf before the expiry of 
the said fifty-year period, the Joint Authority shall be wound up and all assets 
administered and liabilities incurred by it shall be equally shared and borne by both 
Parties. A new arrangement may, however, be concluded if both Parties so decide. 
(2) If no satisfactory solution is found on the problem of the delimitation of the 
boundary of the Continental Shelf within the said fifty-year period, the existing 
arrangement shall continue after the expiry of the said period. 
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Article VII 
Any difference or dispute arising out of the interpretation or implementation of the 
provisions of this Memorandum shall be settled peacefully by consultation or 
negotiation between the Parties. 
Article VIII 
This Memorandum shall come into force on the date of exchange of instruments of 
ratification. 
DONE in duplicate at Chiang Mai, the Twenty-first day of February in the year One 
thousand Nine hundred and Seventy-nine, in the Thai, Malay and English Languages. 
In the event of any conflict among the texts, the English text shall prevail. 
For The Kingdom Of Thailand 
(General Kriangsak Chomanan) 
Prime Minister 
For Malaysia 
(Datuk Hussein Onn) 
Prime Minister 
Source: Reproduced in Charney and Alexander, 1993: 1,107-1,111. 
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Appendix 14 
Agreement between the Government of Malaysia and the Government 
of the Kingdom of Thailand on the Constitution and Other Matters 
Relating to the Establishment of the Malaysia-Thailand Joint 
Authority, 30 May 1990 
THE GOVERNMENT OF MALAYSIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
KINGDOM OF THAILAND, hereinafter referred to as 'the Governments,' 
DESIRING to implement the Memorandum of Understanding between Malaysia and 
the Kingdom of Thailand on the Establishment of a Joint Authority for the Exploitation 
of the Resources of the Sea-bed in a Defined Area of the Continental Shelf of the Two 
Countries in the Gulf of Thailand dated 21 February 1979, hereinafter referred to as 'the 
Memorandum of Understanding, 1979,' 
HAVE HEREBY AGREED on the establishment of the Malaysia-Thailand Joint 
Authority, hereinafter referred to as 'the Joint Authority,' which shall operate in 
accordance with the following provisions: 
CHAPTER I 
LEGAL STATUS AND ORGANIZATION 
Article 1 
Juristic Personality and Capacity 
(I) The Joint Authority shall have a juristic personality and such capacities as shall be 
provided for in the Acts of Parliament to be enacted by the Government of Malaysia 
and the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand, respectively, for the establishment 
of the Joint Authority, hereinafter referred to as 'the Acts.' 
(2) The drafts of the Acts, referred to in paragraph (1) and attached hereto as Appendix 
A and Appendix B respectively, shall form an integral part of this Agreement. 
Article 2 
Purpose 
( 1) The purpose of the Joint Authority shall be the exploration and exploitation of the 
non-living natural resources of the sea-bed and subsoil, in particular petroleum, in the 
Joint Development Area as defined in the Memorandum of Understanding, 1979 for 
the period of validity of the Memorandum of Understanding, 1979. 
(2) In this Agreement, 'petroleum' means any mineral oil or relative hydrocarbon and 
natural gas existing in its natural condition and casinghead petroleum spirit, 
including bituminous shales and other stratified deposits from which oil can be 
extracted. 
454 
Article 3 
Membership 
(1) The Joint Authority shall comprise 
Appendicies 
(a) two Co-Chairmen, one each to be appointed by the respective Governments; and 
(b) an equal number of members to be appointed by each Government, provided that 
the initial number of members, excluding the CoChairmen, to be appointed by 
each Government shall be six. 
(2) The word 'member' shall, for the purposes of this Agreement, and unless he context 
otherwise requires, include a Co-Chairman. 
Article 4 
Procedure 
(1) The Co-Chairmen shall alternate to perform the functions of a Chairman it meetings 
of the Joint Authority. In the absence of a Co-Chairman during his chairmanship, the 
members of the Joint Authority shall elect a Chairman from amongst the members 
representing the same Government as the corresponding Co-Chairman. When so 
elected, he shall have all the powers of the Chairman. 
(2) The quorum for any meeting of the Joint Authority shall not be less than ten. 
Decisions shall be taken jointly at a meeting by the Co-Chairmen. 
Article 5 
Personal Liability 
No member of the Joint Authority shall incur any personal liability for any loss or 
damage caused by any act or omission in the administration of the affairs of the Joint 
Authority unless such loss or damage is occasioned by a wrongful act, gross negligence 
or omission on his part. 
Article 6 
Emoluments 
The members of the Joint Authority shall be paid such emoluments and other 
allowances as the Joint Authority may determine with the approval of the governments. 
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CHAPTER II 
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS 
Article 7 
Powers and Functions 
(I) The Joint Authority shall control all exploration and exploitation of the non-living 
natural resources in the Joint Development Area and shall be responsible for the 
formulation of policies for the same. 
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the powers and functions of the 
Joint Authority shall include the following: 
(a) to decide, with the approval of the Governments, on the organisational structure of 
the Joint Authority; 
(b) subject to subparagraph (a), to appoint the chief executive officer and other officers 
of the Joint Authority, provided that the appointment of the chief executive officer 
and the deputy chief executive officer shall require the approval of the Governments; 
(c) to decide on the terms and conditions of service of the chief executive officer and 
other officers of the Joint Authority; 
(d) to decide on the plan of operation and the working programme for the administration 
of the Joint Development Area; 
(e) to permit operations and to conclude transactions or contracts for or relating to the 
exploration and exploitation of the non-living natural resources in the Joint 
Development Area subject to the approval of the Governments; 
(f) in respect of any contract referred to in subparagraph (e) for the exploration and 
exploitation of petroleum 
(i) to approve and extend the period of exploration and exploitation; 
(ii) to approve the work programmes and budgets of the contractor; and 
to approve the production programmes of the contractor, including the production costs, 
conditions and schedules of the production; 
(g) in respect of an operator of any contract referred to in subparagraph (f) 
(i) to inspect and audit the operator's books and accounts relating to its operations in the 
Joint Development Area; 
(ii) to take periodic inventories of the properties and assets procured by the operator for 
petroleum operations; and 
(iii) to receive, collate and store all data supplied by the operator relating to its 
operations in the Joint Development Area; 
(h) to approve and award tenders and contracts relating to goods and services required in 
carrying out petroleum operations in the Joint Development Area; 
(i) to appoint committees, sub-committees or independent experts and consultants where 
necessary for the administration of the Joint Authority; 
U) to regulate any meeting of the Joint Authority, any committee and sub-committee 
thereof; and 
(k) to do any other thing incidental to or necessary for the performance of any of its 
functions. 
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Article 8 
Production Sharing 
( 1) For the purpose of paragraph (2)(f) of Article 7, any contract awarded to any person 
for the exploration and exploitation of petroleum in the Joint Development Area 
shall, in accordance with subsection (3) of section 14 of the Acts, be a production 
sharing contract. 
(2) A production sharing contract referred to in paragraph (1) shall include, without 
prejudice to paragraph (3), the terms and conditions specified in subsection (3) of 
section 14 of the Acts as follows: 
(a) the contract shall be valid for a period not exceeding thirty-five years but shall not 
exceed the period of validity of this Agreement; 
(b) payment in the amount of ten per centum of gross production of petroleum by the 
contractor to the Joint Authority as royalty in the manner and at such times as may be 
specified in the contract. 
(c) fifty per centum of gross production of petroleum shall be applied by the contractor 
for the purpose of recovery of costs for petroleum operations; 
(d) the remaining portion of gross production of petroleum, after deduction for the 
purpose of subparagraphs (b) and (c), shall be deemed to be profit petroleum and be 
divided equally between the Joint Authority and the contractor; 
(e) all costs of petroleum operations shall be borne by the contractor and shall, subject 
to subparagraph (c), be recoverable from production; 
(f) a minimum amount that the contractor shall extend on petroleum operations under 
the contract as a minimum commitment as may be agreed to by the Joint Authority and 
the contractor; 
(g) payment of a research cess by the contractor to the Joint Authority in the amount of 
one half of one per centum of the aggregate of that portion of gross production which is 
applied for the purpose of recovery of costs under subparagraph (c) and the contractor's 
share of profit petroleum under subparagraph (d) in the manner and at such times as may 
be determined by the Joint Authority, provided that such payment shall not be 
recoverable from production; and 
(h) any disputes or differences arising out of or in connection with the contract which 
cannot be amicably settled shall be referred to arbitration before a panel consisting of 
three arbitrators, one arbitrator to be appointed by each party, and a third to be jointly 
appointed by both parties. If the parties are unable to concur on the choice of a third 
arbitrator within a specified period, the third arbitrator shall be appointed upon 
application to the United Nations Commission of International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL). The arbitration proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the 
rules of UNCITRAL. The venue of 
arbitration shall be either Bangkok or Kuala Lumpur, or any other place as may be 
agreed to by the parties. 
(3) In addition to the matters specified in paragraph (2), production sharing contract 
may, at the option of the Joint Authority, include the following: 
(a) the period referred to under subparagraph (a) of paragraph (2) shall be applied as 
follows: 
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(i) in respect of a contract for petroleum (other than gas), the periods for the 
purposes of exploration, development and production shall not exceed five years, 
five years and twenty-five years, respectively; and 
(ii) in respect of a contract for gas, the periods for the purposes of exploration, the 
identification and nomination of the gas market, development and production shall 
not exceed, in respect of the first three periods, five years each, and in respect of 
the fourth period, twenty years; 
Provided that any period referred to in subparagraphs (a)(i) and (a) (ii) may be varied 
by the Joint Authority from time to time as may be necessary on condition that where 
any such variation affects a subsisting contract it shall only be made with the 
agreement of the contractor; 
Provided further that where the first commercial production occurs, in the case of 
(A) petroleum (other than gas), before the expiry of the development period, the 
balance of that development period shall be added to the production period; and 
(B) gas, before the expiry of the period for the identification and nomination of the 
gas market or the development period, the balance of either of those periods shall 
be added to the production period; 
(b) title to any equipment or assets purchased or acquired by the contractor for the 
purpose of petroleum operations shall pass to the Joint Authority upon such purchase 
or acquisition; 
(c) the Joint Authority shall have title to all original data (raw, processed or 
interpreted) resulting from petroleum operations, including but not limited to 
geological, geophysical, core samples, petro-physical, well completion reports, 
engineering and other data reports and actual samples as the contractor may collect 
and compile; and 
(d) the contractor shall purchase or acquire equipment, facilities, goods, materials, 
supplies, including services and research facilities, professional or otherwise, from 
sources in Malaysia or the Kingdom of Thailand where technically and economically 
feasible. 
(4) The Joint Authority may vary any of the amounts referred to in subparagraphs (c), 
(d) and (g) of paragraph (2) in respect of any contract with the approval of the 
Governments: 
Provided that there shall be no variation of any of these amounts in respect of a 
subsisting contract without the agreement of the contractor. 
(5) For the purpose of this Article-
(a) 'first commercial production' in relation to petroleum (other than gas) means the 
date that production has continued for a period of twenty-four hours following 
completion of testing from the first production well, and, in relation to gas, means the 
date within the first sixty days on which a cumulative 106 Giga Joule (approximately 
947 billion BTTJ) of gas is first sold or the sixtieth day after the gas is first sold if the 
cumulative sale within the first sixty days does not exceed 106 Giga Joule; and 
(b) 'gross production' with reference to gas means gross proceeds of sale of gas. 
(6) The contractor shall pay export duty on its share of profit oil and petroleum income 
tax in accordance with Article 16 and Article 17 of this Agreement, respectively. 
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CHAPTER III 
FINANCIAL PROVISIONS 
Article 9 
Finance 
(1) All costs incurred and benefits derived by the Joint Authority from activities carried 
out in the Joint Development Area shall be equally borne and shared by the 
Governments. 
(2) Until such time as the Joint Authority shall have sufficient income to finance its 
annual operational expenditure, the Governments shall annually provide the Joint 
Authority with the agreed amounts of money in equal shares to be paid into the 
Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority Fund, hereinafter referred to as 'the Fund.' 
(3) Thereupon, as specified in paragraph (2), and unless otherwise decided by the 
Governments, all such annual government contributions shall cease. 
Article 10 
Accounts and Records 
(1) The Joint Authority shall cause proper accounts and other records of its transactions 
and affairs to be kept in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles 
and shall do all things necessary to ensure that all incomes are properly accounted for 
and that all expenditures out of the Fund including payments of salaries, 
remuneration and other monetary benefits to members of the Joint Authority and its 
employees, are properly authorised and that adequate control is maintained over the 
assets of or in the custody of the Joint Authority. 
(2) Either Government may at any time direct any accounts or records to be made 
available to it and the Joint Authority shall comply with such direction. 
Article 11 
Budget 
The annual budget of the Joint Authority shall be submitted to the Governments well in 
advance before the financial year of the respective Governments for their approval. 
Article 12 
Audit 
(1) The Joint Authority shall have a financial year beginning on the first day of January. 
(2) The accounts of the Joint Authority shall be audited annually by an auditor appointed 
by the Joint Authority with the approval of the Governments. 
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(3) The Joint Authority shall, within six months after the end of each financial year, 
have its accounts audited and transmitted to both Governments together with a copy 
of any observations made by the auditor on any statement or on the accounts of the 
Joint Authority and a copy of the annual report dealing with the activities of the Joint 
Authority in the preceding year. 
CHAPTER IV 
REGULATIONS AND RELATIONS WITH OTHER ORGANISATIONS 
Article 13 
Regulations 
The Joint Authority may, in accordance with and for the purpose of section 15 of the 
Acts, submit recommendations on regulations in respect of any matter falling thereunder 
to the Governments for consideration. 
Article 14 
Relations with other Organisations 
In order to fulfil its purpose, the Joint Authority may cooperate with any government or 
organisation, and, to this end, may, subject to the approval of the Governments, 
conclude any agreement or arrangement with such government or organisation. 
CHAPTERV 
THE ACTS 
Article 15 
Amendment of the Acts 
In order to facilitate the efficient management and operation of this Agreement, the 
Governments agree that the Acts shall not be amended without prior agreement between 
the Governments. 
CHAPTER VI 
CUSTOMS AND EXCISE, AND TAXATION 
Article 16 
Customs Matters 
(I) For the purpose of Part X of the Acts 
(a) the rate of export duty payable by the contractor in respect of the contractor's 
share of profit oil sold outside Malaysia and the Kingdom of Thailand shall be ten 
per centum subject to the provision of subparagraph (b)(ii); 
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(b) the Customs and Excise Authorities shall continue to exercise all powers in 
relation to all matters relating to the regulation of the movement of goods imported 
into or exported from the Joint Development Area in accordance with the existing 
legislation of Malaysia or the Kingdom of Thailand, as the case may be, subject to 
the following: 
(i) customs approved goods, equipment and materials for use in the Joint 
Development Area shall be accorded duty exemption if they are imported by the 
Joint Authority or any person authorised by 
it; 
Provided that where one of the Governments proposes to impose any duties or 
taxes on any such customs approved goods, equipment and materials, it may 
impose such duties or taxes after consultation with the other Government; 
(ii) Malaysia and the Kingdom of Thailand shall collect their respective duties 
and taxes collectible under their respective legislation but shall reduce the 
applicable rates by fifty per centum; 
(iii) any goods entering the Joint Development Area from: 
(A) a third country, any licensed warehouse or bonded area of either 
Malaysia or the Kingdom of Thailand shall be deemed an import; and 
(B) Malaysia or the Kingdom of Thailand, shall be deemed an internal 
movement, provided they are customs approved goods, equipment and 
materials for use in the Joint Development Area; 
(iv) any goods produced in the Joint Development Area entering Malaysia or the 
Kingdom of Thailand or a third country shall be deemed an export; 
(v) any goods which has entered the Joint Development Area under the situation 
described in subparagraph (b)(iii)(B) and is to be moved into Malaysia or the 
Kingdom of Thailand shall be subject to the laws of Malaysia or the Kingdom of 
Thailand, as the case may be; 
(vi) any goods falling within the category of goods appearing in both the lists of 
prohibited goods made in accordance with the laws of Malaysia and the 
Kingdom of Thailand, respectively, shall not be permitted to be brought into the 
Joint Development Area: 
Provided that where an exception is required in respect of any specific 
importation, such an exception may be made with the agreement of the 
competent authorities of the other Country; 
(vii) proceeds from any sale of forfeited goods which are the produce of the Joint 
Development Area shall be equally shared by Malaysia and the Kingdom of 
Thailand; 
(c) the Customs and Excise Authorities shall use common customs forms for the 
purpose of import, export and internal movement of goods in the Joint Development 
Area as specified in subparagraphs (b )(iii) and (iv); and 
(d) the Country where the headquarters of the Joint Authority is located shall 
empower the officers of the Customs and Excise Authority of the other Country to 
exercise their authority with regard to customs clearance, including the collection of 
duties and taxes, within the premises of the Joint Customs Office. 
(2) Notwithstanding section 18 of the Acts, and insofar as it applies to customs and 
excise matters, the following arrangements shall apply: 
(a) where an act is committed in the Joint Development Area and that act is an 
offence under the laws of one of the Countries only, such Country whose laws are 
alleged to have been breached may assume jurisdiction over such alleged offence; 
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(b) where the act referred to in subparagraph (a) is an offence under the laws of the 
Countries, the Country which may assume jurisdiction over the act shall be that 
whose officer first makes an arrest or seizure in respect of the alleged offence; and 
(c) where the act referred to in subparagraph (a) is an offence under the laws of the 
Countries and in respect of which there are simultaneous arrests or seizures by the 
Customs and Excise Authorities, the jurisdiction over the alleged offence shall be 
determined through consultation between such Authorities. 
(3) For the purpose of this Article-
( a) 'Countries' means Malaysia and the Kingdom of Thailand, and when used in the 
singular means Malaysia or the Kingdom of Thailand, as the context requires; 
(b) 'customs approved goods' means goods in respect of which customs duties are 
exempted under both the laws of Malaysia and the Kingdom of Thailand relating to 
customs; 
(c) 'Customs and Excise Authority' in relation to Malaysia means the Royal 
Customs and Excise, Malaysia and in relation to the Kingdom 
of Thailand means the Customs Department of Thailand, and when used in the plural 
means both such Authorities; 
(d) 'Joint Customs Committee' means the committee comprising officers of the 
Customs and Excise Authorities established for the purpose of the coordination of the 
administration of customs and excise laws in the Joint Development Area; and 
(e) 'Joint Customs Office' means the office of the Joint Customs Committee 
established in the headquarters of the Joint Authority for the purpose of the 
coordination of the administration of the customs and excise laws in the Joint 
Development Area. 
Article 17 
Taxation 
( 1) For the purpose of Part X of the Acts, the Revenue Authorities of the Governments 
shall, subject to the following, continue to impose and collect taxes in respect of 
income from the Joint Development Area in accordance with the existing tax 
legislation of Malaysia and the Kingdom of Thailand, as the case may be: 
(a) the taxation of such income of any person who holds the right to explore and 
exploit any petroleum in the Joint Development Area under a contract awarded by the 
Joint Authority shall be in accordance with the following rates: 
First 8 years of production 0% of taxable income 
Next 7 years 10% of taxable income 
Subsequent years 20% of taxable income: 
Provided that the tax chargeable by each of the Governments shall be reduced by fifty 
per centum of the amount so chargeable 
Provided further that where the tax chargeable for each year by one of the 
Governments exceeds that chargeable by the other Government, such excess shall be 
shared equally by the two Governments and shall be effected by the Joint Authority 
through appropriate adjustments of payments made under paragraph (d) of section 10 
of the Act 
(b) the taxation of such income of a person who is a Malaysian or Thai national 
exercising employment in the Joint Development Area or with the Joint Authority 
shall be based on his residence; and 
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(c) the taxation of such income of any person other than a person mentioned in 
subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall be in accordance with the Jaws and regulations of 
Malaysia and the Kingdom of Thailand, provided that where the same income is 
subject to tax in both countries, the tax chargeable in each country shall be reduced 
by fifty per centum of the amount so chargeable. 
(2) The Governments agree that any Jaw for taxation which is in the nature of general 
sales tax, including any tax imposed on the provision of goods and services in the 
Joint Development Area, shall not be applicable to the Joint Development Area. 
(3) The Joint Authority shall be exempt from taxation in Malaysia and the Kingdom of 
Thailand. 
( 4) The Revenue Authorities of the Governments shall continue to communicate with 
and consult each other in respect of the implementation and administration of any tax 
law in the Joint Development Area. 
CHAPTER VII 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
Article 18 
Entry into Force and Termination 
(I) This Agreement shall enter into force upon the exchange of instruments of 
ratification, and, unless otherwise agreed to by the Governments, shall remain in 
force for the period of validity of the Memorandum of Understanding, 1979. 
(2) Upon termination of this Agreement, the Joint Authority shall be wound up in 
accordance with a liquidation procedure as may be approved by the Governments. 
Article 19 
Application 
The application and interpretation of the provisions of this Agreement shall be 
consistent with the spirit and provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding, 1979. 
Article 20 
Amendment 
This Agreement may be amended by a joint decision of the Co-Chairmen with the 
approval of the Governments. 
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Any differences or disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the 
provisions of this Agreement shall be settled peacefully by consultation or negotiation 
between the Governments. In the event that no settlement is reached within a period of 
three months either Government may refer the matter to the Prime Minister of Malaysia 
and the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand who shall jointly decide on the 
mode of settlement for the purpose of the particular matter referred to them. 
Article 22 
This Agreement is made in duplicate at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on the Thirtieth day of 
May, in the year One thousand Nine hundred and Ninety, in the English language. 
For The Government Of 
Malaysia 
(Dato' Haji Abu Hassan bin 
Haji Omar) 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 
For The Government Of 
The Kingdom of Thailand 
(Air Chief Marshal Siddhi 
Savetsila) 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Source: Reproduced in Charney and Alexander, 1993: 1,111-1,123. 
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Appendix 15 
:MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN MALAYSIA AND 
THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM FOR THE EXPLORATION 
AND EXPLOITATION OF PETROLEUM IN A DEFINED AREA OF 
THE CONTINENTAL SHELF INVOLVING THE TWO COUNTRIES 
Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 
DESIRING to further strengthen the cooperation between the two countries; 
RECOGNIZING that as a result of overlapping claims made by the two countries 
regarding the boundary lines of their continental shelves located off the northeast coast of West 
Malaysia and off the southwest coast of Vietnam, there exists an overlapping area of their 
continental shelves; 
CONSISTENT with the agreement reached by the leaders of the two countries to 
cooperate in that part of the overlapping area involving the two countries only; 
MINDFUL of the decision by the leaders of the two countries to resolve peacefully the 
question of all overlapping claims involving multiple parties with the parties concerned at an 
appropriate time; 
CONSIDERING that it is in the best interests of both countries, pending delimitation of 
their continental shelves located off the northeast coast of West Malaysia and off the southwest 
coast of Vietnam, to enter into an interim arrangement for the purpose of exploring and exploiting 
petroleum in the seabed in the overlapping area; 
CONVINCED that _such activities can be carried out through mutual cooperation; 
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS: -
ARTICLE I 
(1) Both parties agree that as a result of overlapping claims made by the two countries 
regarding the boundary lines of their continental shelves located off the northeast coast of 
West Malaysia and off the southwest coast of Vietnam, there exists an overlapping area 
(the Defined Area), being that area bounded by straight lines joining the following 
coordinated points: 
A 
B 
N 7° 22.0' 
N 7° 20.0' 
42.5' 
39.0' 
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E 
F 
A 
Nr 18.31' 
N 7° 03.0' 
N 6° 05.8' 
N 6° 48.25' 
N 7° 22.0' 
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E 103° 35.71' 
E 103° 52.0' 
E 105° 49.2' 
E 104° 30.0' 
E 103° 42.5' 
and shown in the relevant part of the British Admiralty Chart No: 2414, Edition 1967, 
annexed hereto. 
(2) The actual location at sea of the points referred to in Clause (1) of this Article shall be 
determined by a method to be mutually agreed upon by the competent authorities of both 
parties. The competent authorities in relation to Malaysia means the Directorate of 
National Mapping Malaysia and includes any person authorised by it and in relation to the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam means the Department of Gee-Cartography and the Navy 
Gee-Cartography Section and includes any person authorised by them. 
ARTICLE IT 
(1) Both parties agree, pending final delimitation of the boundary lines of their continental 
shelves pertaining to the Defined Area, through mutual cooperation, to explore and 
exploit petroleum in that area in accordance with the terms of, and for a period of the 
validity of this Memorandum ofUnderstanding. 
(2) Where a petroleum field is located partly in the Defined Area and partly outside that area 
in the continental shelf of Malaysia or the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, as the case may 
be, both parties shall arrive at mutually acceptable terms for the exploration and 
exploitation of petroleum therein. 
(3) All costs incurred and benefits derived from the exploration and exploitation of petroleum 
in the Defined Area shall be borne and shared equally by both parties. 
ARTICLE ill 
For the purpose of this Memorandum ofUnderstanding-
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(a) Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam agree to nominate PETRONAS 
and PETROVIETNAM, respectively, to undertake, on their respective behalves, 
the exploration and exploitation of petroleum in the Defined Area; 
(b) Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam shall cause PETRONAS and 
PETROVIETNAM, respectively, to enter into a commercial arrangement as 
between them for the exploration and exploitation of petroleum in the Defined 
Area provided that the terms and conditions of that arrangement shall be subject to 
the approval of the Government of Malaysia and the Government of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam; 
(c) both parties agree, taking into account the significant expenditures already incurred 
in the Defined Area, that every effort shall be made to ensure continued early 
exploration of petroleum in the Defined Area. 
ARTICLE IV 
Nothing in this Memorandum of Understanding shall be interpreted so as to in any way-
(a) prejudice the position and claims of either party in relation to and over the Defined 
Area; and 
(b) without prejudice to the provisions of Article ill, confer any rights, interests or 
privileges to any person not being a party hereto in respect of any petroleum 
resources in the Defined Area. 
ARTICLE V 
This Memorandum of Understanding shall continue for a period to be specified by an exchange of 
Diplomatic Note between the two parties. 
ARTICLE VI 
Any dispute ansmg out of the interpretation or implementation of the provisions of this . 
Memorandum ofUnderstanding shall be settled peacefully by consultation or negotiation between 
both parties. 
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ARTICLE VII 
This Memorandum of Understanding shall come into force on the date to be specified by an 
exchange ofDiplomatic Note between the two parties. 
ARTICLE VIII 
For the purpose of this Memorandum ofUnderstanding-
(a) 'Defined Area" means the area referred to in Article I(1) of this Memorandum of 
Understanding; 
(b) '}Jetroleum means any mineral oil or relative hydrocarbon and natural gas existing 
in its natural condition and casinghead petroleum spirit, including bituminous 
shales and other stratified deposits which oil can be extracted; 
(c) '}Jetroleum field" means an area consisting of a single reservoir or multiple 
reservoi~s all grouped on, or related to, the same individual geological structural 
feature, or stratigraphic conditions from which petroleium may be produced 
commercially; 
(d) 'PETRONAS" is the short form of Petroliam Nasional Berhad, a company 
incorporated under the Malaysia Companies Act 1965; and 
(e) 'PETRO VIETNAM'' is the short form of Vietnam National Oil and Gas Company 
established by the Decree ofNo. 250/HDBT of 6 July, 1990. 
Done in duplicate at Kuala Lumpur the 5th day of June in the year One Thousand Nme Hundred 
and Ninety Two in the English language. 
For Malaysia 
H.E. DATUK AHMAD K.AMIL JAAF AR 
Secretary-General, 
Ministry ofF oreign Affairs 
Malaysia 
Source: On file with the author. 
For the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam 
H.E. VU KHOAN 
Vice-Minister ofForeign Affairs 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
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AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN 
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND 
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM 
ON 
THE DELIMITATION OF THE MARITIME BOUNDARY 
BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES 
IN THE GULF OF THAILAND 
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND AND THE GOVERNMENT 
OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. hereinafter referred to as "the 
Contracting Parties·: 
DESIRING to strengthen the existing bonds of friendship :.:>etween the 
two countries: 
-:'.J-
DESIRING to establish the maritime boundary between the 'tv1o 
countries in the relevant part of their overlapping continental shelf claims in the Guli of 
Thailand; 
HAVE AGREED as follows: 
ARTICLE 1 
1. The maritime boundary between. the Kingdom of Thailand and the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam in the relevant part of their overlapping continental sheH 
claims in the Gulf of Thailand is a strai~ht line drawn from Point C to Point K defined 
by latitud~ and longitude as follows: 
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Point C: Latitude Nor 49' 00".0000, Longitude E 103° 02' 30".0000 
Point K: Latitude N 08° 46' 54".7754, Longitude E 102° 12' 11".5342. 
2. Point C is the northernmost point of the Joint Development Area 
established by the Memorandum of Understanding between the Kingdo~ of Thailand 
and Malaysia on the Establishment of a Joint Authority for the Exploitation of the 
Resources of the Sea-Bed in a Defined Area of the Continental Shelf of the Two 
Countries in the Gulf of Thailand, done at Chiangmai on 21 February 1979, and which 
coincides with Point 43 of Malaysia's continental shelf claim advanced in 1979. 
3. Point K is a point situated on the maritime boundary between the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Kingdom of Cambodia, which is the straight line 
equidistant from Tho Chu islands and Pula Wai drawn from Point 0 Latitude N ago 35' 
00".4159 and Longitude E 103° 1 0' 15".9808. 
4. The co-ordinates of the points specified in the above Paragraphs are 
geographical co-ordinates derived from the British Admiralty Chart No. 2414 which is 
attached as an Annex to this Agreement. The geodetic and computational bases used 
are the Ellipsoid Everest -1830 - Indian Datum. 
5. The maritime boundary referred to in Paragraph 1 above shall 
cons~itute the boundary between the continental shelf of the Kingdom of T~ailand and 
the continental shelf of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and shall also constitute the 
boundary between the exclusive econo:nic zone of the Kingdom of Thailand and the 
exclusive economic zone of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 
6. The actual location of the above Points C and K at sea and of the 
straight line connecting them shall, at the request of either Government, be determined 
by a method to be mutually agreed upon by the hydrographic experts authorized for 
this purpose by the two Governments. 
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ARTICLE 2 
The Contrac;ing Parties shall enter into negotiation with the 
Government of Malaysia in order to settle the tripartite overlapping continental shelf 
claim area of the Kingdom of Thailand, the Socialist Republic of y.etnam, and 
Malaysia, which lies within the Thai-Malaysian Joint Development Area established by 
the Memorandum of Understanding between the Kingdom of Thailand and Malaysia on 
the Establishment of a Joint Authority for the Exploitation of the Resource~ of the Sea-
Bed in a Defined Area of the Continental Shelf of the Two Countries in the Gulf of 
Thailand, done at Chiangmai on 21 February 1979. 
ARTICLE 3 
Each Contracting Party shall recognise and acknowledge the jurisdiction 
and the sovereign rights of the other country over the latter's continental shelf and 
exclusive economic zone within the maritime boundary established by this Agreement. 
ARTICLE 4 
If any single geological petroleum or natural gas structure or field, or 
other mineral deposit of whatever character. extends across the boundary line referred a> 
to in Paragraph 1 of Article 1, the Contrc.cting Parties shall communicate to each other 
all infonr.3tion in this regard and shall seek to reach agreement as to the manner in 
which the structure, field or deposit will bE: most effectively exploited and the benefits 
arising from such exploitation will be equitably shared. 
ARTICLE 5 
Any dispute between the Contracting Parties relating to the 
interpretation or implementation of this Agreement shall be settled peacefully" by 
consultation or negotiation. 
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ARTICLE 6 
This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of the 
Instruments of Ratification or Approval, as required by the constitutional procedures of 
each country. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorised by 
their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement 
DONE in duplicate at Bangkok on this 9"' Day of August, One Thousand 
Nine Hundred and Ninety Seven in the Thai, Vietnamese and English languages. In 
the event of any conflict between the texts, the English text shall prevaiL 
For the Government of 
the Kingdom of Thailand 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 
For the Government of 
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
V Lguyen Manh Cam) 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 
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Cambodian Protest Note, 17 February 1998 
MDUSTilY or rollllGM A-'lr J.lJlS 
~ JNTBJtliC411mf.U. COOPD.AT1o .. 
JCJNGOOM OP CAMBODIA 
NA noN-R.EJJOJON·JONO 
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The Ministry of Fureit.tn Affairs and [nternational Cooperarion 
pres4ntS ltcs. comp fiml!nts tu the Royal F.rnbasu;y of Thailand and to the 
Embassy ~f the So<;ialist Republic of Vietnam in Phnom Penh and. with 
ref~rence to the Agrcemem hctwt.:cn the Government of the Kingdom uf 
Thailand and the G<w~ntment of the Socialiit Republic of Vietnam on the 
DclimitatiNl of the Mm·itime ll<>undary between the two Countries in the 
Gulf of Thailand. has tile honour to declare the positil>n of the ~oyal · 
Govemm~nt ofCalt'lh<.HiitJ il:l fpJiows: 
1 -The ~aid Agr~cment b~twccn Thailand and Vietnam, s\gned on<) 
August 1997 in Bnng.kok, in Artide 1, paragraph 3, which is based on the 
so-called H maritim~ houndar)· )> between the Sod~\ist Rcpt1b1ic of 
Vietnam and the Kingdom of ( :ambodiu, and which C4:lmbodia has never 
agreed to, constitllt<.:s a viot4ltion of Cambodia's. sovereisnty Arid her rights 
over her exelusivc: t:\:onomic zone a$ well as her 1;00tinental shelf in this 
part oftht. Gulf ofThaHand. 
2 - All provi~iotls of the !iaid Agreement are witho'Ut prejudice witn 
respect to Camb<>dia, and an:, t..mdc.:r International law, neither binding UJ)Qn 
Cambodi;J nor afl~ct her rights and legitimate interests in the area in 
question. 
3 -· The boundary delimitation of the continental shelf and the 
exclusive economi~ zone in this part of the Ou1f of Thailand shall be 
determin&d on the basis of o.gre11ment in acoordencc with both the genera) 
principles of international law and the United ~ationt Conven\lon on the 
La.w of the Sea of J 9S2, which calls for all states concerned to achiev~: an 
equitable :solution. 
4 .. ln this conne.cti(,n. Cambodia totally reservea her po~ition in 
relation to any delimitation of the 111aritirne boundary In this part of the 
Gulf of TiuiJJand, which has been made or may be made \liithout the 
agteem(;llt of the Royal OO\Ien1mtmt ofCam'oodia. 
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5 - ln a spirit of goodwill, cooperation and respect of each State's 
sovereignty, the Ro)'al Government Cambodia wishes to reiterate its 
readines~ and. dcteTmination to work in a positive. productive and friendly 
way with its neighbours in order to retch a provisional arrangement of a 
practical nature or a iirua.l ag.tcement ,on thi• matter aa soon aa possiblo. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs atld [memational Cooperation avails 
itself of this opportunity to renew to 1he Royal Embassy of Thailand and to 
the Embassy of the Socialist Ropublic of Vietnam the assurances of Jts 
highest consideration. 
Phnom P~nh, 
ROVAL F-MDASSY OF THAILAND 
PHNOMP~!! 
EMBASSY OF 
TIU; SOCIALIST J~EPU8LIC OV VlETNAM 
PHNQMJf'ENJ! 
Source: On file with the author. 
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Appendix 18 
Franco-Siamese Boundary Treaty, 23 March 1907 
The President of the French Republic and His Majesty the King of Siam following the 
delimitation undertaken in execution of the Convention of 13 February 1904, desiring 
on the one hand to ensure the final settlement of all questions connected with the 
common boundaries of Indo-China and Siam by a reciprocal and rational system of 
exchanges, and desiring on the other hand to ease relations between the two countries by 
the progressive introduction of a uniform legal system and by the extension of the rights 
of those citizens under French jurisdiction established in Siam, have decided to 
conclude a new treaty, and have named to this effect their plenipotentiaries as follows: 
The President of the French Republic: R. Victor-Emile-Marie-Joseph Collin 
(de Plancy) Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the 
French Republic to Siam, Officer of the Legion of Honour and Public Instruction; 
His Majesty the King of Siam: His Royal Highness Prince Devawongse 
Varoprakar, Knight of the Order of Maha-Chakri, Commanding Officer of the 
Legion of Honour, etc., Minister of Foreign Affairs; 
Who, provided with full authority, which has been found in due and proper form, agreed 
to the following dispositions: 
Article I 
The Siamese Government cedes to France the territories of Battambang, Siem-Reap and 
Sisophon, whose boundaries are defined in Clause I of the Protocol of Delimitation 
annexed to this Treaty. 
Article II 
The French Government cedes to Siam the territories of Dan-Sai and Kratt, whose 
borders are defined in Clauses I and ll of the aforementioned Protocol, also all the 
islands situated to the south of Cape Lemling as far as and including Koh-Kut. 
Article III 
The exchange of these territories will take place within twenty days after the date of the 
ratification of the present Treaty. 
Article IV 
A Mixed Commission composed of French and Siamese officers and officials, will be 
named by the two contracting Countries, within four months of the ratification of the 
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present Treaty, and charged with settling the new boundaries. It will commence work as 
soon as the weather allows and they will follow and conform to the Protocol of 
Delimitation annexed to the present Treaty. 
Article V 
[Legal arrangements for aliens] 
Article VI 
[Rights of French citizens in Siam] 
Article VII 
[Treaties unaffected by the present Treaty to remain in force] 
Article VIII 
[French version of the Treaty authoritative] 
Article IX 
[Ratification] 
Done in Bangkok in duplicate on 23 March 1907. 
Annexe 1 
Protocol of delimitation 
V.Collin (de Plancy) 
Devawongse Varoprakar 
In order to facilitate the work of the Commission referred to in Article IV of the Treaty 
dated this day, and to avoid all possibility of difficulty in the delimitation, the 
Government of the French Republic and His Majesty the King of Siam have agreed as 
follows: 
Clause I 
The boundary between French Indo-China and Siam leaves the sea at a point situated 
opposite the highest point of Koh-Kut island. From this point it follows a northeasterly 
direction to the crest of Pnom-Krevanh. It is formally agreed that in every case the sides 
of these mountains which belong to the Klong-Kopo basin remain in French Indo-China. 
The boundary follows the crest of the PnomKrevanh in a northerly direction to Pnom-
Thom which is found on the main water parting between the rivers which flow into the 
Gulf of Siam and those which flow towards the Grand Lac. From Pnom-Thorn, the 
border then follows in a northwesterly direction, then a northerly direction the actual 
boundary between the Provinces of Battambang on one side and those of Chantaboun 
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and Kratt on the other side, as far as a point where the boundary cuts the river Nam-Sai. 
It then follows the course of this river as far as its confluence with the Sisophon river 
and then the latter to a point situated ten kilometres below the village of Aranh. From 
this last point it continues in a straight line to a point on the Dang-Reck, halfway 
between the Chong-Ta-Kob and Chong-Sa-Met passes. It is understood that this line 
must leave a direct route between Aranh and Chong-Ta-Koh in Siamese territory. 
From the point mentioned above, situated on the crest of the Dang-Reck, the boundary 
follows the line of the water-parting between the basin of the Grand Lac and the 
Mekong on one side and the Nam-Moun on the other side, and reaches the Mekong 
below Pak Moun, at the mouth of the Huei-Doue, conforming to the line adopted by the 
previous delimitation Commission of 18 January 1907. 
A rough draft of the boundary described above is annexed to the present Protocol. 
Clause II 
On the side of Luang-Prabang, the boundary leaves the Mekong at the mouth of the 
Nam-Huong in the south and follows the thalweg of this river as far as its source, which 
is situated at Phu-Khao-Mieng. From there the boundary follows the water-parting 
between the Mekong and the Menam, and meets the Mekong at a point cal'led Keng-
Pha-Dai, conforming to the line adopted by the previous Delimitation Commission of I 6 
January 1906. 
Clause III 
The Delimitation Commission authorised by Article IV of the Treaty of today's date will 
determine and trace, on the basis of the terrain, that part of the boundary described in 
Clause I of the present Protocol. If in the course of these operations the French 
Government desires to obtain a rectification of the boundary with the aim of substituting 
natural lines for the conventional lines, this rectification must not be made to the 
detriment of the Siamese Government. 
The respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present protocol and affixed their seals. 
Done in duplicate in Bangkok 23 March 1907. 
Source: Reproduced in Prescott, 1975: 444-446. 
V.Collin (de Plancy) 
Devawongse V aroprakar 
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Appendix 19 
The Brevie Line, 31 January 1939 
Directorate of Political Affairs 
Number 867 I API 
Subject: Islands in the Gulf of Siam 
Hanoi, 31 January 1939 
The Governor General of Indochina 
Grand Officer of the Legion d'Honneur 
To the Governor of Cochin China 
(I Bureau) in Saigon 
I have the honor of informing you that I have just reexamined the question of the islands 
of the Gulf of Siam, the possession of which is disputed between Cambodia and Cochin 
China. 
The situation of this group of islands, scattered along the Cambodian coast and some of 
which are so near the coast that land filling presently being carried out will seem to fuse 
them to the Cambodian coast in a relatively near future, logically and geographically 
requires that these islands be under the jurisdiction of the Administration of Cambodia. 
I believe that it is impossible to let the present state of affairs continue as it is, which is 
forcing the inhabitants of these islands to refer, either at the price of a long crossing, or 
at the price of a long detour through Cambodian territory, to the Administration of 
Cochin China. 
As a consequence, I have decided that all the islands located north of the line 
perpendicular to the coast starting from the border between Cambodia and Cochin China 
and making a 140 grad angle with the north meridian, in accordance with the attached 
chart, will be from now on administered by Cambodia. The Protectorate will, in 
particular, take over the police of these islands. 
All the islands south of this line, including the islands of Phu-Quoc, will continue to be 
administered by Cochin China. It is understood that the demarcation line thus made will 
make a line around the north of the island Phu-Quoc, passing three kilometers from the 
extreme ends of the north shore of this island. 
Administration and police powers on these islands will thus be clearly distributed 
between Cochin China and Cambodia, so that all the future disputes might be avoided. 
It is understood that the above pertains only to the administration and policing of these 
islands, and that the issue of the islands' territorial jurisdiction remains entirely 
reserved. 
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You will please make provisions so that my decision is immediately put into effect. 
Please notify me of the receipt of this letter. 
Signed: BREVrE 
Source: Reproduced in Chhak, 1966. 
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